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Intro du ctio n
For the purpose of this investigation, telecommunications may be considered as the two- 
way exchange of information in the form of voice or data messages between two users at 
distinct geographic locations.1 According to this definition broadcasting is not covered by 
the term telecommunications. Broadly speaking, the latter can be separated in three 
distinct markets. Terminals are equipment which is connected to the telecommunications 
network (like the telephone, or a Fax machine). Telecommunications services are services 
which are provided on the network. Voice telephony is considered the basic service whilst 
other services are called value-added. The market for terminals and value-added services 
has been liberalised during the last decade in the EC. Finally, there is the 
telecommunications network which carries these services. The following research addresses 
the question whether and to what extent competition can be introduced in EC 
telecommunications networks and basic voice telephony.
Although in almost all EC member countries the telecommunications industy has faced a 
process of rapid restructuring, on a policy level, the scope for network competition has not 
yet been fully explored. Any investigation by regulators has been carried out solely from a 
national perspective. Moreover, it is generally assumed that network competition 
automatically implies the duplication of the terrestrial fixed (cable) network. As a result, in 
continental Europe, the de jure monopoly of Telecommunications Organisations (TO) has 
not been challenged. This has to be reassessed in the light of recent technological 
developments. In this context one may define TOs as public or private bodies to which the 
state grants special or exclusive rights for the provision of a public telecommunications 
network and telecommunications services.2
In what follows, the question of network competition in the EC is re-examined from the 
supra-national perspective, taking into consideration the impact of new technological 
developments. The issue is investigated in four main steps. In part (I) I discuss the specific 
features of the telecommunications industry. This is the basis for the theoretical discussion 
in part (II) of arguments in favour of monopoly provision or competition for 
telecommunications networks. Part (III) then looks at the different national and 
international policy approaches towards the sector in the EC and the USA. Taking into 
consideration both the theoretical arguments of part (II) and the empirical findings of part 
(HI), eventually in part (IV) I develop a stragegy towards facility-based competition.5
1 See: Mitchell, B.M. and I. Vogelsang (1991a), p.7.
2 So defined in the EC directive Com(90e).
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PART I
Specific Characteristics of 
Telecommunications Supply and Demand

Introduction
The demand for telecommunications services and the supply of the telecommunications 
infrastructure and of services have encountered dramatic changes during the last decade. 
As will be seen technological advance has been the major driving force for this 
development. The following chapter analyses the main characteristics of 
telecommunications demand and supply, putting the main emphasis on recent 
developments. These characteristics - as for instance on the demand side the network 
externality and on the supply side the increasing overlap between different technological 
network solutions - play a major role when discussing the costs and benefits of monopoly 
supply and competition for telecommunications networks.
1. The Demand for Telecommunications Services
The demand for telecommunications networks is closely linked with the demand for 
telecommunications services. As will be seen, in the past especially the demand for vocal 
telephone services has determined the telecommunications infrastructure. For that reason 
in what follows I start with an analysis of the specific characteristics of the demand for 
voice telephony. The issue of non-vocal ("value added”) services will be tackled in chapter 
1SL As will be seen in chapter 33. the specific characteristics of telephone demand and the 
existence of different consumer groups are crucial for the discussion of optimal pricing. 
They also have a strong impact when developing a strategy towards network competition.
1.1. Telephone Demand
Telephone demand is largely demand for two-way conversation. In its service directive1 the 
Commission has defined voice telephony as the "commercial provision for the public o f (...) 
speech in real-time between public switched termination points Three essential features - 
real time speech, two way conversation and transmission over public switched networks - 
therefore distinguish telephone service from other telecommunications services (Facsimile, 
for instance, is an one-way message, voice storage is not real time speech. See chapter 1.2.). 
The demand for telephone services differs from traditional demand functions in various 
aspects:
1.) Telephone demand can be split into two parts: The demand for access to the 
telephone system and the demand for usage. Both parts are complementary. As will be 
shown, the demand for access can be derived from the demand for usage.
i Com 90/388/EEC of June 28,1990.
12
2.) Access demand is parity determined by optional demand.
3.) Access as well as usage causes externalities. Thus there is a public good aspect in the 
telephone system.
4.) Consumer demand does not only depend on personal income, access and usage prices 
but also on time. The latter influences demand in two ways: The usage of a telephone 
is time consuming in itself. On the other hand, the telephone is a time saving means of 
communication compared with its substitutes: personal contact, letters etc. Thus, the 
higher are the opportunity cost of time the higher is the demand for telephone 
services.
I analyse 1) to 3) in more detail in what follows. Price policy will not be treated here. When 
references are made to certain pricing schemes the issue is not why a certain price is used, 
but what effects this will have on customer demand.
1.1.1. Access Demand
Access and usage are complementary. There are cross-price effects in both directions: the 
price for access to the telephone network has an influence on the number of telephone 
users. If the number increases, usage is likely to rise. On the other hand the change of 
usage charges brings about a shift in access demand as well This is due to the fact that the 
individual decision about access depends on the demand for usage. Oply if the utility of 
using the network is higher than the costs of the phone calls made and the price for access, 
the latter takes place2. Moreover, the demand for access depends on the number of 
subscribers who have already joined the network. Thus, the demand ftinction for access is 
given by:
XA *  *a [Pa >Pu >n (Pa )1 * (1-1)
xA = demand for access to the telephone network 
pA » access price 
Pu ” price for usage
N(Pa) “ The number of subscribers, which depends on the price for access. A rise in the 
total number of subscribers raises the utility for each subscriber (consumer externality).
The previous reasoning leads to the following assumptions:3
2 A detailed analysis can be found in: Squire, L (1973), p. S15.
3 6 here represents the partial derivative.
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iX A 5Xa 5N
----  < 0, ----  > 0, ----  < 0
iP A iN  6Pa
Therefore:
dXA iX A 5Xa iN
----  -  ----  + ----  . ----  « 0  (1.2)
dPA 5Pa 5N 5Pa
and:
iX A
------  < o (13)
SPy
(1.2) shows that in the case of the total derivative the negative effect of a price rise for 
access is stronger than in case of the partial derivative. This is due to the subscriber 
externality. The price increase has a direct and an indirect effect on access demand. The 
latter stems from the fact that a smaller network has a lower utility for the customer. This 
will be discussed in chapter 1.1.4.
(13) refers to the considerations made about interdependency of usage price and demand 
for access.
For the potential subscriber the demand for access can be depicted as a spike (Figure 1.1.). 
Up to a critical price the acquisition of a telephone set is undertaken. If the access price is 
above, the customer will stay outside the network.
If S° is the individual’s reservation price for joining the network depending on pu and 
N(pA), the individual demand function becomes:
XA =
0 for pA > S°
1 for pA < S°
If S° equals the net consumer surplus from telephone usage, it is the maximum price a 
customer is willing to pay. Since the surplus varies widely, the critical price S° is different 
for each individual. By aggregating individual consumer demand curves the common 
negative slope is obtained (Figure 1.2)4. The depicted demand curve, however, neglects the 
subscriber externality.
* See for instance: Wenders, J (1967), p.53/54.
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Access N° N 1 Access
Figure 1.1/ individual access demand Figure 1.2: aggregated demand for access
Suppose that the access price is lowered from pA° to pA*: The number of subscribers will 
increase from N° to N*. This, however, will move the whole demand curve outwards 
according to (12). The correct demand curve for access will be flatter than the one derived 
from simple aggregation.
Access demand furthermore is increased by "optional demand*5. The individual will 
already derive utility by having the option to make or receive phone calls; regardless of 
whether they are actually made6. This refers for example to the ability to make emergency 
calls. The existence of optional demand thus will increase ceteris paribus the number of 
subscribers to the network.
Finally, access demand depends also on the business cycle as was confirmed for 
Spain during the 1980s. This, however, cannot be generalized, as for other countries the 
relationship is not as clearcut7
Empirical results:
Several studies have shown that the price elasticity for access is low. Estimates of the price 
elasticity of demand for access to telephone services range between -0.05 and -0.158. For 
West Germany similar results have been obtained.9 The income elasticity of access demand
3 Tayior, L.D. (1980), p.16.
4 Thu may be compared to the ’menu effect' for restaurants; customers derive a higher utility from having a larger
choice of hems for dinner, even though, on any one visit to a restaurant, only one main course is ordered.
7 See chapter 10 and Azzono, R. and F. Morganti (1990).
• Taylor, Lester D. (1980), chapter 3; Perl, Lewis J. (1983); and; Perl, LJ. (1986), p. 237.
* Heuermann, K.H. (1984), p.297.
is generally higher in absolute terms (around +0.5), but still not very elastic10. This might 
have been expected, since the high access rate (around 90% of households) in 
industrialized countries indicates that access to the telephone system has become a basic 
good for almost all income groups. Since strong substitutes are not available, consumers 
cannot avoid a price change for telephone access by switching to alternative means of 
communication. Moreover, it was found that the elasticity of access demand varies 
inversely with the age of the head of the household. Therefore over time one may expect 
that the elasticity of demand decreases for an aging population and rising income.11
1.1.2. The Demand for Usage
Telephone usage consists of making and receiving telephone calls. Only outgoing calls are 
charged. Thus the measurement of demand refers only to the latter. The receiving of phone 
calls can be considered as a (in general positive) externality.
While individual consumer’s demand appears to be stochastic, on an aggregated level one 
finds strong daily and weekly patterns.
Mainly due to the pricing schemes applied in the EC, there are three aspects of the 
demand for telephone usage. One is concerned with distance: the observed demand for 
local calls is different from the demand for long distance calls. The second aspects refers to 
the duration of phone calls: pricing of long distance phone calls, in particular, is generally 
directly related to the time of the call. Finally, consumers can be separated broadly into two 
different groups: private (residence) and business customers12.
I.I.2.I. Demand for Local Calls
In most urban areas local calls reach their peak in late morning and mid-afternoon. In the 
USA, the measurement of local demand has been difficult because of fla t rate p r ic in g This 
mechanism has been widely criticized as not being related to costs, and has recently been 
altered. In European countries local phone calls are charged individually; rates are partly 
time sensitive14. However, so far the demand for local telephone demand has barely been 
studied in the EC. For four EC member countries I have carried out estimations of the 
price elasticity of demand. Results are presented in chapter 13. In general I found that the
10 Wenders, J. (1987), p. 56.
11 Wenders, J. (1987), p. 57.
12 A further aspect could be time of day usage: Normally tariffs for calls during the day are higher than at night.
However, Taylor points out that this will not raise any new questions in principle; day and night calls will be 
substitutes for residence but not business customers. Taylor, L. D. (1980), p. 56-58.
13 The term flat rate pricing refers to a pricing scheme which charges only one (monthly) tariff for both access and
local phone call«- Thus the price for an additional local phone call is zero.
HThe "Deutsche Bundespost* for instance charges one unit ( -  23 Pfennige) for every 8 minutes.
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demand for local phone calls is price inelastic. For instance, for West Germany the price 
elasticity of local demand was estimated to be *0.08 for the sample period 1970-1989 
Similar results were obtained in earlier studies for the USA15. Demand for local call* is 
growing slowly. However, local calls still provide the main bulk of all telephone calls.16
1.1JL2. Demand for Intrastate Long Distance Calls
The assumption that the demand for long distance phone calls is also price inelastic17, u 
not justified. For West Germany I found an estimate of -0.18 which clearly exceeds the one 
obtained for local services. Older investigations obtained even higher estimates for other 
countries.18. According to my estimates in the case of Spain, the direct price elasticity of 
demand even exceeds one (see chapter 13.6). The income elasticity of demand is generally 
above one19 and greater than the price elasticity of demand.
1.1.23. Demand for International Long Distance Calls
In almost all countries the demand for international communication has increased more 
rapidly than the demand for national communication. A development which is especially 
striking given much higher prices in the international telephone market. This will be seen 
more clearly in part III and IV. For EC member countries more than 90% of the 
international traffic is directed to other European countries20. The highest price elasticity 
of demand has been measured for international phone calls. For West Germany I obtained 
for calls to three EC member countries values between -033 and -0.52. For calls to the 
USA the estimate is -0.61. This generally corresponds to the results for the other three 
member countries studied here. Similar results derived in prior studies have led several 
authors to the conclusion that the price elasticity of demand increases with distance21 
However, this conclusion cannot be drawn from the estimations discussed above, given that 
the tariffs vary for the different services. For linear demand curves, the elasticity increases 
with the price. Since the price is higher for international calls, the latter also face a higher
IS According to Littiechild (1970) AT&T assumes the price elasticity for local calls to be -0.1. Similar results can be 
found in Taylor (1980) for the USA and in Waverman (1974) for Sw eden. Quoted from Neumann, K.H. 
(1984), p301/302.
1* For instance, in Spain local calls account for 75% of the total. See: FinTech, April 18,1991.
17 As has been made for instance by Littiechild (1979).
i* see Taytor, L.D. (1980) for the USA: -0.65, Waverman (1974) for Kanada: • 12 and Great Britain:-0.63.
>» See chapter 13 and: Taylor, LX>. (1980) for the USA: 1.25; Waverman (1974) for GB 1.11.
»  For instance for West Germany 97% of all international calls are directed to Europe. See: DBP (1980), pJ.
21 Among others, this has been the conclusion in: Neumann, K-H. (1984), p.41; Neumann, K~H., Schweizer, Un  
and C.C. von Weizsftcker (1963), p. 80; and Neumann, K.H., Schweizer, Un and C.C. von Weizsflcker (1982), 
p. 196; Taytor, LD. (1980); and: Wenders, J.T. (1987), p.58.
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price elasticity of demand. Thus, the higher price elasticities estimated for long distance 
calls may be entirely due to the different tariff schemes and may not be related to distance. 
In contrast to national long distance phone calls some authors found that telegram and 
telex are substitutes for international calls22. This result, however, was not confirmed by my 
estimates.
1.1.24. Demand Related to the Duration of Usage
The customer decides about two variables: first whether a phone call should be made at all 
and second about the duration of the call. Thus, the measurement of demand has to include 
the number of phone calls as well as the overall time consumed. This applies especially for 
those parts of services where the tariffs charged are proportional to the time of usage23. 
Empirical studies have shown that the duration of a phone call, on average, increases with 
distance and that the duration of phone calls made by private households exceeds that of 
business customers24.
1.13. Demand of Private Households and Business
The demand of households is derived from the maximization of utility. The demand of 
business instead is concerned with the maximization of profit. For business customers 
communication is an input for the production of other goods. Business demand for 
telephone services is therefore derived demand. Thus the theory of the firm and not the 
theory of consumer choice must explain business demand25. The parameters of the firm’s 
production function will determine its demand function for telephone calls. The 
heterogeneity of business makes further disaggregation of business demand necessary. For 
instance, Hahn and Singer have shown that the quantitative importance of telephone costs 
varies considerably among different business sectors26. Moreover, there is a high 
concentration on a small number of firms. In 1975 4% of private companies provided 62% 
of business revenues in the US long distance market27. However, data are difficult to 
acquire for disaggregated business demand functions28.
22 Taylor, L. D. (1980) p. 147;, Neumann, K. H. (1984) p.41/42.
23 Difficulties arise where multi-part-tariffs are used: the tariff for the initial period of a toll call is higher than the
one for subsequent periods. Average and marginal price per call period are no longer the same. See: Taylor, 
UD. (1980), p.42/43.
24 Neumann, K.H. (1964), p.43.
25 See in more detail: Taylor, L.D. (1980) p.59-63.
26 Hahn/Singer (1979).
27 A simlar concentration of expenditure for long distance calls can be found for residential customers. See: HOI, J.
(1986), p.72.
28 So far there has not been any investigation in this field. See, for instance: Neumann, K-H. (1984)rp,45.
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Finally, it has been found that business demand is less price elastic (by about one half) 
than residential demand29.
1.1 A  Externalities of Telephone Demand
An externality in consumption arises if the consumption of a certain good by an individual i 
has an impact on the utility of an individual j. The level of consumption chosen by i, 
however, does not take into account these side effects. Thus in the case of a positive 
externality the overall level of consumption of the good concerned is less than optimal 
(from society's point of view)30.
In the case of the telephone system two kinds of externalities exist:
1.) call externality: Only the caller has to pay for the phone call The utility of the phone 
call, however, is shared by the caller and by the receiver. This call externality has been 
modelled by Squire and Rohlfs31. In principle a phone call should be made if the utility of 
both is higher than the marginal costs of the call. Since the caller considers only his own 
utility, the number of phone calls is less than optimal even if tariffs respond to marginal 
costs.
Since there are always only two customers involved, in principle it is feasible to internalize 
the call externality32.
2.) network externality: The second positive externality derives from further access to the 
network. An additional subscriber increases the utility of the network to all other 
subscribers who potentially will communicate with him or her. In contrast to the call 
externality, the network externality concerns a great number of customers. The transaction 
costs of internalization are much higher than in case 1). In case of marginal cost pricing the 
size of the network is less than optimal. For certain potential customers the price of access 
exceeds the personal benefit Taking into account, however, the additional benefit accrued 
to other customers, the price of his or her access may very well remain below overall utility. 
This has been a standard argument in favour of subsidizing access to the network. On the 
basis of this reasoning in the USA the "lifeline" concept was introduced. The corresponding 
measure in West Germany is the *Sozialtelefon'. In both cases access of certain social 
groups defined by criteria like age, income etc is subsidized33. The importance of the 
network externality shrinks if the number of subscribers rises (for a constant population).
»  Neumann, K.H. (1984), p. 45/306.
30 Artie and Averou* have been the fint who investigated this public good character for the telephone system. See: 
Artie, R., Averou», C. (1973).
Jl See: Squire, L (1973); Rohlfi, J. (1974).
32 See: Neumann, KJI. (1984) p.48/49. This does not apply for conference calls which involve more than two
parties.
3) Neumann, KJI. (1984), p.110/111.
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Therefore the externality is considerable when the network is just established. The public 
good character, however, vanishes if universal service is achieved.
The network externality makes the demand curve for phone calls more elastic, as can be 
seen from Figure 13.34.
The conceptual demand curve Nj depicts the relationship of the total number of phone 
talk  made by a constant number of subscribers. Moving along Nj the number of calls 
increases if the price of a call drops. However, additionally the price cut will give an 
incentive for potential subscribers to enter the network. This will further increase the total 
number of phone calls. Thus, we move from Nj to N2. The externality has been responsible 
for the shift The conceptual demand curves cannot be observed. Instead only single points 
(A,B,C) can be detected which correspond to the equilibrium number of calls for the given 
number of subscribers. A,B, and C then yield the observed demand curve which turns out to 
be more elastic than the initial one.
Thus a typical demand function for telephone calls therefore includes the price for usage 
(Py), the personal income (Y) and the number of consumers (N):
5X iX
Xu = X(PUfY,N) with -~  < 0 -
d r y  0 I
> 0
5X
5N
> 0
Figure 13: conceptual and observed demand curve 
1.2. Demand for Non-Voice Services
Until the mid 1970’s the telephone network was almost exclusively used for the 
transmission of voice services. Technological advance as discussed in the following chapters 
now allows for the transmission of many other services. Satellite and fibre optic cables 
permit high quality transmission of large amounts of data. This created the potential for a 
new generation of information transmission. While the variety of new services is increasing
34 A similar description can be found for example in Squire, L (1973), p.517.
fast, regulators have encountered difficulties to distinguish between basic (voice) and non- 
basic services35. In its service directive36 the Commission has defined voice telephony as the 
"commercial provision for the public o f ... speech in real-time between public switched 
termination points ...*. According to this definition voice storage, telephone conferencing, 
picture phones etc do not belong to voice telephony. Instead, they add additional value to 
the service, hence they are called value added network services (VANS). Generally, VANS 
use the telephone service as a bearer service to which further qualities are added. Thus they 
do not require a separate infrastructure. The underlying transport facilities are usually 
obtained by leasing lines from the TO. The leased line interconnects the VANS provider 
own switching and processing node to the switched network. Besides VANS, the 
transmission of data also becomes feasible (facsimile, electronic mail or electronic data 
interchange (EDI)). One of the most important functions of VANS is to optimize the 
communication between different computer systems.37 The videotext service, for instance, 
allows personal computer (PC) owners to access certain data bases anywhere, if they have a 
modem with which to connect their PC to the public telephone network.38 For 1992 total 
demand for VANS in the EC is estimated to amount to ECU 5 billion with the highest 
growth for electronic mail and EDI39. The demand for value added services and data 
transmission is concentrated on business. The finance sector alone had a share of about 
50% of total demand for VANS in 1989. It increases by about 25-30% a year40. Thus while 
presently basic services still account for 80-90% of total revenues from telecommunications 
services, VANS are catching up fast
35 See for instance: Neumann, K.H. and H. Schön (1965), p. 479-482.
*  Com 90/388/EEC of June 28,1990.
37 This is well explained in: Weizs&cker, C.C. von, Knieps, G., Unger-Stemberg, T. and B. Wieland (1987), p. 32- 
34,38.
& Videotext is text and graphics offered to a mass audience on a television screen with a simple hypad convener. 
See for instance: Branscomb, Anne W. (1988), p. 50/51; and: Steinfield, C.W. and L. Caby (1990).
»Sdcon Network (1989).
40 Economist, March 10,1990, p. 10.
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2. The Supply Side: Networks and Services
In the past on the supply side one only had to distinguish between the telephone network 
and terminals.1 The provision of the telephone network coincided with the provision of 
services. The latter were limited to voice telephony. The rising demand for non-voice 
services and new technological developments led to new solutions on the supply side. One 
result has been to distinguish between the supply of networks and the supply of services. In 
the case of VANS the network operator may only provide the infrastructure while private 
firms then provide a specialized service on the public switched network. As far as networks 
are concerned one may distinguish two simultaneous developments. On the one hand, the 
public telephone network has been adapted to the new requirements to carry VANS. Thus, 
it has become more flexible. On the other hand, the need for specialized solutions has led 
to the establishment of private networks for closed user groups. The latter become 
important especially for big enterprises with a considerable amount of in-house 
communication among different branches. Finally, technological progress led to the rise of 
independent network solutions, which may be interconnected with the public switched 
terrestrial network of the TO.
2.1. Public Networks
Public telecommunication networks can be defined as the "public telecommunications 
infrastructure which permits the conveyance o f signals between defined network termination 
points by wire, by microwave, by optical means or by other electromagnetic means."1 In contrast 
to private networks, public networks are principally open to all users who want to be 
connected to the network. As can be seen from the definition above, the public 
telecommunications network is not confined to a particular technology. Besides the 
terrestrial wire, this includes also microwave, mobile and satellite networks.
2.1.1. The Public Switched Terrestrial Network (PSTN)
The PSTN is the cable network traditionally run by the TO. It is by far the most important 
means to transport point-to-point communication.
2.1.1.1. The Structure of the Network
The telephone network has to connect each pair of customers who wish to communicate. 
The most expensive method of doing so would be to install a direct cable between all
1 In what follows the latter are neglected.
2 Network termination points are all physical connections which are necessary to access the public network. See:
Com (1990e).
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subscribers. The number of lines necessary would rise far more than in proportion to the 
number of customers. If switches are introduced the number of lines is considerably 
reduced. The central office performs the switching function using automatic computerised 
electronic equipment Apart from establishing a communication path, the switch reserves 
the needed capacity for the duration of a call. Switches concentrate calls destined for the 
same end node and bundle them for bulk transport. This bundling of calls allows for 
economies of scale. Circuit switching implies that for each call a single path is reserved. This 
contrasts with packet switching which is used to interconnect computers.3 The more switches 
there are the shorter will be the individual link to the network. The bundling therefore re­
duces the cost of lines. On the other hand, the costs of switching are increased. There is an 
optimum of substitution of switches for lines which minimises the overall cost of the system. 
Figure 2.1. depicts a simplified model of a telephone network. Each subscriber is connected 
to a local switch by an individual line. Phone calls from consumer A to B are considered as 
local*.
A long distance call takes place if instead A calls C  This call is first sent to the local switch 
and afterwards it passes through several (here: two) long distance switches. After passing 
through intermediate switching points, the calls arrive at a terminating switch where they 
are unbundled. The call is channelled through the local network to which C belongs. The 
long distance network therefore is star-shaped. Several local networks are put into one 
junction. The phone call of A to C, however, might be channelled through a direct line as 
welL A and C happen to use a high density route. For those routes it is cheaper to build a 
direct line instead of using up the capacity of the long distance switches. They become 
important especially for big enterprises with a considerable amount of in-house 
communication among different branches.
Whilst figure 2.1 depicts the basic model of a PSTN, in reality the telephone network is 
more complicated. For instance, in West Germany there exist 3,500 local networks with 
6,200 local exchanges and a long distance network which is hierarchically structured in four 
network levels. The average geographical area of a local network has a radius of about five 
km.3.
3 See in detail: Mitchell, B.M. and I. Vogelsang (1991a), pp. 7-9.
* In reality a local network consists of more than one »witch.
3 In more detail: Tenzer, G. (1991), p. 37/38.
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Figure ZI.: the telephone network
The telephone network therefore consists of the following components:
1) local and long distance switches
2) the cable network
3) transmission technology (amplifiers etc).
The cable network and the transmission technology are often put together. This is 
reasonable because there is a strong substitutive relationship between the two. 
Technological progress in transmission technology for instance has helped to reduce the 
number of cable lines considerably.
2.1.L2. The Cost Structure of the Network
A rough idea about the breakdown of cost of the old copper cable network can be drawn 
from an estimate made for the German network for the period 1962-19716: terminal 
equipment accounted for 7%, switches for 30%, cable lines for 53% and transmission 
technology for about 10% of total cost. Cable lines therefore entailed the most expensive 
part of the different components. However, technological advance has reduced the costs of 
cable significandy. More recent studies therefore imply a lower share for cable (see below). 
About 75% of the cable lines have to connect individual customer premises with the local 
switch. Adding the share of terminal equipment a major part of total cost therefore can be 
attributed towards the access of individual customers.
Another way of breaking down the costs of a telecommunications network refers to usage. 
In the short-run variable costs are very smalL Maintenance and energy costs are the result 
of operating electronic facilities. They barely depend on the actual use of the network.
‘ Heuermann, K.H. (1984), p. 70.
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Littlechild analysed the long run cost of network services. By doing so four different types 
of cost are distinguished. Network capacity is regarded as variable in the long run. 
Littlechild provided rough estimates for the share of total cost7:
1) Cost directly linked to the individual subscriber (access): 36%
2) Capacity related cost: These depend on demand and quality of service during peak 
periods: 45%.
3) Cost directly related to usage: These apply for each cable independent from the 
period (peak or non-peak period): 10%
4) overhead cost (common cost): They include for instance R&D and administration 
cost: 9%
According to this study, usage-sensitive costs account for more than 50%. The main share 
is borne by the cost of supplying sufficient capacity for peak periods. This has to be borne 
in mind when discussing optimal pricing policies for telecommunications (see also chapter 
2.1.1.7).
Besides the breakdown of costs their development over time has an important impact on the 
evaluation of network competition. In 1973 a meter of fiber cable cost US $ 5, in 1982 the 
price had decreased to US $ 0.2. By 1990 the price dropped further to one tenth of the one 
in 1980.® As a result, dramatic cost reductions have been realized in the 
telecommunications networks. For the transatlantic link, for instance, the cost of 
investment for one minute of use was US $ 2.53 in 1958, 0.22 in 1970 and 0.04 in 1988 in 
nominal dollars.9
Thus the technological advance has led to tremendous reductions in network costs. Any 
static concept of cost functions therefore can hardly be applied to the telecommunications 
network.
U .L 3. Cost of Access
The costs of consumer access arise from the cable which has to be installed to the 
individual premise from the terminal The cost of the cable is the main burden of access 
cost. In order to estimate the marginal cost of access, economies of scale have to be 
considered. The latter are due to
7 Littlechild, S.C. (1970), pp.191.
* Antonelli, C. (1984), p333 and: Economist, March 10,1990.
9 Source: FCC. Quoted from: Financial Times, April 3,1990.
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1) Fixed cost of a local network: if the number of customers rises, the unit cost of 
access drops.
2) The costs of access decline if the density of customers increases. Neighbours can 
share the access cable. This is sometimes referred to as "economies of density": the 
latter are present if the costs of production decrease as points of consumption get 
closer to each other10.
The marginal costs of access therefore decrease if either the distance to the local switch is 
reduced or if the density of customers is increased.
2.1.1A Cost of a Local Call
A local call requires that both caller and receiver be connected to the same local switch. 
The costs of the call depend on duration and the period chosen. The variable costs are very 
low. Costs rise if the phone call is made during peak time. Then marginal cost rises above 
variable cost.
2.1.1.5. Cost of a Long Distance Call
A long distance phone call takes place if caller and receiver belong to different local 
networks. The call consumes capacity of the local as well as of the long distance switches 
(the number of the latter varies). In general the costs of an individual call depend more on 
the general intensity of usage of a certain route than on the distance bridged by the call. If 
the general intensity of usage is high there will be a parallel connection (see figure 2.1), 
which reduces the number of switches used. Therefore the costs of high intensity routes are 
less than those of low intensity ones11. This makes the calculation of marginal cost of long 
distance calls difficult since they may be directed through different lines.
2.1.1.6. Cost Assignment
The cost structure described above leads to the problem of cost assignment. The knowledge 
of long term marginal cost is necessary to determine prices for the different services 
provided. Often fixed costs are said to amount to up to 90% of overall cost12. This 
calculation is based on the assumption that capacity is given. This, however, is only valid for 
the short run. In the long run even common cost are variable. But even if calculations are 
made for long run marginal cost, the problem remains that the bulk of costs (capacity and 
common cost) are joint costs. The latter lack a clear-cut criterion for assignment. Joint
10 Homing, J. and R.W. Wilson (1979). Quoted from Heuermann, K.H. (1984), p.76.
n Heuermann, K.H. (1984), p. 83.
a  see: Heuermann, K.H. (1984), p.73.
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costs are related to the concepts of economies of scope. Without these economies a dear 
assignment of cost to individual outputs would be feasible. The traditional measure of 
separation procedures (as for instance applied in the USA and West Germany) was to 
assign cost to local and long distance services according to the relative share of usage. As 
will be discussed later in more detail this procedure is not Pareto optimal. Instead of arbi­
trarily assigning common cost ex ante the Ramsey criterion determines first the individual 
price (related to marginal cost). Afterwards non-attributable costs will be allocated 
according to demand elasticities. This maximises overall welfare (subject to a breakeven 
constraint - see chapter 33).
2.1.1.7. The Impact of Technological Progress
As was already pointed out in chapter 12., technological progress has significantly changed 
the structure and the scope of the fixed terrestrial telecommunications network.
In switching technology there has been a change from electromechanical to electronic 
switching.13 This led to qualitative improvements and greater speed in communications 
transmission. The new digital switches are themselves computers and function as intelligent 
nodes in the network. Until quite recently, telephone communications was of the analog 
form. Sound waves were converted to continuous analog signals which were sent to analog 
switches. Via amplifiers and repeaters signals were forwarded to their destination. Analog 
signals are susceptible to noise, attenuation and other electrical problems.14 While the old 
electromechanical switches were adequate for voice communication, digitization is 
necessary for the transmission of data. At the same time it complicated the network 
operator’s position. The traditional system was relatively stationary and network quality 
hardly depended on the replacement of the installed switches. The rapid changes due to 
digitization now make it necessary to weigh the quality gains of new technology against the 
higher cost of earlier replacement. The technical lifetime of equipment no longer 
determines the period of depreciation.15 As for switches, the cable technology has changed 
significantly during the last decade. The coaxial cable network has been replaced by fiber 
optic cables. The former had a much lower capacity and a lower quality. Traditional coaxial 
cables suffer from considerable power loss and are subject to interference from other 
circuits within the same cable. This process started in the early 1980s and some TOs hope*
to finish the replacement by the mid 1990s. Beside the higher quality of transmission, fiber 
technology allows for the integration of telephone and data transmission as narrow band
tt Foreman-Peck, J. and J. MiUler (1987), p2.
H See: CrearoeU, C.W. et aL (1990), p.l.
u  Compare: Weizi&cker, C.C. von, et al.(1987), p35.
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telecommunications services. For a cable of given dimensions, optical fiber has a capacity 
more than ten times that of coaxial cable.16
In the past, optical fiber was mainly introduced in the long distance network. More 
recently, further cost reductions make it possible to use optical fiber also for the local 
loop.17 Access technology has developed less rapidly. For low volume nodes copper cable 
remains the cheapest solution. Fiber optic distribution instead becomes attractive for large 
business customers.
A cost comparison of the coaxial and the fiber optic cable is difficult. Compared to the 
former the costs of the fiber optic cable are less sensitive towards distance.18 Optical fiber 
thus is gaining for long distance high bandwidth applications. However, on thin routes and 
for the local loop the installation costs often still render it uneconomical The fixed costs of 
installation become dominant for an optical fiber system.19 The new technological 
development probably has changed the relative cost burden of different services 
significantly. A recent study estimates that, for a fiber optic network 70 per cent of network 
costs are access related, 13 per cent distance related and only 16 per cent volume or 
capacity related.20
The Commission of the EC has promoted the Community wide installation of an 
"Integrated Services Digital Network" (ISDN). ISDN is a gateway to access information and 
to eliminate geographical barriers in information processing. As Lehr and Noll point out, 
the keyword in ISDN is 'integrated' and not *digitaT. The process of digitisation is carried 
out independently of the introduction of ISDN. Especially in the Community ISDN is used 
as a means to integrate public networks and to provide efficient interconnection for all 
voice, data and information services.21 The ISDN is primarily a technical standard which 
describes how to establish an advanced telecommunications network. As far as ISDN is a 
move towards digitization it is within the overall trend of technology. However, as is 
pointed out in chapter 7, the EC concept goes beyond standardization. It fosters an 
upgrading of the public switched network to higher transmission rates, in order to integrate 
data communications. However, voice communication and data transmission require 
different technical performance. Voice communication is tolerant of errors (noise on the 
line) but intolerant of transmission delays. For switched data transmission the opposite
16 Antonelli, C. (1984), p. 333. The trans-Atlantic submarine fiber-optic cable TAT-8 it able to cany 40,000 calls
simultaneously, compared to a few hundred calls on a conventional coaxial cable. See: Com (90) 490 p-39.
17 Shorrock, D. (1989), p.41.
u Tenzer, G. (1991), p.49
w Compare: Sharrock, D. (1989), p.155-156.
20 See: Mulgan, G. (1990), p25.
21 Here and in the following see; Lehr, W. and R. Noll (1991).
holds. As a result, the adding of data transmission to the telephone network changes the 
requirements that are placed on switches.22
Given common standards in the Community, the ISDN concept is chosen to overcome 
network fragmentation among the different European operators. The ISDN is able to 
transmit voice, data, facsimile, telemetry and slow motion video.23 It can transmit a 
multitude of signals compared to the copper cable network. Thus the Commission's ISDN 
concept is based on the three principles of digitization, higher capacity of transmission and 
integration.
The ISDN has a narrow bandwidth, thus it is incapable of transmitting regular television 
program services. The next step of integration leads to Integrated Broadband Networks 
(LBN) which are presently tested in pilot projects. This generates an overlap of cable 
networks, broadcasters and the TOs. IBN are an example for a technology-driven 
integration of different markets. As will be seen later on, this development becomes a 
major argument in favour of opening up the market for telecommunications infrastructure. 
ISDN is mainly attractive for large businesses. It offers an alternative to private 
telecommunications systems serving their increasingly complex requirements for internal 
information services. However, also for small business there may be advantages. Unlike big 
enterprises the former are less likely to install their own private networks. The ISDN then 
offers them access to similar services and thereby keeps small businesses competitive. 
Residential customers are not likely to benefit greatly from the ISDN upgrade. This raises 
the question whether the narrow band ISDN and in future the broadband network should 
be made available ubiquitously throughout the public network. For residential customers 
certain diseconomies could be expected. They arise due to the additional complexity, higher 
technical demands, the cancellation of services24, the incompatibility of analog terminal 
equipment and the security of transmitted information.
In principle, the ISDN does not imply a certain solution for network ownership. Local 
access could be provided by several overlapping networks which are interconnected or by 
one integrated public network. ISDN only requires the compatibility of network and 
terminal equipment. Whether a single network or several interconnected ones should be 
preferred also depends on the costs of providing interconnection through gateways.
In practise, ISDN leads to centralisation since it is presumed that all services shall be 
provided within a single framework of technical standards.25 As is discussed in chapter 3 
this is not optimal By choosing certain standards, other alternatives which may become
22 In the case of voice transmission, the switch has to set up the call and maintain the connection for a relatively 
long time. Data packet twitching is often of shorter duration and ties up transmission resources only when 
data are actually sent.
33 Se: Wigand, Rolf T. (1988), p. 30.
M The ordinary telephone network carnet enough power to operate telephone sets. Electricity supply failures 
hence do not affect the telephone network. Fiber optic transmission eliminates the power supply on the 
network, thus users will depend on the reliability of the electric utilities’ supply.
25 See in more detail: Lehr, W. and R. Noll (1991).
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available in the future are foreclosed. Standards produce high short-term benefits due to 
compatibility whilst bearing the risk of high barriers for superior technical configurations in 
the future.
Parallel to the installation of fiber optic cables the system of the terrestrial network has 
been changed. The copper cable network in West Germany was built in the mid 1960s with 
a planning horizon of 30 years.26 The very long horizon of investments and the rapid 
increase in demand made it difficult to forecast the capacity needed. Parallel to the 
introduction of fiber optic cables a new system has been installed. The fiber optic cables 
are laid in pipes. In the long distance and all local networks a two pipe system is installed 
which increases the flexibility of capacity. For this purpose always one pipe remains empty. 
When the capacity limit of the existing fiber optic cable is reached, a new cable is installed 
in the second pipe while the first one is withdrawn. Thereby it becomes possible to react 
within less than one year to unforeseen shifts in demand.2^  Given the high unpredictability 
of future demand for VANS, this higher flexibility of capacity becomes important.
However, also in the light of network competition the two pipe system becomes significant. 
In general it may increase significantly the entry barriers for new operators in a liberalized 
market. An unpredicted rise in demand combined with short term inflexible capacity of the 
main network operator would offer competitors a better opportunity to enter. The two pipe 
system abolishes this opportunity. Moreover, it allows the incumbent to react quicker to 
demand fluctuations than a potential competitor can enter. Secondly, the investment in the 
two pipe system entails high sunk cost which are not related to capacity. These sunk costs 
comprise, for instance, the investment necessary to lay the pipes and to obtain the right of 
way etc As is explained in chapter 3.2. sunk costs are a major entry barrier for 
telecommunications networks. They require a long investment period. Thus the incumbent 
will be able to react much quicker to shifts in demand than a potential competitor which 
first has to install the two-pipe system.
2.1.2. Microwave Public Networks
Microwave radio technology became the first challenge to the fixed terrestrial network in 
the 1950s. It consists of a network of tower stations among which microwave signals are 
transmitted. Compared to the wired system, microwave networks have the advantage that 
they do not require a right of way.
For over 40 years microwave radio relay systems have been used primarily for long distance 
telephone services in the USA. Compared to alternative means of transmission, microwave 
radio is the most effective for lower capacity applications.28 Technological advance,
24 Tenzer, G. (1991), p. 36.
27 This it ~ p> in more detail in internal publications of the "Femtechnische Zentralamt* of the
Deutsche Bundespost. See for instance: Hare, H J. (1986), p. 49.
2S Sharrock, D. (1989), p.lS8.
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moreover, has made microwave networks applicable for rural areas which are remote from 
highly populated places. In addition, in these areas the population is spread out over a wide 
area which renders it expensive to reach all households with the conventional cable 
network. The microwave radio system is almost insensitive to distance and avoids the cost 
intensive ground installations of the cable. Experience made in Canada shows that radio 
systems could provide virtually ail services of the cable network with the same quality and 
reliability.29 Thus, it is more efficient to use fiber optic for high-capacity backbone 
transmission and microwave radio in sparsely populated regions. Hence, microwave 
technology is a complementary means of transportation to the fixed terrestrial network. 
However, microwave systems also become substitutive means of transmission. In the UK, 
for instance, Ionica has developed a radio based technology which may provide a low-cost 
alternative to British Telecom (BT). This service would be targeted at residential and 
small-business customers.30
2* Compare: Morris, M. (1991), p J9.
30 See: Financial Timet, January 30,1992.
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2.13. Public Mobile Networks
In contrast to the fixed terrestrial networks, mobile networks do not use a cable link 
between terminals. Instead communication is transmitted via radiowaves. This allows the 
moving of terminals. The simplest form may be a cordless telephone which allows the 
moving of a receiver within a small area. Besides the small range of mobility, the cordless 
telephone completely relies on the terrestrial network. Thus it is a technical improvement 
of terminal equipment. Only in combination with other systems it offers also an alternative 
network technology.
Mobile networks exist for a variety of services. Most are limited to a relatively small 
geographical area. The simpler ones only allow for one-way communication of short 
messages. This is, for instance, the case for the paging system which is limited to the 
transmission of short non-voice messages. The Telepoint service instead offers the 
possibility to make phone calk using a cordless telephone. Its network consists of local basis 
stations which are erected at close distances. Telepoint does not allow, however, for the 
receiving of phone calls. Thus, Telepoint is a low cost mobile service which is almost in 
competition with public payphones. A combination of the paging and the Telepoint system 
already would allow a limited two way function. The paging service may inform the 
Telepoint user that someone would like to talk to him or her. The Telepoint network then 
can be used to carry out the calL Unlike the British Telepoint system, France plans to 
launch a two-way Bi-Bop mobile system in Paris in autumn 1992.
A mobile telephony network consists of an infrastructure of Base Stations and System Switch 
and Control Centres (SSCC). The Base Stations comprise a radio transceiver which enables 
the communication with the terminals. It also contains a line interface which ensures 
connection with the SSCC through leased lines from the public switched terrestrial 
network. The SSCC is the control node of the system and performs the switching between 
Base Stations.31 The cellular mobile telephone network of the DBP Telekom, for instance, 
requires about 5000 Basic Stations and 400 SSCC to cover the West German territory.32 
In order to get access to the local loop and to link the different Basis Stations with the 
SSCC, the mobile telephone network has to be interconnected with the fixed network. The 
mobile network operator has to lease lines from the operator of the terrestrial network to 
complete a phone call.
The main constraint on mobile telephony is related to the scarcity o f bandwidth. In 
p a r t ic u la r  the analogue systems have been restricted in their capacity because of cell size 
limitation and frequency availability. Technological progress, however, has considerably 
increased the bandwidth which can be used for mobile telecommunications. In the case of 
the cellular mobile system a certain region is divided into different cells, eadi getting its
31 For a more explanation of the technicalities of mobile networks: Com(900, pp. 197-210.
32 BMPT (1988), p. 56/57.
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own Basic Station. This ensures that the same frequency can be used in different cells 
which helps to overcome to some extent the problem of bandwidth scarcity.33 Having a 
higher frequency band than the older analogue system, the cellular networks operate with 
higher capacity and allow for more participants. Nevertheless, the radio spectrum scarcity 
imposes big constraints on the licensing policy of regulators. The more operators are 
licensed, the smaller is the individual bandwidth and the smaller is the capacity of the 
individual network. In the USA and also in the EC for this reason only two or three 
operators are licensed in order to avoid network fragmentation. As is discussed in more 
detail in chapter 8.4.I.2. this creates the need for an efficient allocation of frequency 
property rights. A regulatory body has to control an open and non-discriminatory 
distribution of scarce frequencies. This may be done by an auction.34 
Standardization, moreover, ensures that the geographical range for which a mobile system 
can be used is considerably increased. The GSM standard35 fixes certain conditions for 
usage and reserves the 900 MHz frequency band for mobile telephony throughout the 
Community. Thereby a EC-wide mobile network is created. Previously different standards 
prevented the use of mobile telephones when crossing borders among member countries. 
Presently the fixed costs per customer of the mobile network exceed the ones of the fixed 
networks. In the UK, an operator invests about ECU 1000 for each customer.36 Moreover, 
the lifetime of a mobile radio terminal is estimated between 5 and 10 years.37 This is 
considerably less than the estimated 10 to 37 years of lifetime for a new fixed subscriber 
line. Even though costs are decreasing fast, for the foreseeable future mobile telephony 
remains more expensive than the fixed network. Thus, the higher mobility has to be paid 
for by higher access and usage tariffs.
On the local level the cellular technology leads to the development of Personal 
Communications Networks (PCN). Although yet not fully explored, it is expected that PCN 
will eventually form a second phone system paralleling the wired one. In contrast to the 
GSM network, the locally operating PCN does not require interconnection into the fixed 
network. However, this requires enormous up-front investment in antennae. Until related 
costs shrink, for a transitional period TV companies are exploring the use of their cable 
networks to carry PCN signals between transmitting antennas.38 Thus a combination of 
cable networks and PCN may create local telecommuncations networks which are 
completely separated from the public switched network operated by the TOs. Another
33 D iw  (1990), p. 47.
3« See in detail: Kruse, J. (1992).
33 GSM ■ Global Standard for Mobile Communication.
3* DIW (1990), p. 47.
37 Com(90f), p. 53/54.
3* Business Week, March 25,1991, p. 100.
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technical solution is presently being explored by Motorola which plan the combination of 
PCN and satellites (Iridium network).39 These systems have the great advantage of not 
requiring investment into underground fiber.
2.1 A  Satellite Communication Networks
Telecommunications satellites have been established mainly to improve international 
communications. Frequency bands are allocated by the World Administrative Radio 
Conferences (WARC’s) and by Regional Administrative Radio Conferences (RARC’s).40 
For the purpose of frequency allocation civil satellite services are divided into fixed, mobile, 
broadcasting and radio determination services. The fixed services are provided by 
telecommunications organizations. Due to technological development the distinction 
between Fixed Satellite Services (FSS) and Broadcast Satellite Services (BSS) becomes 
blurred. This, however, has not been reflected by an adaption of the regulatory scene. For 
telecommunications services the FSS are relevant. While the other services are neglected in 
what follows, some account will be made of the overlap with BSS services.
Generally the satellite network consists of a space segment and an earth segment. The 
space segment comprises the transmission capacity available for the satellite network. The 
earth segment is made up of the satellite earth stations using the satellite capacity that is 
available to the operator of the satellite network.
2.I.4.I. The Earth Segment
The earth segment consists either of receive-only terminals and terminals which can 
transmit and receive. Receive only telecom terminals can be used for the reception of 
entertainment broadcasting, and point-to-multipoint data and voice signals (including video 
transmissions). The second group of terminals is also able to send messages. Therefore it 
can be used for point-to-point communications. There are strong similarities in the overall 
function between these two classes of earth stations.41
Traditionally the space segment of satellite systems for long distance telephony or 
television programme exchange were connected to the terrestrial network. 
Telecommunications organizations owned and operated the large earth stations which were 
required to transmit the satellite’s signal through the public switched network to the 
customer.
39 International Herald Tribune, February 17,1992.
40 See in detail: Com(90a), p .ll.
«I Com<90a), p.88.
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Rapid technological progress increased the flexibility of satellite earth stations anc 
subsequently the range of services for which they can be used. In the past the use ol 
satellites was hampered by the congestion of frequency bands and the minimum size ol 
earth stations. Technological improvements have increased the power of antennae while at 
the same time the use of other bandwidths became feasible. These developments make the 
transmission to and from "Very Small Aperture Terminals' (VSAT) possible. These VSAT 
can be installed directly on the customer’s premises. Thereby the satellite network becomes 
independent from the terrestrial one. Moreover, due to technological progress beside voice 
telephony and broadcasting, the transmission of VANS (like videoconferencing) has also 
become feasible.
l U i .  The Space Segment
The capacity of the satellite network is limited by the space segment. In Europe it is 
growing rapidly since the middle eighties. In 1983 Europe installed its first operational 
satellite, which subsequently was followed by 12 others until 1989. Currently 170 
transponder are available. The Commission predicts an increase to 400 transponders by 
1993.42 The capacity of a space segment can be used either for telecommunications services 
or for TV channels. An important feature is the distribution of cost of the satellite network 
among the space segment and the ground segment. As a rough estimate the share of the 
space segment’s cost in total user cost does not exceed ten or fifteen percent.43
2.1A3. Satellite Networks and Voice Communication
Initially, satellite technology was developed to transmit voice communication over long 
distances. However, due to the rapid development of the fibre-optic cable voice telephony 
remaines concentrated on the terrestrial network. The recent technological improvements 
increased the capacity of the terrestrial network and at the same time reduced the cost of 
provision of the traditional point-to-point communication. Presently, three quarters of 
satellite capacity is used for TV distribution. The share of voice telephony carried by 
satellites to total voice telephony of intra-European international and national long­
distance calls accounts for only 2-3%. For trans-Atlantic telephony the share is presently at 
about 60%.44 However, after the opening of the TAT8 and PTAT transatlantic cables in
42 Satellite capacity is measured in "transponder capacity”. A single transponder can either carry one television 
channel or up to 1700 telephone voice channels. See: Com(90a) 490, page 18 footnote 11.
*3 Snow, (1987a), p.98.
44 Despite the "open-sky" policy adopted by the PCC, in the USA total satellite communications revenues account 
for no more than 2-3% of total telecom revenues. Com(90a)t p. 18,50.
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1990, the share of satellites in total transatlantic traffic fell considerably and it is expected 
to be at around 30-40% by 1995.
However, it is not totally clear whether the rising market share of terrestrial traffic is due to 
lower cost or due to Intelsat’s tariff structure which stimulates bypass (see below).
Cost comparisons between satellites and fiber-optic cable links are difficult to conduct and 
no satisfactory results have been achieved yet. A study financed by Intelsat showed under 
conservative assumptions concerning the life time of a satellite that the cost of a telephone 
circuit on a fully loaded Intelsat space craft is about US $ 504, while the corresponding 
figure for the TAT 8 cable is US $ 1,596.*^  A more detailed study was carried out by 
Comsat which showed that the costs of both modes are roughly comparable. The study took 
account only of the per-circuit capital cost neglecting operation or maintenance costs. The 
satellite and earth segment scenarios showed marked variation, depending on the type of 
system. However, Comsat came to the conclusion that for transatlantic services satellites 
appear cost competitive with the cable systems for the majority of configurations.46
Despite the lower cost of fibre optic cable in Europe, voice traffic via satellites is expected 
to rise significantly in the future. This is due to an expected rise in demand if cost 
reductions are passed over into lower tariffs. Total international and long distance traffic is 
growing strongly at more than 10% per year which also spurs demand for satellite 
communication. At the end of 1987 about 1000 satellite voice circuits were in operation for 
telephony links in Europe. This was expected to rise up to 8500 satellite circuits by the end 
of 1990.47
Moreover, the simple concept of a *break-even distance" of satellite technology has been 
given up. Up to the early 1980s a satellite was regarded as useful only if an operator had to 
transmit ordinary phone calls for more than a minimum distance. In general for the 
comparatively small European distances satellite transmission was more expensive than 
terrestrial transmission. Recent technological developments allow for a diversification of 
satellite use, thereby emphasising the intrinsic advantages of satellites over terrestrial 
systems. One advantage is the widespread geographical coverage; a second is the advantage 
of deploying the network and services immediately over a wide area. The latter made 
satellites an ideal alternative to the installation of a cable network in peripheral regions. 
Hence, satellite technology is an appropriate substitute for underdeveloped Eastern 
European terrestrial networks. For this reason in Germany the use of private satellite 
installations for the provision of VANS and voice services has been liberalized recently.4^
45 Sec in more detail: Snow, M.S. (1987 a), p. 104.
*  Shorrodt, D. (1989), pp. 153-155.
47 Com(90c), Annex VI.
*  In lets than one year more then 38 licenses and approvals were granted. See: Funkschau (10/91).
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The ability to transmit either telecommunications services or broadcasting signals became a 
further strong advantage against the cable. A satellite originally intended for voice services 
can be reconfigured in orbit to specialize in video or data services. Further, a satellite can 
be drifted from one ocean region to another, or from one longitudinal location to another 
in the same region.49 Thereby the share of fixed costs which are sunk is diminished since 
capacity can be shifted from one market to another. More technical advantages of satellites 
relate to the ease of interconnection and their superior performance in terms of continuity 
of service.50
Satellite technology is also used for private networks. The Daimler-Benz AG is setting up a 
satellite-based pan-European network to link its 20 European subsidiaries and to resell 
spare capacity to third parties.51
Recently Motorola came up with the idea of a global satellite mobile telephony. The 
Iridium network consists of 77 low earth-orbiting satellites which allow worldwide 
communication using mobile telephone handsets. This system is expected to be ready by 
1996.52 That satellite technology may become a possible alternative means for the PSTN 
can be inferred from the Conference of European Postal and Telecommunications 
Administrations’ (CEPT) decision. The latter resisted reserving bandwidth for Iridium like 
systems, being afraid of undermining the TO’s fixed network monopolies.53
2.1AA. Satellite Technology and VANS
As has been noted above, recent technological progress led to a considerable decrease in 
costs of ground stations which made the satellite transmission of specialised value-added 
network services economically feasible. It is forecasted that the point-to-multipoint 
communications services will be a strongly growing market. Terrestrial networks are often 
unsuited for these services due to technical problems and tariff structures. Already existing 
examples for such value-added services can be found in Great Britain and in France.54 The 
rapid development of VSATs now permits their installation on user premises where they
«  See alio: Snow, M.S. (1987 a), pp. 35-41.
50 However, as a disadvantage of satellite technology for voice transmission there is the propagation delay which 
does not appear if cables are used. See: Snow (1997a), p. 103.
31 Communications Week International, March 4,1991.
52 Die Zeit, Januar 24,1992.
33 Compare: Economist, March 7,1992.
34 PolyCom for instance offers news to radio stations and newspapers, stock market information to brokers and
meterorological information. In detail' Com(90a)v p.41-43.
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can be operated under the direct control of the user. Thereby the provision of wide-area 
multipoint networks via satellite becomes cost-effective.
2.1.5. Cable Networks
Until today the provision of TV channels and telephone communication was carried out 
using different cable networks. The former point-to-multipoint audio and audiovisual 
entertainment requires high transmission capacity which could not be provided by the 
telephone copper wire. The telephone point-to-point communication requires less cable 
capacity.55 Instead, switching technology became a major part of total costs. The latter is 
not needed for TV distribution. However, during the last decade convergence of both 
systems became feasible. At the present state the integration of some telecommunications 
services in the existing distribution cables is already technically feasible. The contrary does 
not hold. There are no switches available which permit the large scale switching of 
broadband services. Nevertheless, technological development is heading towards network 
integration. The ISDN network already allows the integration of telephone and data 
networks. The integration of TV distribution becomes feasible with broadband networks 
which are presently explored. For instance, the German pilot project OPAL permits the 
integration of telephone calls and up to 30 TV channels in one fiber optic cable.36 
The effect of broadband technology is the integration of two formerly distinct markets; 
cable television and telephone. This requires new regulation and offers principally the 
possibility of competition between operators in both markets. While telecommunications 
licences are granted on a national basis, in many countries authorizations for cable TV 
distribution are granted by local authorities. Television distribution networks operate over 
a limited geographical area.57
In the Netherlands, for instance, parallel to the public switched telephone network, two 
separate networks exist. Municipalities own the terrestrial broadcasting and cable networks 
for TV distribution. About 80-90% of households are connected to these point-to- 
multipoint networks. Having already achieved universal access and a complete terrestrial 
network, the sunk cost of entry into telecommunications becomes much lower. As was 
pointed out above, a combination of cable networks and mobile technology like PCN offers 
the possibility of installing local telecommunications networks which are completely 
separated from the ones of the TOs (see chapter 2.1.3.). On the other hand, TOs may in the 
future use their infrastructure to provide TV signals. Optical fiber connections to 
households allow telephone companies to provide video services, thus also entering the TV
55 The bandwidth requirements for the telephone services are 4 kHz, for the television channels, instead, 4-10
MHz. Compare: Lera, E. (1990), p.287.
34 DBP Telekom, Pressemitteilung, May 31,1990.
57 See: Lera, E. (1990), p. 284.
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market.58 For the time being it is less expensive for cable TV operators to convert their 
networks for two-way transmission than it is for local telecommunications network 
operators to increase their bandwidth in the PSTN, in order to enter video and TV.59 
However, while increasing the scope for network competition, this development on the 
contrary may also lead to further concentration. As in the Netherlands, the ISDN 
proceeding enhances the pressure integrating cable and telecommunications networks in 
one monopolized super-pipe. Regulators may therefore choose to merge TV and 
telecommunications operators instead of encouraging market entry and competition. 
Principally in the 1990s the regulator has to resolve which alternative should be chosen. 
Another potential entrant in public telecommunications networks may be European 
Railways. The Hermes network is a pan-European network which has existed for a number 
of years, providing communication links for the internal use of Railways.60. It has been 
operated separately from the TO networks and links 11 European countries. Presently a 
consortium has been set up to provide private network traffic for big and middle-sized 
firms. Technically speaking it would not be difficult to provide interconnection into the 
terrestrial network of the TOs.
Using the Hermes, an operator could enter who has already installed his own network, who 
has gained operating experience and, moreover, who provides international links.
38 See for instance: Noam, Eli M. (1983), p. 388.
*  Compare: Northern Business Information (1991), pp.16/17.
** The Hermes network has been used for exchanging international freight messages and for linking seat 
reservation systems. See for instance: Benz, O. (1991).
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22. Private Networks
The broader scope of telecommunications services available and the increasing need for 
data transmission has raised significantly the demand for special network solutions. Private 
networks are defined as networks which consist of closed user groups, as for instance 
different branches of an enterprise.61 Private networks may be interconnected with the 
public switched network. They offer big enterprises which have a large amount of internal 
traffic the opportunity to bypass the public network. Moreover, they take account of very 
specific needs as can be seen from the various inhouse EDP installations of firms.62 A 
private network consists of transmission and switching facilities, and customer premises 
equipment.
In 1991 Ford has installed the first private international ISDN network which connects six 
British branches with the two German ones. It comprises 14,000 terminals. These kinds of 
Wide Area Networks (WAN) offer Ford a sharp reduction in costs of internal 
communication, and offer a higher reliability and speed of transmission and specialized 
solutions for inhouse data transmission. The network equipment, set-up and the planning 
was carried out by Siemens, using support from BT and the DBP Telekom.63 Another 
example is Electronic Data Systems (EDS), a computer-mangement company owned by 
General Motors. Besides bringing together more than 100 separate GM networks, 
consisting of 300 mainframe computers, 300,000 computer terminals and 250,000 
telephones, EDS also competes with public network operators for contracts to establish 
private networks for other enterprises.64
Public network operators themselves have started to provide national and international 
private networks, offering their expertise won from handling the PSTN. Thereby they start 
competing among themselves and with enterprises like EDS on the private network market. 
Sprint, the US third largest long-distance operator for instance runs the entire European 
data network of Unilever, connecting 18 different countries. It won the contract competing 
against AT&T, BT, and other computer firms.63
Alternatively, TOs start to include private networks into their public switched ones. By 
doing so they hope to limit the loss of business communication for the public network. 
Metropolitan Area Networks (MAN) are fiber optic based high speed networks which 
comprise the area of a city, or a university campus, used to alleviate traffic bottlenecks.66
61 Other examples where private networks are needed may be business links as between a retailer and its shops, or 
a car maker and its suppliers.
ö  Compare for instance: Weizsäcker, C.C. et al. (1987), p. 36.
«  FAZ, June 10,1991.
64 Economist, March 10,1990, Telecom Survey p J3.
** See also for other examples: Economist, October 19,1991.
66 Communications International, January 1991, p. 32.
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MAN technology is likely to spur the evolution of broadband networks. It leads to an 
accelerated introduction of optical fiber as an access technology.
Similarly, Large Area Networks (LAN) are outside the public network. LAN are 
communication links that permit the interconnection of computers and other electronic 
equipment with the ISDN. LAN are facility based data networks that do not use a 
transmission facility provided by the TO. LAN can be interconnected with each other, 
thereby expanding geographically into Wide Area Networks(WAN).
*Virtual private networks? consist of lines of the public switched network which are used only 
as a closed system. The provision of virtual private networks has become feasible due to 
new software applications which allow the TO to install a private network within the 
pubiidy switched one. Customised software processes each call and routes it over the 
shared facilities. Being provided by the TO, virtual private networks become cheaper than a 
separate private network since they allow different customers to share the physical lines. 
The network operator is able to bundle transmission and switching services and equipment 
offerings to private network customers, allowing for substantial discounts. Even if the TO 
retains its monopoly for public voice traffic the customer of a virtual private network 
nevertheless may use the latter also for telephony.67 Thus, virtual private networks are a 
means for TOs to avoid bypass by big enterprises.
On the other hand, having established a separate private network, the private network 
operator may also try to resell spare capacity to third parties. By doing so he or she could 
reduce costs similarly to the TO which provides virtual private networks. This, for instance, 
is planned by Daimler, which is building a satellite based private network for its 20 
European subsidiaries. By reselling spare capacity, Daimler could lower the costs of this 
network significantly.68 Public switched networks would be put under some competitive 
pressure.
23. Intelligent Networks
As was pointed out above, in the past it was not necessary to distinguish the provision of 
the infrastructure and services. Having established the network, the TO automatically was 
able to provide the telephone service. The emergence of VANS instead renders it 
necessary to separate both functions. VAN-providers may use the TO’s network for the 
provision of a service which competes with similar services provided by the network 
operator. This concept relies on the presumption that the network only contains the basic 
functions of switching and transmission. Intelligent network functions, however, permit the 
operator to preempt potential service competitors.
** Economist, October 5,1991, Telecoms Survey, p. 39.
<* Communications Week International, March 4,1991.
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The basic idea of intelligent networks is to separate the switching from the service features. 
Adding new services to a network becomes time consuming and costly if new software 
releases have to be installed on every switch in the network. In an intelligent network the 
service features are provided by a separate resource, the "feature node".69 Thus an 
intelligent network is a network "which (...) allows functionality to be distributed at a variety 
o f nodes on and o ff the network and allows service provisioning via a service control 
architecture.."7® Intelligent networks allow to decouple the software control of the public 
network from the underlying access and transport technologies.
Adding additional functions to the network, the intelligent network allows also for the 
provision of new services. The essence of intelligent network services is the provision of 
information as opposed to communication (voice telephoiiy). The precursors of the 
intelligent network services were the time and weather information services.71 Nowadays 
they comprise a large range of services as universal access num bertim e and call routing73, 
call allocation74, call queuing, televoting75, ring back when free, mail box, etc.76 The new 
services are expected to face a sharp increase in demand. The DBP Telekom expects that 
the revenues from intelligent network services will rise by 500% until 1995.77 
The above mentioned concept of virtual private networks is one of the major advantages 
offered by intelligent networks to the TOs. In contrast to a physical private network, the 
virtual private network can be dynamically reconfigured and may exist only during business 
hours. Another option is to increase its capacity in peak hours.78
Thus, intelligent networks have two major impacts on telecommunications. First, they offer 
TOs the opportunity to keep big customers in the public switched network instead of 
switching to private ones. Second, intelligent networks may have an impact on the 
competition in VANS markets. This impact may turn out to be blurred.
The separation of "basic” and "value added” services and the overlapping development of 
hardware and software technology leads to a conflict as to where the ”intelligence” shall be 
placed. The telecommunications network may be regarded only as a bearer service which is
»  Finnie, G. (1991).
70 AT&T, quoted from: Shorrock, D. (1989), p. 33.
71 Samarajira, R. and R. Mukherjee (1991), p. 152.
72 A single number that identifies a service provider to be advertised nationally.
73 The routing of freephone «»11« which can be dependent! on the time of the day.
74 The routing of incoming calls proportionally to their destination in the case of congestion.
75 Televoting allows for quick opinion polls.
*  These and other exam ples can be found in: Shorrock, D. (1989), p. 35 and: Handelsblatt, May 21,1991.
77 Handelsblatt, May 21,1991.
»  Sharrock, D. (1989), p. 36.
42

Introduction
National regulators in different countries and at different moments have either promoted 
network competition or monopoly provision of the télécommunications network. The latter 
may either relate to public provision or to the regulation of a private monopolist.
It is useful to distinguish the de jure concept of legal or administrative monopoly from the 
de facto notion of natural monopoly. The legal monopoly is a matter of raison d ’état and 
political favour which may or may not coincide with economic conditions of a natural 
monopoly. The de facto view of monopoly is concerned with the objective properties of the 
cost function rather than a result of legal or political actions.
With the exception of the UK, all EC member countries have granted de jure monopoly 
positions to their public network operators. The following chapters will discuss to what 
extent this is based on an economic rationale. To this end, issues of distribution and goals 
of efficiency are discussed. It is scrutinized to what extent there exists a trade-off between 
both aims for the telecommunications network. Goals of efficiency may be distinguished in 
three subcategories.1 AUocative efficiency is obtained by optimal prices and quantities for 
given demand and cost functions. In the simple one-product case this is achieved by setting 
the price equal to the long-run marginal cost. Technical efficiency requires the cost 
minimizing production of a given output. Technical efficiency refers to economies of scale 
and scope and X-inefficiency.2 Finally, qualitative efficiency is related to the optimal choice 
of products provided by a firm. Qualitative efficiency requires that the degree of product 
differentiation and the amount of different product characteristics matches consumer 
preferences.3 When evaluating the extent to which monopoly provision is efficient, all three 
categories are examined in what follows.
Monopoly provision of the network has been justified by the existence of a natural 
monopoly and network externalities. Both concepts are normally based on a static 
approach. Moreover, further impediments to competition have been put forward to justify 
the granting of exclusive rights. They refer to barriers to entry and exit. It is analysed to 
what extent these factors provide a rationale for granting a de jure monopoly.
In the case of monopoly provision prices are not set by market forces. Monopoly pricing 
leads to allocative inefficiency because it diverges from first best marginal cost pricing. 
Hence the regulator has to control the price setting behavior of the network operator. Thus 
it is necessary to discuss the application of efficient pricing rules for telecommunications. 
Deviations from optimal pricing rules may lead to losses in allocative and qualitative
1 Kruse, J. (1985), p. 223.
2 The concept of X-cfTidency refers to all other sources of deviation from minimum cost. This may occur if the
input of factors of production is not minimized, in the case of organisational slack, etc See Leiberatein, H. 
(1966).
3 Kruse, J. (1985), pp. 117.
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efficiency. Related results are the basis when in part HI I scrutinise the actual pricing policy 
of European telecommunications organisations.
Chapter 4 thereafter looks at different concepts to introduce network competition. It points 
out that basically two strategies may be distinguished for telecommunications. Service-based 
competition is based on the assumption of a unified network. While the latter provides the 
infrastructure, different service providers compete by offering VANS on the network. 
Facility-based competition instead fosters competition between different network operators. 
Principally one may distinguish between the "classical* case of one incumbent who faces 
one potential entrant and the case of many separate incumbents who may be forced into 
competition by a regulatory change. Especially in the former case the incumbent has the 
possibility fix’ strategic behavior to fence off the entrant. If instead there are several 
incumbents operating in several fragmented markets, the entrant can be used to stir up 
competition among incumbents.
Finally, part n  in chapter 5 concludes with an assessment in which the (disadvantages of 
either monopoly provision or competition are discussed. It is argued that network 
competition is more likely to fulfil all three goals of efficiency. Distributional aims must not 
be relinquished in this case. However, they can be pursued in a more efficient manner.
3. Public Monopoly Provision of the Network
3.1. Natural Monopoly
The term "natural monopoly" refers to efficiency in production. It therefore is a 
characteristic of the supply side of a market. A natural monopoly exists for "an industry 
whose cost function over some given set o f products is such that no combination o f several 
firms can produce an industry output vector as cheaply as it can be provided by a single 
supplier"4.
Historical evidence5 as well as theoretical considerations have led to the viewpoint that the 
telephone network is a natural monopoly. This conclusion has to be scrutinized in some 
detail It is fundamental for the question whether state regulation or competition should 
prevail for the provision of telecommunications networks. Natural monopoly elements in 
the past have often provided the rationale to raise institutional or legal entry barriers.
The following chapter will comprise two parts. First the concept of natural monopoly is 
discussed on a general leveL This leads to the question of sustainability of a natural 
monopoly. Only if a natural monopoly is not sustainable, must a de jure monopoly be 
installed. Second the issue of natural monopoly is addressed for the telephone network. 
The results of various econometric studies which test subadditivity in telecommunications
4 Baumot, W J, Bailey, E.E. and RJ>. Will« (1977), p350.
* As will be seen in chapter 6 the US market provides an example of competition in telecommunications networks. 
In an early period AT&T was able to oust all serious competitors and to monopolize the market.
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are discussed. It is also revealing to look at cost comparisons of different national telecom 
operators.
The traditional concept of natural monopoly is concerned with an industry which produces 
one homogeneous good. For the telephone industry the multiproduct case is relevant. 
However, for the sake of clarity the simple one-product-ease is discussed first Afterwards 
an extension to the multi-product-case is undertaken.
3.1.1. The Single Product Case
The following description of a single-product natural monopoly is static and strictly 
neoclassical in the sense that dynamic elements such as technological change are neglected. 
Technology instead is taken as given and known to everybody.
Essentially there are three concepts to explain a natural monopoly.
Economies of scale:
The most common approach is to refer to economies of scale. They exist if an increase in 
output leads to a less than proportionate increase in cost. Thus:
C(ry) < rC(y) for r > 1 andy > 0 (3.1)
Baumol et al show that global economies of scale are sufficient but not necessary for 
subadditivity of cost and therefore natural monopoly6.
Cost Subadditivity: A cost function C(y) is called strictly subadditive at Y if for any
quantities of output yi...yv; y 4s Y; j = 1—k; k > 2; kand Ey: -  Y 
j-1
the following condition holds
C (Y )< rC (y j) (3.2)
j - i
Thus the costs of producing the whole (Y) are less than the sum of the costs of producing 
the parts of total industry output7. Natural monopoly then exists if condition 3.2. holds for 
the entire range of relevant outputs.
Declining average costs imply subadditivity. The opposite, however, does not hold. Hence, 
subadditivity is the weakest condition for natural monopoly8.
Thus, if over the entire range of outputs the cost function is subadditive, the industry is said 
to be a natural monopoly.
* Baumol, WJ. et al. ( 1982), p 21-22. See also: Braeutigam, R.R. (1989), pp.1291.
7 See: Baumol, W J. et aL (1982), p.17.
* A proof as well as an intuitive example for this is given in: Baumol, WJ. et al. (1982), p. 19-21.
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This definition of natural monopoly is ambitious in the sense that for an empirical 
verification of a natural monopoly status the whole cost function must be known. Otherwise 
subadditivity may exist only at one level of output. In that case a change in market size 
could transform a market from natural monopoly into a competitive one (or vice versa).
On the other hand, if non-subadditivity can be proved for a local part of the cost function 
this suffices for a global rejection of subadditivity (and therefore of natural monopoly). If 
there is no global subadditivity, the monopoly coalition can be broken up into a set of 
subcoalitions in such a way that each subcoalition can potentially benefit from the split9.
The existence of a subadditive cost function has been claimed for telecommunications 
services and the network. In the case of the network one may distinguish economies of 
density and horizontal economies of scale.10 Economies o f density occur if long-run average 
cost decreases with a rising number of customers in a certain geographical area. In chapter
2.1.13. it was pointed out that the costs of access are lower in a highly populated area. 
Households can share the access cable thus generating economies of density. Horizontal 
economies o f scale instead arise if long-run average cost falls with a geographical increase of 
the network. These different features of economies of scale become important when 
discussing the optimal network size. If, for example, one finds strong economies of density 
but no horizontal economies of scale, this may hint that a natural monopoly exists in the 
local but not in the long-distance network.
In general, the historical trend of processing costs falling faster than transmission costs 
lessened the economies of scale in the network. The fibre-optic technology may have 
reversed this effect Within optical switches and fibre-optic cables marginal cost approaches 
zero in off-peak periods.11
Economies of scale are reckoned to be important for specialized VANS. A universal 
network allows to supply various new services to the population at large. Whereas for 
instance it would be too expensive for a residential or small business user to install digital 
data links, they may be affordable in a universal network where the cost per user drops.
*
3 .12  The Multiproduct Case
For a multiproduct industry the definition of natural monopoly based on global 
subadditivity is still valid, y now has to be treated as an output vector. The term 'average 
cost” is replaced by "ray average cost” (RAC). RAC refers to a bundle of products (a 
composite good) and is related to proportional changes in the quantities of the whole
* Baumol, WJ. et aL (1977), p. 353. However, this conclusion does not hold for a small market size. The cost 
function may be subadditive for a small output level but not for a large one. If only the low output level is 
relevant due to the size of the market demand, Baumol’s interpretation does not hold.
M See: Knue, J. (1985), p_34.
u Compare: Mulgan, G. (1990), p22.
product set. Ray average cost (RAC (y)) of producing the output vector y 0 is defined 
as12:
C(ry0) 
RAC -  -----
T
yQ is used as the unit bundle of a given mixture of output and r represents the number of 
units in the bundle (y -  ry0). Now one can analyse the change of cost C (tyQ) in relation to 
C (yc) if each component y*0 of the composite good y0 is changed with the same factor r. 
Geometrically in the two product case the development of cost is analysed along a ray. Ray 
average costs therefore indicates how total cost vary as a function of the number of units 
produced.
If C(ryD) < TC(y0) for r > 1 then RAC is decreasing, which corresponds to decreasing 
AC in the one-product case. As can be shown in contrast to the latter, decreasing RAC is 
not sufficient for subadditivity13.
Instead of varying output in fixed proportions one might also change only the quantity of 
one product while keeping the other(s) constant. Studying this kind of output variation, 
defines the incremental cost of a product L For the sake of simplicity this is done for the 
two product case.
Assume that a firm produces initially only one service, voice telephony V. The costs of 
production are C(V,0). Subsequently the production of a data service D is undertaken as 
well Costs of production are now C(V,D). The incremental cost of the data service is the 
addition to the firm's total cost resulting from the production of D. The average incre­
mental cost of the data service is:
C(V.D)-C(V,0)
D * — D------------
Product «poriflf tconnmlM of scale exist for the data service if a small increase in the out­
put of D leads to a decline in average incremental cost14.
As was pointed out above, in the single product case economies of scale imply natural 
monopoly (a sufficient but not necessary condition). In the two (or: multi-) product case 
product specific economies of scale even for both products are not sufficient for subaddi­
tivity15. In that case a competitor could specialize successfully in the provision of one good.
U Baumol, W J.et al. (1962), p. 48.
13 See for instance: Windisch, R. (1987), p.48.
u  a  more general treatment of incremental cost and product specific economies of scale can be found in: Baumol 
et al. (1982), p. 67-71.
“  For details: Panzar, J. C. and R.D. Wfllig (1977), p. 483.
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Thus neither decreasing ray average costs nor product specific economies of scale establish 
a natural monopoly in the multi-product case.
Subadditivity instead requires the existence of economies of scope. Economies of scope 
exist if the overall cost of production for producing V and D separately exceeds the cost oi 
joint production:
C(V,0) + C(0J)) > C(V,D)
Economies of scope16 therefore refer to complementarity in production. If joint production 
is more efficient than separate production, the factors of production have a public good 
character: while factor rj is used for the production of V, it is as well available for the 
production of good D. In the case of the telephone system these economies of scope are 
said to exist for the local and the long-distance network or for voice and data services.17 
They arise for instance from using the same switched network and the same terminals for 
different services. If the local network has excess capacity, long-distance phone calls may be 
fed in without raising costs to the same extent as would have been the case if the long­
distance network was completely separated. Similarly, less spare capacity is needed to 
handle peak demand loads in integrated production than in separate networks.
Economies of scope are a necessary condition for a natural monopoly in the multi-product 
case18. Economies of scope and declining average incremental costs for each product are a 
sufficient condition for subadditivity19. It is therefore more difficult to establish the case 
for a natural monopoly in the multi-product case. The information needed about the cost 
function is more extensive than in the single product case. Economies of scope and 
diseconomies of scale for one or all products may offset each other. In the case of trans-ray 
convexity the cost savings from economies of scope outweigh the effects of increasing re­
turns to scale if the items are produced individually20. In that case economies of scope and 
decreasing ray average costs are sufficient for strict subadditivity 21.
It is important to bear in mind that the concept of subadditivity assumes a qualitatively and 
quantitatively well defined output bundle. Regional or temporal changes of the demand or 
cost function, for instance due to a different density of customers and the availability of
w A more formal definition in: Panzar, J.C. and RJD. Wülig (1961), pi68.
17 In the telephone network the notion of economies of scope is therefore related to the argument of horizontal 
economies of scale made above.
i* See: Baumoi, WJ. et aL (1962), p. 78 and 174.
»  See: Evans, D.S. and J J. Heckman (1964), p.616.
20 "Trans-ray convexity" requires that the complementary production cost C(V,D) of a weighted average of an
output bundle is smaller than the weighted average of the cost C(V) +C(D) of isolated production (for the 
two product case). A formal definition and a graphical explanation in: Baumol, WJ. et aL (1982) p.79-82. 
Spence shows that trans-ray convexity is a very strong restriction: Spence, A ^i. (1983), p.985.
21 See: Windisch, R. (1987), p. SI.
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substitutive technologies (the fixed terrestrial or the mobile network) are not covered by 
this concept22
3.1 J . Economies of Scope in Telecommunications Networks
As the previous examples have already shown, economies of scope may exist for the 
terrestrial telecommunications network. As will be pointed out later, the presumption of 
strong economies of scope has been a key element of the Commission’s policy towards the 
terrestrial network.
In the following I briefly point at the limitations of this concept23
First, there is a lack of generality if there is a large number of services which can be 
provided in one or several networks. Suppose that there are two different data networks 
Dj, E>2 which differ for instance for transmission rates etc, a telephone network V and a 
network for the transmission of television programs, TV. All networks could be integrated 
into one broadband network. Alternatively, voice and TV, and the data services could be 
integrated in two separate networks. Also there would be the option to provide each service 
separately.
Total network integration would only be efficient if:
C ( V #Dl r D2 , T V )  <
C(V,TV) + C(DhD2)
C(V,TV) + CiDO + C(E>2)
(33 .)
C(V) + C(TV) + C(D1,D2)
C(V) + C(TV) + C(Dj) + C( Dj)
The existence of economies of scope in the provision of some services does not necessarily 
justify total network integration. Economies of scope may exist only among the data 
services. In that case, one may choose to integrate data networks but operate voice and TV 
separately.
In reality there are many more services and it is far from clear where the strongest 
economies of scope exist. Total network integration would be efficient only if economies of 
scope existed between every pair of services. Instead it may be the case that the optimal 
telecommunications system would consist of several networks, each being optimised for a 
particular rlnaa of uses. Interconnection could be provided through interface devices and 
gateways. A single network is only superior if the total demand for call services does not 
exhaust scale economies and if gateways are relatively expensive.
As is pointed out below, the viewpoint of a natural monopoly based on economies of scope 
is further weakened if dynamic considerations are introduced. The recent rapid growth of
22 See also: Kruse, J. (1965), p. 30/31.
23 For a similar reasoning sec for instance: Noam, Eli M. (1986), pp.10; and: Lehr, W. and R, Noll (1991).
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private networks contradicts the notion of strong economies of scale and scope in 
telecommunications networks. It can be interpreted as a sign that technological progress 
and a rising diversity of services and network configurations dominate cost reductions 
through network integration.
3X4. Empirical Tests of Subaddithity for the Telephone Network
Various empirical investigations have been undertaken to test whether the telephone 
system indeed is a natural monopoly. Most research has been done for the US and 
Canadian Bell systems. While the results have been contradictory, there has been a wide 
consensus that the available data are not sufficient to provide reliable results.24 
The theoretical considerations have shown that two analytical steps have to be undertaken 
for an empirical test of subadditivity for a multiproduct network:
1) the analysis has to be disaggregated23.
2) the whole range of the cost function has to be investigated if global subadditivity is 
tested.
To test the hypothesis that product specific economies of scale or economies of scope exist, 
the separate influence of each product variable (yi,y2) on the cost function has to be 
investigated. Time series data, especially if stemming from one big enterprise (which is 
normally the case for the telecom network), are highly correlated and therefore do not 
allow for the estimation of separate influences on the cost function26.
A further problem relates to the specification of the technological progress. Most 
productivity studies do not separate technological change from scale economies. The 
former, however, does not depend on the number of firms in the market. Technological 
progress could be realized as well by several independent firms27.
Evans/Heckman investigated the major econometric studies made for the Bell system. 
They found that by circumventing these problems most studies either relied on 
inappropriate statistical techniques or used an invalid aggregate measure of 
telecommunications output28. In order to avoid the problem of extrapolation outside the 
range of the sample, they propose a local test of subadditivity. If subadditivity can be rejec­
24 A good survey can be found in: Wavermann, L (1969), pp. 72. See also: Blankart, C.B. and G. Knieps (1989),
p.581/562.
25 As an illustration why disaggregation is obligatory Evans and Heckman give an example of a two product
industry. Both products produced on their own depict constant or decreasing returns to scale. Nevertheless on
an aggregated level they exhibit large scale economies: Evans, D. S. and JJ Heckman (1963), p.134/135.
*  see: Windisch, K. (1967), p. 53.
27 Evans, DS. and J J. Heckman (1963), p. 141.
28 Evans, DS. and JJ. Heckman (1963), p. 147.
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ted for one region of the Bell cost function, also global subadditivity must be rejected29. 
Using time series data for 1947-77 they reject the hypothesis of subadditivity of the product 
vectors local and long-distance calls for 1958-1977. Evans and Heckman found "that the Bell 
system was not optimally decentralized during our sample period!* This result was confirmed by 
a more recent study of Waverman, who analysed cross-section, time-series data. He found 
that neither scale nor scope were significant in the 1947-1977 period for AT&T’s size.30.
For the Deutsche Bundespost Telekom Elixmann estimated several single-product and two- 
product (static) cost models. From the estimates he concluded that if technical progress is 
taken into account scale elasticities are around one. Thus the German TO operates with 
constant returns to scale. Elixmann, moreover, found that the estimates did not confirm 
cost complementarities between the local and the long-distance services.3 ^
Other studies which ascertain the notion of a natural monopoly conclude that over time 
economies of scale have shrunk. Moreover, estimating different parts of the telephone 
network, they come to the conclusion that natural monopoly characteristics exist only for 
the local network.32 Hunt and Lynk carried out time series analysis for the pre­
privatization period of British Telecom. They found that the local network was subadditive 
for the period 1951-1981.33 Finally, M.S. Snow carried out a simulation exercise examining 
thirteen separate output decompositions of Intelsat’s cost function. In all cases which he 
tested for local natural monopoly he found that Intelsat could produce by itself more 
cheaply than any combination of two firms which attempt to produce the same output.34 
As far as the question of natural monopoly is concerned, empirical investigations have 
several limitations. Even if the existence of economies of scope is proven for the 
telecommunications sector this would establish the case for a natural monopoly only for the 
short run. A dynamic analysis would have to take into consideration the possibility that 
changes in demand (the volume and structure) as well as in technology can eliminate or 
even reverse these effects. As has been pointed out already, econometric estimations of 
cost functions always test only for a local rather than a global natural monopoly. The 
hypothesis of natural monopoly is rejected globally if it is rejected locally. However, if it is 
locally accepted, the result cannot be generalized to the entire cost function.
Moreover, the natural monopoly concept is static in nature, and appears to be inadequate 
for a market which faces rapid technological development. Technological change provides
»  Evans, D.S. and J J. Heckman (1964), p. 617.
30 Evans, D.S. and JJ. Heckman (1984), p. 621; Waverman, L. (1989), p.94.
31 Elixmann, Dieter H. (1969), p. 685-686.
32 Compare: Schön, H. and K.H. Neumann (1985), p. 494.
33 Hunt, L.C. and EX. Lynk (1990), p.232 and 244-145.
M The translog co«t (unction has as arguments two output measures, Atlantic and non-Atlantic circuits, two input
price measures for capital and labour, and an index of technological change. Snow consoucted sixty-five
artificial output disaggregations from 1976 through 1984. See in detail: Snow, M.S. (1987a), pp34-44, and.
Snow, MS. (1987b), pp. 138-140.
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cost savings beyond those furnished by the existence of economies of scale. For instance, 
over the period 1965 to 1985 the annual price per half-circuit, based on average cost of 
Intelsat fell from US $ 32,000 to $ 5,000 in nominal dollars.35 All studies presume that cost 
subadditivity is exogenous to the market organisation. However, this presumption may not 
be correct The cost structure which has been produced under monopoly provision is 
different from one which would prevail under competition. A subadditive cost function then 
may not be the reason for monopoly provision but the result of i t
Finally, the estimates were carried out only either for the terrestrial or the spatial network. 
Thus, it is assumed that the same technology is used by all firms. However, as chapter 2 has 
shown, recently a range of substitutive networks has emerged. The natural monopoly then 
has to comprise all of these networks as well A natural monopoly in the long-distance 
network, for instance, would only exist if subadditivity prevailed for both the terrestrial and 
the satellite network and any combination of both systems.
3.1.5. Natural Monopoly in Telecommunications
The previous discussion has shown that litde empirical evidence could be found for a 
natural monopoly in telecommunications networks.
The theoretical considerations, moreover, have pointed out that while for some networks 
natural monopoly characteristics may exist, they are unlikely to be strong enough to justify 
complete network integration.
Further evidence can be found by comparing the performance of already existing network 
operators. The existence of a natural monopoly would imply that ceteris paribus bigger 
network operators should produce at lower cost than smaller ones. Recently, in the case of 
the terrestrial telephone network, cost comparisons have been carried out These 
comparisons are incomplete and can only be used as a hint Given that governments 
impose different obligations on public operators the ceteris paribus assumption cannot be 
maintained. However, all studies came to similar conclusions. The Ceochini report on the 
"cost for non-Europe* includes productivity comparisons of European TOs. It found 
significant productivity differences between TOs, as a consequence of different production 
technology and the degree of x-inefficiency. The «nailer TOs of Norway and Denmark 
were 'definitely more productive' than the bigger networks of BT, SIP and DBP Telekom.36 
These results were confirmed by a recent OECD study and another investigation carried 
out for the Commission of the EC. The OECD study compared the efficiency of telephone 
monopolies in different countries. It did not find any relationship between size (measured 
in terms of telephone revenues or number of lines) and the cheapness of the telephone 
service. My own price comparisons carried out in chapter 12 confirm this result. Some of
39 Snow, M.S. (1987b), p.134.
»  Mailer, J. (1988), p. 11/12.
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the smaller telephone companies have generally lower prices than bigger TOs.3^  The study 
carried out for the Commission on "Telecom Administrations Performance* found that the 
smaller operators of Denmark, the Netherlands and Luxembourg achieved greater revenue 
per employee then the bigger ones of Britain, Germany and France.3®
If the European operators are compared with their North American and Japanese 
counterparts which operate under competition, it has been found that on average the 
administrative costs of the European TOs are two to three times higher than the ones of 
the former.39 Thus, the extent of X-inefficiency due to size and monopoly provision is 
significant.
One may therefore conclude that in Europe empirical data do not suggest the existence of 
a strong natural monopoly for the telecommunications network. Bigger enterprises tend to 
be less efficient. Higher administrative costs may offset the cost savings due to network 
integration. Thus, the losses due to x-inefficiency may very well outweigh economies of 
scale and scope.
The effect of technological advance on the natural monopoly characteristics of 
telecommunications networks is blurred. On the one hand the optical fibre cable is 
reckoned to increase economies of scale in the local network. The higher capacity of the 
fibre-optic network also increases economies of scope for the provision of different 
services. On the other hand the growing variety of networks weakens the case for monopoly 
provision. Subadditivity of cost may exist for the terrestrial network. Still substitutive 
competition with other networks may be advantageous. Satellite, terrestrial, cable and 
mobile networks can be used to provide the same services of a similar quality. Moreover, to 
the extent that the natural monopoly relies on the high fixed cost of investment, 
competition should not be excluded if a separate network is already installed. This, for 
instance, applies for the networks installed by the railways and cable operators. They have 
already sunk their investment and could enter with low additional cost. Finally, the rapid 
technological progress itself puts the static concept of natural monopoly into question. 
While the latter may exist for a certain moment, competition may be considered necessary 
to promote cost savings over time. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5. Given 
dynamic considerations, the existence of different transmission systems, and the weak 
evidence for economies of scope, one may conclude that telecommunications networks 
cannot be considered as a natural monopoly for networks above a minimum size. In the US 
after liberalisation long-distance carriers competing with AT&T were able to expand 
rapidly. They have captured important market shares for retail and bulk-rate services. The 
same applies for NTT competitors in Japan. Where competition has been permitted, 
incumbents have not been able to oust new entrants.
n  Sec also: Gilhooty, D. (1990), and: Economist, October 13,1990.
*  Com(90d), p.2/17.
»Com(91b), p. 26.
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3.1Ì. Network Externality and Critical Mass
While the concept of "natural monopoly” refers to the cost structure of the firm and hence 
to the supply side, the concept of network externality refers to the demand side. The latter 
was explained in chapter 1.1.4. when referring to demand externalities. The utility each 
customer can reap by participating in a network rises with the number of customers with 
whom he or she may communicate. This is the basic rationale for a unified network40 and 
universal service. Universal service is a very popular term in the debate about liberalisation 
of telecommunications networks. However, it never has been properly defined. Basically, 
universal service refers to two distinct goals. One is to provide to all households the same 
opportunity to join the network, disregarding costs. In that case universal service implies a 
uniform access price and cross subsidies form high density areas to rural ones. 
Alternatively, universal service merely implies a high rate of diffusion of telephone 
terminals. The latter can be achieved even with cost based pricing if special subsidies are 
targeted to households likely to switch off from the network. This subsidy can be defended 
by recuring to the network externality. The more complex definition requesting a uniform 
tariff cannot be defended on purely economic terms. It is linked to political goals such as 
integrating the society. In what follows I use the term universal service when referring to 
the second goal.
The concept of *critical mass* combines both economies of scale and scope on the supply 
side and the network externality on the demand side.41 A prospective subscriber to a 
network will only join if some minimum number of other subscribers has already joined. 
This holds even for a low price of the specific network or service. Since the subscriber 
perceives a greater value of a service the higher is the subscriber pool, the more he or she 
will be readly to pay. This changes the slope of the demand curve the service (or network) 
provider encounters. Normally an increase in output leads to a price decrease. In the case 
of network externalities the service provider encounters rising demand the more customers 
are already connected to the network. This holds until maturity has been reached.
If this is combined with increasing returns to scale, then any operator faces high losses 
during the start up, while as soon as a critical point has been readied he or she realizes 
burgeoning profits. At the beginning the operator has to set very low prices to encourage 
potential customers to join the network although communication is limited to a small 
number of participants. While the number of customers rises, the operator may increase 
price despite decreasing average cost. In the standard analysis of supply and demand the 
adjustment process leads to a stable equilibrium. In the case of the critical mass the 
equilibrium may not be stable. Below the critical mass point there is in-built inertia. Once
*  Note, however, that also several networks which are interconnected reap the same network externality as a 
unified one. Then a policy of standardization has to ensure compatibility and interoperability.
«1 See in detail for instance: Allen, D. (1968), p. 257-260; Rogers, E.M. (1990), p.5/6.
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the critical mass is reached, demand will rise despite rising prices. The relative size of the 
critical mass group to society as a whole is important If it is small, the critical mass 
argument lacks force. If on the other hand, the critical mass group is relatively large then 
there may be a conflict between competitive pricing and universality. Critical mass is an 
argument in favour of subsidizing the start up.4^  Introductory prices thereby may fall below 
marginal cost because of both the additional consumer benefits and because of future cost 
reduction resulting from an increase in output.4^  If the critical mass group is large, 
moreover, the need for subsidisation is used to justify state intervention. This has been the 
case, for instance, for the French videotext system Minitel. The state provided videotext 
terminals at very low cost to all households. As a result Minitel has been spread throughout 
France to a much greater extent than similar services in other EC countries.
However, the critical mass argument does not necessarily imply state intervention. If future 
profits appear secure enough, a private investor would find sufficient financial means on 
the capital market to finance an initial take-off period in which customers have to be 
subsidized. This is, for instance, the case for the new mobile telecom operators which have 
been licensed to build separate GSM networks. However, for many value added network 
services like Minitel future demand is uncertain. Thus they involve high risk. Private 
investors may not be ready to face the high start-up losses. However, in that case the state 
faces similar risks without having more reliable information about the future profitability of 
the service. Hence, the state should refrain from providing the service if the private market 
does so. In the absence of social or political goals which justify state intervention 
(meritorial goods), critical mass does not offer a rationale for public provision if the private 
sector fails to act.
The critical mass argument, on the other hand, reveals the need to limit entry at an initial 
period. If too many firms enter at the same time no one may be able to reach the point of 
critical mass and all may fail. This, for instance, has been an argument for limiting the 
number of licences granted to mobile operators. The higher the number of operators, the 
smaller is the bandwidth which is available to each one. This reduces the capacity of each 
network and hence the number of customers which can be served. Too many licences then 
may discourage operators from carrying out the high start-up investment needed to set up 
their mobile network.
3.1.7. The Sustainability of a Natural Monopoly
Neglecting dynamic aspects, the discussion has shown that if an industry is a natural 
monopoly, then it is optimal for one firm to provide the entire output. In the absence of 
entry barriers, the natural monopoly may be unsustainable; thus Inefficient entry could 
occur. Entiy is inefficient if its net welfare effect is negative. This is the case if the overall
«  Allen, D. (1988), p. 267.
«  Faulhaber, G.W. and J.W. Boyd (1989).
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increase in the cost of production which is due to entry exceeds the increase of consumer 
welfare due to a greater output An unsustainable natural monopoly then provides a 
rationale for establishing institutional entry barriers.
For the one-product case consider the following simple example. It is assumed that the 
demand function for the homogeneous service x is linear
p * a - b f r + x j )  (3.4)
There is only one production technology available. The cost function of any firm in the 
market is assumed to be
C j * c X j  + F;  c > 0 ,  i ■ 1,2 (3.5)
Thus costs of production comprise constant marginal cost (c) and fixed cost (F). Since this 
cost function is subadditive this is a case of natural monopoly (this is true for any F > 0).
A monopolist would maximise
wm = [p(x) - cjx™ - F (3.6)
I define47 Sc = (a-c)/b.
As can be seen from figure 3.1. S', is a measure of market size:
Figure 3.1: The monopolist’s output
♦7 The terminology introduced here is used more extensively in chapter 4. It can be found also in: Martin, S. 
(1992).
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Maximising (3.6) then leads to the monopolist's output
(3.7)
This generates a profit of
1,«n » -b S c 2 - F (3.8)
The consumer surplus can be written as
For xm « Sc/2 the consumer surplus amounts to Bm = b/8 Sc2. The total welfare of 
monopoly provision then is the sum of irm and B®.
Assume that a potential competitor can enter using the same technology. If the incumbent 
has no advantage from having installed his network before, the post-entry output is 
Cournot. As a result total output rises to48
*1 + *e * 2/ 3 sc (3.10)
The incumbent and the entrant both realize the Cournot profit
wc -  1/9 b Sc2 - F (3.11)
Entry is detrimental if overall welfare is reduced, thus if
jrnj + Bm > 2jrc + B<: (3.12)
which holds for fixed cost above a minimum level49
(3.13)
M The "I" irpf**” 1*8 incumbent, "e* represents entrant and d“ symbolizes Cournot.
*  Calculations can be found in the appendix.
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For fixed cost small enough, entry is beneficial despite the existence of a natural monopoly, 
because consumers welfare gain from competition exceeds the producers lost profit and 
higher production cost.
The potential competitor will enter if v c > 0. From (3.11) it can be seen that this is fulfilled 
for F < 8/72 b Sq2. For fixed cost above this level and if the post-entry outcome is assumed 
to be Cournot, no entry occurs (the natural monopoly is sustainable).
Finally, for fixed cost in the interval
|;b S c 2 < F < ^ b S c2 (3.14)
there is the case of an unsustainable natural monopoly. Society as a whole is better off if 
entry is prohibited.
In chapter 4 this example is modified to show that the result no longer holds if the 
incumbent is able to react to the entry threat. The threat forces the incumbent to invest in 
the reduction of his production cost which allows him to fence off the entrant. With lower 
production cost the monopolist raises output and overall welfare. This shows why the static 
approach to natural monopoly is not satisfactory.
In the case of a multiproduct industry the question of sustainability can be regarded from a 
different angle. Baumol, Bailey and Willig define sustainability of a multiproduct 
monopolist as follows:
The announced prices o f a monopolist j/*1 are sustainable if the monopoly is financially viable 
at these prices %m > 0, and if no potential entrant can find a marketing plan for which the 
anticipated economic profits p $ e • C(ye) cover the casts o f entry E(ye) "44.
Whereby: ♦
r m is the profit made by the monopolist
Pe>y»C(yc) arc price, quantity and cost, respectively, of the entrant for an individual 
product
E(ye) is the entry cost which varies with the entrant’s output vector.
Strict subadditivity is shown to be a necessary but not sufficient condition to guarantee the 
existence of a sustainable price-output vector for a market without entry barriers.45 Failure 
of subadditivity would imply that the monopoly coalition could be split into a set of 
subcoalitions in such a way that every subcoalition can benefit. Subcoalitions may involve
44 Baumol, WJn Bailey, EJE., and R.D. Willig (1977), p. 351. Similiar. Baumol, WJ., Panzar, J.C. and R.D. Willig
(1962), p. 9 or 192/193. The marketing plan of a potential entrant is defined as "a subset A of the product N,
and vectors of prices and quantities p£A and y£A for the goods in A* see: Baumol et al. (1977), p 352.
<5 This is shown in; Baumol, W J. et al. (1977), pJ53.
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either smaller firms producing the same range of outputs as the monopoly cnalitinn, or a 
^  specialized firms with each providing only one item of the initial bundle. Scale 
economies preclude only the first case; they cannot prevent the latter type of "economies of 
specialization“46.
For the multiproduct industry consider as an example the previous discussion of different 
telecommunications networks (see chapter 3.13.). C$(D) are the stand-alone costs of 
providing the data service D in a separated network. The cost of operating the data service 
D in an integrated network which also provides voice telephony is Cj(D). Finally, there are 
incremental costs Qc(D) of adding D to an already existing voice telephony network. 
Suppose that C,(D) < Cj(D). The stand-alone costs are smaller than the cost of operating 
D in an integrated network. This may be due to technical problems of integration. 
Integration therefore seems uneconomical. However, total incremental cost might be even 
smaller than the stand alone costs: Cjc(D) < C,(D). This may result from positive 
externalities which arise for other services if the data service is included in the integrated 
network. Then we get
Qc(D) < CS(D) < Q(D) (3.15)
Integration would be economically efficient but it would not be sustainable.50 Any service 
provider establishing a separate network for D could provide this service cheaper than the 
operator of the integrated network does.
A natural monopoly is likely to become unsustainable in the case of cross-subsidisation. 
Cross-subsidisation refers to the relation of costs and revenues attributed to each good of a 
multiproduct enterprise. According to the definition of Faulhaber, a subsidy-free price 
structure exists "if the provision o f any commodity by a multicommodity enterprise subject to a 
profit constraint leads to prices for the other commodities no higher than they would pay by 
themselves.'*1 Therefore every product (or group of products) contributes at least as much 
to overall revenues as its incremental costs in a subsidy free price structure.52 
A cross subsidy therefore implies that either one or a group of products supplied by the 
firm does not recover its incremental costs. In order to judge whether cross-subsidisation 
takes place, Faulhaber proposed the "stand-alone-test"53: No product (or group of 
products) should be charged a higher contribution than would be necessary for a
*  Baumol, W J.et aL (1982), p. 173.
so Panzar and Wfllig formally provide seven necessary conditions for a natural monopoly to be sustainable. See:
Panzar, J.C. and R.D. Willig (1977a), p.7-9.
si Faulhaber, G.R. (1975), p. 966.
52 This im * is further discussed when addressing the principle of "cost-based-pndng" in chapter 3333.
S3 Windisch, R. (1967), pM/85.
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specialized competitor to break even. In the absence of entry barriers a competitor would 
otherwise have the incentive to enter the market.
Thus if some products contribute more than their incremental costs to the general cost, a 
subset of user groups who have a high share in these products could benefit from leaving 
the cooperative arrangement (the integrated network). This is often referred to as bypass. 
Bypass of the regulated public switched network occurs if a group of customers supplies the 
service to itself by using a private network.54 This kind of facility bypass can be provided by 
metropolitan area microwave or fibre-optic cable networks. The bypass is inefficient if the 
incremental costs of providing the service to this customer group are lower for the network 
operator than are the costs of establishing the private network. If the monopolist’s prices 
are within the core of subsidy free prices then there is no cross-subsidy. If it takes place, 
entry is efficient If competitors find it impossible to undercut the monopolist, the existing 
economies of scope establish a natural monopoly. However, if all prices are subsidy free a 
situation may be created in which the network operator does not break even. Given a 
break-even constraint, welfare maximising prices require Ramsey pricing (see below) which 
is not necessarily sustainable. This already shows that cross-subsidisation does not 
necessarily lead to efficiency losses. Only strict marginal cost pricing precludes cross­
subsidisation.55 In that case artificial entry barriers would be needed to maintain the 
optimal market structure.
In telecommunications there exist two different aspects of cross-subsidisation. The first is 
related towards cross-subsidies among products. This is the concept Faulhaber 
concentrated on. It may be due either to goals of optimization (Ramsey pricing, profit 
maximisation) or to predatory pricing.56 The former may create an unsustainable situation 
for the incumbent which encourages entry. Predatory pricing, on the other hand, refers to 
the opposite effect If the incumbent faces entry by specialized competitors, it may use 
profits made in the product market which is still monopolized to cross-subsidize the 
product which is provided by entrants. Thereby the latter is priced below cost. Predatory 
pricing therefore decreases social welfare by deterring socially desirable entry.57 The 
intention is to eliminate competition and to recoup losses encountered in the prior period 
by raising prices afterwards.
The second type of cross-subsidisation in telecommunications is related to subsidies among 
different consumer groups. Since the demand structures of customers are very different58,
34 Another form of bypass is referred to as "service bypass*. The latter occurs if a long-distance operator connects
its customer directly to the network without passing through the local switch. By doing so, the local access 
charge can be avoided. For more detail see chapter 6.
35 See; Faulhaber, GJL (1975), p. 973.
*  Predatory pricing will be discussed in chapter 4.
37 Brock, WA. and D.S. Evans (1983), p50.
3* See chapter 1.1 J.
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the subsidisation of access and local service by the long-distance service entails a 
redistribution effect from business to households. The former use relatively more national 
and international long-distance services.59
Unsustainable cross subsidies in the telecommunications sector lead to "cream-skimming” if 
entry is allowed for. Cream-skimming occurs if the entrant’s ability to undercut some of the 
incumbent’s prices is not due to lower cost of production but due to the price structure of 
the latter. The prices of the incumbent lead to misinformation. High prices appear where 
there are high cross subsidies flowing to other services. Entrants can make profits while 
producing at higher costs.60 This kind of entry is inefficient because overall costs of 
production increase. Accordingly, society’s welfare shrinks if competitors enter.
The undesirable effect of cream-skimming is only likely to occur if the price structure of the 
incumbent is not flexible. In the case of flexible prices, the incumbent is able to carry out a 
credible threat against an non-innovative entrant. Furthermore, as Brock and Evans show, 
the higher the unrecoverable portion of investments (sunk costs), which the entrant has to 
undertake, the less likely it is that entry occurs due to cream skimming.61 The same applies 
for the possibility that other entrants join, which would reduce the profits available to each 
entrant. While the inefficient entrant might be able to undercut the inflexible incumbent, he 
is not protected against more efficient entrants himself.
Therefore cream-skimming is only likely to occur in the case of:
a) Hit-and-run entry
This exploits the incumbent’s inflexibility. The competitor is able to enter and - if 
necessary - to exit quicker than the incumbent is able to make a competitive price 
response.
b) Protected entrants
Entrants may succeed despite being inefficient because the regulator prevents price 
responses from the incumbent and restricts further entry.62
In a market like telecommunications networks hit-and-run entry is not a feasible strategy, 
given high sunk costs. This leads to the next chapter which discusses the importance of 
entry barriers for facility based competition in telecommunications. Thus, cream skimming 
may nm ir only in the case of artificial protection of the entrant. In telecommunications it is 
the result of regulatory failure and does not stem from specific industry characteristics.
59 This Hmt of cross-subsidisation is common. For Spain, for instance, it is reckoned that a local call of three
minute« costs about nine pesetas while Telefdnica charges only 3.9 pesetas. See: El Pais, April 16,1991.
«  Brock, WA. and D.S. Evans (1983), p.63.
«  Brock, WA. and D.S. Evans (1983), pp.66/68.
42 Brock, W A  and D.S. Evans (1983), p.69.
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3.2. Barriers to Entry and Exit
According to Stigier a barrier to entry "may defined as a cost o f producing (at some or 
every rate o f output) which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not 
borne by firms already in the industry*3.
These extra costs to be borne by the entrant refer only to disadvantages which cannot be 
avoided after having made the best possible adjustment to a situation. Bain, for instance, 
did not count the presence of (vertical or horizontal) integration in a market as an entry 
barrier, because optimal adjustment by the entrant would include the proper level of 
integration64.
Barriers to entry are an important feature of the structure of an industry. The 
competitiveness of an industry depends heavily on the ability of potential competitors to 
enter a specific market On the other hand, already established firms are interested in 
raising entry barriers. At least in the long run the height of entry barriers determines the 
level by which their profit can exceed the average rate of return in the economy. Rents 
gained from entry barriers by the incumbent can be seen as the annual equivalent of the 
discounted present value of the entry costs a potential competitor faces. Entry barriers are 
a necessary condition for long run profits.
Therefore economists normally assume implicitly that entry barriers distort the competitive 
process: they lead to a suboptimal entry of resources into an industry65.
The basic concept of barriers to entry was developed by J. Bain. Starting from his analysis 
the following brief summary concentrates on barriers to entry which have some impact on 
the telecommunications industry. Entry barriers occuring in other markets are put aside. 
Bain analysed the circumstances under which entry barriers are likely to occur:
Economies of scale
Bain argued that the deterrent to entry will increase if th e"minimal optimal scale becomes a 
larger proportion o f total industry output**. The entrant will basically face two alternatives. 
One is to enter the industry on a small scale. In that case there will not be a perceptible 
effect on prices and output of the established firms. But the entrant will produce at a 
suboptimal level Alternatively he can enter near the minimum optimal size. By doing so 
probably he encounters price retaliation from the incumbent. Therefore the entrant will 
anticipate that costs of production will be higher than the minimum attainable, or prices 
will be lower. This will work as a deterrent to entry and offer the incumbent the opportunity 
to raise price. Hence, the established firms in the market are able to reap a supranormal
«  Stigier, G J. (1968), p.67.
«  Bain, J. (1956), p.145.
«5 WcizildcCT, C.C. von (1980), p. 400.
«  Bain, J. (1956), pJ5.
64
profit without inviting entry. However, in the case of economies of scale, the existence of 
entry barriers does not necessarily indicate a welfare loss. Von Weizsäcker has shown that 
if impediments to entry do not exist, the number of firms exceeds the optimal number if 
economies of scale are present throughout the relevant range of output67. On the other 
hand, however, the fact that the number of firms exceeds the optimal does not mean that 
society as a whole would be better off with fewer firms, if firms exercise market power.6® 
The monopoly /  Cournot duopoly example in chapter 3.1.7. has illustrated this point.
If the choice of technology is endogenous this will give an incentive to the incumbent firm 
to use capital intensive technology. Thus the incumbent employs technology with higher 
fixed but lower marginal costs. Potential entrants therefore face higher capital 
requirements. Financial markets are likely to put entrants at a cost disadvantage. Due to 
incomplete information, they are unable to properly assess the entrants’ abilities to 
succeed. Therefore entrants will have to pay higher risk premiums for financial capital in 
comparison to incumbent firms. If this keeps competitors out, the decision to use a capital 
intensive technology offers the opportunity to earn profit over the long run though its adop­
tion and may reduce overall social welfare. As will be argued in chapter 73.2. this reasoning 
applies for the ISDN network.
Product differentiation
If buyers have a transitory or permanent preference for established goods instead of new 
ones, barriers to entry exist The disadvantage for the entrant may have the form of a lower 
price or higher selling costs (or both)69. This disadvantage for new firms due to consumer 
behaviour allows the established enterprise to raise its price above minimum costs, without 
attracting entry. In this context advertising can be understood as a means to establish 
barriers to entry by creating a brand name and binding consumers to the firm which 
provides the specific product. For the sale of the plain telephone service AT&T invests 
heavily into advertising. By doing so it hopes to develop the image of a high quality 
operator which justifies prices which exceed the ones of AT&T’s long distance competitors.
"Absolute cost advantages"
Bain used this term refering to several advantages an incumbent firm may enjoy. He 
explicitly mentioned and analysed (also empirically) the importance of the superiority in 
production technique70, imperfections in the market for factors of production, strategic 
factors ^Kh as acres* to natural resources and the capital market71. More favourable terms
67 Weizsäcker, C.C. von (1980), p.405.
“  See. Martin, S (1984), p 628.
** Bain, J. (1956), p. 114/116.
70 Bain explicitly refers to patent», know-how, export management: J. Bain (1956), p. 155.
71 Bain, J. (1956), p. 144-46.
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on the captial market due to a smaller likelihood of bancruptcy for incumbents are 
presumed to be crucial for the capital intensive telecommunication industry.
Sunk Costs
Sunk costs are a further impediment to entry which is especially relevant for the 
telecommunication industry. Sunk costs are often refered to as a barrier to exit72. Costs are 
sunk if a firm cannot recoup them when leaving the market The greater are sunk costs, the 
greater is the risk involved if entry is undertaken. They are connected with plant and 
equipment specific to the industry. These irreversible capital commitments which the in­
cumbent firm has already undertaken make the latter stick to the market Thus the greater 
are sunk costs, the stronger is the incentive for the incumbent to use strategic behaviour in 
order to secure its position.
Investments made in the network (pipes, cables, switches) are likely to have a high degree 
of sunkenness. The network cannot be directed toward usages other than communication. 
Moreover, it cannot be shipped to other markets. Therefore if a firm running a 
telecommunication network wishes to leave the market because it encounters losses, it has 
to find an investor ready to enter this specific market. This, however, is not likely i t  for 
instance, overcapacity has led the firm to drop out in the first place. These specific assets 
could be sold, if at all, only with high capital losses73. Thus in the case of physical assets 
only nonspecific assets which have an easily to ascertain quality do not involve sunk costs.74. 
Sunk costs then entail higher risks for the entrant. Entry therefore will only occur if they 
are matched by higher expected profits.
Other important sunk costs for the telecommunication industry are legal and R&D 
expenditures. Legal costs - for instance in order to obtain the licence to run a telecom- 
network - are mainly sunk. They are a necessary investment to enter a specific market In 
the case of exit, if the licence cannot be sold, the legal expenditures made cannot be 
recovered. Sunk costs have a very high share in total costs for telecommunications 
networks. As was pointed out, high fixed cost oblige the potential entrant to enter with a 
large capacity. If this leads to industry overcapacity, he has to anticipate losses which 
become permanent due to exit barriers (sunk costs). In an industry of natural monopoly 
characteristics, overcapacity is likely to occur due to the high minimum capacity. Then sunk 
costs establish high entry barriers.75
72 The effects of entry and exit barriers are virtually the same.
73 Investments in buildings or real estate instead can be regarded as fixed costs which are not sunk. Though no
investor in the communication business is available at the time, they could be sold for other purpose.
7* Some examples for strategic behaviour given by Bain are related to sunk costs: Expenditures made for product 
differentiation and marketing are mostly sunk if the brand name cannot be sold. Those additional costs deter 
a potential entrant and may offer a *pre entry asymmetry advantage" to the incumbent.
*  Kruse, J. (1966), p. 225.
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The discussion above has already shown that one may distinguish natural entry barriers and 
strategic ones. The former exist due to the specific characteristics of the industry. Strategic 
entry barriers instead refer to those established by the incumbent. Facing a potential 
entrant, the incumbent often has a first mover advantage. Since the entrant's conjectured 
rent depends on the reactions anticipated from the incumbent, the latter has the possibility 
to influence the entrant’s decision.76 The ISDN is a good example of a technological 
upgrade which also raises entry barriers due to a strong increase in the incumbent’s 
capacity. As will be seen in chapter 6 the investment in barriers to entry and especially into 
sunk costs was a major strategy of AT&T in fending off private entry into the market since 
the beginning of the century.
However, as, for instance, in the case of the ISDN, often it is difficult to distinguish 
between "natural" and "strategic” entry barriers.
Entry barriers protect a monopolist against competition even if there are high allocative, 
technical or qualitative inefficiencies. The irreversibility of investment especially creates 
the scope for related efficiency losses. Thus, even if there were no natural monopoly 
characteristics in the telecommunications network, competition might not be fierce if 
networks would be completely liberalized. While on the one hand entry barriers therefore 
provide a further rationale for state intervention, they may also be used to justify measures 
of liberalization. A de jure monopoly is only necessary if an unsustainable natural monopoly 
exists. Even if the telecommunications network were a natural monopoly, the existence of 
high entry barriers makes it unlikely to become unstainable. They are likely to protect the 
incumbent network operator sufficiently even when operating under a break-even 
constraint
*  Caves, RJL and M.E. Porter 0977), p.242.
67
33. Optimal Pricing for Telecommunications
Although the previous chapter concluded that neither natural monopoly arguments nor 
entry barriers justify a de jure monopoly for telecommunications operators, in the EC the 
latter has come about in all EC member countries. Being protected against competitive 
pressure network operators have some scope for price setting. While the previous chapter 
was mainly concerned with technical efficiency, in what follows allocative and qualitative 
efficiency goals are scrutinized. They are related to tariff principles.
Two different concepts for price setting in a public enterprise are analysed. Which 
approach is considered to be more adequate depends on whether the public good aspect or 
the aims of allocative efficiency get priority. I describe optimality rules for cost-based and 
value-based pricing and discuss their implications for the telecommunications sector. One 
major objective of chapter 33.2. is to explore the relevance of the theoretical literature for 
socially optimal telephone tariffs. Thereafter, I scrutinize the price setting schemes which 
have prevailed among European TOs. They lead to efficiency losses due to deviations from 
optimal pricing rules. These price distortions cannot be defended on the grounds of the 
price setting principles developed before.
33.1. Value-Based versus Cost-Based Pricing
The model of perfect competition assumes that the individual firm has no power to set its 
own price. In the absence of entry barriers, a uniform price for a homogeneous product is 
derived. The individual producer will adjust its output such that marginal costs equal the 
market price. No other price is sustainable. This will secure an efficient allocation of 
resources. As was seen above, the telecommunications industry deviates so much from the 
underlying assumptions that this model does not seem applicable.
While the firm operating in a competitive market has only one control variable (output), 
the monopolist has two (price and output). It is subject to one constraint; the total demand 
function. In the basic model the monopolist is thought of as knowing its demand curve. It 
will maximise profit by setting either price or quantity, taking the other variable as given by 
the demand curve. The monopolist’s profit maximisation leads to a welfare loss 
(deadweight loss), due to a price which exceeds marginal cost. Goals of redistribution 
between the producer and consumers and the deadweight loss of monopoly pricing require 
regulation in the case of monopoly provision.
Taking into account the previous discussion of entry barriers, technological change and 
natural monopoly aspects, telecommunications pricing schemes have to reflect the 
following criteria:
1.) Efficiency in allocation: This is the traditional (static) approach which aims at the 
maximisation of consumer welfare. According to the Pareto criterion, an allocation is 
efficient if no other allocation exists which improves the situation of at least one
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individual without making somebody else worse off. This criterion is not useful for the 
decision between different price setting schemes, since normally the alternatives imply 
that some individuals are made better off and some are made worse off. A more 
general criterion was developed by Kaldor and Hicks: an alternative is superior to the 
status-quo if those individuals who have benefited from the change are potentially 
able to compensate the losers. Thus after compensation the situation could be 
preferred by everybody. Whether compensation actually takes place is a political 
question and not a problem of efficiency. If in the following certain situations are 
described as "efficient" or "inefficient", I mean efficient or inefficient in terms of the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion. The static efficiency rule generally leads to marginal cost 
pricing. Prices then work as indicators which drive scarce resources towards the most 
efficient sector of employment.
2.) Innovative efficiency: A broader concept of efficiency takes dynamic considerations 
into account. A deviation from prices given by static optimality rules may be necessary 
in order to ensure the firm’s financial ability to invest and innovate. Thus, there may 
be a trade-off between low prices in the short run and low prices in the long run. 
Differences arise because marginal cost varies for the short and long run. This aspect 
of intertemporal efficiency is important for the telecommunications sector because of 
the high share of fixed cost in total cost and the speed with which technology changes.
3.) Inefficient market entry: Market entry is considered to be inefficient if it implies that 
social welfare decreases as a result. As has been discussed above, inefficient market 
entry is concerned with the question of sustainability of a natural monopoly.
4.) Cost recovery: If economies of scale and scope are present, prices equal to marginal 
costs will imply that the firm fails to recover all cost of production. In the case of a 
public enterprise, these deficits could be made up for by state subsidies. If cost 
recovery is required, a second best pricing scheme has to be set up.
5.) Cost •iinratinn; The telecommunications operator provides more than one good. 
Given the high share of fixed cost in total cost, the allocation of cost becomes crucial 
The relative burden each service has to bear, has to be decided. Cost allocation has 
become a politically sensitive issue given the concentration of consumer demand. 
Shifting the burden to finance common cost from the long-distance to the local 
service, for instance, also partly shifts the burden from business to households.
6.) Public good aspects: The telecommunications network has some public good aspects 
which derive from the externalities in consumption. They are the foundation of the 
universal service goal and may justify the cross-subsidisation of customer access.
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7.) Distributional aims: In the past European TOs had to apply tariff principles which 
reflect political goals of redistribution.77 In West Germany, for instance, the 
■Gtmdnwirtschaftslehre* has been influential for the regulation of public enterprises. It 
rejects the primacy of principles of allocative efficiency for price setting rules.78
It is obvious that efficiency and distributional aims may conflict with each other. As far as 
telecommunications are concerned, von Weizsacker has pointed out that the different 
concepts of optimal pricing can be categorized as either value based or cost based79. Value 
based pricing is related to Lindhal pricing of public goods.
The issue of public goods is linked to market failure. Market failure prevails if there are 
externalities which cannot be internalized, if consumption cannot be excluded or if 
consumption of one person does not diminish the supply for others (nonrival 
consumption)80. The T J n d a h l  theory of burden sharing refers to the pure public good. A 
pure public good is characterized by non-rival consumption and very high costs of 
exclusion81.
Efficiency in production and consumption of a private good requires the equality of 
marginal utility and marginal cost («price) for each individual In the case of the pure 
public good, marginal utility will not be equal for all consumers: consumers cannot be 
excluded from consumption. In this case, the same amount of the good is provided to 
everybody. Because preferences for the public good diverge, the marginal utility of 
consumption is different for each consumer. For the public good, efficiency is characterized 
by the equality of the sum of marginal utility and the marginal cost of provision82. If prices 
are set equal to marginal utility in the case of a private good, each customer will pay the 
same price while consuming different amounts. In the case of the public good, prices will 
differ while the amount of consumption is the same83, findahi pricing of the public good 
requires for the case of constant marginal cost84 that the contribution of each citizen is 
generated from the individual’s marginal utility times the quantity of which the public good 
is provided85. The greater is the utility derived from a certain service, the greater must be
77 See chapter 3.1.7. on croM-subodisation.
78 See in more deuil: Thiemeyer, T. (1964), p. 219; and: Neumann, K.H. (1984), pp.85-89.
79 see: Weizsgcker, C.C. von (1964), p. 197-207.
80 Musgrave, R A  (1964), p.64.
81 see: Musgrave, RA. and P.B. Musgrave (1980), p. 56-57. and: Musgrave, RA., Musgrave P.B. and L. Kullmer
(1965), p.62.
82 see in defail- Musgrave, P A , Musgrave P.B. and Kullmer (1984), p. 65-68.
83 A graphical explanation in: Musgrave, PA., Musgrave, P.B. and L. Kullmer (1984), p. 68.
84 Therefore marginal cost equals average cost
® see: Weizsacker, C.C. von (1964), p.197.
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the consumer’s contribution. The value of the good for the individual determines his or her 
contribution. In the USA this principle was applied for the pricing of rural and urban areas. 
Since the utility of the network is presumably higher for the latter, the citizens in urban 
areas were charged more for local calls and for access. This is in direct contradiction to cost 
based pricing since the costs of access and services are lower in urban areas due to 
"economies of density*.
The problem of Lindahl pricing is that consumers cannot be compelled to reveal their 
preferences. Moreover, in telecommunications public good and private good aspects exist 
together.
The public good character of telecommunications services derives from externalities in 
consumption. The point of nonrivalry in consumption could be made for usage as long as 
the limit of capacity is not readied. However, the discussion of the cost structure of 
telecommunications has shown that the cost of capacity has to be regarded as flexible in the 
long run. Therefore, the network does not have a clear-cut public good character. Further­
more, exclusion is feasible at minimal cost. Finally, the Lindhal solution of providing a fixed 
amount of output to all consumers is not optimal. Consumption varies considerably among 
consumers and among services. The main public good aspect of the telecommunications 
network therefore derives from the network externality. It is the basis for the universal 
service goal These externalities, however, vanish once universal service has been achieved. 
Generally, they are reckoned to be low in those EC member countries which have already 
installed a mature telecommunications network.86 Public provision of telephone services 
therefore is more justified on grounds of market failure on the supply side (economies of 
scale and scope) than by market failure in consumption. Von Weizsäcker concludes: 'The 
extent o f the economies o f scale will determine whether the equivalence principle derived from 
the Lindahl scheme or the marginal cost principle derived from the competition model is more 
convincing.
In the following I Hitm« optimal pricing rules which are concerned with allocative 
efficiency. In chapter 3 3 3 .1 analyse the extent to which these principles can be applied for 
telecommunications. A comparison is made with the pricing policy which prevailed in the 
EC. F in a lly , measures which may reconcile the aims of value-based and cost-based pricing 
in telecommunications are proposed.
33.2. Pricing Rules
The Commission of the EC has asked member states to ensure that prices of 
telecommunications services under «elusive rights are brought in line with costs. In the UK 
one of the main objectives of OFTEL is to relate prices of the dominant firm BT to costs of
«Among EC member countries still considerable differences occur. This is discussed in some detail in chapter 14.
*7 Weizsäcker, CC. von (1984), p. 201/202.
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production and of seeking improvements in internal efficiency.88 However, to establish cost 
related prices is a rather controversial subject in a multiproduct industry with a high share 
of common cost. Chapter 33.2.1. and 33 2 2 . concentrate on linear multiproduct tariffs. 
Thus, the (»ice does not change with the quantity purchased. Chapter 33 2 3 . then 
proceeds to non-linear tariffs which vary according to the quantity consumed.
I abstract from all effects that telecommunications prices may have on other sectors of the 
economy. This partial equilibrium assumption is a strong one given that 
telecommunications services are an input for the business sector. However, it is in line with 
most of the literature.
Prices are regarded as instruments to pursue policy objectives. The major objective 
discussed here refers to the maximisation of society’s welfare. A second objective is related 
to fairness and equity issues. This will be discussed in chapter 3.3.3.1.
3JJL1. Marginal Cost Pricing
In competitive markets firms are forced to apply marginal cost pricing. It is quite easy to 
show that welfare maximisation leads to the same result for a multiproduct public 
enterprise.89 For each service the (»ice has to equal marginal cost Ownership does not 
change the optimality criteria for welfare maximising pricing. Thus marginal cost prices are 
the benchmark for all public enterprise tariff schemes. Principally a telecommunications 
network incurs two types of costs. The first one is associated with the interconnection of the 
customer. This is a non-traffic sensitive cost which varies with the customer’s location. On 
the other hand there exist traffic-sensitive costs which are generated by usage. They vary 
with the time and duration of usage and to some extent with the distance traversed by the 
call. Marginal cost pricing would require a lump-sum payment which covers the marginal 
non-traffic-sensitive costs and a separate tariff for the customer’s usage. This leads to a 
two-part-tariff which is discussed in more detail below.90
Marginal cost pricing, however, is difficult to apply for telecommunications. First, the 
textbook solution depends on the assumption that marginal costs are measurable for each 
service. For telecommunications networks, however, it is undear whether the relevant cost 
is one of connection, of increasing the switch’s capacity or some other element of the 
network.*1 Only network access has clearly defined marginal costs which are related to the 
laying of the cable, the necessary increase of capacity of the feeder cable and of adjusting
»  See for instance: Hartley, N and P. Culham (1968), pJ
The regulator has to let prices such that total social benefit - the sum of consumer surplus and producer revenue 
minus cost of production - is maximised. This is formally shown for instance in: BAs, D. (1981); and; Brown, 
S J. and D.S. Sibfy (1986), p.194
«0 See: Kahn, AM. (1964), p. 140/141.
N For this reason Mulgan reckons it to be impossible to apply marginal cost pricing in telecommunications. See: 
Mulgan, G. (1990), p23.
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the frame capacity of a local switch,etc. The marginal cost of a certain service is very high at 
peak time if capacity is scarce or almost zero when there is spare capacity.92 This makes it 
necessary to distinguish between short-run and long-run marginal cost. In the long run 
capacity is flexible. In the short run instead capacity is irreversible. The marginal cost 
principle has to take account of all cost components, hence for the price-equal-marginal- 
cost rule long-run marginal cost has to be taken into accout.93
This leads to peak-load-pricing. If capacity is not flexible in the shortrun and if there are 
certain peaks in demand, then marginal costs diverge for different periods.
For simplicity I assume that there exist only two periods: an off-peak demand period (night 
time) is followed by a peak-demand period (business hours). The network operator has to 
provide a certain capacity. If this capacity is chosen to meet peak demand then in the off- 
peak period some capacity is idle. Intertemporal profit maximisation leads to the same 
pricing policy as instantaneous profit maximisation. Off-peak marginal revenue should 
equal peak marginal revenue. In the case of welfare maximisation the problem becomes to 
find the socially optimal peak and off-peak prices such that capacity is optimal94. If the 
difference between both periods is high then there is a "firm peak” and the optimal price in 
peak time corresponds to the long-run marginal cost. In the long run capacity is flexible. 
Thus capacity cost are reflected by the peak-time price. Off-peak prices instead should be 
related to short-run marginal cost.93 In the case of a "firm peak” only peak demand 
determines total capacity. In telecommunications this would lead to very high peak-time 
prices. Given that the short run marginal costs of a phone call are close to zero, off-peak 
prices would be very low. This would generate a considerable shift of demand. When in 
West Germany the DBP introduced a very cheap 'moonlight” tariff in the 1970s, the peak 
demand for long-distance rail* shifted to late evening hours. Thus, telephone demand is 
unlikely to face a "firm peak”. In the case of a shifting peak Mitchell and Vogelsang 
demonstrate that the optimal pricing rule requires setting the price equal to variable cost in 
off-peak periods and higher prices in peak periods such that demand is equal to capacity 
and the combined revenues from the peak periods cover long run marginal cost.96 
Bergstrom and MacKie-Mason have shown that the introduction of peak load pricing can 
plausibly reduce the price in both periods if the company operates with a fixed rate of 
return on capital This results from a more efficient use of capacity in both periods.97 In the 
case of peak load pricing less capacity is idle off-peak. Thereby total capacity costs are 
reduced. Peak-load pricing, however, is not sufficient to avoid rationing. Telephone
*2 Compare Renihaw, E.C. (1983), p iU .
*3 Kruse, J. (1985), p. 75.
** Compare: Phlipt, L. (1983), p. 134-137.
*  Kruse, J. (1985), p. 87.
*  Mitchell, B14. and K. Vogelsang (1991a), p.41.
n  Bergstrom, T. and J.K. MacKie-Mason (1991), p.244.
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demand faces absolute peaks in short periods which occur unpredictable and cannot be 
covered by broadly defined day, evening and weekend tariffs. To meet these absolute peaks 
would require additional capacity which would remain idle most of the time. Rationing 
therefore remains in absolute peak moments.**
As was pointed out in part (I), the ISDN has driven marginal cost to very low levels while 
raising the fixed cost of the fibre-optic network. Thus, strict marginal cost pricing will not 
generate sufficient revenues to recover total cost. This leads to the second problem 
connected with marginal cost pricing in telecommunications. The marginal cost pricing rule 
is valid, independent of the type of cost function. The outcome, however, is different. 
Baumol has shown that in the case of continuously decreasing ray average costs a public 
enterprise which sets prices equal to marginal cost will run a deficit99. Therefore in the 
static analysis public provision with a permanent deficit is welfare optimal100. Marginal cost 
pricing for a public enterprise with decreasing ray average cost therefore makes permanent 
subsidies necessary.
There are, however, several objections against public enterprises running permanent 
deficits101. The two main arguments refer to new inefficiencies which may come about as a 
result from permanent state subsidies:
1) If deficits are automatically covered by state subsidies the incentive to minimize cost is 
reduced.
2) The taxes needed to finance the deficit lead to distortions. The latter may outweigh 
losses in efficiency which derive from a departure from marginal cost pricing in the 
enterprise.
While providing a simple principle, marginal cost pricing hides major conceptual 
difficulties, measurement problems and potential inefficiencies. The consequences of 
external subsidies are distortions outside. It is not obvious why external distortions caused 
by taxes are deemed to be more acceptable than those caused internally by the firm which 
deviates from marginal cost pricing.102
9* Call attempts are rejected with a circuit-busy tone. This amounts to a random rationing since calls are not 
arranged according to wfllingness-to-pay or urgency. However, redialing increases the probability of a 
successful call but requires more time. Thus in periods of excess demand call attempts are to some extent 
ordered according to the individual’s priority and opportunity cost of time. See also: Mitchell, B.M. and I. 
Vogelsang (1991a), p. 42.
99 see: Baumol, W J. (1976) and: Bdt, D. (1961), p27.
100 Alternatively the state may pay a permanent subsidy to the monopolist to cover the deficit in the case of private
provision.
101 in more detail: Neumann, KJi. (1984), p.93.
102 Compare: Mitchell, B.M. and I. Vogelsang (1991a), p. 34,59-40.
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In order to avoid external efficiency losses, there are strong reasons for a break-even 
constraint on public enterprises. For this end second-best pricing rules have been 
developed to maximize social welfare under the constraint that the enterprise breaks 
even1®. This requires a deviation from marginal cost pricing. Principally two different 
approaches may be applied in this respect. In a multiproduct enterprise each product may 
take a share of the common cost burden. In that case the Ramsey pricing rule will offer a 
second best pricing scheme.104 This is discussed in what follows. Alternatively, price 
discrimination among consumer groups may be applied. The marginal consumer group 
pays marginal cost prices while those with a higher reservation price pay more. Price 
discrimination and non-linear tariffs are discussed in chapter 3.3.23.
3J H  Ramsey Pricing In the Telephone Network
The theory of Ramsey prices refers to the problem of covering production costs and 
minimising the distortions which stem from deviations from marginal cost pricing105. As 
will be seen, Ramsey-pricing belongs to the category of value based pricing.
If total costs of production are covered, the common costs of production have to be 
allocated to the different services.
For simplicity I assume that the network operator offers only two services. One is the local 
telephone service Xj, the other one is long-distance service x^ . Accordingly pi is the price for 
local and pd the price for the long-distance service. Demand depends only on the own price, 
thus cross price elasticities are neglected.106 Income effects are neglected in what follows as 
well
Then the operator’s revenues are
R -  Pl*l(Pl) + Pd*d(Pd) (316)
If input prices are given, the cost function is
C = C[Xj(p,) , Xd(Pd)] (31?)
Finally, let U(p) be the consumer’s net utility (consumer surplus) in money terms, which is 
derived from the goods Xj and Xj.
103 sec: Baumol, W J. and D.F. Bradford, (1970), p.265.
104 As Kruse points out, the term "second best* in this context should not be misinterpreted as "less efficient"
compared to the first best alternative of marginal cost pricing. In reality the latter is likely to lead to higher 
inefficiencies which arise from the need to cover the deficit by external subsidies. Compare: Knue, J. (1985), 
p. 84/85.
105 They refer to Frank Ramsey who provided a solution to the optimal pricing problem for an industry in which
marginal cotf pricing does not cover total costs. See: Baumol, W J. and D.F. Bradford (1970), p*278.
106 go* the more general case of the cross-price elasticity being above zero. See: Bös, D. (1981), pp.25.
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Then the problem of maximising consumer's utility subject to a break-even constraint of the 
network operator can be formalised as
Max U(pj,pd) (3.18)
P
subject to: R - C > Rq with: R© > 0 and Pi > 0, i = 1, d.
Ro represents a minimum profit required. In the case of the break-even constraint Rq is 
assumed to be zero.
If the constraint is not binding, one obtains the marginal-cost-pricing rule. In the case of
decreasing ray average cost the constraint is binding.107. Then (3.18) leads to the Ramsey
pricing rule.108 
The Langrangian is
L = U(p!,pd) + r[p, x, + pd Xd - CXx^)] r  > 0.
L is the social objective function as a weighted sum of consumer welfare and enterprise
profit r  is the Lagrange multiplier.
The first order conditions for pj can be derived by differentiation of L:109 
SL Sxi SXi
T  * -*i + T(Xj + Pi r~ - ^  ~ )  * 0 (3.19)
*Pi *Pi
with
iU  SC
r* -  - * " > ; iij“ *
The derivative of the utility function can be derived by classical theorems of price theory.110 
kj are the marginal cost of service L (3.19) then can be transformed into
= H  (3,20)
«  *
with £j being the price elasticity of demand.111 If I define the price-cost margin
107 Bfe, D. (1961), p.124/125.
10® For simitar treatments see for instance: BAs, D. (1961), p. 124/125; Brock, WA. (1983c), p. 191/192; 
Weizsäcker, C.C. von (1964), pp.199/200.
1» S represents the partial derivative.
no This can be found in: Baumöl, J.W. and D.F. Bradford (1970), p269. 
in  The price elasticity of demand is defined as » (xj/pj) (pj/xj).
76
since the right hand side of (3.20) is a constant.
This finally leads to the inverse elasticity rule of Ramsey pricing:
m< e2
—  = — (3.21)
“ 2 «1 V '
The optimal relative deviations of the prices from marginal costs are equal to the reciprocal 
ratio of the price elasticities of demand. If the firm encounters increasing returns to scale 
and has a break-even constraint, both prices have to be above marginal costs. In that case 
the inverse elasticity rule states that the more price inelastic demand is for one product the 
higher is its optimal price (given the marginal cost of production). It follows that the less 
price elastic is demand, the higher is the relative burden of common costs the product has 
to bear. Social welfare therefore will be served most efficiently if the deviations from 
marginal costs are unequal112. The underlying idea is that the more price inelastic demand 
is, the smaller are distortions stemming from consumer decisions due to "wrong” price sig­
nals. In the case of a totally inelastic demand curve the consumer cannot avoid the price 
rise. The latter therefore will entail only an income effect (redistribution) without any 
negative effects for allocation. According to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion for this product a 
price increase does not generate any efficiency loss. The Ramsey price rule therefore is a 
means of covering total costs of production at minimal welfare distortion. In comparison to 
the outcome in the case of marginal cost pricing Ramsey-pridng, reduces proportionally 
the quantities demanded of each product. Von Weizsäcker has shown that given linear 
demand functions the Ramsey pricing rule leads to the same result as the "equivalence 
principle” of value based pricing. In the Ramsey-Boiteux optimum the ratio of the net 
benefit Us and the contribution made to cover non attributable costs [(p; - k jx j is the same 
for all products113.
Taking into consideration the empirical estimates of price elasticities of demand discussed 
already in ^hapt**r 1.1.2. one may conclude that access and local services should carry a 
relatively high burden of the common cost. This, however, only holds to the extent that 
long-distance services are more elastic than local ones.11* Ramsey prices may be difficult to
112 Baumol, WJ. and D.F. Bradford (1970), p.267.
113 (pj4^)xj is the contribution made by consumers of service i in access of the attributable costs (if pj > kj). See:
WeizsScker, C.C. von (1984), p .201/202.
114 As was pointed out in chapter 1.1.2. despite the empirical estimates it is not necessarily the case that the
for long-distance services is more elastic than the demand for local calls.
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implement politically since they imply a price structure which is quite different from the 
existing one. Consumers with an inelastic demand would have to pay more than those with 
an elastic one.
This result is in conflict with the analysis of externalities in consumption. To the extent that 
network externalities exist, the optimal access charge will be below marginal cost. The 
difference between marginal cost and the optimal access price corresponds to the 
additional utility created for other subscribers. The deviation of the optimal price from 
marginal cost of access due to externalities can be considerable115. Therefore externalities 
are an additional factor (apart from scale economies) which render a deficit if first best 
prices are applied. As has been pointed out above, the relevance of consumer externalities 
is diminished since the target of universal service has been almost achieved in most 
member countries.
A more serious problem with Ramsey prices is that they are not necessarily sustainable. A 
potential competitor may specialize in serving consumers who use those services intensively 
which have a high deviation of prices from marginal cost. The price discrimination against 
business customers could lead to a bypass of the public network by an increased use of 
private networks. The problem arises because entrants supply only a subset of goods 
offered by the incumbent. If the incumbent applies price discrimination in order to prevent 
entry, sustainable prices lead to a non-welfare-maximizing pattern of cost recovery. Ramsey 
prices therefore may make the erection of entry barriers necessary. Competition in 
telecommunications would be precluded. However, it is not dear whether Ramsey prices in 
telecommunications would lead to inefficient entry. Often the non-sustainability of Ramsey 
prices is overemphasized. Entry barriers, moreover, provide some protection to the 
incumbent who applies Ramsey pricing rules in telecommunications.
33JL3. Non-linear Pricing
Ramsey pricing leads to a set of uniform prices which maximise total surplus subject to a 
break-even constraint.116 Prices vary between different markets, depending on the price 
elasticity of demand. N on-uniform  pricing goes beyond Ramsey pricing by discriminating 
between consumers in the same market. The amount a consumer pays does not vary 
proportionately with the quantity consumed.117 The network operator may grant quantity 
discounts to certain consumer groups.118 Nonlinear tariffs therefore involve price 
discrimination since different units of a homogeneous product are sold at different prices. 
As will be seen, non-uniform pricing allows a greater reduction in efficiency losses than
U3 Neumann, KJi. (1964), p.109; Willig, R.D. (1979).
ii* Ramsey prices are uniform since the amount the consumer pays is proportional to the quantity he or she 
consumes.
U7 Phlips, L. (1963), p.166.
simple Ramsey pricing.11^  Thus, non-linear prices improve on simple Ramsey pricing, while 
they still allow recovery of the cost of production. It offers heterogeneous consumers a 
wider variety of tariff packages from which they can choose. Consumers then will buy at 
quantity levels where marginal prices are doser to marginal cost.120
If price discrimination is applied to cover the enterprise’s deficit, the allocative efficiency 
requires a complete separation of consumers. If arbitrage can be prohibited, each 
consumer could be charged up to his individual reservation price (first-degree price 
discrimination).121 By doing so the consumer surplus could be entirely passed over to the 
enterprise. However, in reality complete price discrimination is not practicable. The 
producer would have to negotiate with each customer individually which would become too 
costly. Price discrimination therefore leads to simpler practises as for instance two-part 
tariffs and Mock tariffs.
The simplest form of non-uniform pricing is the two-part-tariff.
Let’s assume that there is only one telephone service which is charged with one unit per 
call. Thus for simplidty I neglect distance, day time and duration of calls. If q is the quantity 
of calls made by a customer, A is the access price for the network, and p is the price for one 
unit, then for q>0 the consumer’s (monthly) expenses are
E(q) * A + pq (3.22)
Thus, two-part-tarifis consist of a fixed price (lump-sum fee) which is not related to the 
quantity consumed and a usage-sensitive price. They are common for tdephone services in 
Europe. The access charge has to be paid without regard to the number of phone calls 
made. Services then are tariffed corresponding to the length of a call.
Only for q«0 can the consumer save the access charge. A uniform price is simply a two- 
part tariff with A=0. The lump-sum fee A then appears as a purchase privilege tax which 
extracts part of the consumer surplus.122
In telecommunications equation (3.22) may also be considered as two prices for two 
different services. The access price A is the price for participation in the 
telecommunications network while p is the price for consumption. Since the demand for 
arerew is highly inelastic, the Ramsey rule suggests a high access fee and a low usage charge.
11* However, as Brown and Sibley (how, the inverse elasticity rule is also valid for non-uniform pricing. For 
instance, it can be combined with quantity discounts. See in detail: Brown, S J. and D.S. Sibley (1986), pp.107- 
112.
uo Non-linear tariffs can only be used under certain conditions. The firm has to have some market power, perfect 
arbitrage must not be possible and ^>Mpynegated demand data have to be available. See: Mitchell. BAI. and I. 
Vogelsang (1991a), p.74.
121 Assuming that the consumer can be forced to reveal his or her individual preferences for the commodity. See:
Phlips, L. (1983), p.158.
122 Phlips, L. (1963), p.161.
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In this particular example the Ramsey pricing rule corresponds to the optimal two-part 
tariff. Coase showed that the two-part-tariff allows complete elimination of the dead weight 
loss. For this result to materialize, the usage charge p should be set equal to marginal cost, 
while the access charge has to be such that total costs are recovered. The only difference 
from the marginal cost pricing rule discussed in 33.2.1. is that the sum of access charges are 
transferred from consumers to the network operator.123 The fixed fee operates as a non- 
distortive head tax.124
However, the existence of cross-elasticities has to be taken into account (see chapter 1.1.2.). 
A higher access charge causes some consumers to switch off from the network which also 
reduces total demand for usage. Since the demand for access is not completely inelastic, 
non-uniform pricing for telecommunications is not efficient if it leads to marginal cost 
pricing. One has to take account of the total number of network participants. This leads to 
the problem of sorting consumers according to their willingness-to-pay for 
telecommunications services.
In chapter 1.13 it was pointed out that customers can be broadly categorised into two 
groups. Household demand mainly depends on disposable income and on the price. 
Business demand instead is less price-elastic and varies with the business cycle. It, 
moreover, varies among different sectors of the economy. Business demand is concentrated 
on the service sector which relies on telecommunications services as an important input of 
production.
I assume that there are only two groups of consumers: Households (H) are consumers with 
low demand, while business (B) have a high demand for the telephone service. Then a two- 
part-tariff may not be optimal if both consumer groups pay the same access fee A/2. A/2 
may exceed the total utility which H can derive from participating in the network. In that 
case H prefers to disconnect If the two consumer groups can be identified, prices for each 
of them are determined separately. They face different access fees. H’s access fee would be 
small enough to induce it to stay in the network. Thus, in the case of heterogeneous 
consumer groups a discriminatory two-part tariff is applied. The inverse elasticity rule 
carries over to non-linear pricing. Business customers have a lower elasticity of demand for 
access than households. A higher access price for B then can be used to subsidise the access 
ofH .125
Although so far non-linear pricing has referred to the single product case, the two-part 
tariff discussed above can be viewed also as a tariff for two services: access and usage. 
However, multiproduct nonlinear pricing refers to services which do not have a hierarchical
123 See for intranet!: Brown, SJ. and D.S. Sibley (1986), p.67.
12* Mitchell, B.M. and K. Vogelsang (1991a), p36.
123 |n  this respect the Ramsey pricing rule corresponds to the aims of redistribution.
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relationship.126 In telecommunications it occurs in the form of bundling. Bundling arises 
when two services are offered in fixed proportions.
A multi-part tariff then can be applied to take account of different consumer preferences. 
In practice one does not observe smooth non-linear tariffs. Instead, frequently tariffs 
consist of discrete parts, called blocks. These blocks are discrete intervals within which the 
same (marginal) price applies. Brown and Sibley define a multi-part-tariff as ” a nonuniform 
price schedule with a finite number, n, o f rate steps, where n> 2'^ ri Thus, the multipart tariff 
can be written
P(<ll) “ Pi for 0 < q < qx
P(<fe) " P2 for qj < q < qj
p(qn) -  Pn for q«-i < q < qn
Figure 3.2. illustrates a two part and a four part tariff.
Figure 3.2.: Two-part and four-part tariffs
A is the access price. For any unit consumed the customer has to pay pj which is the slope 
of the line. If Pj — pj for all units consumed, a two-part tariff occurs. Alternatively a four- 
part tariff is depicted if the price (slope) is changed at certain quantities. For all units until 
qj a price pj has to be paid. For additional units until q2 the price falls to etc- Thus> 
figure 3.2. depicts a four-part tariff of a declining block type which is common for
telecommunications.
If there is a finite number T of discrete consumer types then a block tariff which comprises 
T parts is optimaL It would render the same result as a smooth tariff. By selecting a certain
1» Access and usage are in a hierarchical relationship since the demand for access is derived from the consumer 
surplus stemming from usage.
127 Brown, SJ. and D.S. Sibley (1986), pM
81
tariff customers would sort themselves into the group they belong to. However, costs of 
metering rise with additional blocks as do the cost of optimization and comprehension for 
customers. Transaction costs then reduce the optimal number of rate steps.128 
A pure bundling strategy129 is applied if both products are offered together at a given price. 
The customer cannot buy the individual services separately. This, for instance, was applied 
in the US before 1984 in the case of flat-mte pricing. The latter consists of a fixed monthly 
price for access and local usage. The effect is that additional local calls have a price of zero, 
once the flat-rate is paid for.
A mixed bundling strategy instead is applied if both products are offered separately and also 
as a  package of both. Thus, the consumer can choose to pay for access and each local call 
separately cm* to take a flat-rate. For a consumer with a high demand for local calls the 
latter becomes attractive. These mixed bundling strategies are increasingly applied in the 
USA and GB. If economies in the bundling process and complementarity in consumption is 
excluded, it can be shown that mixed bundling leads to higher sales than either pure 
bundling or simple monopoly pricing. This may be explained with the following example. A 
consumer may have a reservation price for access which is below the marginal cost, while 
the price for calls is below the reservation price for usage. Thus if both services are sold 
separately the particular consumer does not interconnect. He or she then would make 
phone c a lls  by using a public telephone box. If the individual’s reservation price for usage is 
above the marginal cost, a flat-rate price could be offered which makes the consumer join 
the network. Depending on the distribution of the consumers’ reservation prices, mixed 
bundling also can produce the highest profits.130
Total revenue and total volume discounts are increasingly applied by telecommunications 
operators. The heterogeneity of services thereby leads to a preference for total revenue 
discounts.131 They require that larger demand be more elastic than «nailer demand. Large 
business customers can install their own private networks thereby bypassing the public 
switched network. The alternative to switch to substitutive networks makes their demand 
more elastic.
Hence, price discrimination may increase total welfare. A monopolist can maximise profit 
and increase consumer welfare by offering a series of optimal multi-part-tariffs. Consumers 
then can choose their best combination of fixed and variable payments.132 If there is no 
break-even constraint a uniform average price equal to marginal cost is optimal. However,
12« Mitchell, B M  and I. Vogelsang (1991a), p. 104.
129 Here and in the following compare: Phiips, L. (1983), p. 176/177.
130 Mixed bundling becomes the most profitable strategy if some customers have a reservation price below
marginal cost for a particular service. Pure bundling instead becomes more profitable when reservation prices 
are more uniform. See in detail: Phlips, L. (1983), p.180-183.
131 Different quality of services makes an aggregation of quantity discounts difficult to apply. See: Mitchell, B.M.
and L Vogelsang (1991a), p.113.
132 This is shown for instance in: Brown, SJ. and D.S. Sibley (1986), pM.
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if a nonnegative profit is required, non-linear prices are better tha uniform ones. The more 
tariff levels are introduced ceteris paribus, the higher is the welfare gain133 because 
customers get a wider variety of tariff packages from which they can select. This shows that 
quantity discounts do not rest only on cost differences between serving large and small 
customers. Since the inverse elasticity rule also applies for non-linear pricing quantity, 
premia and discounts are also justified by differences in demand elasticities.
Technological advance and especially intelligent network services in the future may limit 
the scope for non-linear pricing. The existence of open access may make it difficult for 
operators to discriminate between different categories of use and user. Thus ISDN and 
broad-band technology may lead to simple tariff solutions loading most costs on to access 
fees.
333. Optimal Pricing, Universal Service and Equity
Before applying the general principles of optimal pricing for telecommunications I briefly 
review the present pricing schemes in EC member countries. While a detailed comparison 
is carried out in chapter 12.2.2. in what follows I outline those features which have 
prevailed in almost all countries which have granted a de jure monopoly to public network 
operators. The actual pricing policy then will be compared with optimal pricing criteria as 
derived from the previous discussion.
Some general conclusions have already been made for usage-sensitive and non-sensitive 
charges. In what follows the considerations of optimal price setting are applied to access 
charges and usage-sensitive tariffs in a more specific manner. The kinds of price 
discrimination among user groups, which could increase overall welfare, are of special 
interest.
333.1. General Features of Actual Tariff Schemes in the EC 
Universal service at a uniform price:
This terminology has been popular to characterise the polity of public provision of 
telephone services. The intention is to emphasize the public firm’s obligation to consider 
social aims and goals of integration.
The concept of universal service at a uniform price is aimed at providing a means of 
integration of society by offering every household the same opportunity to join the 
telephone network (without regard to individual cost differences). In the European context 
the notion of a public service is rooted in the idea that all citizens in a country have the
133 T h i s  h o l d s  o n l y  if it is assumed that there are no other costs involved with raising the number of tariff*. If, for 
instance, a more detailed tariff package requires customers to devote considerable time to figure out the 
individually optimal solution, the opportunity costs of time will establish an upper limit for the number of rate
steps.
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right to certain basic services on equal terms.134 As was pointed out in chapter 3.1.6. this 
more complex concept cannot be defended by the network externality alone. It is a 
demand-related concept of "fairness*135 which implies a right of access to the telephone 
network for everybody. It implicitly leads to a weighting of customer classes according to 
distributional aims. Distributional pricing uses the correlation between income and the 
demand for specific services. Services consumed relatively more by poor customers would 
receive greater weights in the welfare maximisation problem.136 However, the target of uni­
versal service has been almost achieved in industrialized countries, where about 90% of 
households have access to the telephone system.
Given the break-even constraint, the principle of universal service implies that a large 
portion of access cost is recovered in charges for usage. Given the demand elasticities, this 
leads to a cross-subsidisation which directly contradicts Ramsey pricing rules.
Uniformity of the price implies that disregarding his or her location, each consumer has to 
pay the same amount for the same service. Local calls are priced the same everywhere. 
Long-distance calls are only priced according to the distance traversed, the duration and 
the day time of the call The cost considerations made in chapter 2.1.1.5 instead imply that 
prices should vary according to the density of the route, not the distance. For both services, 
the averaging over a large number of subscribers implies a subsidy from high density to low 
density areas.
Redistribuiioa among customers:
In contrast to the aim of integration, which led to cross subsidies among different regions 
as described above, the tariff system also implies a cross subsidy among groups of 
customers. In all EC member countries and the USA before divestiture, long-distance 
charges far exceed costs. Additional revenues are used to subsidise the local service and 
access. Again the estimates of price elasticity of demand suggest that this is in direct 
contradiction of the inverse elasticity rule derived in chapter 33.22. Cross-subsidisation 
from long-distance services to local service cannot be justified on the grounds of 
externalities or value based pricing. It has developed partly accidentally. Technological 
advance reduced the cost of long-distance calls over time, while the cost of the local 
network and access remained constant. Keeping nominal prices constant implied that over 
time the augmenting profits from long-distance services made up for increasing losses in 
the local network. The increasing profits in the long-distance market were easy to hide 
given that they relied on cost reductions and not on price increases. While the increasing
134 The universal service goal was explicitly defined in the wording of the 1934 Communications Act in the USA. It 
asks mto make available, so far as possible, to ail people of the United States, a rapid, efficient, nationwide and 
worldwide win and radio communications service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges * Compare: 
1934 Communications Act, 47 USC 214.
13* In contrast to a supply related concept which asks for a "fair* allocation of costs. See in more detail chapter
333.4.
13* See in more detail: Bfa, D. (1965).
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cross-subsidisation was only a matter of book-keeping for the telephone company, it 
became politically popular because of a redistribution mainly from business to residential 
customers137. The high concentration of the bulk of long-distance calls on a small number 
of customers ensured that the median customer was better off although the mean customer 
was worse off compared to a subsidy-free tariff scheme. While it serves the politician's 
interest, the aross-subsidisation did not require a deliberate tariff policy but could be 
achieved by the regulator’s passiveness. The technological progress allowed politicians to 
avoid politically sensitive price changes. However, as was pointed out, the evolving cross­
subsidy directly contradicts principles of optimal pricing and hence creates an increasing 
efficiency loss. It cannot be defended by demand externalities or Ramsey pricing.
It can be shown that related objectives of redistribution can be reached in a more efficient 
manner138. Moreover, even the redistributive effect is less dear cut than is normally 
claimed. Business and rich customers also use the subsidised local service and profit from 
the low access rate. The long-distance charge has to be paid for by all customers 
disregarding their income. Since businesses normally pass on their costs in their prices, 
residential customers are subsidised by a sales tax on products which involve high 
telephone service. The redistribution effect becomes blurred since it cannot be evaluated 
which customers consume those services more intensively.
The inefficiencies which occur from telephone tariffs being used as a means of income 
redistribution therefore are threefold. They create high efficiency losses since the tariff 
scheme directly contradicts optimal pricing rules. The redistributive effect is small since the 
subsidy is spread among a large number of customers disregarding individual income. And 
finally the extra "tax" burden is spread among consumers of services with high 
telecommunications inputs, disregarding their personal income.
More recent studies for the USA, moreover, raise some doubts whether the cross­
subsidisation has any redistributive income effects at all. Crandall, for instance, has shown 
that low income subscribers in the mid 1980s spent about USJ 7 to USJ 25 a month for 
local service and between USJ 17 to USJ 21 a month on long-distance services. Thus, even 
for low income subscribers it may be the case that an abolition of the cross-subsidisation 
does not have negative effects on income. The increase in local charges may be greatly 
offset by lower long-distance rates.139
An analysis of Southwestern Bell’s regional traffic showed that the long-distance usage of 
lower income users increased much more than for the average residential subscriber as a 
response to the rebalancing of tariffs after AT&T’s divestiture. The average customer of
137 see for instance: Kahn, A.E. (1984), p. 144,
1» see for «««*»■«»• Bfe, D. (1983), pp.171, and; Heuermann, K.H. (1984), pp. 137-145.
** Compare: Crandall, R. W. (1991), p. 108/109.
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the US *Lifeline* concept140 spent approximately the same share of the total telephone bill 
on long-distance services as the average residential customer.141
3.33.2. Optimal Telephone Tariffs
Applying the principles of optimal pricing as developed before may lead to a conflict with 
the universal service goal However, even if the latter is given priority the previous 
discussion has shown that it cannot justify the present subsidy scheme. The latter mainly 
gives subsidies to the inframarginal consumer who effectively becomes a free rider with 
respect to the goal of universal access. Instead subsidies should be targeted at the marginal 
consumer. This fosters the goal of universal access and the goal of income redistribution. 
More efficient subsidy programs have been developed in the US. They are in chapter 6. 
The discussion of efficient pricing rules leads to the conclusion that the cross-subsidy to 
poor customers would be best regarded as an additional fixed cost which has to be covered 
by other consumers. According to the theory of non-uniform pricing, better designed tariffs 
allow the subsidy while making other consumers better off.
If cost based prices for access are deemed too high for some customers, they should either 
be reimbursed by the government or receive a tax deduction for the service.142
Optimal Access Charges
The Ramsey pricing rule and the Coase result for a two-part-tariff both lead to the result 
that access should bear a relatively high burden of common costs. Tlie very low price 
elasticity of demand makes it unlikely that customers switch off if the access price is 
increased. The access charge, moreover, does not generate an efficiency loss since it is 
usage-insensitive.
Quite to the contrary, in all EC member states access is priced much below marginal cost. 
This dearly contradicts the pricing rules derived above. It is justified by the network 
externality. In chapter 333.1., however, it was pointed out that the latter diminishes once 
universal coverage has been achieved. Moreover, even if the latter justified a subsidisation 
of access, the Ramsey pricing rule has demonstrated that the present regime of subsidizing 
access by highly elastic long-distance services is especially ineffident. In the following I 
discuss alternative means to achieve the universal service goal.
If both the cost structure and demand elasticities are taken into account the following 
criteria for optimal access charges can be derived:
140 Lifeline program» subsidise low income household’s telephone services. In detail see chapter 6.
mi Compare: Larson, A-, T. Makarewicz, and C. Monson (1988); and Makarewicz, T. (1990).
Mi Faulhaber, G JL (1983), p.23.
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1) Price differentiation according to costs of access: The costs of access vary with the 
distance of the individual subscriber from the local switch and the density of 
subscribers in the local network. Hie further away the individual subscriber is and the 
lower the density, the higher are access costs. Thus in principle individual tariffs 
should be charged. If the cost of extortion of individual fees or other reasons make 
unified charges for a local network necessary, the access charge should be lower for 
high density areas in general
2) Price differentiation among user groups: Part (III) discusses empirical evidence that 
demand for access is income elastic. The higher the customer’s income, the higher one 
may estimate is his or her reservation price. Higher prices for inframarginal customers 
do not lead to a disconnection from the network. Thus a uniform access price is an 
inefficient means to promote universal service. Instead price discrimination among 
customers would allow then to recover the cost of access without threatening the 
universal service goal
Price discrimination among customers may not only refer to income. Price elasticities of 
demand for access are considerably lower for business customers than for households. 
Thus, some of the business’ surplus can be transferred to the operator without changing 
marginal decisions. Higher access prices for business therefore would satisfy both, the 
criteria of network externality and the Ramsey price rule. In the US typically the monthly 
business access rate exceeds the residential one by a factor greater than 2.
Chapter 33.23. provided some hints as to how an unbundling of access charges could be 
feasible without knowing individual’s reservation prices. The network operator has to 
design a package of optional tariffs which forces customers to reveal their preferences. 
Demand for access being mainly derived demand from usage, the individual’s reservation 
price mainly depends on the surplus she derives from usage. Low users therefore may pay a 
lower access charge than high users. Figure 33. demonstrates how the self selection 
procedure could work in the case of a two-part tariff for access and usage.149
MJ For simplicity, here I neglect the existence of several services.
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Figure 3.3.: optional tariffs
A low user consuming less than qj calls in a month would prefer a low access charge At and 
a relatively high usage price pj. A customer making calls between qj and Cfa would prefer a 
higher access charge but a lower usage price. High users, finally prefer the flat rate. These 
kinds of optional tariffs were first tested by AT&T in 1983. Despite the additional 
transaction costs they are increasingly used in the US.144 AT&T’s competitors have 
subsequently introduced their own optional calling plans (OCP). These plans have become 
more and more sophisticated.145 Their effect is a marked increase in the number of calls 
made. During the first year after adopting an optional calling plan AT&T increased the 
mean minutes subscribers calls at cheap rates by 42%. The overall price elasticity of 
demand of OCP subscribers significantly exceeds the one of all residential subscribers.146 
Recently, the FCC guidelines for OCP have relaxed considerably the tariff supervision of 
regulated carriers.
Cost orientation of access charges would require a major shift towards non-tariff-sensitive 
pricing. Presently in the EC only 15% of the TOs’ revenues stem from access and rental 
charges. However, as was pointed out in part (I), in an ISDN environment about 70% of 
network costs are access related.147
144 It can be shown that suitably designed optional two-part tariffs are equivalent to nonlinear tariffs when 
consumers and suppliers have full information and no transaction cost exist for switching from one tariff to 
another. In more detail: Mitchell, B.M. and I. Vogelsang (1991a), chapter 5 and (1991b) chapter 8.
143 For instance, in 1990 AT&T adopted an optional calling plan which enables subscribers to obtain reduced
tariffs only for calls made to one specific area.
144 Mitchell, BM. and L Vogelsang (1991b), pS2.
147 Mulgan, G. (1990), p. 25.
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Optimal Local Charges
Considerations based on cost-based and value-based pricing lead in the same directions. 
Cost-based pricing requires a change in the tariff structure because technological change 
reduces the cost of long-distance calls considerably, while the cost of local usage has been 
rising1« Ramsey pricing requires that local services should bear a comparatively higher 
share of non-attributable cost in relation to long-distance service.
Further price discrimination which reflects the different costs of provision is necessary:
1) Price differentiation among local and urban areas: similar to the considerations 
made for access, the higher frequency of calls made in high density areas reduces 
usage-sensitive costs. Therefore tariffs for rural areas have to be higher.
2) Price discrimination among consumer groups: as in the case of access, the different 
elasticity of demand for business calls and households rails should lead to different 
residence and business rates. In the US, for instance, businesses pay substantially 
higher rates.1** This price discrimination, however, is generally not applied in Europe.
3) Prices according to duration of the phone call: for the local network, the costs 
directly linked with the duration of a phone call (capacity cost) have increased relative 
to the fixed costs of a phone call (set-up). Nevertheless, since every call causes set-up 
costs, the total cost of a local phone call is not proportional to the duration of a phone 
call Neumann concludes that after taking into account the cost of measurement as 
well, a local tariff consisting of a fixed surcharge and a tariff proportional to duration, 
is most efficient.
4) Peak-load pricing: It was pointed out before that marginal cost varies considerably 
between peak and off-peak periods. Especially local networks are engineered for peak 
usage. Peak-load pricing, however, is rarely applied for local services. Among the four 
EC member countries studied in some detail in part (HI) only Italy charges different 
prices for a local call depending on time of day. Peak load pricing for local calls would 
offer efficiency gains and also meet distributional aims. Peak usage usually occurs 
during office hours as a result of business use, rather than a residential one. Peak-load 
pricing therefore would raise the relative share of business customers and presumably 
reduce the burden for households.
Neumann, ICH. (1964), p. 133.
>4» See: Mitchell, BM. and I. Vogelsang (1991b), p .ll.
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Optimal Long-distance Tariffa
The rules of price discrimination which apply for local rails cany over to long-distance calls. 
Due to technological progress, distance has lost most of its impact on long-distance costs. 
This trend will be fostered by new transmission technologies (satellites, fibre-optic). In 
addition the costs of measurement for distance sensitive pricing are high. Therefore, tariffs 
disregarding distance might be optimal Peak-load pricing should be an important feature 
for long-distance tariffs.
Price discrimination according to capacity utilization leads to different prices depending on 
the time of the phone call and the route chosen. The time of the call is considered by 
different prices at the weekend and during the week as well as for day and night calls. The 
route effect can be explained by referring to the network model of figure 2.1. It was pointed 
out that the phone call of A and C could be directed through a direct line. The latter are 
installed for high density routes. The cost of the call using these routes is lower than the 
cost of a long-distance call which passes through long-distance switches. This leads to 
different prices for essentially the same service. When introduced in the UK by BT, this 
created some resistance among customers.150 While in the EC generally three pricing 
periods are applied, AT&T in 1990 filed an optional caUing-plan rate structure which 
provides for 8 separate time-of-day/day of week pricing periods.151 As far as duration is 
concerned the considerations made for the local service also hold for long-distance. 
Duration is an important feature for cost of a long-distance phone call. Therefore a tariff 
related to duration is necessary. Price discrimination among user groups (business and 
residence) can be recommended due to the different price elasticities of demand. Business 
demand is concentrated almost entirely on regular weekday working hours. Different prices 
for day and evening calls hence allows one to discriminate among customer groups. In this 
respect two contradictory effects have to be observed. On the one hand business demand is 
reckoned to be less elastic than residential demand. This, however, only held as long as 
business customers did not have substitutive networks to which they can switch. The bypass 
possibilities of private networks raise the elasticity of big users considerably and makes it 
optimal to offer volume discounts. In the US, for instance, long-distance operators offer 
switched service at bulk rates for WATS tariffs.152
Lewin, D., D. Rogerson and T. Johiuon (1969), p. 117.
131 See: Mitchell, B.M. and I. Vogelsang (1991b), p.19
is  Recently AT&T has replaced a set of optional two-part long-distance tariffs with a single nonlinear WATS 
tariff that offers increasing discounts at higher volume levels. The WATS market is highly competitive with 
AT&T’s market share down to 44%.
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3 3 3 3 . Cost-based Pricing for Network Services
Cost-based pricing has recently become a popular term among telecommunications 
regulators. The previous discussion of optimal pricing rules took costs as one major factor, 
beside the characteristics of the demand side. Cost-based pricing instead stresses the 
principle that tariffs should cover some notion of cost. Even if one agreed upon the 
principle, the previous discussion has shown that it is far from clear what cost-based tariffs 
should look like. It mainly refers to marginal-cost pricing and the ending of cross­
subsidisation. Prices which are related to costs are often regarded as being "fair" in the 
sense that the customer’s expenses should not exceed the costs which arise if he or she is 
served. However, the main rationale for cost-based pricing stems from the aim to open up 
the telecommunications network for competition. Whether facility based or service based 
competition153 is introduced, in order to avoid unfair practises by the incumbent or in 
order to avoid inefficient entry, the network operator’s tariffs have to correspond to 
underlying costs.
Finally, in the actual discussion in the EC there is a third motivation for cost-based prices. 
This is related to the inefficiencies which have come about due to the specific pricing 
patterns characterized in chapter 3.3.3.1. The discussion of optimal tariffing led to the 
conclusion that value-based pricing as a second best strategy would generate higher static 
efficiency gains than cost-based pricing. This, however, only holds for optimally applied 
value-based pricing. In all EC member states and the US before divestiture monopoly 
prices were substantially distorted by political pressure. The comparison of actual features 
of telephone pricing as they have prevailed under monopoly provision in all industrialized 
countries and optimal tariffs has shown that a move towards cost-based pricing actually 
corresponds also to value-based pricing goals. Even if the extent of rebalancing is disputed, 
it is generally agreed upon that cost-based pricing requires lower long-distance and higher 
local charges. This corresponds to the Ramsey-pricing rule. A conflict may arise only for 
access charges. The optimal non-uniform tariff would raise access charges substantially; 
even beyond marginal costs. This conflicts with the goal of universal service. However, 
several reasons were put forward why the universal service goal can be achieved with cost- 
based pricing.
The main problem with value-based Ramsey prices is that in certain circumstances they are 
not subsidy-free.154 If they are not, the monopolist may require legal entry barriers to be
133 See in more detail chapter 4.
154 In detail Faulhaber, G. (1983), p. 17.
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sustainable. Sustainable prices p* are defined by two properties:1"
a) p* q(p*) - Qq(p*)] > 0 (3.23)
b) no quantities and prices pe, qe exist, such that p*q* - C(q*) > 0 and p¡e < p¡*
for some i and q* < D*(p*,pe). (3-24)
However, it is not obvious that Ramsey prices in the telecommunications network are 
unsustainable. In effect optimal value-based prices may very well be sustainable.156 In this 
context it is important to distinguish whether the incumbent is unsustainable due to the 
tariff structure chosen or due to technology and the underlying cost function. When it is 
claimed that European 7 0 s are not sustainable then normally reference is made to the 
tariff structure. However, the nonsustainability of the present tariff scheme in EC member 
countries is not caused by a price policy following the principles of static efficiency. It is 
reckoned to come about rather because TOs have failed to adapt their prices to the 
technology driven changes of underlying costs. It was pointed out that (political) inertia 
rather than distributional aims are the origin for the present tariff structure. The present 
price regime in EC member countries therefore cannot be justified by either static or 
dynamic efficiency goals. It contradicts value-based and cost-based pricing principles. It is 
likely to create severe efficiency losses by attracting too many resources to underpriced and 
too few to overpriced services. The empirical estimates which I have carried out for four 
member countries indicate that no dose substitutes exist for telephone service. This has 
protected the network monopolies from substitutive competition in spite of their tariff 
policy. Moreover, regulators traditionally have foreclosed entry and exit in the industry. 
This has ensured that interest groups have captured the price-setting procedure. Since the 
main aim of cost-based pricing is to generate the environment for competition, previously 
discussed concepts of stand-alone and incremental costs become relevant. Stand-alone cost 
is the average cost of providing a particular service. It represents a maximum price in a 
truly competitive market Incremental cost is the average additional cost per unit of 
providing the service. Incremental cost is lower than stand-alone cost if cost savings are 
possible from joint provision of services. It represents a lower bound on a price.
Prices are a signal to consumers and potential competitors as to how much to consume and 
to produce of a certain good. They are signals for investors too. Cost-based pricing then
us Compare Mitchell, B M  and I. Vogelsang (1991a), p.124.
U* Baumol, Bailey and Willig have argued that a monopolist actually may be forced to implement Ramsey prices 
to protea itself against inefficient entry. They argue that Ramsey prices are the only sustainable ones when 
the monopolist has got only local information on costs and demand. See: Baumol, J. E.E. Bailey and R.D. 
Willig (1977). On the other hand Einhom has shown that cost-based prices are not necessarily sustainable. If 
large customers have the option to leave the network for an intermodal supplier (bypass), an optimal non- 
uniform price schedule may indude prices below marginal cost for these customers. In detail: Einhom, M. 
(1987), pp-550-563.
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ensures that society’s scarce resources are used in the most efficient fashion.157 Cost 
orientation of prices may be preferred to value-based pricing if the efficiency gains from 
competition are higher than the static efficiency losses due to prices deviating from the 
Ramsey rule.
Competitive pressure, moreover, precludes tariff distortions which have prevailed 
throughout the Community. While cost-based prices are a precondition for the opening of 
the market, on the other hand entry itself forces incumbents to apply more efficient pricing 
schemes. Empirical evidence from the UK and the US has shown that competition 
motivated the incumbents BT and AT&T to introduce a large variety of tariff packages. 
This is discussed in more detail in chapter 11. In the Uk the rebalancing from 1984-88 led 
to fourteen different tariff packages. Since then this number has risen further.
The "critical mass" argument could be used against the cost-based principle for tariffs. 
Critical mass issues favour strategic pricing. The network operator may wish to encourage 
the use of the network, or of certain services in order to reach the critical-mass point This 
may require pricing below cost for a limited period of time. If obliged to stick to mechanical 
cost principles, prices may not be optimal. The critical-mass argument therefore is often 
used to justify public provision and strategic subsidies (see the Minitel case). In effect it 
may rather be taken to justify competition and privatisation. New services and strategic 
pricing involve high risk. The latter are more likely to be taken into account if decision 
makers face the risk of failure. Regulators can force TOs to apply cost-based pricing. 
However, they normally are not able to decide when strategic pricing is justified. 
Competition would force TOs to apply cost-based pricing without a bureaucratic 
requirement With regard to a regulated monopolist in the case of competitive pressure no 
restriction on strategic pricing would be necessary (see chapter 4).
Cost-based pricing requires substantial rebalancing of tariffs in EC member countries. This 
was seen after 1984 in the UK and the USA (see part (HI)). Several authors have estimated 
the probable welfare effects of a rebalancing of telephone tariffs. Obviously the results vary 
considerably depending on the underlying assumptions. However, in general the overall 
welfare effects are reckoned to be substantial. Crandall estimated the annual welfare gains 
from repricing through 1988 to range from US$ 664 million to USS 1.4 billion in the 
USA.158
He also estimated the impact of tariff rebalancing on income distribution aftej^ the 
divestiture of AT&T. &  ~ j f V  %
Crandall comes to the conclusion that telephone rates as a means of redistribution, a
costly, "reducing social output by more them two dollars for every dollar transfcrre^Jro^H i
157 Compare: Faulhaber, G. (1983), p. 13.
1» Crandall, R.W. (1991) p. 164. See also: Griffin, J.M. (1982), p. 59,64 and 66. Wenders, J.T. (1987), p. 82-89. For 
We* Germany: Neumann, K.H., Schweizer, U and C.C. von Weizsäcker (1983), p.84.
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income to lower-ineome households. It is far better to target subsidies to very ¡ow-income 
households through Universal service funds.'1S9
333.4. Cost Distribution: Station-to-Station versus Board-to-Board Calculation
As was pointed out before, the main problem of cost-based pricing the allocation of joint 
cost
From the very beginning, the proper allocation of costs between different services has been 
disputed. As is pointed out in chapter 2.1.1.6., the assignment of cost of the telephone 
network is especially difficult because of the high share of joint costs. It has been estimated 
that 70% to 90% of the cost of the local loop are common cost to local and long-distance 
services.160 Due to this problem, essentially two approaches appeared, which differ in the 
prop«' definition of a long-distance call.
Going back to the simple model of the telephone network (figure 2.1.), the problem occurs 
whether the phone call made from A to D is totally "long-distance” or, whether the part 
from A to the local board and again the channeling through the local board of D are 
considered local In the latter case only the part of the phone call which actually connects 
the two local switches is considered to be "long-distance”.
The discussion of separation of cost has a long tradition in the USA161. The first concept is 
called “station-to-station": the entire call is considered to be long-distance. The 
consequence is that the long-distance service has to contribute to the cost of the local 
network. This corresponds to the concept of 'fully distributed costs' according to which the 
long-distance service should bear some part of the non-traffic-sensitive costs of subscriber 
access162. The station-to-station approach would lead to a burden sharing of long-distance 
and local services according to the relative usage of the network. The technical drawback of 
this mechanism is that the actual calculation of the adequate contribution of long-distance 
is difficult to assess.
The second approach is called "board-to-board": the local service has to recover all costs of 
the local network. The board-to-board concept is easier to administer by having separate 
accounts for local and long-distance networks. The board-to-board principle apportions all 
the costs of the local loop to local services. A long-distance call would be charged for two 
local calls and the cost of the inter-exchange between them. The board-to-board principle 
was applied in the USA following the Minnesota Rate Case of 1913.163
1» Crandall, R.W. (1991), p. 164.
MO Huber, P (1987).
1*1 jee in detail: Temin, P. and Galambos, L (1987), p.19-27. 
1« Kahn, AM. (1964), p. 142.
1« Mulgan, G. (1990), p. 22.
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Recalling the cost breakdown made in chapter 2.1.1.2., it is obvious that the board-to-board 
system assigns the main part of overall cost to the local network and access. In the USA the 
controversy about the appropriate accounting system was brought to the Supreme Court. In 
Smith vsJllinois Bell (1930) the Court concluded that since the exchange properties were 
used for both services the board-to-board system was inadequate164. Intrastate (and later 
inter-state) rates therefore had to be calculated on a station-to-station basis165. In Europe 
as well fully-distributed-cost pricing has been judged to be "fair” by regulators. Eveiy 
consumer pays his or her attributable cost and a certain part of the unattributable costs. 
The rationale for this procedure is that local and long-distance services are complementary 
in demand. Parts of the local network cost should be allocated to usage and then divided 
among local and long-distance services according to their relative share of usage.
The counter argument is that complementarity of services does not exist on the supply side. 
The production of one product (service) does not automatically yield a given amount of the 
other one. Therefore the long-distance tariff should only reflect the additional costs which 
are inflicted by long-distance calls. This reflects the incremental costs of providing a long­
distance service. The station-to-station principle thus implies a cross-subsidy from long­
distance service to local service inasmuch as the contributions of the former exceed 
incremental costs. While having been quite viable in the case of public provision, fully- 
distributed-cost pricing is challenged in a liberalised environment. It puts the incumbent at 
a disadvantage and may lead to an inefficient bypass.166 It is mainly based on accounting 
principles rather than on economic principles. "The accounting approach subordinates the 
outcome to the process, and in doing so may neglect efficiency.'161
The emergence of VANS has made cost allocation even more difficult. The proliferation of 
a multitude of services all using the same integrated digital capacity switches undermines 
mechanical cost formulas.
1«  see: Hoiwitz, R. B. (1989), p.104.
Tcmin, P. and L Galambagos (1987), p. 22.
ltt Braeudgam has shown that fully-distributed-coft pricing is not optimal for public enteiprises either. Compared 
to Ramsey pricing it leads to efficiency losses. See: Braeudgam, RJl. (1980).
M7 Mitchell, B.M. and I. Vogelsang (1991a), p.144.
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3 A. Pablk Provision versos the Regulation of a Private Monopolist
State intervention can be justified on the basis of welfare economics or it may be based on 
aims of income redistribution. As was argued already in chapter 3.3-3.3. the use of an 
industry sector for distributional aims is highly inefficient. A given redistributional effect 
can be obtained more efficiently by tax policies than by telecommunications tariff 
schemes.168 For this reason I concentrated in the previous chapters on the normative theory 
of regulation which explains state intervention by market failure. The discussion of the 
sustainability of a natural monopoly, however, has shown that the level of state intervention 
may vary considerably with the degree of market failure. If a natural monopoly exists which 
is sustainable, entry can be fully allowed for. The threat of potential entry already imposes 
some discipline on the incumbent. The level of entry barriers and the incumbent's cost 
advantages determine the degree of the entry threat. If the natural monopoly is not 
sustainable, there will be a tradeoff of static efficiency losses in case of entry and dynamic 
efficiency gains due to competitive pressure. If the latter is estimated to be higher, one may 
take off all non-sustainable obligations from the incumbent’s tariff structure and pay for the 
extra burden (infrastructural tasks) by government subsidies or by a special surcharge 
imposed on competitors. Finally, of course, the trade-off may favour the exclusion of 
competitors. Then institutional entry barriers may bar competition altogether. This has 
been the outcome in Europe in the past.
Natural monopoly characteristics, public good aspects and high entry barriers for 
telecommunications networks led regulators to the conclusion that a market solution would 
not be optimal for society as a whole. Instead a state monopoly was created for 
telecommunications networks. The concept of state monopoly deviates considerably from 
the economic interpretation of monopoly. It implies a regulatory action of the state. The 
latter grants exclusive or special rights to an enterprise to provide a certain service.169 The 
state monopoly does not necessarily imply public ownership. Exclusive or special rights can 
also be granted to a private enterprise.170 Public ownership and regulated private 
ownership then appear to be the two alternative methods of pursuing public policy goals. In 
the EC the TTT-model" has been dominant The Ministry for Post and 
Telecommunications runs the telecommunications network. Being the owner of the 
enterprise, the state is responsible for the firm’s business strategy and the regulation of 
market access. In the US, in contrast, AT&T has always been a private entity which is
ms This is also explained in: Faulhaber, G.R. (1983), pp.14-15.
W An cxdusive right constitutes a monopoly. Special rights already allow for some competition. The latter is, for 
instance, the case in the UK where in 1984 competition was limited between BT and Mercury. A state 
monopoly does not exist if the state only establishes a set of non-discriminatoiy licensing criteria which all 
network operators have to fulfil. See in more detail part (III).
170 in Spain, for instance, the majority of Telefonica’s shares are held privately.
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regulated by the FCC. Both approaches were justified by market failure which arguably did 
not allow the liberalisation of telecommunications networks.
However, during the last decade the discussion shifted to regulatory failure. It became 
obvious that market failure does not automatically imply that regulation is a superior 
solution.171 Market failure is only a necessary condition for government regulation. 
However, one has also to demonstrate that regulation can offer a remedy.172 The positive 
theory of regulation as developed for instance by Stigler argues that state intervention 
cannot be expected to follow a welfare maximising approach. Instead politicians pursue 
their own interests by maximising votes in future elections. They may be captured by 
powerful interest groups.173 According to the public choice theory this rent-seeking 
behaviour of civil servants and politicians leads to efficiency losses which exceed the dead­
weight loss related to monopoly provision.174 More recent research has led to the 
conclusion that most of the monopoly rent can become a loss to the economy due to the 
resources spent by rent-seeking activities.175 Ample evidence was found that the TTT- 
model” created significant inefficiencies on its own. The most obvious one was already 
discussed when describing the deviations of the actual tariff structure from the optimal one. 
Beside the political pressure for tariff averaging, most of the time monopoly operators do 
not have an analytical accountancy system and do not exactly know their cost structure. 
More sophisticated tariff principles are therefore not applicable. Inefficiencies arise also 
internally. They are related to the absence of sufficient means to control firm’s 
performance. These X-inefficiencies and additional rents offered to employees may 
increase the firm’s cost significantly.176 Additionally technical inefficiencies arise due to 
inappropriate investment decisions caused by a management pursuing its own interests. 
According to the prindpal-agent theory efficiency losses arise since the owner (principal) 
cannot completely control the firm’s management (agent), or control itself becomes too 
costly. Tax payers as the owners of the public enterprise have less supervisory control than 
shareholders in the case of a private company. Thus, informational problems of the 
principal are estimated to be higher for a public enterprise. Often it is claimed that public 
firms maximise turnover instead of overall welfare or profits. This leads to a firm size which 
is too big. Public enterprises are also notorious for not satisfying qualitative efficiency.177
iti See for iniunce: Müller, J. (1962), p.182; Braeutigam, R-R. (1989), pp. 1299; and: Joskow, P.L. and N.L. Rose 
(1989).
in  Noll, R.G. (1989), p. 1258.
173 Compare: Stigler, G. (1971); and: Knieps, G. (1988), pp.55-59.
17« See In more detail: Noll, R.G. (1989), pp. 1262-1277.
175 An example for this is modelled in chapter 4322. See also Tirole, J. (1989), pp. 76-77; and: Blankart, C.B.
(1983), pp.l52>155.
it* See: Kruse, J. and G. Yarrow (1985), p.15.
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The supply is limited to standardised products. The introduction of product differentiation 
is resisted since it complicates monitoring, raises the risk of failure and does not offer 
sufficient rewards to the management Deregulation then becomes a response to regulatory 
failure. It should occur if the cost of regulation exceed the transaction costs of a change 
plus the costs of market failure.178 To what extent these theoretical arguments apply to the 
European PTTs is discussed in part (HI).
As will be seen, regulatory failure and changing markets require an institutional reform in 
Europe. Basically three different concepts appear available. First, one may switch from 
public provision to the regulation of a private monopolist The transfer of BTs ownership 
in the UK follows this road. After describing the past history of public control of BT as a 
major policy failure, Vickers and Yarrow concluded that the privatisation programme of 
BT "can be regarded as a policy response to an intractable institutional weakness."
The second alternative is to introduce competition while not changing ownership. As will be 
seat in chapter 7 this is the Commission's approach. Deregulation in the sense of an 
abolition of exclusive or special rights must not be linked to privatisation.179
Finally, both steps can be combined. This was the approach eventually chosen in the UK.
At first sight the transfer of ownership may have certain advantages. Often public 
corporations lack clearly defined objectives. The business strategy varies more with a 
change in government than with market developments. Clearer objectives and an 
institutional structure that reduces state involvement then may be expected from 
privatisation. Hence, the biggest advantage of privatisation may be to raise obstacles to 
intervention. It is a form of political self-controL180 Littlechild concludes that private firms 
are more likely to apply optimal pricing rules.181
However, many of the shortcomings of European PTTs also arise in case of a regulated 
private firm. First, regulators can be captured by political interest groups as much as 
politicians. The tariff structure in the USA before divestiture of AT&T corresponded to the 
features described for European PTTs. Political pressure ensured an efficiency distorting
177 in public enterprises qualitative efficiency may be distorted in both directions. Besides offering a low quality 
level, it has been argued that sometimes a quality standard is obtained which is more than optimal. Facing the 
alternative either to reinvest into the network or to subsidise external budgets, a PTT management may have 
an incentive to overinvest. Compare: Kruse, J. (1985), pp.251-252,
n* Noll, R.G. (1909), p.1260.
179 Since increased competition often leads to more regulation in what follows I use the term liberalisation” 
instead of "deregulation".
ift> Another advantage which is related to higher internal efficiency due to takeover threats which exist for private
enterprises, is not likely to apply for big network operators. Compare: Vickers, J. and G. Yarrow (1965), p. 15.
i»i Littlechild, S.C. (1983), pp3*9,375.
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toll-to-local subsidy. AT&T obtained a regulation which guaranteed its profits and offered 
protection against competition and antitrust.182
Second, regulation itself may create new incentives to deviate from aims of efficiency. 
Besides price and output, other variables exist under the management’s control (R&D, 
quality of services, managerial effort). Thus, while the regulator’s control is concentrated 
on prices and output, the management may pursue its own interests among the others. 
While regulation is directed towards allocative efficiency, technical and qualitative 
efficiency are likely to be neglected since they are more difficult to quantify. The Averch- 
Johnson effect shows how price control leads to distortions of capital expenditure decisions 
in case of rate-of-retum regulation. Under rate-of-retum regulation prices are set to allow 
the company to recover its expenses, capital (deprecation charges) and to earn a "fair" 
return on capital.183 In theory, rate-of-retum regulation does not give incentives to the firm 
to reduce costs. It will overutilize capital relative to labour since capital investment raises 
the rate base. This is in the management’s interest if expected profits exceed the allowed 
return on capital. Rate-of-retum regulation cannot be optimal since no objective function is 
maximised.
Third, the regulator faces a lack of information. Since no other firms exist in the market, 
the regulator depends exclusively on information which is provided by the firm. The 
enterprise’s management then can influence regulation by withholding or releasing certain 
information. Thus, information is imperfect and unequally distributed between the 
regulator and the firm.
Fourth, the firm’s investment decision depends on expected regulatory decisions since the 
latter influences its profitability to a considerable extent. The investment in specific and 
durable assets depends, for instance, upon expectations about allowable prices. Investors 
then may shrink from investment in sunk-cost technology since regulators ex post are able 
to reduce prices without risking supply failures.184
Hence one may conclude that the transfer of ownership alone does not solve the regulator’s 
problem. In both frameworks of state intervention the objectives remain the same while 
only some constraints change.
However, this perception may change if a policy of liberalisation is also envisaged. Several 
reasons then may favour a transfer of ownership and indirect regulatory supervision to 
public control A privately owned firm is more likely to respond to competitive pressure. 
Employees of European PITs are civil servants who cannot be layed off. In the past the
10 See in more detail chapter 6 and; Wenders, J.T. (1988), pp. 16-19.
Noll, R.G. (1991), p.43.
»4 See: Helm, D. and G. Yarrow (1988), p.5.
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PITs were often used as a means for countercyclical employment programs, thus 
employees were hired in times of recession disregarding the firm’s own needs. As a result 
they are often overstaffed. In some cases governments force PITs to make high side 
payments to the federal budget which exceed those which were necessary if the PTT was 
liable to taxes. Internal inflexibility, government’s responsiveness to sensitive political 
issues185 and their interest to divert the firm’s profits towards external purposes then put 
public enterprises at a disadvantage in a competitive environment. Public enterprises, 
moreover, can be expected to be more difficult to control than private ones in a competitive 
environment In chapter 43.13. it is argued that predatory pricing as a strategic behaviour is 
not very likely to occur for profit maximising firms. This, however, changes if the public 
firm’s management becomes an output maximiser.
When privatised, state intervention can be expected to diminish, as was seen in the case of 
BT. The firm’s flexibility to react to competitive pressure has to be increased significantly. 
A privatised firm, moreover, has the advantage of being given clearly defined objectives 
and observable measures of performance (the share price).186 This is crucial if inefficient 
entry shall be fenced off. On the other hand, the privatised incumbent enjoys considerable 
market power even if entry is liberalised. In order to avoid strategic behaviour regulatory 
supervision has to continue.187
For this purpose, some regulatory changes have been introduced. In recent years regulators 
have switched from rate-of-retum regulation to price-cap regulation. Price-cap regulation 
sets a certain price ceiling for a bundle of services which cannot be exceeded by the firm.188 
Within the ceiling the regulated firm is free to choose its own prices.
Thus price-cap regulation has four properties:189
1) The regulator directly sets a ceiling for prices charged by the firm
2) These ceilings are defined for baskets of services.
3) The price indexes of services are adjusted periodically by a factor which is exogenous 
to the firm.
4) In longer intervals the adjustment factors and baskets are reviewed.
us Like the rebalancing of tariffs, 
u* Vickers, J. and G. Yarrow (1985), p.l3.
U7 As can be seen in chapter 6, however, the US experience in the long distance market has shown that as 
competition develops, the regulatory supervision is relaxed.
u* For instance, AT&T» services were divided into four baskets with different price-cap«. It is permitted to 
restructure the rates within one basket, but not across baskets. See: Rohlfs, J.H. (1990), p.9.
«* See: Acton, JJ*. and L Vogelsang (1989), pp369-372.
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Most price-cap regulation permits rates to be raised by a certain percentage per year. The 
percentage depends on general economic conditions (for instance inflation) and does not 
depend on the firm’s performance. However, the performance will influence the 
renegotiation at the end of the term. The regulatory lag offers some incentives to the firm 
to reduce costs and thereby raise profits.190
Compared to rate-of-retum regulation the flexibility of tariffing is increased and 
competitive responses to entry can be made.191 Rate-of-retum regulation lets regulators set 
individual rates. Rate changes thus become a tedious ana time consuming effort. As is 
discussed in more detail in chapter 11, price-cap regulation, however, may create new 
problems. It may give the incentive to reduce costs by reducing quality and it creates the 
risk of capture of the regulator since the firm invests strategically into cost reductions. Since 
the investor will look at costs when revision starts, the firm has an incentive to raise costs in 
the period before. Finally, price-cap regulation may allow the regulated firm to apply 
predatory pricing.192
1*0 In more detail: Heim, D. and G. Yarrow (1968), pp.12-28. 
»1 See: Rohlfi, JJI. (1990), p.5.
1*2 See chapter 43.13.
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4. Concepts for Competition in Telecommunications
4.1. Competition and Innovation
In the previous chapter it was argued that the absence of competition leads to higher 
production costs and a more restrictive choice for the customers of the monopolized 
service. The underlying assumption of the natural monopoly concept is that the owner, 
managers and employees behave as if the company were operating in a competitive market. 
This assumption, however, is unrealistic and it was suggested that public organizations tend 
to pursue objectives other than merely the minimizing of costs of production.
However, even if public firms only mimicked a competitive market situation they would 
only achieve allocactive efficiency. No incentives exist to achieve technical and qualitative 
efficiency.
As part (I) showed, the telecommunications industry, however, is characterized by rapid 
innovation in the service and the transmission market. The legally protected public or 
private monopolist does not have the same incentive to foster innovation that would exist in 
a competitive environment. Thus, state intervention based on the natural monopoly 
argument neglects dynamic aspects. These, however, can be expected to be strong in 
telecommunications.
However, there are further aspects of telecommunications networks which favour the 
introduction of competition. One is concerned with the form of entry. Generally speaking, 
one may distinguish imitative entry from innovative entry. Imitative entry may be defined as 
the replication of the incumbent’s services by using the same technology of production. If 
imitative entry is likely to occur, the incumbent has little incentive to invest into innovation. 
The possible return quickly evaporates due to competitors who are able to save the costs of 
R&D by copying the incumbent’s solution. Imitative entry is likely to occur in industries 
which do not face entry barriers due to sunk cost.
Where entry barriers exist, incumbents have an incentive to invest in innovative activities to 
safeguard present and future profits. Transitional monopoly positions offer the opportunity 
to reap profits above average and hence they encourage innovation to maintain this 
position.1 However, this incentive also depends on the intensity of rivalry between the 
incumbent and the potential competitor. This influences the speed with which process and 
product innovation is introduced. Sunk costs may deter entry by imitation but they cannot 
deter entry by innovation. Innovative entry appears if the entrant either uses a new 
production technique or provides new services (or both). Competition by innovation
i This correspond* to Schumpeter’s classical notion of a dynamic and innovative entrepreneur. See: Kruse, J. 
(1985). pA
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becomes the discipiinatoiy force of the market.^ As is discussed in more detail in chapter 6, 
in the USA AT&T always has been under the threat of innovative entry. This pressure 
encouraged it to invest heavily in R&D through its Bell Laboratories which are the biggest 
private research institute in the world. The de jure monopoly position granted in Europe 
eliminated this pressure on the k it s . This may be regarded as one major reason for their 
relative backwardness when compared to the US operators.
The concept of natural monopoly, however, is normally applied only to imitative entry. 
Process innovation as described in part (I) has eliminated the natural monopoly position of 
major parts of the telecommunications industry.3 In order to reap the benefits from 
technological progress, in the 1980s competition has been introduced in the 
telecommunications sector. Broadly speaking two different concepts were developed. In the 
EC the public switched network is left under the exclusive control of national TOs. Like 
motorways, it is regarded as an element of infrastructure which has to be publicly available 
to foster competition among service providers. This approach may be called service-based 
competition. It is fundamentally different to the Anglo-saxon approach of facility-based 
competition which envisages competition among network operators. Thus, in the case of 
facility-based competition operators provide their services on the basis of own facilities 
while service providers hire leased lines from the public switched network. In what follows I 
concentrate on the latter. The different features of service-based competition are briefly 
characterized. It is pointed out where the limits of this approach can be expected. It is 
discussed in more detail in chapter 7.
4.2. Service-Based Competition 
4*2.1. Competition for Basic Services
If network competition is not allowed for, competition for basic services only becomes 
feasible in the form of resale. Resale may be defined as the leasing of a circuit from the 
public switched network operator and the reselling of the capacity to other customers. By 
doing so the reseller can make arbitrage gains when undercutting the operator’s tariffs in 
certain markets. The amount of these gains depend on the relationship between leased line 
tariffs and local and long distance charges in the public switched network. In contrast to the 
switched network connections, leased lines offer communication over a fixed connection. 
The latter is cheaper in the case of heavy traffic. It can be interconnected into the switched 
network on one or both sides. In the USA resellers are allowed to purchase switched 
services in volume under high-volume tariffs like Megacom, add billing features and resell 
them. Similarly aggregators combine the monthly traffic of small users and thereby apply for
2 Compare: Gentzoglanis, A. (1990), p.5.
3 Noll, R.G. (1991), p.9.
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the discounts granted to big users.4 To make resale a feasible option, the TO has to be 
required to offer leased circuits on a cost-based flat-rate basis. Interconnection with the 
public network is necessary and related interconnection charges have to be cost-based and 
nondiscriminatory. They should compensate the TO for the actual cost of interconnection. 
Resale is often regarded as beneficial because it forces the network operator to rebalance 
his tariffs and eliminate cross subsidization. When in 1990 the US and Canada liberalised 
resale and shared use of private-line services among both countries, accounting rates5 of all 
voice traffic decreased immediately by nearly 50%.6 The digitization, increased flexibility 
and intelligence of the new switching systems increase the opportunity for arbitrage since 
they allow large users to reroute their traffic to circumvent excessively high prices.
However, from the perspective of optimal pricing resale is not optimal It limits the scope 
for price discrimination to the additional costs of resale. If the latter were costless, its effect 
would be to introduce a uniform price equal to average cost.7 Thus, without transaction 
costs, resale leads back to linear pricing which is inferior to non-linear pricing. Moreover, it 
does not put any pressure on the network operator to reduce the cost of provision. Hence 
competition for basic services is of very limited scope as long as a network monopoly 
persists. It may be beneficial only if thereby internal cross subsidisation is reduced.
42-2. Competition for VANS
If competition for VANS is permitted, the TO still keeps the transmission monopoly. Thus 
it controls the "backbone” network. The service provider has to lease transmission facilities 
from the network operator and by using her own switching facilities she adds features to 
the basic service (often called "bearer* service). The VANS provider is explicitly prohibited 
from providing real-time voice telephony.8 The network operator’s monopoly is reduced to 
a transmission monopoly thus service providers are entitled to use their own switching 
facilities if needed to provide the particular service.9 In EC member states the network 
operator is also entitled to provide VANS in competition with other service providers. 
Economies of scope between the provision of basic services and VANS are regarded as 
strong. This, however, offers the TO two possibilities for unfair practices. One is to provide 
preferential access to its own service provider. Superior network access may arise in terms
4 Mitchell, B.M. and I. Vogelsang (1991b), p.61^2.
5 See in detail chapter 12.
« Gilhooly, D. (1991), p. C.10.
1 Brown, SJ. and D.S. Sibley (1966), p.192.
* International Chamber of Commerce (1991), pp. 31-32.
* Neumann, KJI. (1967), p2.
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of features, functionality, transmission quality, reliability and prompt installation, 
maintenance and repair services. The second unfair practice is created by cross- 
subsidisation. The network operator is able to use profits made in the regulated markets 
(basic services) to subsidise his activities in the unregulated ones. The TO can overallocate 
operational costs or improperly assigning investment risk, thereby assigning a 
disproportionate part to the section operating under special or exclusive rights. Thus 
service-based competition requires strong regulatory safeguards to supervise the network 
operator’s activities. Structural regulatory safeguards separate the sector which operates 
under exclusive or special rights from the one under competition. Both enterprises then 
operate on an "arm’s length basis” and are treated as separate entities. This is easier to 
monitor and diminishes the scope for cross subsidisation by reducing joint and common 
cost. On the other hand structural safeguards lead to a loss of economies of scope. Non- 
structural safeguards instead do not impose a separation of entities. They establish 
accounting rules according to which costs are assigned as if monopoly and competitive 
services are offered by unaffiliated entities. It has to be ensured that the capital investment 
risk is not borne by the monopoly rate-payer.
The main regulatory task is to establish access charges for VANS providers. These have to 
be fixed by the regulator since otherwise they can be used by the TO to preclude access. 
The fixing of access charges requires a good insight into the cost structure of the TO. As far 
as the regulatory experience of the FCC and AT&T before divestiture can be taken as a 
yardstick, the lack of information on the regulator’s side offers considerable scope for anti­
competitive behaviour.10 Moreover, problems arise in the practical application of tariffs 
(sharing of fixed cost, peak-load pricing, etc), the specification of entry terms and the 
provision of supporting back-up supplies.11
To the extent that economies of scope exist, supervision by the regulator becomes even 
more difficult because a clear cost allocation is prevented. In order to foster competition 
the regulator has to determine objective criteria for effective access which have to be 
transparent and non -discriminatory. They should be predetermined, thereby excluding 
discretionary power of the state.12
However, in the absence of network competition one may expect that service-based 
competition is also unlikely to gain force. Since the network operator is not encouraged to 
reduce network costs, service providers are handicapped since via access charges they have 
to bear their share of network costs. Moreover, the network operator is not forced to 
develop and install sophisticated technology which may be needed to transmit new services.
10 Compare chapter 6.1.
u See also: Helm, D. and G. Yarrow (1988), p-23.
11 See in more detail chapter 7.23.1.
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43. Facility-Based Competition
The following chapters explore the scope to introduce network competition in the EC. 
Principally two types of competition may be distinguished: the "national” and the 
"European* perspective. The traditional viewpoint assumes the presence of one network 
operator which in the past has enjoyed a de facto or de jure monopoly position and then 
faces an entry threat. This may be described as the national perspective. Besides the UK, 
member states of the EC have granted exclusive rights to their network operators. Thus, it 
is assumed that one incumbent is already installed. In that case a regulator who fosters 
competition has available three alternative approaches. If the cost function is subadditive 
he may substitute competition within the market with competition for the market. 
Alternatively the theory of contestable markets proposes that potential competition can 
replace actual competition. Both concepts are discussed for their relevance for 
telecommunications. Finally, if the market is not considered to be a natural monopoly, a 
second (or more) operator may be licensed. This was the policy chosen in the UK. In this 
case the incumbent’s scope for strategic behaviour is of special interest. This is discussed in 
chapter 4 3.1.3.
In the European context there is also a reasonable second approach to investigate the scope 
for facility-based competition. One may study a situation where many incumbents operate 
in markets which are separated due to technology. Regulation and the cable network so far 
have prevented, for instance, France Telecom and the Deutsche Bundespost Telekom from 
competing in the provision of basic services. A regulatory change could lead to indirect 
competition by comparing the performance of national TOs (yardstick competition). 
Alternatively competition among these operators could be introduced by licensing one 
entrant who may choose one of the national markets. Incumbents start competing against 
each other trying to push the entrant to the other’s market. This is modelled as a rat-race.
43.1. Competition with One Incumbent ♦
The first two approaches discuss the substitution of "competition for the market" for the 
traditional concept of "competition within the market". Competition for the market may 
become a substitute if entry barriers or subadditivity aspects make competition within 
unfeasible or uneconomical. Both, the concept of franchising and the contestable market 
theory will be discussed as far as their relevance for telecommunications is concerned.
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43.1.1. Franchising
Demsetz has pointed out that natural monopoly does not imply the need for state 
controlled provision (either by public provision or regulation). Instead he proposed that 
rival sellers could compete for contracts with buyers. Bidding competition for the market 
could essentially replace competition within the market. The franchise would be granted to 
the firm promising the lowest price for the provided service.13 Alternatively, the service 
price could be fixed in advance and the firm making the highest bid could be licensed. In 
that case the allocation is done through an auction and the government receives the 
proceeds.14 If all bidders are symmetric, the highest bid corresponds to the monopoly rent 
which can be reaped thereafter.15 The monopolist still exploits his market power and 
consumers pay the monopoly price. However, the monopolist makes a side payment which 
is equal to the present discounted value of monopoly profit over all future time to the 
government. Thus bidding competition leads to a redistribution of the monopoly rent to the 
government. Given perfect foresight and the existence of several bidders which do not 
collude, the bidders could only achieve an average return on their investment. The 
enterprise has strong incentives for X-efficient production during the franchise period since 
all cost reductions render higher profits. Franchising then leads to technical efficiency.16 It 
appears to be an attractive approach towards natural monopoly since it combines the 
advantage of single firm cost-efficiency with the advantages of competition.
The assumptions under which franchising would reap the desired results, however, are 
rather strong. Various reasons render it rather unlikely that it becomes feasible for the 
public switched telecommunications network. First of all the amount of capital needed to 
buy a telecommunications franchise is considerably high. This and the need for experience 
reduces the number of potential bidders.17 A serious threat of collusion between these 
bidders exists. Second, the telephone network is a multiproduct industry. Comparisons of 
different bids would have to rely on certain criteria to evaluate different sets of prices. 
Moreover, besides the price some measure of quality has also to be introduced since 
normally a trade-off between quality and price exists. When deciding on objective criteria 
the franchising body has to have information on consumers’ preferences. Most important,
13 Demsetz (H. (1968), p.56/57. The distinction between 'competition for the field* and "competition in the field*
had first been made by E. Chadwick (1859), p J81.
14 An auction was the underlying principie for the sale of the Compañía de Teléfonos de Chile (CTE), where
Telefónica bought for US $ 388 million the majority of shares. See: FinTech, February 21,1991, and Sharma, 
P. (1991), pp J6-38.
is Tiróle, J. (1989), p.77.
16 Compare: Kruse, J. (1966), p.234.
17 One of Demsetz’ assumptions has been that all inputs are available to potential bidden. This, however, is
unlikely to be fulfilled for a trained and experienced working force. Instead it is more likely that the 
incumbent operator has a considerable advantage by controlling production specific input factors. See: 
Demsetz, H. (1968), p.58.
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however, is the question of the time horizon of the franchise. Short franchise periods have 
to be preferred since then the regulator is able to react to shifts in demand and changes in 
production technology. On the other hand most of the investments made into the 
telecommunications network are durable and irreversible. In the case of short franchising 
periods these investments pass from one franchisee to another. This offers a wide range of 
strategic actions for the incumbent.18 Moreover, the danger exists that the wrong 
technology will be chosen since the franchisee is more concerned with winning the next 
franchise than minimizing long run costs if the latter cannot be reaped by himself. If the 
incumbent is likely to lose the forthcoming bidding it is difficult to ensure that long-term 
investments are undertaken adequately. The combination of irreversible long run 
investments and quick changes in technology and demand then makes franchising rather 
inefficient. A conflict of aims arises between allocative efficiency which requires long term 
franchises and technical and qualitative efficiency which require shorter franchise periods. 
Rapidly changing market conditions, moreover, make the assumption of perfect foresight 
and complete information for all bidders unrealistic, rather they offer the incumbent firm 
considerable advantages. Having been the previous supplier the latter is better informed 
about likely market changes. This will either allow the incumbent to reap extra rents or it 
leads to the winner’s curse. By the fact that another bidder has won the contract against the 
better informed incumbent the former already knows that she has offered too much.
Vickers and Yarrow therefore conclude that the Chadwick-Demsetz proposal is useful only 
in cases of simple contracts.19 In the case of the public switched telecommunications 
network, contract specification and administration would raise immense problems. 
However, franchising has become a feasible concept for mobile networks where the scarcity 
of bandwidth limits the number of operators. This is discussed in more detail in part HI.
M Strategic actions may comprise ‘strategic accounting” (the choice of depreciation periods), the moment of
investment, and the choice of technology. See in detail; Kruse, J. (1985), pp344-365.
»  Vickers, J. and G. Yarrow (1985), pJO.
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43.1.2. The Potential Entry Threat
Franchising was described as a market solution for a natural monopoly. It substitutes 
competition for the market for competition within the market. Competition for the market 
can also arise between an incumbent and a potential entrant. Although no actual entry 
occurs, the incumbent is forced to take measures against the entry threat. These measures 
aim at driving the entrant’s post-entry profits below the average return she could reap in 
other markets. As a result the entrant decides to stay out. Defensive measures of the 
incumbent may either increase society’s welfare or lead to a waste of resources. If the 
incumbent reduces cost of production and raises output as a reaction to the entry threat 
overall welfare is increased. Potential competition has served as a substitute to actual 
competition within the market. This is discussed in the present chapter. The contestable 
market theory describes an extreme case where potential competition renders the same 
outcome as "perfect” competition. Thereafter I extend the example of chapter 3.1.7. which 
described the case of a unsustainable monopoly. The extension shows that if the incumbent 
can react to the entry threat, regulatory entry barriers may become unnecessary and the 
potential entry threat raises overall welfare.
Contestable market theory shows that under certain strong conditions potential entry can 
force an incumbent to behave as if put under actual competition. Therefore the dismantling 
of entry and exit barriers has been proposed as a policy alternative to regulation or 
nationalisation when addressing a natural monopoly. This goes beyond Demsetz’s proposal 
in that the bidding process is relinquished. The latter still can be seen as an interventionist 
means. The regulatory authority which organises the auction has considerable power to 
influence the outcome. For Demsetz the auction is necessary to prevent the winner of the 
bidding from reaping all the benefits of a temporary monopoly position. Contestable 
market theory denies that these benefits materialise. It relies on the vigilance of 
entrepreneurs outside the market. They will enter as soon as the monopolist’s profits 
exceed the average rate of return in other markets. In that case the bidding process is no 
longer necessary. The theory of contestable markets has thus become a cornerstone in the 
present discussion concerning deregulation in the telecommunications industry. Before 
discussing its relevance for the industry, I present a short description of this approach. 
Since the presumption of the absence of any entry and exit barriers is crucial, I begin with 
this issue.
A contestable market is defined as a market "into which entry is absolutely free, and exit is 
absolutely costless"20.
Furthermore it is assumed that21:
20 Baumol, W. J. (1982), p. 3.
21 Here I will concentrate on the assumptions especially relevant for the telecom-sector. See: Baumol, WJ. et al
(1982), p. 200 and Windrich, R. (1987), p. 67.
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1.) The productive techniques are known and generally available. This excludes any 
advantages for the incumbent like market experience or a lead in innovation.
2.) While fixed costs may exist, sunk costs are excluded. This assumption implies that 
all suppliers have the same rights. This excludes for instance conditions imposed 
on licensed carriers, which impede market exit and thereby increase the 
opportunity cost of entry.
3.) The potential entrant has Bertrand-Nash expectations: The potential entrant 
assumes that the pre-entry price set by the incumbent will prevail after entry. In 
this case an unsustainable price vector will induce entry. The potential competitor 
therefore neglects the possibility of strategic behaviour and a price war.
4.) Consumers instead react immediately if a slight price difference occurs. Their 
decision depends only on the price; other parameters for consumer choice are 
ruled out (like quality, product label, etc).
Given these conditions, contestable market theory explores the requirements which have to 
be fulfilled to render a monopoly configuration sustainable.
Strict subadditivity is shown to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition to guarantee 
the existence of a sustainable price-output vector for a market without entry barriers22. 
Failure of subadditivity would imply that the monopoly coalition could be split into a set of 
subcoalitions in such a way that every subcoalition can benefit. Subcoalitions may involve 
either smaller firms producing the same range of outputs as the monopoly coalition, or a 
set of specialized firms with each providing only one item of the initial bundle. Scale 
economies preclude only the first case; they cannot prevent the latter type of "economies of 
specialization"23.
Panzar and Willig have shown that the firm which breaks even in a contestable market will 
behave optimally from society’s point of view24.
The monopoly is not sustainable if it does not produce at the lowest possible cost, if it sets 
prices above the marginal cost, and if it applies cross subsidisation or predatory pricing. 
Thus, in a contestable market a monopolist is only sustainable if he does not abuse his 
market position. Potential competition forces him to behave as under perfect competition. 
In particular, hit-and-run-entry25 makes the monopolist vulnerable: any departure from
22 A proof can be found in: Baumol, WJ. et aL (1977), pJ53.
23 Baumol, WJ. et aL (1982), p. 173.
a* Panzar, J.C, and R.D. Willig (1977), p.7.
23 Hit-and-run entry signifies that the entrant is able to undercut the incumbent’s price vector slightly and sell as 
much as she wants (up to the output level formerly held by the incumbent). Before the incumbent is able to 
respond the entrant can make her odt.
110
optimal pricing, cross subsidisation or the failure to produce at minimum cost offers the 
potential entrant an incentive to enter, make a profit and depart before the monopolist can 
react. Exit is assumed to be completely costless. The "weak invisible hand" is therefore able 
to control monopolistic markets26. Society in that case gets both efficiency in production, 
which requires only one enterprise in the market, and efficiency in distribution, which 
requires that the single firm mimics the behaviour of a competitive market. Therefore the 
authors claim that the theory of contestable markets is a substantial generalization of the 
classical theory of perfect competition27.
Besides offering new theoretical insights contestable market theory promised to rewrite the 
rules for antitrust policy. The authors claim that their theory can readily be applied.28 As 
Baumol put it: "It tells us that a history o f absence o f entry in an industry and a high 
concentration index may be signs o f virtue, not a vice."2® According to him the analysis has 
shown that markets which are far from meeting conditions required from perfect 
competition nevertheless perform welL Public intervention therefore should be restricted.30 
Traditional means of antitrust policy like indicators of poor market performance 
(concentration indexes, price discrimination, vertical integration etc), have to give way to 
contestability as a benchmark, which Baumol sees as "appropriate and applicable to virtually 
all industry structures"?1
The main message of the contestable market theory is therefore to direct antitrust policy 
aims away from securing a certain level of competition inside a market toward lowering 
entry barriers. This would meet regulators interest in that most of the day-to-day 
supervision of private dominant firms could be relinquished.32 In Europe, TOs could be 
privatised and left on their own since the entry threat would impose a sufficient safeguard 
against an abuse of market power. Thus, applying the contestable market theory to 
telecommunications would have far reaching consequences. As Bailey argued: "Under the 
contestability framework, entry and price regulation is deemed inappropriate in industries which 
do not have system - wide natural monopoly characteristics. On this criterion brokerage, airline, 
trucking, l«ng distant» telephone and terminal equipment should not be regulated.33
»  Baumol, W J. et aL (1977), p. 351.
27 Baumol, WJ. et al. (1982), p. 15.
2« Bailey, E.E. (1981), p. 179.
»  Baumol, W J. (1982), p.4.
»  Baumol, W J. (1982), p. 14.
31 Baumol, WJ. (1982), p.479.
32 As Baily put it: “...iwhite the weaknesses of the contestability doctrine may have been evident to some eariy on, the
doctrine remains very influential in Washington.’ Compare: Baily, M-M. (1987), p. 38.
33 Bailey, E.E. (1986), p.l (emphasis added by the author).
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There is little doubt that the contestable market theory was a leading force for the 
divestiture of AT&T in 1984. While telecommunications networks may not fulfil its 
underlying assumptions, the authors postulated that the extension of their policy 
recommendations to "hearty contestable markets' would be adequate.34 In order to shape 
regulatory policy according to their findings the authors suggested 'rules o f thumb that can 
be used to guide policy design'.35 By doing so, the application of contestable market theory 
to real markets was suggested without stressing the importance of the underlying 
conditions.36 However, the contestable market approach appears to be applicable only to 
the extent that the conditions summarised before are fulfilled. The theory is related to 
markets which have attributes of natural monopoly as well as free and easy entry and exit. 
The assumption of free entry is substituted for the price-taking behaviour in cases of 
internal competition. At first sight the telecommunications industry fits as an example since 
internal competition either has never existed (Europe) or was almost extinguished during 
an early period of competition (USA). Entry barriers are present but partly due to 
regulatory measures. Thus the dismantling of entry barriers could make the market more 
contestable. However, the contestable market approach relies on an extreme case by 
assuming "ultra-free-entry".37 As Shepherd points out, this is based on three rather strong 
assumptions. First, it implies "entry without limit": the entrant can immediately duplicate 
and replace any existing firm. Thus entry is total and does not encounter any lags. Second, 
it assumes "absolute entry": this excludes any price response by the Bertrand-Nash 
expectation. Moreover, even a tiny price difference will be sufficient for the entrant to 
prevail and sell his output up to the previous level provided by the incumbent. Lastly 
"complete reversibility” is implied: sunk costs are zero, therefore exit does not involve any 
costs.
First of all, these conditions are inconsistent. The assumption of an inactive incumbent is 
only valid for trivial entry (entry on a small scale). 'Total entry, which would entirely 
duplicate and replace even a monopolist, would be particularly absurd in a Bertrand-Nash 
m odern  While entry on a small scale is consistent with price taking behaviour, it is 
excluded for markets where technology requires a large market share to produce 
efficiently. Furthermore, entry on a small scale very much resembles the ordinary model of 
perfect competition which also assumes that price taking firms will enter a market as soon 
as its profitability is presumed to be above average rate of return.
While large scale entry is precluded by the Bertrand-Nash assumption, it is crucial to exert 
the disciplinary power over the monopolist. This discipline forced upon the monopolist
3« Baumol, W J. et aL (1962), p.14.
35 Bailey, E.E. (1961), p. 181.
3* This can be seen for instance when comparing Baumol, WJ. et al. (1982), pp.476-483.
37 A term coined by W. Shepherd: Shepherd, W.G. (1984), p.573.
3» Shepherd. W.G. (1964), p.576.
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from outside, is the major argument in favour of replacing regulatory measures by the 
pressure of potential entry.39 This was the basis for the authors’ claim to have generalised 
economic theory by giving the "invisible hand" additional power over monopolistic markets. 
Furthermore, even for contestable markets it is not clear whether a monopolist will indeed 
choose to set prices equal to marginal cost. If entry and exit are completely costless, the 
monopolist himself might opt for maximising short term profit and to leave the market as 
soon as entry occurs. Hit-and-run entry is very unlikely to occur even in the absence of sunk 
costs. For instance, financial markets are likely to place potential entrants at a disadvantage 
with respect to incumbents. This offers the latter the opportunity to engage in strategic 
behaviour.40 As far as telecommunications networks are concerned all three conditions of 
"ultra-free-entry" are dearly violated. Building up a second network is time consuming. 
Entrants like Mercury, MCI or US Sprint were able to enter only on a small scale. Only 
over time are they able to build up their networks. Second, the incumbent’s price responses 
have been quick and considerable which contradicts the Bertrand-Nash expectation. Third, 
high sunk costs preclude hit-and-run entry. Exit is costly in telecommunications markets 
where most of the network entails specific investment.
Baumol himself acknowledges that most markets are not perfectly contestable, bu t"may be 
approximately so."41 He supposes that nearly contestable markets perform in nearly the 
same manner as perfectly contestable markets do. Schwartz and Reynolds have pointed out 
a deficiency of contestability theory which precludes this supposition. It is not robust. Any 
slight deviation from the strict assumptions made, may result in a very different outcome.42 
What kind of outcome this would be cannot be analysed by applying the concept of 
contestability. This derives from its static approach. The static analysis prevents the 
modelling of a game which makes those strategies explicit which might be adopted by the 
monopolist or entrants.
Predictions about strategic behaviour, moreover, are more realistic if they take quantity as 
given instead of price. Quantity sustainability assumes that the monopolists’ quantities 
remain fixed. Thus firms vary their price in order to maintain a certain market share. This 
applies for standardised products. In the case of differentiated products price setting 
behaviour becomes more relevant, because a slight price difference does not generate a 
complete loss of sales. For telecommunications services the product may be regarded as 
standardised (though there may be differences in the quality of transmission). Dominant 
firms often are more profitable because they exert market control due to a high market 
share.43 This is relevant in particular for the telecommunications industry, with a large
39 The assumption that fixed costs do not amount to entry barriers as well presupposes total entry. Entry on the
fringe instead implies that fixed cost per unit are higher for the entrant, who therefore faces an entry barrier.
40 Martin, S. (1989), p.1102.
41 Baumol, W J. et al (1962), p.14.
42 Schwartz, M. and RJ. Reynolds (1983), p.488/9 and: Agliardi, E. (1990).
43 Brock, WA. and DS. Evans (1983), p. 79.
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share of sunk cost and small variable cost. In that case it is in the incumbent’s self interest 
to maintain output level after entry.44 Brock and Scheinkman have shown that quantity 
sustainability is a weaker concept than price sustainability. Price maintenance instead is the 
most favourable response the incumbent can offer to an entrant. If the monopolist’s output 
configuration is sustainable, entrants anticipate negative profits even without taking into 
consideration the depressing effect of their output on price; the monopolist is secure 
indeed. The incumbent’s configuration might, however, be quantity sustainable without 
being price sustainable. Therefore keeping market share is more unfavourable towards the 
entrant. It enhances the monopolist’s chance of fencing off competitors. Brock and Evans 
therefore argue that the assumption made by Baumol et aL implies irrational behaviour on 
the part of the monopolist He charges a price which encourages entry which virtually 
annihilates his position. Thereafter the incumbent does nothing to counter the entrant’s 
challenge.45
The concept of quantity sustainability is based on Cournot’s quantity equilibrium. Its 
considerations lead to the traditional concepts of oligopoly theory. In contrast to Baumol et 
aL quantity sustainability stresses the importance of the traditional concept of market 
share. It therefore furthermore weakens the claim that measures based on the contestable 
market theory could replace regulatory policy towards natural monopolies.
Summing up, the theory of contestable markets provides a solution for an ideal market 
situation which is very unlikely to materialise. Its conclusions cannot be applied to market 
configurations which are not perfectly contestable. Therefore the claim that the theory is 
more general than the concept of perfect competition has been rejected. Instead Shepherd 
argues that simply an "odd special case" has been added to economic theory.46 It has worked 
as a reminder of the importance of potential competition which hardly is a new idea.47 As 
Vickers and Yarrow conclude: "Entry should be made as free as is practicable, but it would be 
foolhardy to restrict policy to the easing o f entry."4*
#
The following example shows how potential competition can increase overall welfare in a 
natural monopoly. Moreover, extending the previous model of chapter 3.1.7. it is seen that 
if technology is not fixed, an unsustainable natural monopoly may become sustainable. This 
result is related to chapter 4.1. which argued that entry pressure may lead to innovation and 
higher productivity. The following example shows a case in which due to natural monopoly
«♦ Brock, WA. and JA. Schcinkman (1963), pp.222/223.
«  Brock, WA. and D.S. Evans (1963), p. 76
** Shepherd, W.G. (1984), p. 577.
47 *// is hardly necessary to point out that competition (...) acts not only when is being but also when it is merely an 
ever-present threat (...). The businessman feels himself to be in a competitive situation even if he is alone in his 
field Schumpeter, JA. (1950), p.85.
** Vickers, J. and G. Yarrow (1985), p.19.
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characteristics society as a whole is better off if no entry occurs. However, also the 
incumbent has an incentive to prevent entry and maintain his monopoly position. Unlike 
the case described in chapter 3.1.7. now the incumbent can invest in the reduction of his 
marginal cost. It is seen that in this case society is better off to 'liberalise" the market and 
to allow the entrant to come in. The incumbent is forced to invest more than he would have 
done as a monopolist. As a result, the entrant is kept out. The entry threat, however, has 
reduced the incumbent’s cost of production and it has raised output and overall welfare.
For convenience I repeat the features of chapter 3.1.7.
The model
A market for one homogeneous good is considered. There are two firms only. Incumbent 
1" has already installed his network in the market. In period 1 he can invest in an upgrade 
of his production technology. This reduces his marginal cost of production while raising 
fixed cost. All fixed costs are assumed to be sunk. At the beginning of period 2 the entrant 
"e* makes her entry decision. If she enters thereafter both firms play Cournot with different 
marginal costs. If not, firm "I" remains a monopolist.
Both firms have perfect information. Thus, when making her entry decision, the entrant 
knows the incumbent’s investment in period 1. Both firms also have complete information, 
thus they are informed about the cost function of their rival.
The demand function is assumed to be linear:
p -  a - b (xj + Xe) (3.4)
The incumbent’s cost function is given by
Cj = (c - i)x¡ + (z/b) i2 + F (z/b) > 0 (4.1)
Thus, in period 1 the incumbent can invest i in the reduction of his marginal cost. This 
raises fixed cost by (z/b) i2 (investment costs). It is easy to verify that for i = 0 (4.1) 
reduces to the previous example (3.5).
(z/b) is a constant. The denominator b is only a normalisation. In order to keep the algebra 
interpretable in the following example I have chosen z = 1.5. Similar results would be 
obtained for a large range of z.
The entrant produces according to (3.5).
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Figure 4.1.: The potential entry game
There are three possibilities. First, society may prevent entry by regulation. An absolute 
entry barrier is installed by granting exclusive rights to the TO. In that case the incumbent 
realises the unconstrained monopolist profit. Second, entry is allowed and the incumbent 
chooses to accommodate the entrant. In that case in period 2 both play Cournot. Third, 
entry is permitted by regulation but the incumbent deters.
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The Monopolist’s Output
If there is no entry threat, the monpolist maximises
Wfii  * [p(xm)-(c - i) ]x 'n - 1.5/bi2 -F  (4.2)
Maximising (4.2) with respect to x*11 and i leads to the monopolist’s investment and output
i -  ib S c  x«" = jb S g  (4.3)
Thus, even without an entry threat the monopolist will invest into the reduction of his 
marginal cost. Compared to (3.7) he increases his output.
Finally the monopolist’s profit will be
' r  = “ bSc2 -F  (4.4)
which also exceeds (3.8).
The Cournot outcome
In the case where entry takes place in period 2 both firms play Cournot. However, in period 
1 the incumbent has some power to influence the outcome to his advantage. He maximises
*Id * [p(*i + x*) - c + i] xr - (1-5/b) i2 - F (4.5)
Maximising (4.5) with respect to Xj gives the incumbent’s first order condition for his 
output, given his prior investment.
Sc Xe i
Xl .  ~ - -  + _ (4.6)
2 2 2b
Instead, the entrant’s reaction function becomes
Sc xj
X e----------  (4.7)
2 2
Using (4.6) and (4.7) one can determine the outputs chosen by the firms, which depend on 
the incumbent’s previous investment.49
«* Note that for i » 0, (4.8) represents the quantities both firms realise in the simple Cournot case.
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(4.8) shows that the Cournot quantities in period 2 are different if both firms produce with 
different marginal cost. The incumbent’s output exceeds that of the entrant.
Now it is assumed that in period 1 the incumbent has a first-mover advantage by deciding L 
According to (4.8) the more he invests, the higher will be his post-entry output and the 
lower will be the entrant’s output
Substituting (4.8) into (4.5) gives the condensed profit function of the incumbent. 
Maximising the condensed profit function with respect to i then leads to the incumbent’s 
optimal investment if he expects entry in period 2
i = — bSr
19
(4.9)
(4.9) exceeds (43). Thus, anticipating entry, the incumbent will invest more than if he is 
sheltered from the entry threat by regulation. Finally, in period 2 both firms realise the 
following quantities and profits
xia =
19
*cd = -  Sc 
19
(4.10)
w f  -  -  bS,.2 -F  
19
25
a = —  bSc2 -F  
361
f  W S"c
The result is illustrated in figure 4.2 which depicts the reaction curves of both firms.
1 Cf 9 c ,X vv ttOv ~3 19 2
Figure 4.2: reaction curves o f incumbent and entrant
If both firms operate with the same cost function, C will be the non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium.5° Both firms in period 2 produce the same output and realise the same profit 
(see chapter 3.1.7). S is the Stackelberg equilibrium with Xj = Sc/2, xe = Sc/4. If the 
incumbent is able to make his investment decision before entry takes place (and if this 
investment is recognised by the entrant), his reaction function is shifted outwards from Rj 
to Rj1. The new equilibrium is Q. In the particular example I have chosen, the incumbent 
produces less than in the case of Stackelberg leadership (with equal costs). However, for i 
> 0 he produces more (the entrant less) than in the symmetric game. Thus, being able to 
make his investment decision prior to the competitor’s entry decision offers the incumbent 
a limited leadership position.
Natural Monopoly
Similar to chapter 3.1.7 one may determine the level of fixed cost which is necessary for a 
natural monopoly. Entry reduces overall welfare if
JTjini + B™ > + ired + Bd (4.11)
The right hand side (left hand side) represents total welfare in the case of monopoly 
(Cournot). If consumer welfare is determined according to (3.9), entry is detrimental for
F > 0.019 bSc2 (4.12)
Entry Deterrence
In order to deter the entrant, the incumbent has to choose i such that *ed < 0. Using (4.8), 
one can determine the critical level of i (see appendix). If in period 1 the incumbent 
chooses
id > bSc -3 7 W F  (4.13)
then the entrant prefers to stay out.
The incumbent chooses id if his monopoly profit at this investment level exceeds the 
Cournot profit in the case of accommodation.
Given (4.13), one can determine the incumbent’s monopoly profit in the case of entry 
deterrence »imd. If JTimd > JTj®* the incumbent chooses to deter the entrant. This is the 
case for fixed cost between
0.004 b Sc2 < F < 0.22 b Sc2 (4-14)
» in a Nash equilibrium the {Mice and the quantities sold are such that no competitor has an individual interest to 
deviate from these prices and quantities. Each competitor maximises its profits, given that others do the same. 
A Nash equilibrium is non-cooperative if collusion between both firms is ruled out. Compare: Phlips, L. 
(1987), p.28.
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Given condition (4.12) then for
0.019 b Sç2 < F < 0.22 b Sc2 (4.15)
entiy is detrimental for society, but the incumbent will deter the entrant, if entry is 
permitted. In the case of entry the entrant realises the Cournot profit wcd * 25/361 b Sq2 - 
F. One can easily verify that if F > 0.069 b Sq2 the entrant does not enter. For fixed costs of 
this level entry is blockaded. Since it is lower than the right hand side of (4.15), one can 
conclude that for the example chosen here, the incumbent will always deter if entry is 
detrimental for society.
Regulation versus Competition
Although the incumbent is able to protect himself, this does not establish by itself that 
regulatory entry barriers are unnecessary. Since investment is costly, the entry threat may 
encourage the incumbent to overinvest. Lower marginal cost increase the monopolist’s 
output and hence makes consumers better off. On the other hand, it requires additional 
resources which in the present model are represented by higher fixed cost.
Society as a whole is better oft liberalising entiy if
w f*  + Bj"“ < B!««1 + irImd (4.16)
The left hand side (right hand side) represents overall welfare if regulation (deterrence) 
prevents entry. (4.16) eventually leads to a last condition for fixed cost
Given the previous remark for blockaded entry, one finally finds that for F > 0.032 b Sc2 
entry is detrimental, the incumbent chooses to deter and society is better off to liberalise. 
Although entry is not in society’s interest, potential entry is beneficial since it forces the 
incumbent to reduce cost of production and to raise output.
In the case chosen here, the disciplinary force of potential entry is much weaker than it was 
assumed to be by the contestable market theory. However, it shows the shortcoming of a 
regulation based on the presumption of an unsustainable natural monopoly. At an 
investment and output level chosen according to (4.3), the incumbent’s position is 
unsustainable for a certain range of fixed cost. Regulatory entry barriers would cement this 
position. However, when facing the entry threat the incumbent will not stick to (43) but 
carry out an investment which makes him sustainable, thereby reducing variable cost of 
production. This raises overall welfare. Hence it is not optimal for society to grant a de jure 
monopoly to the incumbent.
0.032 b Sc2 < F < 0.071b Sc2 (4.17)
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4J.1J. The Scope for Strategie Behaviour
The previous chapter showed that a potential entrant can exert some competitive pressure 
on the incumbent even if entry does not occur. The following chapter discusses in more 
detail the possibility that incumbents take defensive actions to deter the entrant. Strategic 
behavior to deter entry becomes relevant in markets with high sunk costs. Entry is likely to 
considerably reduce the incumbent’s profitability especially if it leads to excess capacity in 
the market. High exit barriers then prevent the incumbent from switching to other markets. 
On the other hand, irreversible investments also increase the scope for entry deterrence.51 
The previous model described a situation in which this behavior actually can be beneficial 
for society as a whole. However, it is more likely that the profit maximising behavior of the 
incumbent conflicts with aims of welfare maximisation. He may try to foreclose the market, 
or apply predatory pricing. Another alternative is to install excess capacity and to threaten 
that the market will be flooded in the case of entry. While by so doing the incumbent 
relinquishes some of the present profits, he expects greater ones in the future by 
maintaining his monopoly position. This strategic behavior is detrimental for two reasons. 
First it prevents competition and reinforces the incumbent’s dominant position. Second, it 
leads to wasteful investment (like having excess capacity which is actually never used).
Market foreclosure has been practised in the USA, where AT&T imposed high legal 
expenses on entrants like MCI trying to receive a regulatory approval.52 Legal expenditures 
are normally non-recoverable and thereby become an effective means to raise entry costs.
In Europe market foreclosure becomes relevant for TOs abusing their monopoly position 
for the public switched network. Mobile network operators and service providers have to 
interconnect their facilities with the public switched network to achieve access to the 
residential subscriber. TOs then have an interest in denying or delaying physical access to 
the local exchanges, or to demand exorbitant access charges. Higher access charges may not 
only generate higher revenues but also increase the input costs of their competition. The 
network operator therefore has to find the right trade-off between the lower revenues 
collected as the wholesaler of network capacity with the higher revenue he expects as a 
retailer of VANS. The higher are the wholesaler revenues the smaller is the TO’s incentive 
to foreclose. Another limitation arises through the possibility of bypass. High access 
charges encourage large business subscribers to install their own networks. In that case 
wholesaler and retail revenues are foregone. However, recent battles over access charges in 
the UK and Germany have shown that TO’s are ready to use their bottleneck facilities for 
market foreclosure (see part III).
Compare: Kruse, J. (1965), p. 327.
52 See: Brock, WA. and D.S. Evan* (1983), and Globerman, S. (1985), p. 321.
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While the rationale for market foreclosure is relatively dear and ample evidence exists that 
it is applied by network operators, predatory pricing is more difficult to establish.
Predatory pricing requires that price be set below the one necessary for cost recovery and 
below the short-run profit maximising price. It has to be distinguished from "limit pricing” 
which leads to a price permanently set above average cost but below the monopolist's profit 
maximising price. Limit pricing can be used against potential entrants with higher average 
costs.
Predatory pricing instead occurs if in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium the entry value is 
positive and the incumbent’s pricing policy makes it negative so that sunk cost are no 
longer compensated by the present value of future profits.53
Predatory pricing is expected to emerge only in rare cases. If quick entry and exit is 
possible the predator does not succeed in inflicting losses on rivals through below-cost 
pricing. Moreover, these losses cannot be recouped by raising prices in the future. In such a 
case competitors would reenter the market. Finally as McGee pointed out, acquision or 
merger offers a higher present value than a price war. The latter can be expected to be 
considerable since by cutting the price the incumbent has to sell more at a price which does 
not cover costs. When purchasing is cheaper than price cutting, competitors stick it out. 
Under complete and perfect information predation is impossible because the entrant will 
not give up.54 The chain-store paradox has shown that predation is impossible in a non- 
cooperative game which comprises identical markets and a finite time horizon.55 However, 
this result does not hold if imperfect information exits. In this case predation can become 
an equilibrium strategy. One may assume that past behavior is relevant for future periods. 
The possibility exists that the incumbent is a "fanatic predator”. Moreover, entrants may not 
know the costs of predation. Hence predation must occur. The incumbent has an incentive 
to preserve a reputation of aggressiveness.56 If future entry (or entry in other markets of 
the incumbent) depends on the perfomance of a present entrant, predation becomes 
possible if the lost profits in this period are smaller than the gains made by keeping further 
entrants out
Predation then becomes an equilibrium strategy if five conditions are fulfilled.57 The 
aggressor must be a multimarket (or multiproduct) firm; the attack is carried out after 
entry has occured; the attack brings the price below the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium
»  Phlips, L. (1988), pp 233-234.
54 Me Gee, J.S. (1980), p. 140 and Phlips, L. (1988), p. 199-201.
55 By backward induction it can be shown that in each period it is better for the entrant to enter. The incumbent is
not able to build up a reputation as being 'aggressive”. Compare: Selten, R. (1978).
5« See for details: Phlips, L. (1988), pp. 207-211.
57 See: Phlips, L. (1988), p. 218.
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level at which the entry value is positive; the price cut makes the entry value negative and 
finally the entrant is not sure whether the price cut is predatory. The last condition is 
required because otherwise the entrant will not enter beforehand and predation would not 
be observed. This condition, however, also implies that predation is difficult to identify in 
practice. For predation to occur it is not necessary that the incumbent sets a price below its 
marginal cost. Rules to determine when predatory pricing occurs can hardly be 
established.58 A comparison of marginal and average cost with the price set by the 
incumbent is not sufficient Instead it has to be shown that under "normal competition” the 
present value of future profits exceeds the entrant’s sunk cost and that the incumbent’s 
price cut has driven the present value below this level The difficulty is to show that the 
observed price cut is not the result of normal competititon.
Telecommunications networks may fulfil the requirements for predatory behavior. High 
sunk costs increase the incumbent’s incentive and the entrant’s vulnerability. It is a 
multiproduct industry and newcomers will only enter some markets. The regulatory 
separation of competitive and monopoly markets raises the incumbent’s scope for 
predation. Cross-subsidisation from monopolised (basic) services towards liberalised ones 
(VANS) is feasible.59 Consequently, the incumbent does not have to recoup all the cost of 
predatory behaviour in the competitive market segment. Setting prices above marginal cost 
in the regulated market gives the incumbent resources which could be invested in 
predation. The regulated market guarantees that the incumbent has sufficient financial 
means to sustain a price war.
To deter the entrant this cross-subsidization need not exist permanently, so it is often 
sufficient to announce credibly that it will be applied in the case of entry. However, as Me 
Gee points out, the "long purse" argument alone is not sufficient.60 The incumbent must 
have an incentive to spend his reserves on predation instead of seeking an alternative 
return by financial (or physical) investments. This incentive, however, may be given by 
regulation or public ownership. In the case of rate-of-retum regulation the incumbent can 
cross-subsidise by paying higher prices internally. This may happen in a vertically integrated 
firm like AT&T where the network operator buys equipment from its own affiliate. The 
regulated part then incorporates the higher price in its rate base. In that case the telephone 
subscriber eventually pays the inflated equipment costs of the network operator.6* In 
chapter 3.4. it was pointed out that in the case of public enterprises management may 
substitute the aim of maximising sales for maximising profitability. In such an event cross­
M In detail: Phlips, L. (1987), pp. 67-70.
5» One ha* to <ti«ringni«h carefully this kind of cross-subsidization from the one discussed in chapter 3.1.7. The 
latter is based on political aims of redistribution among customers and may render the monopolist 
unsustainable. Thus, it rather has the opposite effect to cross-subsidisation, which aims at predation.
«  Me Gee, J.S. (1980), pp. 297-300.
Compare chapter 3.4. and: Globerman, S. (1985), p. 323.
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subsidies to the unregulated activities of a TO become more likely in order to spur output 
growth.
Finally it is interesting to note that a private regulated firm may use rules of optimal pricing 
to hide cross-subsidies. By claiming that the long distance market has become more price 
elastic since entry has been allowed for, BT tried to convince the regulator that according 
to the Ramsey rule more of its common cost should be shifted from long distance to the 
(monopolised) local networks. However, this also fitted its interest when competing against 
Mercury in the long distance market.
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4J2. Competition with many Incumbents
In what follows I investigate the case where there are several markets where incumbents 
produce the same service with the same technology (cable network). As an example, one 
may consider the intra-EC long-distance market for telecommunications. Competition is 
precluded in this market by regulation and more importantly by technology. The cable 
network cannot be transfered from one country to another for the sake of entering the 
market. Nevertheless, competition can be introduced as is discussed in two different 
approaches. In the case of yardstick competition the performance of different monopolists 
is compared. This can be done among TOs operating in different countries. Yardstick 
competition, however, could also be applied if different firms run local monopolies within 
one country. The rat-race competition model instead assumes that one additional entrant is 
licensed which also uses the cable technology. While leaving the decision which market to 
enter to the entrant, the incumbents are forced into an investment race.
43.2.1. Yardstick Competition
If TOs operate under similar circunstances the performance of fellow network operators 
could be taken as a yardstick to measure the efficiency of management and employees. This 
"tournament idea" allows to introduce incentives to increase x-efGciency. By using 
yardsticks, regulation can mimic the incentive properties of a competitive product market 
despite the fact that the actual market is monopolized.42 To some extent it allows the 
regulator to tell whether lower profits are due to managerial slack or demand and costs 
shifts (which then must be assumed to hit all firms similarly).*3 Granting licences to 
different operators, each keeping a local network monopoly, yardstick competition could 
also be introduced within one country. It would still allow the exploitation of economies of 
density while on the other hand the disaggregated structure provides separate cost and 
profit centres.
Even if markets are to some extent idiosyncratic, yardstick competition is likely to raise 
efficiency because it still reveals some information to the regulator, who faces the problem 
of asymmetric informations regarding the monopolist.44 Helm and Yarrow propose the 
following example for price regulated firms.45 a p (a) is the real allowable price change for 
an individual firm. It depends on what is anticipated to be a fair rate of return on its own
e  Yarrow, G.K. (1985)
o  See: Tirole, J. (1988), pp. 41-42.
m Compare chapter 3.4. and: Helm, D. and G. Yerrow (1988), pp. 18-19.
45 Compare: Heim, D. and G. Yarrow (1988), p. 20.
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assets, a p (b) is considered to be a fair rate of return on their assets. Then the following 
rule may apply
a p * r  a p (a) + (1 - r)  a p (b)
where 0 < r  < 1. If r  * 1 there is no yardstick effect r  close to unity is chosen for 
idiosyncratic cost and demand conditions. It will be closer to zero if there is a high degree 
of correlation of costs and demand among the regional monopolists.
However, it is apparent that different conditions limit the use of yardstick competition. 
Differences, for instance, exist in topography and population density, in input costs and 
through varying historic costs. The regulator may find it difficult to determine r  when 
accounting idiosyncrasies and measurement errors exist. Finally, perfomance may depend 
significantly on the inherited assets which make comparisons more difficult.44
«  Tirole, J. (1968), p. 42.
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4 J 1 1  Rat-race Competition
Consider the case that there are several incumbents, each being a monopolist in his 
submarket. Taking each submarket on its own, natural monopoly considerations may 
render entry uneconomic. The existence of many incumbents then would offer the 
possibility of yardstick competition as described above. Alternatively the regulator may 
license a number of entrants which is smaller than the number of incumbents. Since due to 
the cable technology an entrant can only enter one market, some incumbents will be able to 
preserve their monopoly position. Each of them then has an interest in making its own 
market less attractive for entry than the others are. As a result, incumbents start an 
investment race. If this race leads to a higher output and lower prices also in the markets 
which eventually remain monopolized, consumers are made better off. This is modelled in 
what follows. The investment race thereby may be regarded as an intermediate stage 
between monopoly provision and full competition. In some markets entry takes place, in 
others the more efficient incumbents remain monopolists. As far as incumbents enter the 
race, some competition among them is achieved.
I build on the model presented in chapter 43.1.2. Thus incumbents have the possibility to 
invest in their network before the entrant makes her entry decision. The more an 
incumbent invests, the lower is his marginal costs in period 2, the higher will be his output 
in the duopoly, and the lower is the entrant’s profit. This may be taken as a rough 
description of the previously discussed installation of an ISDN network in Europe. As has 
been pointed out, ISDN investments raise fixed cost considerably while marginal costs of 
production are lowered substantially. Since the incumbent TOs can carry out this 
investment before potential competitors are permitted to enter, the former enjoy a first 
mover advantage which allows them to gain a higher market share in a liberalised market. 
The following model shows that prior investment becomes optimal even if entry is certain. 
However, as will be seen, the investment race is likely to lead to an "overshooting" from 
society’s point of view.
The model distinguishes two cases. First I analyse the discrete case of investment, where 
the incumbent may either invest a certain fixed amount or he may not: either a complete 
ISDN network is installed or it is not. In that case incumbents may find themselves in a 
prisoner’s dilemma situation in which the entry threat forces them to cany out the 
investment. As a result society as a whole is better off.
Secondly I discuss the case of a continuous investment function. This was applied already in 
chapter 43.1.2. In that case each incumbent aims at investing just enough to remain 
monopolist. The resulting mixed-strategy equilibrium shows that incumbents are likely to 
overinvest As a result, society may be worse off compared to a de jure monopoly granted to 
the TOs.
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The model
There are two incumbents which face the same demand and cost functions and which both 
produce the same product. In period 1 both incumbents can invest into the reduction of 
their marginal cost. The cable entrant is licensed to install one cable network at the 
beginning of period 2. Due to technology she can only enter one market. For simplicity it is 
assumed that she cannot choose between different levels of marginal and fixed cost. The 
profit maximising entrant chooses the market where the incumbent operates with higher 
marginal cost. If both have invested, the entrant is indifferent and randomises. The post­
entry outcome is Cournot in one market and monopoly in the other.
All firms are assumed to be risk neutral and profit maximising firms. For convenience I 
repeat the features of the chapters 3.1.7. and 4.3.1.2. The only difference is that I neglect 
fixed cost F which are not related to the investment i. Including F would render the algebra 
more complicated without leading to new results.
The demand function is assumed to be linear:
p ■ a - b (Xi + X2) (3.3)
The cost function of the incumbents is given by67
Q(*) * [ofl* + (z/b) i2 I « 1,2 (4.1)
The entrant instead is assumed to produce according to
Cg(x) * cxg c > 0 (3.4)
Joint Entry Deterrence
In this model the emphasis is put on the outcome if entry actually occurs. For the sake of 
completeness, however, I briefly discuss the case when both incumbents prefer to deter 
jointly the entrant. This is the case if both incumbents invest iun«, so that the entrant 
neither enters market 1 nor market 2. The way this example is modelled makes entry 
deterrence rather unlikely to occur.
Entry will be deterred only if for both markets tre < 0.
The profit of the entrant is given by
»e = &>(** + */) - (418)
7^ The subscript T  represents incumbent, and V  represents entrant. As before for the calculations I assume that z
-  15. For details see chapter 43.1.2.
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For tc = 0 we eventually get the entry deterring investment level68
iun« * bSc * (a - c) (4.19)
If both incumbents invest more than (4.19) in period 1, their output choice in period 2 will 
be such that the entrant makes negative profits. Observing the incumbents’ investment, the 
entrant therefore will not enter in period 2.
A graphical illustration shows that this case is unlikely to materialise. The most plausible 
case is that (a-c) > c, so that (c-iumt) < 0, which is impossible (the incumbent would 
produce with negative marginal cost). As will be seen below, indeed incumbents co not 
choose to deter jointly the entrant.
The Entry Threat
If either incumbent invests less than (4.19) then there will be entry in one market at the end 
of period 1. The entrant will choose the market where the incumbent operates with higher 
marginal cost (or: where i is lower). The extensive form of the game is depicted in figure 
4.8). The payoffs of firms depend on the investment L 69
If i = 0 then the incumbent realizes ir0ra in the case of no entry or he realizes w0c in the 
case of entry, while the entrant realizes wtm. Alternatively the incumbent has invested ia 
and subsequently his profit in the case of monopoly (entry) is Wjm ( Tjc, Tea ) .
Thus I define:
jr0m = monopoly profit without investment 
w jm = monopoly profit if ia is invested. 
t cc = Cournot profit without investment. 
jfjc = Cournot profit with investment.
The extensive form of the game is depicted in figure 43.
w Calculations can be found in the appendix.
»  The superscript "m" represents monopoly and "c* Cournot.
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Incumbent 1
Incumbent 2
Entrant
»1
»2
0 . 5*0*  + 0 .5 * Qc  
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Figure 43: the game tree
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-  bSc2 
9
D r  21-12
- “  [Sc + -----
9 L b J
-  - -  [  s c  -  L]
Q L v> J
b
The payoff matrix for the incumbents is depicted in figure 4.4:
Incumbent 2
¡2 -  ia ¡2 = 0
l l  -  i a
Incum ­
b e n t  1
i !  = 0
*1
in•oII +S•H 0 .5  JTic *1 -  T-™
*2 = 0 .5 * i m + 0 .5  JTiC *2 II * 0 0
*1 = *oC * H II O • *om +
00fcin•o
*2 = *2 = 0 -5 *om + 0 .5  *0C
Figure 4.4: the payoff matrix for both incumbents
Depending on i four outcomes in pure strategies are possible: Either no incumbent invests 
(0,0), or one of them (1,0), (0,1), or both (1,1).
Whenever both incumbents have made the same decision about i in period 1, the entrant is 
indifferent and randomises. For (1,1) to materialize we have to assume that entry
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deterrence will not be a feasible strategy for incumbents. As will be seen below for the cost 
function specified in (4.1) indeed entry deterrence will not be chosen by incumbents.
For consumers the best outcome is the equilibrium (1,1), since subsequently prices would 
decrease most in both markets. Therefore in the following I concentrate on the conditions 
which have to be fulfilled to reach an equilibrium where both incumbents invest (1,1). 
Subsequently this will be compared with the case where both incumbents do not invest 
(0,0).
To make the analysis interesting it is assumed that 
*om > *im (4.20)
(4.20) implies that the costs of investment are such that without an entry threat neither 
incumbents would invest.
Since JT0m * [pix,,,) - c] x„, using (3.3) to (4.1) we get
1 2
w0m = — bSc2 (4.21)
4
Accordingly we get for trf1
b r  i"! 2 1 .5
T i"  ■ ' 7  LSc + " ¡ J  * V  (422)
Then (4.20) leads to a first condition for i:
ia > 0.4 bSc (4.23)
Thus condition (4.20) is only fulfilled if ia has a minimum level Otherwise incumbents 
would invest in the reduction of their marginal cost even if there was no entry threat. 
Secondly it is assumed that
JTim > V  (4.24)
Thus each incumbent would prefer to invest ia and remain monopolist rather than not to 
invest and play Cournot with certainty. Similarly from the procedure above we get for wQc  
and i:
1 ,
w0c « — bSc2 (4.25)
9
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i» < 0.59 bSc (4.26)
Only if ia is small enough the incumbent will prefer to invest in the reduction of his 
marginal cost. For high ia the loss envisaged by entry is less than the costs of investment. 
Accordingly the incumbent prefers to accommodate.
Eventually it is assumed that
*oc > r f  (4.27)
which corresponds to (4.20). If entry occurs each incumbent would prefer not to have 
invested into i*.
Since
b  r 2 i  i  2 1 .5
* i °  * —  Sc + ----- -  -----i 2 (4.28)
9 L b J b
finally (4.27) leads to a third condition for ia
i» > 0.42 bSc (4.29)
(4.29) includes (4.23) which intuitively makes sense because if entry takes place with 
certainty the incumbent has a stronger incentive to invest in his marginal cost than if he
were to remain a monopolist. Consequently if i is high enough to make the investment
unprofitable in the event of entry, it always will be unprofitable in the case of monopoly. 
With the assumptions (4.20), (4.24), (4.27) I have established a situation in which all firms 
prefer (0,0) to (l.l)70. Finally we have to investigate when (1,1) will be better for society 
than (0,0). This will be the case if:
Bjm + Bjc + ITjm + Tjc + jred > B0m + Bcc + T0m + t 0c + xe?
with
B|m = the consumer surplus in the case of investment and monopoly.
Bjc * the consumer surplus in the case of investment and entry.
B0C * the consumer surplus in the case of no investment and entry.
The left hand side represents the level of welfare when investment is employed. On the 
right hand side there is total welfare without investment. If we define
70 from the payoffs above we immediately see that the entrant will always prefer no investment.
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[a  -  p(x, + x,) ]
B -  ------------------------------  (xx + xs)
2
(4.30)
then we find that investment will improve total welfare if
i* < 0.593 bSc (431)
Since (431) is included in (4.26) it can be neglected in what follows. Thus, society as a 
whole is always better off with investment.
A Prisoner's Dilemma Situation
In the present example, society as a whole would be better off if incumbents invested into 
the reduction of their marginal cost. The latter, however, have contrary interests. They 
prefer no investment.
Given (4.20), (4.24), and (4.27) we find that there are two conditions to be fulfilled for (1,1) 
to be the only pure-strategy equilibrium. Each incumbent must be better off with 
investment in the event that the other does not invest as well as in the event that the other 
invests. In that case both incumbents will invest in period 1.
JTi® > 0.5 V »  + 0 J iroc (432)
If the other incumbent does not invest then a risk neutral incumbent will invest if the 
monopoly profit after investment exceeds the expected profit of no investment. The latter is 
given by an equal probability of remaining monopolist and facing entry.
w0c < OiTj1" + OS w f (433)
Alternatively firm 2 is assumed to invest. Then incumbent 2 will invest as well if the 
expected profit of investment exceeds the Cournot profit if there is no investment.
If (432) and (433) are fulfilled both incumbents will choose to invest in i and (1,1) is the 
Nash equilibrium. Similarly to the discussion above (4.32) and (433) lead to two further 
conditions for i*:
(432) is fulfilled if i* < 0.51 bS,- (4.34)
(4.33) is fulfilled if i* < 0.52 bSc (4.35)
Since (434) includes (435) we can neglect the second condition for (1,1).
Comparing (434) and (4.19) we find for the case discussed here that entry deterrence will 
not be a feasible strategy. The investment which has to be carried out by both incumbents 
in order to deter would reduce their profits by more than if they decide to play Cournot.
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Then as a first result for a certain range of ia we see that both incumbents are trapped in a 
prisoner’s dilemma situation.
If
0.5 ir,® + 0.5 jt0c > 0.5 »j1» + 0_5 iTic (436)
then both firms prefer (0,0) to (1,1). Thus both would be better off if there were a binding 
agreement not to invest 
(436) leads to
If ia is in the range defined by (4.38) then both incumbents in period 1 find themselves in a 
prisoner’s dilemma. Both prefer the situation where no one invests to the one of investment 
by both firms. However, they are both better off to invest if the other one does not. 
Moreover, if the other incumbent invests, as well, according to (433) and (4.35), they are 
better off investing. Thus both incumbents will invest and the equilibrium will be (1,1), if no 
binding agreement is possible.71
This simple model has shown that, in a fragmented market competition among incumbents 
is introduced. Thereby overall welfare can be increased. This results holds even if the 
entrant is not able to enter more than one market and if entry is limited to only one firm. 
The regulator has to announce the licensing of one entrant for the next period. Incumbents 
then will invest in the reduction of costs of production. This leads to an investment race in 
which both incumbents compete against each other.
Consumers in both markets are better off because lower costs of production ceteris paribus 
increase the firms’ outputs.
i*> 0.41 bSc (4.37)
(434) and (437) then lead to
0.41 < i* < 0.51 (4.38)
71 In the prisoner’s dilemma we may even include the entrant who, as well, would prefer (0,0) to (1,1).
135
Limiting Entry as a First Best Solution
As far as private telecommunications operators have been permitted to enter at all, 
regulators have refrained from complete liberalization. Instead the number of competitors 
has been kept smalL72 This artificial restriction is sometimes justified by high fixed costs. 
However, in chapter 3.1.7. it was shown that the level of fixed costs alone cannot justify the 
restriction of entry by regulation. Instead, if a sustainable (natural) monopoly existed, a 
potential entry threat could be beneficial because it forces the incumbent to choose a price 
below the monopoly price. In the following I try to point out a case where limiting entry 
might indeed be beneficial for society.
The case that society is better off if entry is restricted to only one entrant arises if condition 
(4.27) is fulfilled and if in the previous game (1,1) is a Nash equilibrium. If two entrants are 
allowed for then each incumbent believes that entry is will take place and if (4.27) holds he 
will not invest.
Using (33) and the quantities which were calculated for the profit functions above, I obtain
b r i  1 2
Bj® -  - -  Sc  + — (439)
8 L b J
b  r  i  i  2
i c  -  —  2SC + —  (4.40)
18 L b  J
2 0
B0 = —  bSc2 (4.41)
9
Accordingly for the entrant's profit we can write« 
b  r  i  n 2
r C1 " e
9 L b
which is the entrant’s profit if the incumbent has invested, and
co b— s c ‘
9
(4.43)
for the entrant’s profit if the incumbent has not invested.
72 See for instance the duopoly of BT and Mercury in the UK or the duopoly of DBP and Mannesmann for mobile 
telephony in Germany.
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Then society as a whole is better off having only one entrant instead of two if
Bj® + Bjc + jrjm + iTjc + jre® > B0C +B0C + r0c + jr0c + rc“  + ire«> (4.44)
On the left hand side of (4.44) we have total welfare in the event of entry by one entrant
and both incumbents investing into ia. On the right hand side there is total welfare if there 
are two entrants and both incumbents do not invest (due to (4.27)). Each entrant will enter 
one market. In there are two entrants, there is an additional fixed cost F on the right hand 
side of (4.44). Thus, a certain level of fixed cost would ensure that (4.44) holds since the 
additional F reduces overall welfare. However, even if fixed cost are neglected, one finds 
that (4.44) may be fulfilled.
Some algebra leads to the condition for (4.44) to be fulfilled:
0.07bSc < ia < 0.53bSc (4.45)
(4.75) may be interpreted as follows:
For very low i the price effect of investment in the case of monopoly will be small. 
Consumer surplus therefore would be much higher if entry occurred. The potential 
consumer’s gain from more competition outweighs the higher profit of both incumbents 
due to the low cost of investment and one incumbent remaining a monopolist. Therefore 
having more competition (right hand side) outweighs the benefits of investment (left hand 
side). For very high ia the fixed cost of investment (which reduce society’s welfare) 
outweigh the positive price effects (for consumers). Again no investment and competition 
is to be preferred to some competition and investment. For ia in between we find that 
restricting competition to one entrant makes society better off.
Bringing all conditions together we find that for
0.42 < i» < 0.51 (4.46)
both incumbents will choose to invest in the case of one entrant while not investing in the 
event of 2. For this range of ia as well we find that (4.44) is satisfied. Thus, for i within 
these limits, society as a whole would be better off restricting entry.
Conclusions
Hie rat-race model has shown that in the European telecommunications market
competition could be launched despite market fragmentation. While it was argued 
previously that the ISDN investment ceteris paribus diminishes the scope for network
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competition, it actually could be used to stir up competition among incumbents. Thereby an 
entrant could have a competitive impact not only on the market segment which she actually 
enters. Instead, by not deciding previously where entry will occur, the potential entrant will 
have an impact on the incumbent who remains a monopolist. It was argued that the first 
mover "advantage” puts incumbents into a prisoner’s dilemma situation which can be 
exploited by the regulator to raise general welfare. The main impact of the entrant is to 
encourage an investment race among incumbents. For this reason society as a whole may 
be better off if entry is restricted.
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A Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
It is interesting to analyse to what extent results change if I assume that incumbents are 
able to raise i continuously. As will be seen, in this case there will be an equilibrium only in 
mixed strategies.
The assumptions (33), (3.4) and (4.1) concerning linear demand and cost functions are not 
altered. As well I stick to the case of two incumbents and one entrant. However, now 
incumbents are able to reduce their marginal cost continuously by investing a bit more (or 
less). As a result, many different levels of investment become feasible. Thus the assumption 
that i « 0 or i * ia is given up. This is elaborated in the following.73
It is assumed that each incumbent takes the investment strategy of the other as given. 
Moreover, only a symmetric equilibrium is discussed. The level of i chosen by an incumbent 
has an impact on his profit in the event of monopoly or entry and on the probability that 
one of both possibilities will materialize in period 2.
The impact of i on the profit of each incumbent is depicted in figure 4J5.
Figure 4.5: the impact o fi on * f and
If firm 1 remains a mnopolist in period 2 then the monopolist’s profit would be highest for
i,,,. If instead entry occurs the profit of firm 1 is the highest for ip.
Incumbent 1 succeeds in remaining a monopolist if he invests ij > ¡2- In that case he will
realize the monopoly profit ir¡nl. If instead i2 > ii he faces entry despite his investment. In 
that case he realises a profit which is lower than the one if he had chosen to play Cournot 
from the beginning: jtuc < for ij +
731 mainly follow an approach chosen by Varian analysing a mixed strategy equilibrium for a model of sales. See:
Varían, Hal, R. (1980), pp. 651-659.
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If both incumbents randomise then for each incumbent exists a cumulative distribution 
function F(i) which indicates the probability of investing at least L
Analysis
If entry took place for certain then each incumbent would choose Then the post-entry 
Cournot profit of the incumbent will be w^0. instead is the monopolist's profit if he has 
invested i*. Let i* be such that This is depicted in figure 4.5.
Proposition 1: F(i) « 0  for i > i*
Proof:
i* will not be chosen by incumbent 1 since if incumbent 2 invests less then firm 1 will realize 
JTj.m = which is the minimum profit he can realise by investing ^  in period 1. I t  
however, the other incumbent also invests i* then with probability 0.5 incumbent 1 will 
make a lower profit then
Thus in figure 4.5 i* is the maximum level of i which might be chosen by any incumbent. 
Proposition 2:
There are no pure strategy equilibria where both incumbents invest the same L 
Proof:
If both incumbents invested the same i with i,,, < i < i* then a slight increase in i by one 
incumbent would secure the monopoly position for him and thus make a positive profit.
Proposition 3:
There are no point masses in the equilibrium investment strategies.
Proof:
i is a point mass of a probability density function f if there is a positive probability 
concentrated at L
If incumbent 2 invested 12 with positive probability then for a slightly higher ij *= ¡2 + e 
which is invested with the same probability, incumbent 1 would remain monopolist if ¡2 is
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realized. For small e the profit of remaining monopolist is higher then the expected profit 
for = ¡2 which includes a 50% chance of entry. Thus for small e the profit is positive 
which contradicts the assumption of an equilibrium.
Since there are no point masses in the equilibrium density f(i), the cumulative distribution 
function F(i) for f(i) will be a continuous function on i.
Proposition 4: F(i) = 0 for i < ^
Proof:
i is defined such that for all i < i f(i) -  0.
Thus the probability that entry occurs is 1 if i is chosen.
Then for i < ic it follows that jt£ < iricc. Thus, any i < ic cannot be part of the equilibrium 
strategy and i<. is the minimum level of investment.
Given the propositions 1) to 4) the cumulative distribution function can be depicted as in 
figure 4.6:
Figure 4.6: cumulative distribution function F(i)
For any i -  two events may appear. If incumbent 2 invests more, then firm 1 realizes 
jridc. This happens with probability 1 - Ffa). If however, ij > i2 then incumbent 1 remains a 
monopolist. Thus with probability F(i<j) he realises *rjdm.
The expected profit function for incumbent 1 then can be established as follows
E (» l)  -  I (F fid )» ^  + (l-FCy))*^] f(i)di (4.47)
All i which are chosen with a positive probability must yield the same expected profit. If
not, some i would yield a higher expected profit than others, thus the latter would be
dominated and excluded from the equilibrium strategy.
Since Wy.c is the minimum profit incumbent 1 could achieve if he decides to invest ¡q, I can 
write
F(id)*idm + (1-F(id ) )* u f  = *icc (4-48)
And for the equilibrium cumulative distribution function
«■¡cc “  ^ id 0
F(id) = ------------------  (4.49)
»id"1 "
Finally I have to establish those i for which a positive density exists. For the lower limit of i 
f(i) is characterised as
Proposition 5: F(id) > 0 for any i^  > i^
Proof: •
Suppose not, then i = i  ^ > i,. is the lowest level of i and F ^ )  = 0. When is invested 
incumbent 1 will face entry since with probability 1 firm 2 has invi sted more. However, Tidc 
< for > ig. Then iridc is dominated by w*e and it is not part of the equilibrium 
strategy.74
For the upper limit
Proposition 6: F(i* - i<j) < 1 for any i«| > v
** Proposition 5 also follows immediately from (4.49).
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Proof:
If not, incumbent 2 could invest ¡2“  ( i*  -  i^ /2 ) and remain a monopolist with certainty. 
Then he would make a higher profit than iricc.
Thus investments near ^  and i* are carried out with positive density.
Proposition 7: There is no interval (ia, ib) for i,. < ia < ib < i* with which f(i) = 0.
Proof:
If not, let i* < < ?». Then if firm 2 invests i2 < ia, if and ib succeed in guaranteeing the
monopoly position for firm 1. But the monopolist profit for iy is higher then ib. If instead 
firm 2 invests ¡2 > ib, & and ib will both lead to entry. But again the Cournot profit for iy is 
higher than for ib. Thus in each circumstance since ¡Y < ib, if makes a higher profit and ib 
cannot be part of the equilibrium strategy.
Example 1)
As has been argued before, the reason to invest in i for an incumbent is twofold. First, the 
level of i determines the likelihood of entry in the market Secondly, even if there is 
certainty that (no) entry occurs both incumbents would invest (but less). It has been seen 
that in any case both incumbents would invest at least ia.
The exercise of this chapter is to analyse the investment behaviour of the two incumbents 
as a response to the entry threat. Therefore it might be interesting to separate the motives 
of investment of our model and to look first at a simpler case.
Suppose as before that the investment of i determines whether entry occurs. However, it 
does not change the marginal cost of the incumbent (instead it may influence the quality of 
the service and the entrant ceteris paribus prefers the market where the incumbent 
operates at a lower quality level). Leaving everything else as specified above the profit 
function then changes to
1.5 2
*1 * fo>(*i + *e) • CH - g - 1
If entry occurs with certainty then both incumbents invest % = i,. = 0.
Then as in the previous chapter we obtain:
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-----------2~  (4 .50)
W  (5/36)bSc + (l-5 / b ) i /
Since f(i) = F(i) we obtain for the density function
r  = ( 5 / 1 2 ) ^
'T i s /^ j b s c 4'+ (5/ i 2 ) i / s c2  + 3 ( ¡ / / b 2) ”
This density is depicted in figure 4.7
If we insert this into (4.49) we get
Figure 4.7: the density o f example 1)
Incumbents tend to invest in intermediate i with higher probability than extreme i. This 
seems intuitively plausible since for very high i the increase in profit compared to the profit 
which could be made without investment is low. On the other hand the potential loss which 
arises if the other incumbent has invested more, rises with L Similarly for very low i the 
likelihood of remaining a monopolist is low. The potential loss of choosing a higher i is
relatively small compared to the potential gain. Therefore incumbents have an incentive to 
choose intermediate i instead of extreme ones.
Example 2)
The second example is calculated for the initial profit function where the investment will 
lead to a reduction of marginal cost As has been stated above there are two overlapping 
effects of an investment in L As a result the density function f(i) has shifted to the right. 
The steeper part of the function is now in the range of (i^ i*).
As in the first example, the density function is calculated as the first derivative of (4.49) in 
which (4.22) and (4.28) are inserted. Calculations can be found in the appendix.
Figure 4.8: the density function o f example 2)
For i < i,. the calculated values for f(i) are smaller than zero. Thus, corresponding to 
proposition (4) incumbents will not choose an investment level which is smaller than the 
investment which they would carry out if entry took place with certainty. More importantly, 
in the relevant range ^  < i€ < i* f(i) increases continuously, thus for i approaching i* 
the probability og investment is higher than for smaller L This shift to the right results from 
the fact that in example 2) the higher fixed cost of investment are partly offset by lower 
marginal cost of production. Thus raising i beyond i,. is less costly in example 2) compared 
to example 1). The trade-off of (lower) marginal costs and (higher) fixed costs with rising i 
then determines how much the density function of example 1 is shifted to the right. *
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Overinvestment due to the "Rat-Race" Effect
In what follows I compare three different scenarios. The first one is monopoly provision. 
The second one discusses the duopoly outcome if in each market a cable entrant enters. 
The last one refers to the rat-race. Profits, consumer surplus and overall welfare are 
compared for all three cases. They are summarised in table 4.1. As far as the rat-race is 
concerned, one cannot predict investment levels of incumbents with certainty. However, I 
can calculate the expected values of investments and profits.
The rat-race model discusses a case where an individual incumbent tries to deter entry. The 
alternative is to accommodate the entrant. Whereas in the entry-deterrence model the 
incumbent's behaviour is dictated by the entrant’s profit73, in the accommodation game it is 
dictated by the incumbent’s profit in period 2.
The incentive to invest in the accommodation game is given by
»1 »  [¡, Xi(i), Xe(i)]
which is maximised with respect to i.
Then also in the accommodation game the effect of the incumbent’s investment on can 
be decomposed into a direct and a strategic effect.
dUf Su|  fffj dXg
d i S i S Xg d i
direct effect strategic effect
The direct effect is a cost-minimising effect. Even if the entrant cannot observe the 
investment in period 1, it has some influence on the incumbent’s output of period 2. The 
strategic effect instead results from the influence of period 1 investment on the entrant’s 
period 2 output. In the quantity game a higher i leads to a higher output of the incumbent 
and a lower output of the entrant.76
Even if there is no entry threat, with the given cost function the incumbent invests in 
reduction of his marginal cost. The monopolist maximises (4.22) and invests
im -  0.2 bSc (4.51)
In the case of entiy and accommodation ic is invested. Due to the strategic effect explained 
before ^  exceeds i,,,
75 In the rat-race model We has to be driven below the entrant’s profit in the other market in order to deter the 
entrant.
ft The incumbent behaves as a "top dog" and overinvests. See: Tirole, J. (1989), pp326-327.
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ic -  0.211 bSc (4-52)
(4-51) and (4.52) may be compared with the expected investment from rat-race 
competition.
E ( i )
i *
if(i) di (4-53)
Integration by parts yields
i  f ( i )  d i F ( i )  i F(i) di (4.54)
(4.54) eventually leads to
E(i) = 0.436 (435)
Comparing (432) and (4.55) we find that the possibility to fence off the entrant encourages 
incumbents to increase their investment considerably. However, in this model it can be 
seen that incumbents are likely to overshoot. The rat-race is likely to lead to 
overinvestment from society’s point of view. This can be seen when comparing overall 
welfare.
The incumbents’ expected profit can be written as
E i» ! )  » ir jc f(i) di = 0.16 b Sp (436)
which slightly exceeds the profit after accommodation and if the incumbent invests ^  (*kc
-  0.158 b Sc2). Thus although one incumbent actually remains monopolist, their expected 
profit will not exceed substantially the profit they would make individually if they played 
Cournot from the beginning. The rat-race withdraws most of the incumbents’ advantage of 
having only one entrant instead of two.
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This corresponds to Posner’s assertion on rent seeking behaviour. In an extreme case of a 
contest between firms to become a monopolist the total expenditure by the rent seeking 
firms is equal to the rent itself (rent dissipation)7* Also the entrant’s profit is diminished b> 
the incumbents’ investment race. If both incumbents have invested according to (435) then 
the expected profit of the entrant will be
E0red) * 0.0353 b St2 (4.57)
In the case of accommodation and investment i^ the entrant’s profit would have been 
almost twice as great (weK -  0.069 b Sc 2).
Finally, using (435), (436) and (437) one may calculate the expected total social welfare 
due to the rat-race:
E (W) * 0.88 b St2 (4.58)
Table 4.1 summarises all results. As is seen, the expected welfare of the rat-race is below 
the total welfare with monopoly supply. Thus, we find that the contest between rent-seeking 
firms may lead to a socially wasteful dissipation of rents. Rat-race competition does not 
make society as a whole better off. However, in contrast to a patent race, the investment 
race raises consumer welfare. Hence, to some extent it leads to a redistribution of income 
from the incumbents to the customer. Finally, a comparison with duopoly in both markets 
depends on the level of fixed cost. For high fixed costs the duopoly generates lower welfare 
than monopoly provision or even the rat-race.
Conclusions
The model has picked up three features of the European telecommunications market. 
First, it has given an economic rationale why under certain conditions it might be optimal 
to restrict entry by regulation. This may come about if the welfare raising effects due to 
entry and competition in one market are substituted through welfare gains arising from 
competition among incumbents operating in different markets.
Secondly, the prisoner’s dilemma situation of the discrete case as well as the rat-race 
situation of the continuous case of investment have shown that competition among
77 Compare: Tirtrie, J. (1989), p.76; and: Posner, R. (1975).
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incumbents may be induced through an announcement of future liberalisation. By making 
this announcement the regulator grants a first-mover advantage to the incumbents. Before 
the entrant makes her output decision they can invest in their marginal cost Thereby they 
are able to influence the post-entry outcome to their advantage. Similar to the argument of 
entry restriction, the entrant is put at a disadvantage due to regulation. On the other hand, 
the regulator can use the entry threat to force incumbents to compete against each other. 
The investment race leads to lower costs of production and an increase in output which 
makes consumers better off.
The incumbents are driven by the motivation to deter the entrant However, from the 
individual incumbent's point of view entry deterrence becomes feasible without driving the 
entrant’s profit to zero. The entrant is not deterred altogether but instead she is pushed 
towards the other market As a result in this model strategic investment becomes more 
likely to occur. However, while entry cannot be deterred by both incumbents the rat-race is 
likely to result in overinvestment. The model has shown that the rent-seeking race almost 
completely dissipates the monopolist’s rent. It is partly redistributed to consumers who 
enjoy a higher output and lower prices. However, from the viewpoint of society the 
investment race is detrimental. The incumbents’ overinvestment leads to socially wasteful 
rent dissipation.
The results of the model may partly explain the current investment race among national 
telecom operators in the EC. This is related to the rapid installation of the ISDN in Europe 
(see part IQ). In an earlier chapter it was pointed out that since the middle 80s on average, 
network operators have increased their investments by 30% annually. This coincided with 
the change of the regulatory environment in the USA and the UK where entry by private 
operators has been permitted. Though facility based competition has not yet been installed 
on a European level, in the quickly changing regulatory environment operators perceive 
future liberalisation as likely. As far as mobile telephony is concerned, network competition 
has already started in some member countries. According to latest developments full 
liberalisation may be in place by the end of the decade. A typical public relations 
justification for the ISDN investments for instance of the DBP Telekom is to "get fit for 
competition9. The rat-race model has pointed at the possibility that this dynamism actually 
may lead to overshooting and to a wasteful use of scarce resources.
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5. An Assessment: Monopoly Provision Versus Competition
The following assessment comprises three steps. First, I weigh the arguments for 
competition and monopoly provision. Thereafter the scope for competition and problems 
of a "mixed regime" are discussed. Finally, based on the findings of part (II), I point out the 
features on which a strategy of liberalisation should be based.
The supply of telecommunications networks faces three fundamental characteristics. There 
are high sunk costs of establishing the network, economies of scale and scope in operation, 
and rapid technological progress. On the demand side customers’ needs are quickly 
changing due to demand diversification. The decision for monopoly provision or 
competition therefore depends on the evaluation of the trade-off between static and 
dynamic efficiency gains. Competition may lead to a loss in economies of scale and scope 
when total output is provided by several entities. Monopoly supply on the other hand 
relinquishes potential gains from process and product innovation. Finally, even if 
competition is preferred, entry barriers may prevent competition from becoming intensive.
For two reasons, however, I find that this general trade-off comes out in favour of 
competition. The first one is related to time. While fifty years ago static efficiency gains 
may have outweighed dynamic ones, the latter have become dominant during the last 
decade. As long as there was only one cable technology available and communication was 
limited to plain voice telephony, the network infrastructure was dominated by static 
considerations. The TO’s write-off period for network equipment was decided on the 
moment of replacement.1 The emergence of various substitute means of communication as 
described in chapter 2 and the diversification of consumer needs have fundamentally 
changed the environment in which TOs operate. Technological progress and demand shifts 
now determine the investment decisions of the network operator. Technical and qualitative 
efficiency goals dominate those of allocative efficiency. The former, however, are better 
served in a competitive environment. Compared to the rather stable traditional 
telecommunications network, today a large potential for innovation exists.
The second argument in favour of competition is related to specific characteristics of the 
European telecommunications market which render general comparions of a trade-off 
inadequate. The latter, as described above, may describe the situation of a sole member 
country which considers licensing of a new cable entrant.2
However, it does not apply if entrants are considered who have already installed their 
communication networks, as cable companies, railways or satellites. In the latter case the 
prohibition of entry actually reduces static efficiency because cable companies cannot
1 In chapter 6 it is argued that the period of ’early” network competition in the US showed empirically that a
natural monopoly existed. AT&T was able to oust all of its competitors and to monopolise the market.
2 Thus, broadly speaking, it may apply for the case of Mercury’s entry in the UK.
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realise economies of scope of TV and telecommunications services. Since networks are 
already installed, few additional fixed and sunk costs arise if entry into telecommunications 
networking is permitted. The natural monopoly argument is no longer applicable. Secondly, 
unlike the general model, in Europe there already exist a multitude of incumbents instead 
of only one. If the still separated national markets were integrated, in the EC twelve 
national 70s (plus Mercury) could enter into competition. Having installed their networks 
already, a policy fostering competition among these incumbents would not relinquish 
economies of scale and scope. Sunk cost would turn out to be pro-competitive. They 
prevent exit of already installed operators. The 12 incumbents are unlikely to be driven out 
of the market Instead of a natural monopoly, the specific circumstances in the EC create a 
natural oligopoly? Thus, there are already enough players in the market to generate 
intensive competition.4 Newly developed technology as satellite and mobile networks foster 
market integration and competition among incumbents. The technological rationale (cable) 
for market fragmentation is more and more eliminated.
The discussion in chapter 3 has put forward further arguments why the economic 
foundation for monopoly provision of a telecommunications network is weak. The latter 
can be defended on the basis of an unsustainable natural monopoly and universal service 
goals. Econometric studies overall did not support the viewpoint that the entire 
telecommunications network is a natural monopoly. A comparison of European TOs’ 
performance, moreover, indicated that the smaller ones are more efficient Furthermore 
entry barriers make it unlikely that even if a natural monopoly existed, sustainability would 
become a serious issue. The presence of high sunk costs shelters the incumbent from 
inefficient entry. If the natural monopoly is sustainable, there is no need for granting 
special or exclusive rights. Instead a policy of liberalisation could introduce some 
disdplinatory force through potential competitors.
The present tariff structure, however, is unsustainable since it leads to internal cross­
subsidisation. Digital networks and "smart" terminals make it increasingly possible to divert 
international traffic from basic telephony to enhanced "off-net" services. The present tariff 
structure artificially supports the bypass by using private networks. Estimates of demand 
elasticities and optimal pricing considerations have also shown that it is highly inefficient. 
While inefficient pricing is not a necessary result from public provision, the fact that it is 
common for all EC member states shows clearly that public provision is likely to create 
these price distortions. Regulatory inertia and a regulator captured by political interest 
groups are the reason for the existing tariff scheme. Vote maximising politicians have an 
interest in maintaining a cross-subsidy which makes the median customer better off. 
Competition raises the pressure on the incumbent to rebalance tariffs which contradict
> A natural oligopoly is defined by the property that the welfare maximising number of firms is small, but larger 
than 1. See, for instance: Vogelsang, I. (1990).
* This argument is explained in more detail in: Stehmann, O. (1991).
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rules of optimal pricing both in the static and in the dynamic sense. Part of the efficiency 
gains which can be expected from competition therefore are due to state failure of public 
provision.
Universal service as the second rational for public provision has become a weaker 
argument over time. First, many countries have already achieved universal service. The low 
price elasticity of demand for access renders it unlikely that this achievement would be 
jeopardised if the cross-subsidy were reduced.5 In those countries where universal service 
has not yet been achieved, there exist more efficient means of fostering residential access. 
An entry tax could be imposed on all operators in the market This tax should depend on 
the net revenue of the individual operator. After having paid the tax, they should be free to 
set their tariffs. Secondly, customers having a high reservation price for access (rich 
households, business) could be charged higher access tariffs. Additional revenues stemming 
from these measures then could be used to set up a universal service fund which is 
targetted on the marginal network customer. By doing so, some of the gains stemming from 
competition could be used to finance universal service coverage.
While the arguments for public provision have become weaker, the ones for competition 
have gained momentum. Sunk costs stimulate competition by innovation instead of 
competition by duplication. The rapid development of substitutive means of 
communication supports this view. Even in markets where in the short run entry cannot be 
expected, a competitive outcome can be mimicked by using franchising and yardstick 
competition.
However, although competition is thought to be superior to monopoly provision, at least 
for a long transitional period state supervision will remain necessary. Liberalisation does 
not lead to deregulation but rather to reregulation. Its incumbent position, the control over 
the only universal network, economies of scale and entry barriers ensure that the TO 
remains the dominant firm. Hence an independent regulator is required which essentially 
has to fulfil two tasks. On the one hand, the TO has to be freed from politically motivated 
obligations which impose an unsustainable price structure and lead to inefficient entry. 
Thus the incumbent has to be permitted to carry out competitive price responses in 
markets where entry occurs. On the other hand, the regulator has to ensure that 
anticompetitive behaviour is prevented. Cross-subsidisating services provided under 
competition by using revenues from monopolised or dominated markets one possible 
anticompetitive action which TOs are able to carry out.
Finally, one has to decide which level of the market shall be opened to competition. 
Basically, two approaches can be distinguished. Service-based competition does net
3 As was pointed out in chapter 1, demand for access is derived demand which depends on the demand for 
services. While it is unlikely that an increase in the fixed monthly charge induces many customers to switch 
off, it becomes even less likely if the monthly telephone bill does not rise correspondingly due to simultaneous 
price decreases for services.
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challenge the de jure network monopoly of the TOs. Since it comprises the provision of 
basic services, this strategy still leaves 80% of telecommunications revenues under exclusive 
rights. Moreover, it does not put TOs under pressure to reduce the cost of network 
installation and mangagement. Instead, facility based competition also liberalises the 
provision of telecommunications networks. Supposedly, this also fosters service provision to 
the extent that input costs of the network shrink. It, moreover, reduces the scope for anti­
competitive cross subsidisation of the TO.
However, facility-based competition does not abolish completely the trheat of anti­
competitive behaviour. Although the core of market failure may be small, not all markets 
are likely to become highly competitive. While the latter can be expected for the long­
distance network, the local network is less competitive.6 Separating the natural monopoly 
core from the competitive parts - as it was intended by the divestiture of AT&T • may 
create the loss of economies of scope. This becomes even more relevant in small European 
markets. I t  on the other hand, the TO is left integrated, the incumbent’s ability to cross- 
subsidise persists. This problem may diminish over time when the local network also 
becomes competitive. Local competitors may arise from the combination of PCN and cable 
television firms. Licensed mobile operators also start competing in urban areas. MAN 
operators provide alternative fibre optic networks for instance in New York (see chapter 
6). Further competition arises from private networks and the possibility of bypass. 
However, for the foreseeable future, the local network is unlikley to become highly 
competitive. Regulatory safeguards remain indispensable. Thus, while the regulator’s 
influence should diminish rapidly in some markets, it will remain crucial for others. Hence 
a gradual approach towards network competition is likely to occur. A "middle-of-the-road" 
strategy may increase competitive pressure step-by-step while for a transitional period the 
incumbent gains time to adapt.7 Moreover, infrastructural obligations can be gradually 
reduced and necessary substitutes can be created.
Network liberalisation therefore leads initially to a mixed regime in which some markets 
face entry and competitive pressure while others remain controlled by the TO. A strategy 
towards network competition faces three fundamental problems. On the one hand it has to 
avoid inefficient entry. The latter is likely to happen if the incumbent is kept from making 
competitive price responses in market segments facing a potential entiy threat. Constraint- 
market- pricing has to be applied, which allows the operator to set prices between stand­
alone and incremental cost. On the other hand, it was pointed out that the industry 
characteristics foster anti-competitive behaviour. Finally, as the rat-race model showed, 
depending on the approach taken towards liberalising entry, incorrect incentives may be
* Natural monopoly elements may still exist in the local network due to economies of density which save switching 
and line costs. See chapter 2.1.1.1.
f Having been run for a century as a state office, TOs lack the business expertise which is necessary to operate in a 
competitive environment. Often employees are civil servants, which reduces significantly the TO’* flexibility.
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given to incumbents. An ISDN investment race may be detrimental for society because it 
leads to overinvestment. Furthermore, a strategy towards facility based competition should 
aim at a maximum of intensity of competition. The higher is the competitive pressure on the 
incumbent, the smaller is the need for regulatory supervision. To raise the intensity of 
competition, one should concentrate on specific features of the European 
telecommunications industry. Telecommunications markets are separated according to 
products, technology and geographic areas. Different product markets are point-to-point 
and point-to-multipoint (TV) communication. Differences in technology refer to the fixed 
cable, mobile, satellite and microwave networks. Geographically markets are separated 
between countries. The more these markets become integrated, the greater is the potential 
for competition. Thus priority should be given to firms which already have installed their 
own networks (cable firms, railways) and to entrants using a technology which leads to 
market integration. As was shown, satellite networks surmount market fragmentation and 
foster geographical, technological and product market integration. This makes them very 
attractive for a policy which aims at raising the intensity of competition.
The existence of 12 or 13 incumbents in the EC is a big asset for a strategy of facility-based 
competition. Instead of licensing new cable entrants, priority may be given to spur 
competition between already existing ones. Competition between already established TOs 
would not require big investments in sunk costs. No economies of scope would be lost since 
all of them operate already fully-fledged national networks. Thus, innovative entry can be 
fostered which leads to competition between different communication systems (cable, 
satellite, mobile microwave systems). Since the intensity of competition has to be 
maximised, the incumbent TOs should be banned from new communication systems in the 
absence of economies of scope. For instance, the GSM mobile network is estimated to 
become one of the major competitors of the fixed terrestrial network in the future. Scarcity 
of bandwidths restrict the number of mobile operators. The limited number of operators 
then may render it beneficial to grant these licences to private firms which are not affiliated 
with the TO. This would increase competitive pressure.
The intensity of competition, finally, could be increased by applying a combination of
measures discussed before. While competition in the intra-EC international market may be 
spurred by letting TOs compete against one another, mobile operators are most effective in 
the national urban and long distance markets. Yardstick competition then could be
introduced on the local level by running local network as profit centers.
The following part (DI) investigates recent developments in four member states of the EC, 
the intercontinental market and the approach chosen by the Commission. A comparison is 
made to the policy approach chosen in the USA. This is analysed in view of the arguments 
raised in part (I) and (O). Part (IV) finally leads to a concrete policy proposal for the 
liberalisation of the European market of telecommunications networks.
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PART m
Policy Approaches towards 
National and International Telecommunications

Introduction
After the preceding theoretical considerations part (III) is concerned with the actual 
telecommunications policy. In all industrialised countries a process of liberalisation has 
come about during the last decade. Broadly speaking, two strategies have been followed. In 
the USA and the UK1 to some extent facility-based competition has been introduced. In 
the EC countries of continental Europe instead a service-based strategy emerged. This 
strategy has been sketched mainly by the Commission of the EC. Nevertheless individual 
member countries have parallely developed national approaches. International 
telecommunications, finally, turns out to be an unique market on its own. This happens to 
be the case because in this market the more liberal anglo-saxon approach conflicts with the 
European concept of network monopoly.
Besides being interesting for its own sake, the recent development of the regulatory regime 
in European telecommunications has to be scrutinised carefully before developing a 
strategy towards facility-based competition (part IV). The degree of liberalisation already 
achieved, will be investigated. I will discuss the extent to which interests of member 
countries diverge. In this context the different level of development of national networks 
becomes important. The scope of the work does not allow investigation of all twelve 
member countries. However, national telecommunications sectors can be categorised into 
three groups. The main distinction refers to the degree of network development already 
achieved. For each group one representative country has been chosen. West Germany 
represents the case of a fully developed telecommunications natwork, which, however, is 
still fully owned and controlled by the state. In this context it is interesting to analyse to 
what extent this market structure is adequate for the urgent need to develop the 
rudimentary telecommunications infrastructure of the old GDR territory. Spain represents 
the case of a member country which has not yet achieved universal service. Italy, as the 
third example, is a hybrid. While the north has reached an infrastructural level similar to 
more advanced EC member countries, southern Italy is still far behind. In this combination 
of in terms of telecommunications advanced and less developed regions, Italy resembles the 
EC as a whole. GB, finally, is distinct in that it is the only EC member country which has 
already introduced some competition among network operators. In what follows I analyse 
the regulatory system as it developed through the last decade for all four countries. For all 
four member countries the price elasticities of demand for national and international 
telephone services have been estimated. As has been seen in part (I), different price 
elagtiritiVs of demand for local and long distance services are a crucial argument against the 
gristing cross-subsidisation. Similar research already has been carried out for other 
countries (especially the USA), however, no recent comprehensive studies on demand
1 Similar developments have occured also in Japan. Although an analysis of the Japanese telecommunications 
sector promises to lead to interesting insights it had to be neglected here.
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elasticities could be found for the countries discussed here. While some reference to the 
results is already made before, chapter 13 presents an overall comparison. In chapter 14, 
finally, some conclusions are drawn.
Beside the UK, the road towards competition chosen in the USA is most revealing for 
continental EC countries. The breakup of AT&T was the precendent and spurred 
European efforts to restructure the industry. For that reason I start with the development 
in the USA. In chapter 6 no full account can be made of the development in the US market. 
However, some interesting lessons for the EC may be drawn.
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6. The Precedent: Network Competition in US Telemmainnifatlniiit
While in Europe the telecommunications network traditionally has been provided by public 
Telecommunications Organisations (TO), in the US there is considerable experience with 
competition, even before the breakup of AT&T. When analysing the (dis)advantages of 
network competition in Europe, this experience has to be taken into consideration. In this 
respect two periods of competition can be distinguished. At the beginning of the century 
there was no dominant firm. After a short interval of competition, however, AT&T 
succeeded in monopolising the market. The second period started in the mid 1960s when 
the first specialised long-distance carrier was licensed. A process of decentralization began. 
Both periods offer interesting insights for an approach towards network competition. In the 
following this development is briefly analysed. Thereafter I try to point out the main lessons 
which can be drawn for a polity of network liberalisation in the EC.
6.1. Before the Breakup: Early Competition and Regulation
Contrary to Europe, in the USA the provision of the telephone service and the 
corresponding infrastructure was never controlled by the state. After the invention of the 
telephone by Alexander Bell in 1876, the Bell company ousted Western Union (telegraph), 
which previously had been the dominant firm in the communications market. Western 
Union did not anticipate the importance of the new technology. For some time thereafter 
the Bell company was protected by patents. However, after the expiry of its basic patent 
rights in 1893 more than 1000 companies were attracted into the market1. By this time 
technology allowed only the establishment of local networks. It has been argued that the 
Bell company probably underestimated the price elasticity of demand for telephones. By 
maintaining a high price it encouraged entry and allowed its competitors to gather a high 
market share2. By 1900 the "independents" controlled 38% of all installed telephone sets. 
This share rose subsequently to 49% in 19073. At this time no significant area was left 
without a telephone network in the USA. Major cities had two competing networks which 
were not interconnected. Fierce competition had encouraged quick development by cutting 
prices and thereby causing a dramatic surge in demand. This period will be later referred to 
as "early competition".
Again a technological breakthrough reshaped the US communications market. AT&T (the 
former Bell company) was the first to construct a long-distance network. Since it refused 
interconnection to other companies, the latter lost consumers. Subsequently they merged
1 Monopolkommission (1961), p. 78.
2 A analysis of the development of the telephone network in the USA can be found in Brock, Gerald W.
(1981), pp. 111-114.
3 Brock, Genld W. (1981), p. 121.
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with AT&T. By 1932 the market share of the latter had risen up to 80%4. Still existing 
"independent” companies by then were granted interconnection. However, thereby they had 
come to terms with the dominant firm, thus they did not exert further competitive pressure. 
The rapid monopolisation of the market which came about in the USA therefore has been 
considered as an empirical proof of the natural monopoly character of the 
telecommunications network. By 1945, federal and state policy was grounded on the 
premise that the telephone network was a natural monopoly.5 Nevertheless, the 
monopolist’s high profits thereafter made new entry attractive especially in the long­
distance market AT&T was continuously aware of the need for defensive measures. From 
the beginning the control of technological innovation became a crucial means to fence off 
potential competitors. Patents became an important protection for the monopolist. With 
the "Bell Laboratories'" AT&T established the world largest private research institute. By 
1935 the Bell system owned 9,255 patents itself and was licensed under 6,000 owned by 
others6. A potential entrant had to be afraid of infringing any of these patents as soon as a 
separate network was installed. Thus technological progress itself became an important 
entry barrier. The highly subsidised Bell-Labs were only maintainable for a company of 
AT&T’s size.
The second protective means of AT&T arouse from vertical integration. Besides the local, 
long-distance and international networks, and the Bell labs, AT&T also owned the 
manufacturer Western Electric. AT&T procurement policy made Western Electric 
essentially its only supplier of equipment and terminals7. Thus any potential entrant was 
obliged to install a network and to start manufacturing at the same time.
62. The Road towards Divestiture
62.1. Entry on the Fringe
Given AT&T’s dominant position, generally speaking there existed three different 
alternatives for behavioral control The first was to enforce more competition by antitrust 
policy. This would have led to the break up of the vertically integrated firm. The second 
alternative was nationalization and public provision. Finally, public regulation of the private 
monopolist was chosen and in 1934 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was 
set up. AT&T itself regarded regulation as the best choice, and for several decades it 
succeeeded in playing the "regulatory game" to its own advantage. After the second world 
war pressure rose to switch to the first strategy. The antitrust case of 1948 aimed at
4 Brock, Gerald W. (1981), p. 157.
3 Compare: Noll, R  G. and BA!. Owen (1989).
« Brock, Gerald W. (1961), p. 173.
7 Brock, Gerald W. (1981), p. 235.
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separating AT&T networks from Western Electric and at liberalising the equipment 
market8. AT&T’s vertical integration increased the difficulty of regulating local and long­
distance services.9
However, by intensive lobbying and with the support of the Defense Department AT&T 
was able to preserve its vertical structure. The Consent Decree o f 1956 confirmed AT&T’s 
position as a regulated private monopolist. As a result the latter was prohibited from 
entering the competitive computer markets and it was obliged to license its patents to 
companies operating in these markets. On the other hand the separation of the computer 
and telecommunications markets sheltered AT&T from entry. Thus, with the Consent 
Decree it relinquished patents as a means of protection. Instead it tried to use the 
regulatory mechanism as an effective substitute. However, by doing so, the firm passed over 
some of its power to the regulatory authorities. Later-on this proved to be a decisive 
mistake from the company’s viewpoint. Despite the consent decree of 1956 the FCC did 
not relinquish all kinds of competition. It agreed with AT&T that a breakup of the 
company and a complete liberalisation would be detrimental due to the existing economies 
of scale and scope. Thus, the main threat for AT&T’s monopoly position was not a full 
scale liberalisation policy. However, AT&T and the FCC disagreed about the potential 
advantages which could arise from entry on the fringe. AT&T fiercely resisted the latter, 
knowing that any precedent could lead to a quick erosion of its profitable position. The 
main regulator, however, favoured opening up market niches. It was mainly concerned with 
the exploitation of benefits arising from new communications technology. The dominant 
firm was regarded as being too slow in exploiting these. Therefore the FCC first permitted 
entry for a microwave carrier and later liberalised the satellite market. However, AT&T 
correctly foresaw the danger steming from this entry on the fringe. Once Microwave 
Communications Inc (MCI) had been licensed to construct a link between St Louis and 
Chicago in 1971, further entry could not be successfully prevented by the main carrier.
Entry by MCI set off a step by step procedure of liberalisation. This development did not 
follow any deliberate plan. To a large extent it was driven by "regulatory accidents".
Broadly speaking three different factors led to network liberalisation in the U SA :
a) changing political interests
b) technological progress
c) uncoordinated actions of a disjointed regulatory system
While only b) delivered a rationale to switch from regulation to competition, it was not the 
most important factor to bring about the fundamental change.
Political interests were mainly concerned with the pricing policy of the 
telecommunications carrier. Until 1930 the board-to-board pricing mechanism was applied.
* Brock, Gerald W. (1981), pp 187.
* Noll, R.G. and B.M. Owen (1988).
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According to the latter all costs of the local network were allocated to local services and 
access. This calculation mechanism was relatively easy to administer and relied on cost 
based pricing. However, in Smith vs. Illinois BeU the Supreme Court rejected this pricing 
scheme in 193010. It obliged AT&T to switch to the station-to-station principle. Under this 
polity, distance calls had to make a contribution to the local network costs. This led to the 
cross-subsidisation of local services and access by long-distance services. Since the costs for 
the latter decreased sharply over time, cross-subsidisation steadily increased despite 
modest price cuts. Given these price cuts the FCC did not face pressure to investigate 
AT&T’s pricing policy. Moreover, cross-subsidisation was politically popular. Any full scale 
investigation was put off until the 1960s. Rates had an uniform nationwide charge per 
circuit for a given mileage. They were based on average costs. Thus AT&T could prevent 
capital losses on old equipment if a new technology appeared. AT&T did not oppose the 
subsidy because it only meant a mere bookkeeping procedure, a transfer from AT&T long­
distance to its fully owned local operating Bell companies. Moreover, the uniform price 
setting helped the company to develop the image of an enterprise concerned with national 
integration and social objectives instead of a profit maximising monopolist. It hoped to use 
the cross subsidy politically to fence off entry. Thus, the rate structure benefitted both the 
regulated private monopolist and also the regulator.
However, AT&T thereby was completely at the regulator’s mercy. The higher the profit 
margin of the high density long-distance routes, the more attractive entry became. Thus 
regulation itself created artificial incentives to end AT&T’s monopoly. When political 
interests changed, AT&T was locked in a trap. Long-distance services had become an 
important input factor for the service sector as a whole. Subsequently an increasingly strong 
pressure group lobbied against the continuation of the station-to-station principle11. 
However, after the Supreme Court decision and given strong political support for the cross­
subsidisation, a direct reversal of the tariff principles appeared difficult to accomplish. 
Instead, the liberalisation of the long-distance network was regarded as a proper means to 
pass by the overpriced AT&T long-distance network. This also offered the possibility for a 
compromise with regulators. While being favourable to "specialised entiy", regulators 
resisted a full switch to cost based pricing12. The FCC obliged the dominant firm to stick to 
its old "fully distributed costs* principle. Each service had to recover a portion of the
10 See in more detail: Temin, P. and Galambos, L. (1987), p.19-27.
11 For the importance of interest groups: Joshow, Paul L. and Roger Noll (1991), pp 12-14.
12 For instance, in 1973 AT&T attempted to implement the "Hi-Lo" tariff, after the Specialised Common Carrier
decision of the FCC. The "Hi-Lo* tariff intended to de-average single channel leased lines rates on the basis 
of traffic density and costs. The proposed tariff on high density routes was less than one third the tariff of low 
density ones. The FCC, however, disallowed the "Hi-Lo* tariff. Further examples can be found in: Phillips, A. 
(1991), p. 52-53.
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common costs13. The FCC thereby ensured that entrants could undercut AT&T, whether 
they were more efficient or not14.
Specialised entiy fitted the interests of the FCC and the pressure groups favouring 
liberalisation. It allowed an initial bypass of the AT&T network, while preserving cross­
subsidisation. As a result, however, the stand-alone costs of large users were substantially 
lower than the rates AT&T was allowed to charge. From the viewpoint of the dominant 
firm the regulatory system had failed to provide the expected protection against entry. It 
had also prevented AT&T from launching a "competition price response” against entry. 
The latter was rejected as predatory pricing.13
Thus one may argue that the second factor, technological progress, became a pretext for 
MCI, when filing its request for authorization as a common carrier in 1963. By using 
microwaves it was able to argue that no duplication of investment into telephone cables 
took place. Instead, better usage of existing communication technology would come about. 
In its *'Above 890 Decision", the FCC permitted the private use of otherwise idle microwave 
bands in 1959. This decision offered a specialised carrier like MCI the possibility of 
entering the highly profitable long-distance market. The FCC confirmed this in the decision 
on Specialised Common Carriers in 1971. The FCC dedared that it would license further 
entrants, as far as they serviced new and specialised demand. Direct competition to AT&T, 
however, was not envisaged.
The second technological challenge to AT&T’s monopoly position arose from satellites. In 
its "open-sky" decision of 1972 the FCC allowed any company to establish an independent 
satellite network and to provide communications services.16 However, until recently 
satellite carriers had to interconnect into the terrestrial network of AT&T due to the size 
of the ground stations. Only the recent development of VSAT terminals has made it 
possible to bypass the terrestrial network altogether. Thus, initially the threat steming from 
"satellite entry" was rather small (see below).
F inally, however, the existence of rivalrous regulatory institutions brought about the 
decisive blow to AT&T’s monopoly position. In the USA the telecommunications sector is 
regulated mainly by five different institutions, which have sometimes overlapping 
jurisdiction and diverging interests. Potentially the most powerful source is Congressional 
legislation. However, different political interests ensured that Congress was blockaded as
13 In more detail: Breyer, Stephen, p. 1024.
14 Differently to AT&T, in the early days of long-distance competition, specialised common carriers did not have
to pay local companies part of their revenues. See: Joshow, P. and Roger Noll (1991), p. 22; and: Temin, pp. 
33-35.
13 Noll, R.G. and B.M. Owen (1969).
M RCA and Western Union launched satellites in 1974/75. Other companies leased capacity. Besides television 
transmission services, subsequently specialised services for individual companies and private line voice circuit* 
were offered too.
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an attractive regulatory force. Different "AT&T bills", either seeking more protection or 
liberalisation, fell through17. Day-to-day regulation is carried out by the FCC and state 
regulators. While the FCC is responsible for the approving of licences for common carriers, 
to require interconnection and to supervise the rate setting in the interstate market, state 
regulators supervise the intrastate market18. Antitrust policy is carried out by the Justice 
Department. While AT&T was de facto exempted from antitrust policy since the consent 
decree of 1956, antitrust became important again after specialised carriers entered the 
market However, the most important changes in the 1970s were brought about by District 
Courts. In 1975 MCI offered a new service called Execunet. Using AT&T local networks, 
Execunet created a dial up long-distance service19. This service was in direct competition to 
AT&T and violated the FCCs regulation on specialised common carriers of 1971. 
Consequently, the regulator rejected the Execunet service. In 1977, an appeals court 
reversed the decision made by the FCC on formal grounds20. This led to the "accidential" 
liberalisation of the US long-distance market against the will of the main regulatory 
commission. The district court’s decision thereby became the decisive breakthrough for 
network competition in the USA.
However, not only the district courts, but also the Justice Department enforced a policy 
which initially contradicted the intentions of the FCC. For 20 years antitrust policy was not 
applied to the telecommunications industry. However, after specialised carriers had 
successfully entered the market they were able to challenge AT&T's anticompetitive 
behaviour. In 1974 a new antitrust case was filed. By charging high access fees AT&T had 
tried to prevent interconnection of its competitors21. The intention of the new case was 
similar to the previous one of 1948: to separate those parts of the Bell system which could 
be opened to competition from the "natural monopoly core".
6J2J2. An Evaluation
♦
The antitrust case of 1974 led to the breakup of AT&T and the full liberalisation of the 
interstate long-distance market. Thus, neither Congress nor the main regulator but the 
Courts had reshaped the telecommunications industry. Although very much restricted at 
the beginning, specialised carriers were able to set off a dynamic process of liberalisation 
even though this contradicted the regulator’s policy objectives. On the other hand it is
17 In the 1970s Congress was devided between cutting down the oversized AT&T and preierving the popular cross- 
subsidy scheme. In more detail: Brock, Gerald W. (1961), p. 289-294 and Tumstall, J. (1966), pp. 107-109.
«  Hills, J. (1986), p. 55.
»  In detail: Brock, Gerald W. (1981), p. 225.
20 The judge argued that neither AT&T had got an cxplidt monopoly for the matched long-distance market, nor
had the FCC property defined the boundaries for the specialised carriers.
21 Tumstall, J. (1986), p. 111.
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important to note that competition was not the outcome of a carefully developed strategy. 
Two approaches were applied simultaneously. The FCC was concerned with efficiency in 
production. Given the existence of economies of scale and scope it reckoned that the 
integrated monoplist would be the most efficient means of supply. Instead the Department 
of Justice was concerned with potentially detrimental effects of market power and the 
abuse of a monopoly position. It interpreted previous experience with regulation as 
evidence that AT&T could not be sufficiently controlled by the FCC. It therefore gave 
priority to efficiency due to competition. However, antitrust policy originally did not intend 
to liberalise networks. It was mainly concerned with the separation of manufacturing and 
services. Only for the former competition was envisaged. Thus, while each regulatory 
institution followed a peacemeal approach on its own, only the combination of both led to 
regulatory changes which were far more radical While this ended AT&T’s monopoly 
position in manufacturing and long-distance services, at the same time it led to a decisive 
shift of regulatory power. Since divestiture there has been a transfer of power from the 
FCC to the Court. The Federal District Court of Columbia which oversees the new consent 
decree can be regarded as an additional regulator.
To a large extent entry came about due to political inertia which created artificial 
incentives and thereafter protected the new competitors from fierce price responses of the 
dominant firm. On the other hand, AT&T had used all means available to bar entry. 
Monopolistic abuses included refusals to deal22, the denial of interconnection with its local 
facilities, and the raising of competitor’s costs.23 No "fair market test" had taken place, to 
prove whether the long-distance market is a natural monopoly and whether this monopoly 
would be sustainable. It is arguable whether an earlier revision of the rate structure 
probably would have avoided the "Execunet" controversy and the later divestiture of 
AT&T.
Thus while the earlier process of concentration clearly indicated the natural monopoly 
character of the traditional cable telephone network, the more recent change back towards 
competition cannot be cited as a sign that "natural monopoly" characteristics have 
evaporated in the meantime. Entrants were well enough cushioned to survive. On the other 
hand it does not strengthen either the claim for regulatory protection of AT&T. That entry 
has been successful does not imply the existence of an unsustainable natural monopoly. It 
has only proven the unsustainability of the cross-subsidisation scheme.
63. The Divestiture of AT&T and Subsequent Regulation
Before a final decision had been made in the antitrust case of 1974, AT&T and the Justice 
Department settled the case in an agreement by 1982. AT&T thereby was allowed to
22 AT&T, for did not permit its customers to buy equipment from other sources.
23 See in detail: Noll, R.G. and BJM. Owen (1988).
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participate in the decision concerning which parts were to be split. It divested itself from 
the 22 Bell operating local companies (BOC), while keeping AT&T long-distance, Western 
Electric and the Bell Labs. According to the Modification o f Final Judgement (MFI) of 1982, 
the BOCs were formed into seven independent Regional Holding Companies (RHC). They 
operate in 160 "Local Access and Transport Areas' (LATA), in which access charges are 
levied to replace the previously existing long line contributions24. LATAs are usually 
confined to one state. The FCC regulates interstate interLATA and interstate intraLATA 
services.
The MFI forbade AT&T from offering value-added services. This restriction, however, was 
reversed by the FCC in 198625. As a bargaining chip Justice had offered AT&T relief from 
the constraints of the old consent decree of 1956. It therefore got permission to enter the 
unregulated computer market. Expecting AT&T and IBM to become fierce competitors, 
the 13 years old antitrust case against IBM was dismissed at the same time. This twin 
decision relied on the assumption that voice and data transmission technology would 
eventually merge. In 1984 the FCC then also deregulated the customer premise equipment 
(CPE) market26.
The interstate market was liberalised. Any company may compete either by reselling 
capacity or by constructing its own facilities. Except for microwaves, no licence is required 
for entering the market. Presently there are more than 100 companies offering long­
distance services, while three operate throughout the country as common carriers. Of all 
carriers only AT&T is still subject to price regulation27. Price-cap regulation replaced the 
traditional rate-of-return regulation in 1989. AT&T’s services are divided into four 
categories.28
The MFI, however, did not completely liberalise the long-distance market. Interexchange 
carriers are generally allowed to offer services between LATAs, while intra LATA long­
distance service is controlled by state regulators. Thus by 1984 about 25% of long-distance 
calls were exempted from competition. By 1990 twenty six states had allowed full intra­
LATA competition, while forty-two had allowed the resale of services.29 However, LATA 
boundaries still often demarcate the boundary between monopoly and competition. This 
also inhibited the development of robust competition between LATAs.30
M Hill, J. (1986), p. 68.
25 Tarifka Annual (1991), p. 384.
2* Johnson, E. (1986), p. 57.
27 US Council for International Business (1990), p J.
2> These are residential and small business, toll free 800 services, business services including WATS and special
services.
2» Crandall, R.W. (1991), p-50
»  Noll, R.G. and B.M. Owen (1989).
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The district court of Columbia did not allow the RHCs to produce their own equipment, to 
enter the long-distance market, or to offer information services31. Otherwise, it was feared, 
they could cross subsidize their activities in the competitive markets or allow discriminatory 
access of long-distance carriers to their local networks. In the absence of generally accepted 
standards, the RHCs could design network technology which would exclude competition in 
sophisticated downstream services which require the public switched network. This applies 
for instance for electronic mail, call forwarding etc.32. In contrast to the approach pursued 
in the EC, in the US originally the separation of basic and value-added services was 
envisaged. Even without the RHCs ability to preclude competition, regulators would face 
serious problems deciding on adequate access charges for VANS providers using the local 
networks. These restrictions imposed on the RHCs have been continuously critisized33. 
They were opposed by the FCC which reckoned that the costs of structural separation 
would outweigh the benefits. By 1986 antitrust authorities themselves had changed their 
mind and advocated that the BOCs should reintegrate into nearly all of the liberalised 
markets (manufacturing, information services and long-distance). Only their own service 
territories were supposed to be exempted.34 Some BOCs had refused to offer new forms of 
ISDN interconnection since they did not want to offer VANS competitors a first-in 
advantage. Thus, the separation became a handicap for network development.35 In its 
Computer Inquiry HI of 1986 the FCC adopted "non-structural safeguards” to prevent 
cross-subsidisation of the dominant carriers. The latter then were allowed to provide VANS 
as welL A concept of 'Open Network Architecture* (ONA)36 was developed to provide for 
nondiscriminatory access to networks for suppliers of VANS37. On July 25th 1991 the 
District Court finally reversed its decision on information services and permitted the RHCs 
to sell them too38.
The regulation for local network carriers also has been challenged recently. Presently 
different bilk have been put before Congress to let the RHCs carry television and
telephone services or to start manufacturing39. In a bid to break the local cable TV
31 Like electronic yellow pages, on-line news and share price quotations.
32 Pepper, R. and N. Brotman (1987), p. 148.
33 See for instance: Noll, R. (1983), and: Economist, August 3,1991.
34 Joshow, PJL and R.G. Noll (1991), p. 57.
33 Noll, R.G. (1991), p 5 l .
3^  ONA is a framework of disaggregating network components such that open access is permitted also for entities 
using their own installations. It relies on the principle of unbundling the multiple functions of the exchange 
switch. Thereby outside parties can substitute parts by their own facilities if they can provide these functions 
cheaper themselves. More in detail: Noam, Eli A. (1986), p. 61-61
37 In more detail Phillips, a. (1991), p56/57; and: Wollenberg, R., Witten, R. and J. Nadler (1990), p. 25.
3® Economist, August 3,1991.
3* Economist, July 6,1991.
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monopolies, the FCC ruled in October 1991 that the Bell Operating Companies should be 
able to provide a "video dialphone". Customers then can use their phone lines to dial up 
video services. On the other hand their local monopoly position has been put at risk. Some 
state regulators have made new access arrangements for local networks. Thereby RHCs are 
obliged to interconnect private bypass networks. While the latter are allowed to use leased 
lines of the RHCs, state regulators also consider bypass carriers to enter switched services. 
The latter account for the vast majority of the RHCs’ revenues40.
Further competition in the local network may come from cable TV firms. The revision of 
the 1984 cable act which bars cable TV firms from the telephone business is at stake. Cable 
companies could offer the next generation of mobile telephone service (PCN). They could 
thereby link their cable networks to the transmission masts of a digital, cellular radio 
telephone system41. Moreover AT&T has applied for permission to test a new network for 
pocket sized radio phones using its network of microwave towers. The latter were gradually 
taken out of service when traffic was concentrated to the fibre-optic lines and digital 
switches. This would put AT&T in direct competition with the RHCs42.
Fiber-based local competitors already install Metropolitan Area Networks (MAN) which 
provide alternative access to the long-distance carriers. This allows the latter to avoid the 
access fees to the RHCs local network. MAN revenues have been growing by 22% a year. 
In New York, for instance, Teleport has more than 70 customers, including AT&T and US 
Sprint.43
Thus the period after divestiture has shown that in the USA the drawing of a borderline 
between "competitive" and "natural monopoly" parts of the network and service industry 
has failed. This holds dearly for the separation of basic and value-added services which has 
been abolished in the meantime. However, the convergence of telecommunications and 
broadcasting and new developments in mobile technology also put into question the 
"natural monopoly" character of the local network.
•o Fin Tech, March 21, 1991. The New York State Public Service Commission in November 1991 adopted rule*
under which rival companies can offer bask telephone services in New York city. Compare: Harald Tribune, 
December 28,1991.
u Economist, January 12,1991.
o  Wall Street Journal, June 26,1991.
o Tetke, P. and J. Gebosky (1991), p.432.
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6A. Has Competition Prevailed? An Assessment of Divestiture
&4.1. AT&T's Declining Market Share
Despite all institutional differences and the divergent structure of the network operator, 
the experience with facility based competition in the USA is revealing for a policy concept 
for the EC. In this respect the intensity of competition in the interLATA long-distance 
market and repercussions on the universal service goal are most relevant. They will be 
scrutinised in what follows.
In the long-distance market competition has come about from two different sources. First, 
beside AT&T there are two other common carriers providing nationwide long-distance 
services. The market share of MCI and US-Sprint has increased continuously over the past 
seven years. This can be seen from table 6.1. However, in 1990 for the first time AT&T was 
able to stop the trend and to reverse it slightly.
Year Share
1984 80.2
1985 77.1
1986 74.0
1987 70.4
1988 67.1
1989 63.9
1990 2nd quarter 62.1
4th quarter 62.8
19911st quarter 63.1
3rd quarter 6Z5
Table 6.1.: AT&T share o f US Interstate M inuted
With a market share of above 60% still AT&T remains the dominant firm in the market. 
However, its competitors are well established.
To some extent AT&T is still protected by the method chosen for customer access. 
Customers make a one-off choke of carrier through which all their long-distance calls are 
routed. They can switch the carrier later if preferred. Customers who express no preference 
are allocated to the available earners in proportion to the existing market share. This
+* Source: Federal Communications Commission (1992).
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method offers the traditional carrier an inbuilt advantage, which would end if customers 
had to choose their carrier on a call-by-caU basis, by putting in an appropriate code. Prices 
would thereby become more significant for the customer’s choice45.
The second source of competition stems from private earners4^ . They lease space on the 
network of the three common carriers and resell to their customers. Thereby they design 
their routes to minimize costs in a particular region or specialize on a few cities. In order to 
avoid paying local aoreiss charges they can connect their customers directly to the long­
distance network. A private line can connect a customer to the total network of a long­
distance carrier, to another local area, ot to a specific office47. Finally big business set up 
their own installations mainly to connect their own branches. Thereby they avoid the public 
network altogether. Spare capacity then is sold to other firms.
The importance of private lines can be estimated from the fact that since divestiture up to 
one third of total investment in telecommunications networks was accounted for by private 
carriers. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the capital expenditures in 
telephone and telegraph tripled from 1975 to 1988. However, the capital expenditure of 
local and long-distance carriers rose much less. According to Crandall probably 25 percent 
of all telecommunications net capital stock is now in the hand of non-TOs (like airlines, 
banks, insurance companies etc.)48. Large users shift massively towards private carriage. 
This leads to a bypass of the public telecommunications network4^ . Beside being 
advantageous by satisfying specialised needs, private carriers avoid access charges which 
have to be paid by common carriers when interconnecting into the BOCs local networks. 
Access charges for interconnection into local networks still impose some of the non traffic 
sensitive costs on the long-distance carriers in order to subsidize consumer access. Thus 
they comprise some efficiency losses as those which materialized from the old cross­
subsidisation scheme. Fixed cost (local access) are paid for by a usage sensitive charge. 
Bypass is considered to be uneconomic if the private communications are more costly than 
the incremental costs of providing the service by the local switched network. Thus 
additional social costs are produced if bypass is encouraged by the existing access charges.
It erodes substantially revenues needed to invest into the fibre optic local networks and into 
digitalization of switches. The RHCs claim to have lost $ 3.73 billion in 1989 due to 
bypass50. It is impossible to measure exactly the volume of private carriage. Moreover, it is
«  Mullins, Stephen (1990).
*  Private carriers are here defined as carriers which offer specialised services to some user groups.
47 Jochow, OX. and Roger Noll (1991), p. 61-62.
*  Noam, Eli (1988), p. 14; Economist, October 5,1991 and: Crandall, R.W. (1991), p. 45-50.
*  may be defined as a situation where a toll service customer or a toll service «•^ rri**' utilizes facilities which 
are not owned by local telephone companies for toll traffic, thereby avoiding to pay a toll-to-ktcal subsidy' So 
defined in. Egan, Bruce L. and Dennis L Weisman (1986), p. 166.
Fin Tech, March 21,1991.
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not possible to conclude that all of it is inefficient. However, as with the entry of specialised 
earners in the 1960s and 70s, the regulatory regime still gives artificial incentives to avoid 
the public switched network.
A second form of bypass emerged from common carriers setting up direct links to the end 
users. They thereby avoid local access charge as well A cost breakdown of AT&T revealed 
the strong incentive to do so. 60% of total costs of a long-distance call consists of access 
charges, 25% represent general and marketing costs, 13% network and 2% operator service 
costs5*. In 1985 the FCC allowed AT&T to construct the first bypass facilities5^ . Thus 
RHCs face competitive inroads into their local markets to which they are not permitted to 
respond. Access charges are regulated by state regulators and the FCC. In 1985 the FCC 
began to change the system of access charges which until the mid-1980s covered about 25% 
of the total cost of local exchange service. By 1990, the FCC had transfered about half of 
the federal share of local costs to subscriber line charges (SLC). Interstate long-distance 
rates fell approximately by 25% while residential and business access charges rose by 20% 
and 10% respectively53. The FCC has authority to preempt state regulation that would 
frustrate FCC objectives54. While the latter wants access charges to be reduced to costs, 
state regulators try often to preserve cross-subsidisation. Thus the permission granted by 
the FCC to common carriers to build their own bypass facilities is a means to put state 
regulators under pressure to revise access charges. The SLC is an example where the FCC 
itself imposed a significant change. However, as before divestiture, the MFI could not end 
the rivalrous regulatory system.
6A2. Development of Prices
During the 1960s and 1970s the price of a basket of telephone services rose at roughly one 
half the rate of general inflation. During the period of AT&T’s divestiture it rose more 
rapidly than the general price index. This was mainly due to the sharp price increase for 
local calls. The 1**^  ^ urbanized states and communities and rural areas in smaller states 
were hit most. Smaller communities in larger states still receive a subsidy by the larger 
intrastate long-distance service. Since 1986 the average telephone rate again moves 
according to the historic tendency, below the general inflation rate. More important, 
however, are the diverse trends of individual services. Graph 6.1. gives a rough idea of the 
price development of different telephone services since divestiture in the USA
31 National Telecommunications & Information Administration (NTIA) (1985).
a  Hill«, J. (1986), p. 72.
»  Joshow, P i. and R.G. NoU (1991), p. 61.
54 See: US Council (1990), p. 7.
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Graph 6.1.: Real prices for telephone services in the US55 (1977 -  100)
As can be seen from graph 6.1., in the interLATA market competition has produced the 
expected price decreases. By 1991 the real price of interstate long-distance services has 
shrunk by 59.7% since 1977, while the price decrease accelerated through the last seven 
years. Real prices for intrastate long-distance call* also fell over time. However, the price 
decrease was less significant. Local prices fell until 1981. Thereafter they rose to a level 
about 10% above the one of 1977. However, since 1986 they have started to decrease again. 
Real international call prices on average dropped by 71.8% in the decade 1977 to 198756. 
Generally, competition for market share between the three common carriers is considered 
to be fierce. AT&T’s marketing expenditure has risen considerably during the period 1988- 
1991. The main area of competition, however, has been rate cutting. All carriers have 
offered a lot of price discounts in the residential markets and for large business users57. As 
has been pointed out AT&T is still subject to price cap regulation. So far, however, prices 
filed by AT&T have with one exception been accepted. Thus the regulatory restraint on 
AT&T has been much relaxed since divestiture.
Though the price decrease in the long-distance market is considerable, the related welfare 
effects may be less impressive if one accounts for the lower cross-subsidisation which has 
come about. Though the present access charges are still regarded as too high to prevail
55 Source: US Council (1990).
»  US Council (1990), p. 17.
57 Fin Tech, March 7,1991.
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under competition, they are much lower than the previous ones paid by AT&T to its 
formerly fully owned BOCs. On an aggregated level the price development in 
telecommunications since the introduction of competition in 1978 is not too impressive if 
compared with the period prior to liberalisation. As Phillips points out the ratio of the CPI 
for all telephone service to the CPI of all items58 was 231 in 1968, 0.87 in 1978 and 0.40 in 
1988 (1977 = 100). Thus the decade before competition saw relatively higher price 
reduction than the decade which followed liberalisation. It is therefore impossible to tell to 
what extent price cuts in the competitive markets are due to an increase in productivity or 
to a mere abolition of the previous price structure.
Finally, as far as service quality is concerned, little evidence was found that a deterioration 
has been taken place since the breakup»59.
However, overall the introduction of competition is regarded as successful This can be 
seen from the fact that most states by now also permit competition in the intraLata long­
distance market60.
6A3. Universal Service
It is widely believed that network competition and universal service are two conflicting 
goals. This view is based on the assumption that the cross-subsidisation of access is 
necessary in order to offer all households access on "reasonable terms”. Full network 
competition, would quickly erode this basis for the subsidy. Above, however, it was pointed 
out that the cross-subsidisation of access through services is only one possible means to 
foster interconnection. This general subsidy which does not discriminate among customers 
has been described as very inefficient.
The repercussions of competition on the universal service goal may be very different 
depending on whether universal service has already been achieved when the market is 
liberalised. Once universal service has been achieved, competition would be only 
detrimental if it induced many households to disconnect. Given the low price elasticity of 
demand for access, this is not likely to occur. Instead, if universal service has not yet been 
achieved, competition may erode the means of the operator to subsidize interconnection of 
remote areas which have not joined the network.
As was pointed out in chapter 6.1, in the USA two periods of competition have occured. In 
the first decade of the century fierce competition came about when various operators built 
up local networks. Brock pointed out that competition at this time spurred considerably the
5* A measure of telephone service prices in terms of all consumer goods. CPI •  Consumer Price Index. See:
Phillips, A. (1991), p. S3, Footnote 10.
»  In more detail: Crandall, Robert W. (1991), p. 121-122.
w US Council for International Business (1990), p-7.
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provision of local telephone services throughout the country61. The main carrier was put 
under pressure to speed up the installation of its own networks. Moreover, the immense 
capital needed for investment was raised easier by several independent firms. Thus at an 
early stage of network development competition fostered the universal service goal. 
However, by the time when AT&T had monopolized the telecommunications network 
many remote areas were not interconnected. It is generally acknowledged that thereafter 
the cross-subsidisation of access has helped to interconnect these regions. While in 1950 
only 50% of households were connected to the Bell network, the percentage was growing 
steadily by 2% a year. 1983 91.4% of all households had access62. Thus in the USA the 
universal service goal had been achieved by the time of liberalisation. From what was said 
above, it was unlikely that thereafter liberalisation would threaten this achievement. In fact, 
despite the high rate of access already achieved before, it rose further to 93.4% in 199163. 
This may be explained mainly by three factors. Contrary to forecasts, the effects of 
repricing on equity have been rather small. The lowest income classes incurred an increase 
in telephone related expenditures of about 4%, while the highest income classes realized 
savings of less than 3% since the breakup64. From these income effects one cannot expect a 
high rate of disconnection.
Secondly, however, divestiture did not end the subsidisation of household access to the 
network. While not all of the traditional cross-subsidisation steming from long-distance 
services was stopped63, additional programs were set up. Currently, about 27% of local loop 
costs are recovered from interstate rates.“  Programs to subsidize poor housholds’ access 
were started by individual states and also by the FCC. For instance, in 1983 California 
adopted the "Moore Universal Telephone Service Act" according to which households 
below a certain income level receive a 50% discount on basic local services. This program is 
financed by a 4% surcharge on intrastate services. In 1984 the FCC adopted a plan which 
allows a total reduction of 50% in fixed charges for households satisfying a means test. 
Lifeline programs are available in all states. They are funded through charges paid by 
interstate ratepayers and not by federal taxes17. Nevertheless, consumers qualifying for
«  Brock, Gerald W. (1961), p. 144.
*2 Phillips, Almarin (1991), p. 50.
«Source; FCC(1992).
M For the effects of repricing through 1967 Crandall estimated that lower income households payed about US S 16 
more a year. A detailed analysis of income effects caused by price changes since the breakup: Crandall, 
Robert, W. (1991), p. 112-115,164.
Long-distance carriers pay carrier access charges to the RHCs. They are divided into Carrier Common Line 
(CCL) charges that recover non-traffic-sensitive costs and other traffic-sensitive charges.
«« Mitchell, B. and I. Vogelsang (1991b), p.70.
On January 1990 the FCC estimated that about 1-8 million subscribers received reduced rates under the federal 
Lifeline Assistance programme. See in more detail: Dordick, H.S. and MJD. Fife (1991), pp. 119-120.
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Lifeline assistance in 1990 paid 11% more for unlimited calling, 36% more for the lowest 
generally available rate and 44% more for connection68.
Besides the low income subscribers, rural areas were expected to be hit by the tariff 
changes. The Rural Elictrification Administration (REA) established by Congress in 1949 
makes funds available to rural telephone companies. These funds at low interest rates are 
used to serve towns with populations of 1500 or less. In 1986 around five million subscribers 
were provided by REA borrowing telephone companies69.
Thus the liberalisation of the long-distance market in the USA has not stopped the 
subsidisation of access. However, it led to a concentration on those subscribers who are 
expected to need subsidies most. As a side effect the liberalisation process brought about 
more detailed studies on access demand. Thereby the strong relationship of "access to the 
telephone network” and the "households income” has been shown empirically in various 
studies. It was found also that the low income elderly household is not the one likely to 
disconnect in case of price increases. While the latter have been the traditional target of 
assistance, recent studies provided evidence that low income households aged 16-24 years 
are the least served70.
Moreover, existing cross subsidies do not stem from long-distance services. Instead, explicit 
charges are levied to the customer for access to the long-distance service (Subscriber Line 
Charge). These charges allow a closer alignment of rates with marginal cost.
Finally, the third reason why liberalisation did not cause harm to universal service stems 
from technological progress. It is important to note that rapid technological progress makes 
the telephone service a special bargain for consumers. When compared to cost increases in 
other services, telephone charges have risen modestly. Even for local calls, after a sharp 
increase in 1984, the CPI has steadily fallen. It has been equal or lower than the CPI for all 
items. Given the drastic price decreases for long-distance and international calls, relative to 
other goods and services, on average telephone services have become much cheaper over 
time71.
Suming up, one finds that universal service has not been put at risk despite considerable 
rebalancing of tariffs. While the overall burden of cross-subsidisation was reduced, it 
became more efficient in two ways. The subsidisation was targeted more closely on needy 
customers. Secondly the remaining burden was shifted away from the very price elastic 
long-distance services. Moreover, a very low price elasticity of demand for telephone access 
meant that households did not switch off when prices rose. Finally, technical progress itself 
ensured that in comparison to other products and services, telecommunications prices have 
decreased over time.
** Dorderick, Hj . and M.D. Fife (1991), p. 122.
»  Fuhr, Joseph P. Jr. (1990), p. 183/184.
70 See: Dordick, H.S. and MS. Fife (1991), p. 120-122; Hudson, H.E. and Edwin P. Parker (1990), p. 198; Hills, J.
(1989), p. 137.
71 Dordick, HA and M.S. Fife (1991), p. 123.
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<L5. Lessons for Europe
In the USA competition in the long-distance market came about mainly for two reasons. 
The first was related to cross subsidies which increased over time. Given strong political 
interests in preserving the subsidy, a rebalancing within the existing regulatory regime was 
more difficult to obtain than the opening of the long-distance market. The latter, however, 
led automatically towards cost based pricing. The second motivation was technological 
progress. The dominant firm did not make full use of new transmission technology. The 
FCC therefore allowed specialised carriers to exploit the related benefits.
While the divestiture of AT&T is often referred to as the "big bang“ of liberalisation, in the 
USA much more a step-by-step approach was applied. The experience made by this step- 
by-step approach is threefold.
One important lesson from the process of liberalisation in the US is the considerable 
dynamic momentum which is gained, once entry on the fringe is permitted. Once 
specialised carriers were established in the market, protectionist regulation of the 
dominant firm became obviously unfair. This is much less apparent if competitors exist only 
"potentially". AT&T (like European F i l  s) was exempted from antitrust policy as long as it 
operated as a monopolist. Once installed, however, small entrants used antitrust quickly as 
a powerful means to put away with protection. However, one should note, that in the EC 
antitrust is not privately enforceable, as it is in the USA. To gain a similar dynamic 
momentum as in the USA, small firms would need an active support from the Commission. 
The second lesson is related to the continuous efforts to draw a line between the 
"competitive" area and the "natural monopoly" parts. The FCC only favoured entrants 
using technology which would have left idle otherwise. Soon these entrants competed in the 
main market of the dominant firm. After divestiture value-added and basic services were 
separated in order to prevent cross-subsidisation. This separation meanwhile has been 
given up. The main idea of divestiture was, however, to split the local networks as the 
"natural monopoly core" from the long-distance market. As has been pointed out recent 
technological development is likely to put an end to the local monopolies as well. Thus 
technological advance made any borderline futile as soon as it was drawn. This has been 
dearly seen from various efforts made by the FCC in its "computer inquiries" trying to 
distinguish value-added and bask services. The spectrum of technical possibilities in 
telecommunications is continuous. In that case there is a danger involved in imposing an 
artificial separation of regulated and unregulated parts. By doing so, incentives are given to 
direct innovation towards a service or a technology which is a very dose substitute to the 
regulated part, but still remains open for entry. The already existing service is merely 
copied. The competitor nevertheless will be able to make profits since he or she does not 
operate under the regulatory burden. This leads to the third lesson which is concerned with 
ineffident entry.
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Inefficient entry has become a serious problem because regulators wanted to have both 
cross-subsidisation for social reasons and competition to raise efficiency in the long­
distance market Entry by specialised carriers has been stimulated significantly by 
preventing the dominant carrier from realigning its tariff structure. In the US, the FCC did 
not begin a broad investigation of the sustainability of geographical rate averaging before 
taking its "above 890 decision”. It probably underestimated the scope for "cream-skimming’’. 
Prohibiting competitive price responses by AT&T, the regulator almost guaranteed profits 
for entrants. This prevented a "fair market test”. Thus if the telecommunications network is 
a sustainable natural monopoly, entry appeared only due to flawed regulation. It may be 
argued that the success of MCI and US-Sprint after divestiture gives some empirical 
evidence against the "natural monopoly” case. Although AT&T by now has been mostly 
relieved from regulatory constraints, it could not avoid losing market share. However, 
losing market share initially may have been in the incumbent’s interest. It helped to 
convince the FCC to loosen control. Secondly, AT&T avoided across-the-board pricing cuts 
which would have reduced profits. Moreover, the fact that MCI and US-Sprint have not 
been pushed out of the market may be due to the existence of high sunk costs. Due to the 
latter barriers to exit exist. Once carriers have established their networks they are unlikely 
to be driven out of the market again. Anticipating this, the dominant carrier may abstain 
from a price war, though it might produce at lower cost. It will rather choose to accomodate 
the entrants.
The artificial incentives for bypass given to private and common carriers have shown that 
until today this problem has not been resolved. Given the high investments especially 
undertaken to install private networks, it is therefore likely that considerable funds are 
misallocated.
Thus, before taking measures of liberalisation, the main operator has to be relieved of 
uneconomic tariffs. While this appears straightforward, in the US this principle has not 
prevailed despite 25 years of experience with the liberalisation of telecommunications 
networks. As was pointed out this is mainly due to the existing regulatory system.
However, the main advantage of competition has proven to be the rapid development of 
new comunication technology (mobile systems, VSATs, the fusion of telecommunications 
and TV services on cable), which allows for competition among different systems. While 
this was probably not the main intention behind the liberalisation process in the USA, it is 
nevertheless an important outcome which has to be taken into consideration for network 
competition in Europe. Instead of introducing competition between operators using the 
same cable technology, more emphasis should be given to competition between operators 
using different communication systems.
The experience made in the USA has shown that the main carrier is hardly put at the risk 
of disappearance. Despite artificial incentives for entry AT&T has lost only in market 
share. However, it did not have to reduce total output. Market growth for basic services 
was strong enough to make room for the additional carriers.
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Universal service goals have not been put at risk in the USA. In this respect it might be 
useful to distinguish three periods of network development. At the first stage local 
networks are set up mainly in urban areas. These networks promise to be profitable even if 
no subsidisation is made. In the second period the network can be increased only by 
providing access to customers with either incur high costs of access (remote areas, small 
villages) or have a low income. In this second stage cross-subsidisation becomes necessary 
to raise aocess share further. In the third period universal service is accomplished. During 
the first period the USA achieved a much higher penetration of telephones than European 
countries. This has been mainly due to the strong competition between AT&T and the 
■independents''. Providing services in remote areas, the independent companies ensured a 
widespread supply of the telephone network. When competition was reintroduced universal 
service goals were not threatened. Liberalisation led to a more efficient use of those means 
which remained to subsidize aocess. Contrary to the assumption that universal service and 
competition are conflicting goals, the experience made in the USA has been different. At 
an early stage competition fosters universal service. At the time of a mature network it is 
unlikely to create much harm. Only at a medium stage of network development one might 
therefore expect both goals to conflict.
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7. Competition versus Integration: The Commission’s Approach
The rapid change of the US telecom industry had an important impact on European policy 
makers. However, the approach chosen in Continental Europe has been very different from 
the USA.
During 1980s the telecommunications sector was restructured on both the national and the 
supranational level. As will be seen in the following, the main driving force has been the 
Commission of the EC. Actions taken by individual Member States appeared in the service 
sector only after the former had already sketched a broad concept. Despite the differences 
still existing on the national level, one therefore may regard the Commission’s approach as 
a synthesis to which continental policies will converge. For this reason the latter becomes 
especially important when exploring the road towards facility based competition in Europe. 
In what follows, first the rationale for action at the Community level is discussed. Then the 
legal scope of supranational action is looked at. Subsequently I review the policy measures 
taken by the Commission. In an evaluation of the Commission’s approach I put the 
emphasis on its ISDN policy which is especially relevant for network competition.
7.1. The Motivation for Supranational Action
Until the early 1980s telecommunications was not considered a priority sector for the 
European Community. The Commission of the European Communities (CEC) had not 
established a distinct policy approach in its own right.1 "Telecommunications” was almost 
identical with the provision of the plain voice telephony service which was carried out by 
TOs being exempted from national and European competition policy.
In 1983 a telecom Task Force was set up, coming out of DG XII (Industrial Policy). The 
Task Force was initially concerned with infrastructure projects and public procurement 
related to terminals and the equipment market. By then telecommunications was more and 
more regarded as a key industry of the Community. Technological progress during the 
previous two decades had fundamentally changed the industry sector. The convergence of 
the telecommunications and information technology enabled the introduction of new 
services and products which vastly improved the quality and the range of 
telecommunications services. Telecommunications and data processing became related 
industries. The demand of industry for communication was rising fast. It became an 
important input factor especially for the growing service sector of the economy. Cheaper 
and faster means of communication reduce transaction costs in all areas of the Community. 
Therefore the rapid development of an efficient communications network was regarded 
crucial for fostering higher productivity growth, a central aim of the Single Market project. 
Substantial economic gains for instance are expected for the European financial service 
markets. F inally, the existing national networks were regarded insufficient to cater the
i For a detailed analysis of the origins of EC policy in telecommunications: Schneider, V. and R. Werle (1988), 
pp.17-46.
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forecast increase in demand for telecom services. Demand was especially expected to rise 
for international communication, due to the envisaged market integration.
Besides the importance as an input factor for other industries, the telecommunications 
industry itself has a considerable size.2 The growth potential is considerable. While in 1984 
the sector’s share of Community gdp was slightly above 2%, it is expected to rise to 7% at 
the end of the century.3 The world market for telecommunications services presently grows 
at 12% a year.4 The digitalization of communication allows the integration of 
telecommunications services, data transmission, and audio-visual media. New markets for 
value added network services arise. Since the latter are highly specialized services, they 
only succeed in a large integrated market Providing a European wide homogeneous 
infrastructure was supposed to be beneficial also for the development of value added 
network services. The VANS markets are expected to overtake basic services in 
importance. They are growing by 20% annually.5
From recognizing the growing importance of the telecommunications sector to establishing 
the need for supranational action was only a small step. The Commission justified its own 
involvement by the existing market fragmentation and restrictive national public 
procurement policies.
Market fragmentation became the central concern of the Commission. It appeared 
detrimental for both the equipment and the service markets. Digitalization had 
tremendously increased the cost of R&D for transmission and switching technology. This 
established the need for integration and standardization in the Community’s 
telecommunications market. Market integration through standardization supposedly 
increases price competition in switching markets. An network operator’s production cost 
could thereby fall by between 2 and 8%.6 Market fragmentation is a serious problem in an 
industry facing considerable economies of scale. The United States’ share of the world 
market for telecommunications amounts to 35% followed by Japan with 11%. A genuine 
common market would amount to more than 20%. However, even the biggest national 
market in the EC does not account for more than 6%.7 It has been estimated that at least 
an 8% share of the world market in telecommunications equipment is needed to recoup 
R&D investments. Cost estimations indicate that the fragmentation of the European 
telecommunications market due to different technical standards and nationalistic public
2 The world market of telecom equipment amounted to ECU 90 billion in 1966, of which the Community share is
roughly ECU 17 J  billion. See: Com (87) 290, p3.
3 At this time up to 60% of all jobs in the EC will depend directly or indirectly on telematic technologies. Com(87)
290, p. 2 and: Schulte-Braucks, R. (1968), p.6.
4 Routet, M. (1968), p .ll.
J Roulet, M. (1968), p .ll.
* Mailer, JQrgen (1969), p.271 and: Mailer, JOrgen (1987), p.65.
7 Ungerer, Herbert (1967), p.20.
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procurement policy has considerably driven up costs of production. In the middle of the 
1980s the costs of procurement for instance were 60% to 100% above those in the USA. 
Prices for mobile telephone systems on average were seven times those in the USA 
Small national markets also have hampered the development of specialized VAN services. 
The total market size of telecommunications services in Europe amounts to only one half 
of the size in the USA,8 despite the fact that there are more inhabitants in the EC. As long 
as national markets in the EC are fragmented, they will not permit enterprises to reap the 
considerable economies of scale which materialize for these services. Finally, as has been 
discussed in some detail the welfare losses due to inefficient price setting were 
considerable. The welfare losses due to noncompetitive pricing in international phone calls 
for Germany alone have been estimated to be above ECU 1 billion annually.9 These 
welfare losses are mainly borne by business customers who use long distance service 
intensively. Therefore they may be considered as a specific tax, which increases input cost 
for other enterprises. The need for a European wide strategy to overcome market 
fragmentation for services therefore was widely accepted among Member States.
The need to liberalize markets for VANS was put forward. It was argued that only a 
"Schumpeter" type of entrepreneur could reap full benefits from the newly emerging 
technologies. State monopolies were seen as too risk averse to let all potential gains 
materialize.
While the importance of deregulating telecommunications markets was widely accepted, 
different national approaches bore the risk of deepening the existing market fragmentation. 
The Commission therefore saw the need to integrate markets for equipment and VANS 
and to coordinate national action. Furthermore, the Commission pointed to the danger of 
an extension of state monopoly. The possibility existed that national PTTs would extend 
their monopoly rights from basic services to VANS. Finally, the wide discrepancies of 
telephone tariffs for interstate calls10 were regarded in contradiction to the principle of 
harmonization and integration as prescribed for ”1992”.
H aving established the need for action at the Community level, the Commission started 
with liberalizing the markets for equipment and terminals. Recently the liberalization of 
service markets was undertaken. The following analysis is concentrated on the latter. 
Before scrutinising the measures already undertaken by the Commission I first discuss 
briefly the scope for a telecommunications policy at the Community level.
• Cecchini, Paolo (1988), p-43-
* Zietz, J. (1986), p. 421 and Zietz, J. (1985).
10 For a phone call from Athens to Bonn (minimum rates always) cost* more than twice as much as from
Bonn to Athens. A detailed study of the tariff structure can be found in: BEUC (1988), p. 33.
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7.2. EEC Powers to Regulate Télécommunications Services in Europe
As has been pointed out, telecommunications traditionally was regarded as the exclusive 
domain of national regulators. The provision of services was an integral part of the national 
infrastructure without a sufficient Community interest in the context of Community 
competition law. The scope for European telecommunications law was explored (only after 
the Green Paper). As will be seen, over the past five years the Community’s power to 
regulate this sector has increased rapidly.
This chapter analyses the various types of regulatory instruments which are at the disposal 
of the Commission. This is important for two reasons. First, the analysis of the 
Commission’s approach towards telecommunications renders it necessary to clarify the 
scope for action which actually exists at the supranational level Second, when discussing 
alternative strategies it will be interesting to see to what extent they could be implemented 
within the present regulatory framework. Thus the question will arise whether steps 
towards facility based competition in Europe can be launched by the Commission itself.
7.2.1. Regulatory Instruments
Article 189 (1) of the Treaty of Rome mentions four types of Community acts to exercise 
its regulatory power in the telecommunications field. These acts are distinguishable 
according to their binding force and the scope of their applicability.11
a) Regulation: a regulation is binding and has to be directly applied in all Member States. It 
has the force of law. There is no need for transformation or confirmation by the Member 
States.
b) Directive: directives differ from regulations with respect to the scope of their binding 
force. A directive is only binding upon the Member State to which it is addressed. A 
directive requires implementation on the national level National authorities have to adapt 
national laws in order to meet the content of the directive.12
c) Decision: a decision is binding only upon those to whom it is addressed.
d) Recommendations and Opinions: Neither recommendations nor opinions have a binding 
force.
u Here and in the following: Scherer, Joachim (1990), pp. 235-255.
12 Member States have to implement a directive by a legally binding act. A mere change of adminitfrative practices 
does not suffice.
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In practise, directives have become the main regulatory instrument for European 
telecommunications. The failure of a Member State to implement a directive constitutes a 
violation of the EEC Treaty leading to infringement procedures under Article 169 EEC 
Treaty. Directives can either be issued by the Commission or by the Council, depending on 
their legal basis. The difference becomes important because Council directives generally 
take more time. Moreover, they rely more on a compromise seeking approach.
7.2.2. Regulatory Powers of the Commission in the Field of Telecommunications
The EEC Treaty of Rome does not contain specific provisions for telecommunications. The 
application of competition rules was further limited due to the public service character of 
telecommunications.13 Nevertheless the EC’s competition policy has been applied recently 
to the sector.
In principle there is supremacy of Community law over national law. Moreover, there is an 
implementation requirement on Member States. Given the tools as described above one 
therefore would expect that the Commission is in a strong position to go ahead with its 
telecommunications policy. However, the scope of regulatory powers of the Commission is 
highly disputed. This stems from the fact that the Commission has only recendy started to 
apply general competition rules to the telecommunications sector.
The legal framework for EEC competition policy is laid down in Article 85 and 86 for the 
market behaviour of commercial undertakings. They apply both directly and throughout the 
Community to all undertakings, whether public or private on equal terms and to the same 
extent. If the challenged behaviour is imposed on the firm by a mandatory State measure, 
then Article 90 may be applied to the State, while Article 85 and 86 apply to the 
undertaking. The Commission has made clear that TOs are undertakings within the 
meaning of Articles 85 and 86. The only exemption is provided by Article 90(2).14 
The power to enforce these rules is conferred upon the Commission which can impose 
fines for infringement. The European Court of Justice has virtually unlimited jurisdiction in 
respect to appeals against decisions by the Commission.
Article 85:
Article 85 prohibits all agreements between undertakings15 and concerted actions which 
may restrict or distort competition within the common market. According to 85(3) 
exceptions can be made if a specific agreement improves general welfare.
13 Ravaioli, P. (1991), p.103.
14 See: Commission of the EC (1991a); and also: Mensi, M. (1991).
U The notion of "undertaking*" indudes public companies when they do not exercise powers of public authority. In 
more detail: de Cockbonte, Jean-Eric (1990), p£54.
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In its "Guidelines on the Application o f EEC Competition Rules in the Telecommunications 
Sector"16 the Commission points out that horizontal agreements between TOs concerning 
terrestrial facilities and reserved services are covered by Article 85. This is the case if these 
agreements affect trade between member states. Especially price agreements as settled by 
the CEPT may be seen as serious infringements of Article 85.17 However, Article 85 may 
also be applied against TOs agreements which limit hub-competition and the routing of 
calls.
Article 86:
Article 86 prohibits an abuse of a dominant position of an undertaking. It applies if a 
dominant position is held and if the abuse affects trade between Member States.
If a company is in a dominant position as a result of Member States measures (e.g. granting 
of exclusive rights), and if it thereafter abuses this position, Article 86 is applicable. The 
company’s behaviour is its sole responsibility.18
National TOs individually or collectively hold a dominant position for the installation of 
fixed terrestrial public networks. Moreover, they hold dominant positions for the reserved 
services and some competitive services. Abuses of TOs for instance may occur when they 
try to acquire a foothold in non-reserved service markets by cross-subsidization or when 
they restrict competitors’ access to their networks.19 However, cross-subsidization among 
reserved services is not covered fay Article 86 since no distortion of competition is feasible.
Article 90:
In case of public undertakings Article 90 EEC Treaty is relevant. Article 90(1) states that 
Member States shall not maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules of the Treaty 
if special rights are granted to public undertakings. 90(2) states that these undertakings are 
subject in particular to the rules on competition, in so far that these rules do not obstruct 
the particular tasks assigned to them. Finally, 90(3) states that the Commission shall ensure 
the application of the provisions of the Article. It shall address appropriate directives or 
decisions to Member States.
K The 'Guidelines’ offer advice on general legal and economic principles when applying the ECs competition 
policy. They are not binding and their application is enforced on a case-by-case basis. Compare: Com(91a) 
233.
17 Following the Commission’s intervention, the CEPT abolished recommendation PGT/10 for a 30% surcharge 
for third-party traffic using leased lines. See below.
l* de Cockbome, J.-E. (1990), p. 856.
19 For instance the Commission has taken action in respect of the Belgian Régie des Télégraphes e t Téléphones 
(RTT) after receiving a complaint concerning an alleged abuse of dominant position from a private supplier 
of value added services. After discussions with the Commission RTT authorised the private supplier to use the 
leased circuits. See: Com(91a) 233.
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According to the Court’s case law it is the Member State’s choice to grant certain 
undertakings the right to provide special services. However, the Commission decides on the 
basis of the Community law whether these services are of general economic interest. The 
same applies for the provision of Artide 90(2).20 From the case law of the Court of Justice 
the Commission infers that it has exclusive competence to decide whether an exception 
according to 90(2) shall be made.
In its Green Book, the Commission recognised the central role of TOs performing their 
public task. The latter consists in the provision of a universal network and universal service. 
This fundamental obligation is regarded as a justification for the exception provided by 
Article 90(2), under certain circumstances.21
Thus when operating services of public interest, the granting of exclusive rights is not 
prohibited under the Treaty. However, also state monopolies have to comply with the basic 
objectives of the Treaty. They are not permitted to take measures which distort 
competition in the common market.22 As a result the operational and commercial activities 
of all TOs are subject to a strict and continuous review by the Commission for compliance 
with EC rules on competition. In this respect the Community’s power for competition 
policy often exceeds the power granted to corresponding national authorities. In Germany, 
for instance, the "Xartellgesetz" exempts the Deutsche Bundespost from national 
competition rules. The power granted by Artide 90 is essential especially since the 
Commission favours a "mixed regime”. TOs provide "reserved" services and operate also in 
the liberalized service markets. This enables them to restrict access to their networks and 
to cross subsidize services under competitive pressure. While the application of 
competition rules to the liberalized service markets seems straightforward, as the examples 
above have shown, the Commission also has some power to intervene in the sphere of 
exclusive rights of TOs. However, the extent to which the Commission may do so has not 
been dearly defined yet
After reviewing the situation, the Commission found that many member countries were not 
in conformity with competition rules as regards terminal equipment and services. For this 
reason the Commission refrained from taking individual action and chose Artide 90(3) to 
implement the terminal equipment directive and the service directive. In order to avoid 
delay and duplication it resolved to use directives addressed to all Member States.
It has to be stressed that according to the "Guidelines'' the application of EC competition 
policy cannot be avoided by international conventions. Artide 234 of the EC Treaty only 
protects the rights of third countries but it does not protect obligations between EC 
member countries. Thus, for instance, the competition rules apply to the *International 
Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee' (CCITT) recommendations.
20 As an -v-pHon to the ruling of the Treaty, Artide 90(2) has to be interpreted strictly. It must be demonstrated
that the relevant task cannot be performed by other means. See: de Cockbome, J.-E. (1990), pJ}59.
21 See: Com(91a) 233.
22 Pappalardo, Aurelio (1960), pp .203-205.
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Council legislation
While Article 90(3) is the basis for the Commission’s directives concerning 
telecommunications, Council directives may be based on Article 100a EEC Treaty.23 
Article 100a is the amendment to Article 100, created by the Single European Act. In 
contrast to the latter, Article 100a does not require unanimous decisions by the Council. It 
enables the Council to enact measures for the approximations of national laws on the basis 
of a qualified majority voting. A dynamisation and acceleration of harmonising national laws 
is envisaged However, compared to directives applied by the Commission, action 
undertaken by the Council ensures more influence for national policy makers. It is 
generally assumed that Council legislation would be considerably less oriented towards 
liberalization. Council legislation, for instance, was chosen for the ONP directive which 
aims at harmonizing access conditions to national networks.
The use of Article 90(3) for directives by the Commission is therefore not undisputed. 
Procedural questions are highly political since they implicitly lead to a redistribution of 
power. A success when applying EC competition rules directly to TOs not only made 
European telecommunications policy more effective, but increased the competence of EC 
institutions. The first breakthrough was the cornerstone decision of the European Court in 
the British Telecom C a s e Before the Telecommunications Act of 1984 the British 
authorities had prohibited the transit of telexes between third countries by a private British 
agency. This service had been offered by Telespeed which took advantage of substantial 
price differences in various Member Countries. These differences were due to different 
tariffs, costs and currency fluctuations. The Commission overruled this decision on the 
basis of Article 90(3). Thereafter the Commission’s action was challenged by the Italian 
government In its judgement of March 20, 1985 the European Court dismissed the action 
brought by the Italian government It confirmed the Commission’s view in two important 
aspects. First, it was confirmed that the competition rules of the Treaty of Rome apply to 
TOs.25 Second, and as a result, the rejection of the extension of monopoly from voice 
transmission to data transmission and storage was correct. The private firm therefore was 
entitled to use the line it had already rented to forward telex messages.26 The British 
Telecom decision supported the Commission’s view that the inherent tendency of
23 In fact the Commission is not obliged to adopt a directive under Article 90(3) to liberalize the service market. 
The Treaty of Rome leaves the Commission considerable scope of discretion to exercise its supervisory 
functions. The Court of Justice has laid down basic principles for the exercise of legislative powers under 
Article 90(3). In more detail: Scherer, J. (1990), pp-240-242.
M A detailed analysis can be found in: Bruce, RJL and Jeffrey P.C. Mark (1968), pp_J04. See also: Ravaioli, 
P.(1991), pp.IQS.
25 Ungerer, H. (1988), p.167/168.
2i Schuite-Braudu, R. (1987), p.90/91.
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undertakings enjoying special rights to attend the scope of their exclusive activities, is an 
abuse of a dominant position.27
In 1988 France took the Commission to Court when it used Article 90(1) and 90(3) for the 
equipment directive. France argued that instead this would have had to pass through the 
Council, thus ensuring national authorities some influence on the process. France asserted 
that Article 90 could not be used to make law in new areas and that the Commission had 
gone beyond its competence.28 In its final decision on March 19, 1991 29 the European 
Court confirmed the legal approach made by the Commission on the application of Article 
90 to liberalize the market for terminal equipments.30 Overall the Court's decision is 
regarded as a landmark judgement” which confirms the Commission’s power to correct 
breaches of the EC free trade and competition rules by public sector entities which are 
entrusted with special rights. Belgium, Spain and Italy have already launched an appeal 
against a similar procedure for the service directive. It seems unlikely to be successful after 
the previous ruling.31
Summing up, the provisions of the Treaty of Rome offer the Commission a powerful 
instrument to ensure free trade in services. Moreover, given its power to judge whether 
Article 90(2) can be applied, the Commission may have a say also as far as the network 
monopoly is concerned. While according to Article 222 the Commission is not entitled to 
decide on public or private ownership of TOs 32 it nevertheless may have the power to 
challenge the network monopoly of the latter. If it is deemed favourable the Commission 
may adopt a directive asking Member States to licence further network operators.
7.23. The Commission’s Approach towards Telecommunications
723.1. Terrestrial Networks and Services
In 1987 the Green Paper on Telecommunications33 introduced a programme for future 
regulation of the telecommunications sector. The removal of trade barriers, mainly those 
due to public procurement policy, was a principal aim. TOs would have to abandon any 
special rights for the installation of terminals. The separation of business functions and
27 Ellgcr, R. and O. Witt (1990), p328.
28 See: Ravaioli, P. (1991) pp.110-127 and also: Economist, October 28,1969, p.87.
2» Decision March 19,1991, aff 202/88 France/Commission.
»  However, the Court limited the Commission’s power by stating that Article 90(3) EEC Treaty cannot be used to 
ask a Member State to end an infringement in relation to a firm which has been granted exclusive rights.
31 FinTech Telecom Markets, April 18,1991.
32 Article 222 EEC Treaty rules that the Community shall in no way prejudice the choice of property ownership in
Member States.
33 Commission of the EC (1967).
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regulatory power was seen necessary to avoid an abuse of special rights by TOs when 
competing with private entities. Otherwise the TOs would have a dominant position for 
instance for type approval, licensing, interface specifications, allocation of frequencies and 
the general surveillance of network usage conditions. Finally, the Green Paper stressed the 
importance of dear requirements for transparency in financial relations between Member 
States’ governments and TOs.34 A major cause of distortion of regulatory efficiency is the 
lack of protection available for TOs against an abuse by national governments. The latter 
have a long tradition of using TOs for short term political objectives which are contrary to 
the aim of an effident telecommunications sector. TOs often lade the autonomy and 
flexibility necessary for adequate financial planning.
While any special rights concerned with the equipment market were to be abolished, the 
network monopoly of TOs was not challenged. In the case of services voice telephony was 
reserved for TOs. The network monopoly and the service monopoly were justified on 
grounds of universal service. Moreover, the service monopoly was meant to provide the 
financial sources to go ahead with network investments. An integrated network throughout 
the Community was regarded as essential for a free market for VANS. Private 
undertakings offering VANS then can use the existing network without being compelled to 
build their own installations. The integrated ISDN system yields compatibility. Services 
therefore can be provided beyond national frontiers, which is necessary for the more 
specialised services to break even. Therefore the Commission stimulated coordinated 
investments into a harmonized ISDN network. The installation of an integrated ISDN 
network was agreed upon in 1986.35 Building a digital fibre optic network is by far the 
largest investment programme ever faced fay TOs.36 The interconnection of computer and 
telephone networks requires huge industrial coordination efforts which supposedly are 
easier made in the environment of a small number of experienced network operators.
Thus beside the universal service argument there was a second motivation for reserving 
basic telephone services to national TOs. Granting related exdusive rights to national 
operators was justified because of the financial needs for the ISDN network. The revenues 
stemming from basic services should finance the huge investments into the infrastructure. 
Competition was envisaged for value added network services which according to the Green 
Paper should be opened to entry. Based on the assumption of important economies of 
scope for the provision of basic and value added services, the TOs obtained the right to 
operate in both areas.
After formulating the basic policy goals, the Commission started their implementation by 
using different directives. Two generally different stages may be distinguished. The first
3* See as well: MQller, Jurgen (1969), pp. 470-477. And: Steven, Ester (1990).
39 See for instance the Council Recommendation 86/659/EEC on the coordinated introduction of the ISDN 
network and: Schulte-Braudu, R. (1968), p.14.
*  Compare in more detail: Sch&n, H. and K.H. Neumann (1985), p. 478 and Scherer, J. (1987), p.11.
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step was rather defensive in that the Commission tried to prevent the extension of exclusive 
rights granted to TOs. By doing so it could establish itself as a further regulator in the field 
of telecommunications. In this context the above-mentioned "British Telecom case” was 
crucial since it confirmed the Commission’s rejection of the extension of monopoly rights 
from voice telephony to data transmission and storage.
The second stage is offensive in the sense that the Commission forces national authorities 
to restructure the telecommunications market according to the principles which have been 
formulated in the Green Paper. It could only be undertaken after the Commission's 
position as an additional regulator was entrenched by the ruling of the Court The most 
obvious signs of this position have been the two service directives finally adopted in July 
1990.
ONP-directive 90/387/EEC:
The directive on "Open Network Provision" (ONP) imposes general principles for the 
provision of telecommunications networks. They comprise rules of transparency, equal 
access and non-discrimination. Thus, the intention of ONP is to provide a legal framework 
allowing all users to gain access to telecommunications networks throughout the 
Community. Only in cases where ONP does not protect against anti-competitive practices, 
the Commission applies directly the principles of competition policy as outlined above.
The directive on ONP imposes dear rules for interconnection and access on TOs. Access to 
the network infrastructure for new service providers and for users shall not be 
discriminatory and conditions for access have to be transparent. Harmonization applies for 
technical interfaces, usage conditions and tariff principles. According to the ONP directive 
tariffs must be based on objective criteria, they must be transparent, non-discriminatory 
and cost oriented. The fixing of the tariff, however, is left to national legislation.37 
ONP has a fundamental role in providing European-wide access to Community-wide 
interconnected public networks. It mainly applies to reserved services in reaching some 
degree of commonality within the Member States. However, ONP conditions should apply 
also for non-reserved services offered by TOs via joint ventures or subsidiaries. In this 
respect transparent and uniform accounting procedures are be necessary.38 
Transparency of cost allocation has to be applied by TOs, which is important to prevent 
cross subsidization between reserved and non-reserved services. An accounting system has 
to be established which ensures the fully proportionate distribution of all costs between 
reserved and non-reserved activities.
37 Price agreements among TOs can caiisc serious restrictions to trade of services. However, agreements to set up 
a common tariff structure or tariff principles may be permitted under Article 85(3) if the economic benefits 
outweigh the restrictions on competition. This could be the case due to higher transparency of tariffs, which 
facilitates users* decisions about traffic flows or the location of headquarters or premises. This is aimed at by
the ONP definition of harmonized tariff principles.
»  Lewis, Angi (1989), p.126.
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A first application of ONP has been done through a specific directive to leased lines, which 
was formally adopted by the Commission in February 1991.39 As an integral part of the 
network infrastructure leased lines are classified as a part of the reserved area. All leased 
lines will be subject to usage and supply conditions that are transparent and published 
appropriately. Technical restrictions in respect of interconnection of leased lines are 
prohibited. The directive pronounces the principle of cost-oriented pricing for leased lines. 
Related to the ONP approach the CEPT decided to abolish Recommendation PGT/10 on 
the "General Principles for the Lease o f International Telecommunications Circuits and the 
establishment o f Private International Networksf, after the intervention of the Commission. 
The CEPT recommended the imposition of a 30% surcharge or an access charge when 
third party traffic was carried on an international leased circuit. It also recommended the 
application of uniform tariff coefficients in order to determine the relative price level of 
international telecom leased circuits. The Commission found that the Recommendation 
amounted to a price agreement between undertakings under Article 85 which substantially 
restricted competition within the European Community. The CEPT agreed to abolish this 
recommendation, and to allow for competition between telecom operators for the supply of 
international leased circuits.40
The Commission has proposed the Council the application of ONP to voice telephony. It 
aims at establishing the user’s rights with respect to the supply of telephone services of a 
defined quality.41 A requirement to establish cost-accounting principles and billing 
transparency is also foreseen. Presently, the Commission investgates to what extent the 
ONP concept can be applied to broadband networks, intelligent networks and mobile and 
satellite communications.
As Ravaioli has pointed out, the ONP directive does not establish competition rules. 
Hence, even after the adoption of the ONP directive Article 85 and 86 are fully applicable 
to the telecommunications sector.42
Service Directive 90/388/EEC
The service directive intends to remove ail exclusive rights for TOs except for infrastructure 
and voice telephony. It does not apply to telex, mobile telephony, paging and satellite 
services. While the exclusion of telex was motivated by its declining importance, mobile and 
satellite services will be regulated in the future. For mobile telephony especially no 
consensus was reached how far liberalisation should go. Being exempted from the service 
directive, these services are still covered by the competition rules. Voice telephony was 
exempted on the basis of Article 90(2). This has been justified by the need to ensure the
3* The Council adopted a common position in December 1991. See: Com(91) 509.
*o Com(91a) 233.
*1 These rights include targets for network access supply time and quality, and the right of access to a minimum set 
of advanced telephone features.
«  Ravaioli, P. (1991), p.128.
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"financial viability” of TOs which have to provide the universal service network.43 In 
practise, restrictions on the provision of unreserved telecommunications services consist 
mainly in the prohibition of interconnecting leased lines, in imposing high access charges or 
applying volume sensitive tariffs without economic justification. These restrictions will be 
abolished. Generally, simple resale of capacity for non voice services will be allowed from 
January 1, 1993. The directive establishes "essential requirements” which are the only 
justification to restrict the use of the public switched network for service provision.44 
However, Member states may indude public service requirements in the licensing or 
declaration procedures.45 Exclusive rights granted to TOs to provide non voice 
telecommunications services are dedared incompatible with Artide 90(1) in conjunction 
with Artide 86 and have to be withdrawn. The definition of the reserved voice service is of 
a very limited scope and has to be interpreted strictly. Moreover, the burden of proof that a 
service falls within the limits of this definition is put on the TOs.46 In case of controversy it 
will be the Commission who deddes which category applies. Finally, the service directive 
asks for the withdrawal of all regulatory functions from the TOs.
A political compromise led to special rules for packet-switched data services. Here 
countries are allowed to establish further licensing conditions for providers. Although these 
conditions have to be vetted by the Commission they may obstruct the liberalization of this 
market.47
In reality the separation of basic and value added services is less dear cut then it appears to 
be in the service directive. The Commission opts for a strict interpretation of the voice 
telephony monopoly. Consequently it proposes competition in markets which overlap with 
the reserved area. An important market in this respect are mobile networks. Based on an 
initiative by the Commission the Council made the Recommendation 87/371/EEC on a 
coordinated introduction of public pan European cellular digital landbased mobile 
communications in the Community. It is envisaged that separated mobile networks are 
installed also by private undertakings. Moreover, the latter are permitted to provide 
telephone service as well as value added services. Thus in the mobile market the
«  Ravaioli, P. (1991), p.131/132.
«  Fwnhiai requirements are related with the maintenance of network integrity, the security of network 
operations, and data protection.
45 This applies especially for packet A circuit switched data services.
4« The directive ««air« an attempt to Hiaingninti voice and non-voice service». Thereby voice services are defined 
as the 'commercial provision for the public of the direct transport and witching of speech in real time 
between public switched network termination points („)* From this definition we can defer that services as 
voice mwanging, vokc service for closed user groups, least cost routing, voice storage, etc are non-reserved. 
See as well: Amoiy, Bernard (1990), p.7/8.
47 TI*. r«mmi«««« «nil main» a proposal for a Council directive implementing a system for mutual recognition of 
for services within the Community. Due to pressure of some Member Countries, those having an 
underdeveloped infrastructure may ask the Commission for an extension of their monopolies on data services 
until 1996. See as well; Bernard, Keith E. (1990), p-280.
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Commission is ready to make an exemption from both the network monopoly and the 
service monopoly of national TOs. As a result one may expect that TOs will face some 
competition on the fringe.
7 2 3 2 . Satellite Networks
The Commission published a second Green Paper on satellite communications in 1991. 
While the policy approach towards satellites broadly follows the approach towards the fixed 
terrestrial networks, it appears to be more liberal in some points.
Traditionally, in Europe the policy towards satellite networks has been similar to the one 
for fixed terrestrial networks. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 122. Markets 
remained fragmented and controlled by governmental intervention. In most member 
countries the installation, ownership and operation of receive-only terminals for 
entertainment broadcasting reception is already largely liberalized.48 These terminals do 
not pose a threat to operators since they have no transmit capability. They were included in 
the Directive 88/301/EEC which liberalized the terminal equipment market by the latest of 
30 June 1990. The new VSAT earth stations49 which are capable of sending and receiving, 
however, are still not liberalized in most member countries. As a consequence it has been 
argued that the European satellite manufacturing industry lags behind US competitors. 
Equipment prices for ground stations and satellites as well as tariffs for services exceed 
considerably those charged in the US. Fragmented markets prevent producers from 
reaping the benefits of economies of scale which according to an EC estimation could 
reduce the costs of a commercial satellite in Europe by 40%.so The fragmentalization, 
moreover, handicaps specialized satellite services providers, while the existing monopolies 
are not able to provide sufficient transponder capacity to allow a rapid expansion of these 
services.
The Green Book on satellites follows the approach of the Green Book for terrestrial 
networks. The Commission again draws a line between voice satellite services and other 
services. While the latter have to be opened up to competition the satellite voice services 
are reserved. However, in case of the satellite network an exemption has been made. As 
was described in chapter 2.1.4. the satellite network consists of the space segment and the 
earth segment. The latter accounts for more than 80% of total satellite network costs. 
Traditionally the large earth stations used with Intelsat and Eutelsat were owned and 
operated by the national telecom organisations. The messages they received were 
transmitted into the terrestrial network which thereafter distributed them to the user. With 
the arrival of VSATs this link to the terrestrial network can be circumvented. VSAT earth
Com(90a), pJBS.
4* For the importance of VSAT* tee chapter 2.1.4.
30 Com(90b), p2.
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stations can be installed directly on the customer’s premise. When using VSAT systems the 
provision of liberalized services render it necessary to liberalize the use and installation of 
the earth segment. Consequently, the Green Book argues for an exemption of the network 
monopoly of TOs as for as the earth segment is concerned. Thus as a central aim the Green 
Book promotes the fall liberalization of the earth segment in order to make competition 
possible for VANS provided over satellite networks.
Legally, the liberalization of the VSAT is based on Article 30 and 37 of the EC Treaty. 
According to Article 30 the restriction of imports is prohibited, thus if a certain VSAT 
system is marketed in one of the member states it can be deployed freely throughout the 
Community. Article 37 abolishes all discrimination resulting from state monopolies of a 
commercial character. A monopoly of the provision of satellite earth stations may prevent 
users from choosing freely the equipment which best suits their needs. Moreover, the 
monopoly may lead to an exclusion of certain producers of VSAT systems. Thus the 
Commission argues that the provision of satellite earth stations may no longer be 
monopolised by TOs. As far as VSAT systems also allow the provision of services which are 
still subject to special or exclusive rights (voice telephony) the use of these systems may be 
restricted by certain regulatory safeguards through licensing.51
Similarly to the principle of equal access for the terrestrial network, the satellite Green 
Book asks open access to the space segment. Here member countries are bound 
individually by international treaties and institutions like the ITU, Eutelsat, and Intelsat. 
The Commission urges them to initiate individually the necessary procedures to liberalise 
the access to space capacity. As discussed before, in international arrangements the 
signatories have the exclusive right to allot space capacity. Since all member countries have 
designated their TOs to act as signatories this raises the problem of having TOs operating 
as referee and player at the same time. In general since the signatories hold a dominant 
position in the sense of Artide 86 they have to provide capacity to all potential users at fair 
prices and on a non-discriminatory basis. However, in practise they may abuse their power 
concerning the coordination of frequencies, and the use of orbital resources (resale of 
space capacity) in order to discriminate against private entities offering satellite services in 
competition to the TOs. The principle of separating regulatory and operational functions 
has been implemented in the Directives 88/101/EEC and 90/388/EEC and it has to be 
applied also to the satellite systems. While the present cartel of national operators is not 
challenged, Eutelsat has been asked to review its charter allowing for equitable, non- 
discriminatory access on a cost-based basis. ^  Free access to space capacity is necessary if 
national operators compete with private firms in the provision of (non-voice) services. 
Presently users and independent service providers have to buy transponder capacity
si Com(90a), p.90/91. 
H Hayes, Dawn (1991).
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through public network operators. However, Eutelsat’s supreme decision-making body, the 
Assembly of Parties has rejected the proposal that national TOs relinquish capacity control
Thirdly, the satellite Green Paper asks for fall commercial freedom for space segment 
providers. Thereby it is hoped that Eutelsat will operate at arms-length from national 
operators. In order to avoid any distortion of competition the best solution is seen in 
ensuring direct access of users to space capacity. Providers should market their capacity 
directly. The distribution of capacity then could apply competitive biddings by all service 
providers instead of an arbitrary allocation through national operators. Already Eutelsat 
directly offers space capacity to the European Broadcasting Union which shows that the 
direct lease of space capacity is feasible.53 Eutelsat could develop into a full scale 
entrepreneurial organization by marketing space segment directly to service providers. 
Prices are expected to become more cost oriented and the existing price differences for 
two-way satellite services due to non-competitive market segmentation could be eliminated. 
It is estimated that prices in some cases could be reduced to one third or one fourth.54 The 
main problem with this approach is that the investment is carried out by the signatories 
whose investment share depends on their use of the Eutelsat segment. This may lead to 
underinvestment if their use declines while private operators’ share of the space capacity 
increases. Hence the existing arrangements have to be reviewed so that new parties can 
become members of Eutelsat However, given that EC member states hold 88% of total 
share in Eutelsat and furthermore given the interest of Eastern European countries in 
liberalizing the satellite market, the Commission reckons that the base for reform can be 
found.55
Based on the Green Book, in 1992 the Commission will provide four key pieces of draft 
legislation on satellite services and equipment. Thereafter they have to be adopted by the 
Council of Ministers.
The satellite policy of the Commission appears to be a logical continuation of the approach 
applied to the terrestrial network. Liberalization is concentrated on those parts which are 
essential for the provision of all non voice services for which competition is envisaged. 
Equal access rules are supported to ensure that the Eutelsat signatories do not abuse their 
network monopoly power when competing with other service providers. In this context the 
liberalization of the earth segment cannot be regarded as a first step towards the end of the 
network monopoly. It is rather meant to be a necessary but exceptional device to promote 
the provision of non-voice services. However, it is a good example for the technology driven 
retreat of network monopolies.
53 Com(90a), p.104.
34 Com(90b), p.4.
»  Com (90b), p.110.
7233. Farther actions
Finally, the Commission has started to play an active role in regional development of 
telecommunications networks. This is carried out by the STAR programme.56 As was seen 
when discussing approaches of individual Member Countries, the penetration even of basic 
services varies widely throughout the Community. The integrated ISDN network is 
regarded an important advantage for those regions since this could help to overcome the 
handicap of geographical isolation. The Community provides ECU 780 million and the 
Member States themselves again ECU 520 million for the period 1987-1991. These funds 
shall be used to invest into the infrastructure and to stimulate demand.57 A second 
programme (Revolve) with similar intention has been set up to explore the relevance of 
Integrated Broadband Communication (IBC) for these regions.58
The idea of these programmes is to reduce the regional disparities in economic 
development in the EC. A good communication network could to some extent eliminate 
the disadvantages associated with distance from the core markets. Thereby the less 
favoured regions could achieve access to the fast growing markets of value added services. 
In that case these regions could benefit proportionately more from advanced 
telecommunications than the core of the Community. The rationale then for a regional 
programme is, that while potential benefits are high, the poor actual demand in this area 
would by itself not attract private investments. Therefore a demand-led strategy would 
generate a penetration of VANS which is too small. On the other hand the supply-led 
strategy by the Commission is risky since demand is uncertain and the investment needed is 
tremendous.
73. An Evaluation of the Commission’s Policy
7.3.1. A brief Comparison to the USA
In the USA the driving force towards divestiture of AT&T was the concern of the 
relationship of prices and underlying costs. The magnitude of subsidies among services 
attracted mainly the interest of industrial users.3* It is interesting to note that a rebalancing 
of tariffs would have been possible by service based competition alone. The reason why the 
US eventually moved further towards facility based competition may be found outside the
»  STAR: Special Telecommunications Action for Regional development.
57 Ungerer, H. (1988), p.157.
»  EUI, N o.4,1988, p.64. For a general analysis. Beale, Jeremy (1988),
»  Mansell, Robin (1990),
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telecommunications sector altogether. It has been argued that the divestiture of AT&T to 
some extent was a regulatory accident due to the uniquely cumbersome public 
administration apparatus.60
In the EC61, prices generally were far more out of line with costs than in the US before the 
AT&T breakup. Nevertheless pricing issues were not in the forefront of regulators concern. 
Instead the motivation to restructure the telecom industry was more related to the 
modernization of the infrastructure and the development of new services.
As far as the infrastructure is concerned the development therefore was quite contrary. The 
US went from an integrated network to network fragmentation. The regional networks 
were separated from AT&T long distance and, moreover, further public switched long 
distance networks were installed. The US began with one public network and ended up with 
seven. In Europe instead previously separated networks have been integrated by 
harmonizing standards for the ISDN network. Thus ideally continental EC countries would 
move from 11 separated to one integrated network. The USA chose to separate firms 
operating in the monopolized (local) markets from those operating in competitive ones. In 
the EC a corresponding separation of the reserved and the competitive area would have 
implied to bar TOs from the provision of non reserved services. However, in contrast to the 
US in the EC the scope for predatory behaviour by cross subsidizing TOs was not regarded 
a major problem. In order to reap economies of scope therefore TOs are permitted to 
operate in both markets. Thus, while the development in the USA can be described as an 
accelerated process of decentralization the opposite holds for the Community62. This 
applies for the telecoms network. However, it applies also for the regulatory environment. 
While in the USA the FCC has lost influence to the courts, in the Community the 
Commission dominates national regulators.
In both cases regulators refrained from complete liberalization. Natural monopoly 
arguments and universal service were regarded as important enough to limit entry. 
However, while in both cases the VANS market are liberalized, the main difference 
remains that the USA have introduced facility based competition in the long distance 
market. The emphasis given to network integration kept the Commission from taking the 
same step. This was justified by considerable economies of scope for the provision of basic 
services and economies of scale for value added services. However, it would have been 
within its legal power to issue a directive to member states asking them to licence further 
network operators.
The presumption of economies of scope differs not only as regards services, but also for the 
relationship of manufacturing and network operation. In the USA, the vertical integration 
of AT&T has not been touched. In continental Europe instead TOs in general are not
Anania, Loretta (1990), pA.
«  When I speak of the "EC in the following I refer to continental Member States only. Most of what is said for 
the US applies also for the UK.
*2 Lera, Emilio (1989), pp 32.
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vertically integrated and the combination of network provision plus manufacturing was not 
regarded as necessary.
In Europe, the main gains from competition were expected to arise in the service markets 
which subsequently were liberalized. Competition among network operators in this respect 
was seen to be counterproductive. It could generate different networks which due to 
incompatibility could not be interconnected. This would hamper the development of 
VANS. The US approach led to several types of ISDN specifications and a lack of "system 
implementation”. The lack of infrastructural planning therefore may turn out expensive if 
later a conversion of different network topologies becomes necessary.63 
The fact that two strategies were chosen which in many respects are diametrically opposed 
may lead to the conclusion that measures of liberalization were driven by non-economic 
reasoning. Political, legal and institutional differences were decisive for the process of 
restructuring the telecommunications industry. If this is correct, one may conclude that 
considerable efficiency gains could still be expected by a further opening of markets.
73.2. Hie Concept of Network Integration
Broadly speaking, the Commission pursues two goals. On the one hand it fosters 
integration. This aim is promoted by regional development funds, the harmonization of 
standards, and most important by network integration. On the other hand the Commission 
has favoured competition far more than continental Member Countries have done in the 
past. The main point of criticism in the following is that where both principles conflict, the 
Commission sacrificed competition for the aim of integration.
As has been pointed out, the main concern of the Commission was to avoid an extension of 
the TOs’ exclusive rights towards non-voice services. In order to promote competition for 
newly developing service markets it did not challenge the network and voice service 
monopoly of the TOs. The provision of an universal and integrated ISDN network is 
regarded as essential for a liberalized VANS market. Joint investment, however, could be 
achieved best by avoiding entry by private network operators. Moreover, by reserving 90% 
of the telecommunications revenues to entrenched TOs, the Commission could develop a 
mainly consensus oriented approach towards liberalization.
The main problem with this approach is that major decisions were made on a priori beliefs 
which are based on an unclear economic foundation. This relates especially to the 
installation of an integrated ISDN network and the division of reserved and unreserved 
services. ISDN has been mainly analysed from a technical perspective. It seems to reflect a 
static engeneering concept which is concentrated on technical performance, putting aside 
the user’s perspective of costs.6* This is discussed in what follows.
a  Anania, L. (1990), pp. 25,41, and SUa, Paul (1988), p.XIV. Quoted from; Anania, L. (1990), p.49.
«  A good example for this approach is Mossotto, C. (1991), especially p. 47. See also Mulder, RJ. (1991), and 
Lera, E. (1990), p. 275/276. A critical view instead is presented in: Noam, Eli (1987), pp. 44-47.
197
As has been analysed in chapter 2.1.1. the ISDN network consists of two distinct 
characteristics. First, due to digitization it is superior for data transmission when compared 
to analog networks. Second, it puts together separate communications networks into one 
unified super-pipe.65 This integration of all services into one standardized network may be 
attractive from a technical point of view. However, the underlying economies are much less 
dear. The bask economic foundation for an integrated ISDN network are economies of 
scope. That the latter exist has been assumed a priori by policy makers. However, for a 
variety of services it is far from clear whether economies of scope among all services are 
strong enough to justify total network integration. Moreover, voice and digital data 
networks are partial substitutes. Using a modem, data can be sent through a voice network 
while on the other hand voice telephony can be digitized and transmitted over a digital data 
network. Thus separate networks could offer a competitive environment to stimulate cost 
reductions of network operation. The ISDN concept thus reduces the scope for network 
competition. This effect is enhanced by the ultimate goal to pass on to an integrated 
broadband network. By doing so TOs would enlarge their activities and probably pre-empt 
the emergence of alternative cable networks, namely those of cable TV operators who 
could become potential competitors.
The second drawback of the integrated ISDN network relates to the rise of entry barriers. 
The latter arise from two different sources. First, the ISDN network increases the required 
initial investment which is needed to match the upgraded technical capabilities of the 
incumbent’s network. In chapter 2.1.1. it was pointed out that the ISDN concept requires 
big initial investment outlays, which the monopolistic TOs are able to carry out by cross 
subsidizing with service revenues. Potential competitors will not be able to raise the 
necessary funds in a similar pattern. Moreover, the start-up subsidy is used to justify a 
variety of restrictive policies to protect the incumbent. Second, there is a trade-off between 
fixed cost and marginal cost, when switching from the coaxial to the ISDN network.66 While 
the former rise, the latter are reduced. Both effects deter potential competitors because 
entry as well as price competition in the market is made more difficult. The range of 
"natural monopoly” is increased since there are higher economies of scale involved in the 
upgraded network.
Third, the share of sunk cost in total fixed cost for the set up of a competing network rises 
considerably. Thereby entry barriers are increased even further. Finally, the new 
technology leads to a tremendous increase in capacity which - as has been shown 
theoretically and empirically67 - may be used to deter entry. All this enhances the 
incumbent’s scope for strategic behaviour. The Commission did not justify the assumption
«  Noun, Eli M. (1986), p. 5.
This has been demonstrated in chapter 2.1.1.6. In West Germany, for instance the investment necessary to 
switch to the ISDN network is estimated to be DM 35 billion. Compare Kubicek, H. (1989), p. 184.
& See Stehmann, O. (1991a) and chapter 12.1.5.
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that the installation of a harmonized ISDN network requires state owned TOs which exert 
monopoly rights. The investments into digitization carried out by US and British carriers 
show that also in a competitive environment ISDN networks emerge. A directive to 
harmonize standards could have been sufficient to guarantee that value added services can 
be provided throughout the Community. The initial high fixed investment also may lead to 
a loss of qualitative efficiency.^ The high irreversibilities of investment do not allow for a 
response to changes in demand, as long as the reversible unit costs of the old network are 
below the total unit costs of the new one, the operator will stick to the old technology.49 
Thus, the higher the irreversibilities, the more likely it becomes that todays network 
investment will become suboptimal in the future. A mix of networks instead would 
presumably allow for more flexibility to qualitative changes in demand.
Thus, while the efficiency gains due to economies of scope are uncertain there may be 
considerable losses by forestalling facility based competition. Far from being only a 
technical "upgrade" the integrated ISDN network very well may be part of a general 
attempt of national TOs to maintain control over terrestrial public switched networks. It 
leads to further concentration in the market. National TOs may use it as a strategic device 
to preserve their exclusive rights70. The move towards the ISDN therefore is driven mainly 
by the supply-side. Frequently user groups have mentioned their concern that eventually 
they will have to pay for an availability of services they are not demanding. Especially those 
users who do not need digital data transmission are likely to pay for a non required 
increase in the variety of the service menu. Moreover, business customers for which the 
ISDN concept was mainly designed nevertheless switch from the public to private networks 
which are more adequate for their specialized needs. A recent survey found that large 
telecom users have little genuine demand for ISDN.71 Thus, eventually a situation may 
arise in which those customers who have no need for ISDN nevertheless face the cost, while 
those for which the concept was designed do not any longer participate in the network. 
Finally, as will be seen in the next chapters there is no empirical evidence that network 
competition hampers the development of VANS for which ISDN was mainly designed. This 
can be seen when comparing the UK and Continental Europe. Rather the opposite has 
been noted recently. There are many more non-basic services offered presently in the UK 
than in Continental Europe. This could have been expected, given much cheaper rental 
charges for leased lines in the UK72. Network competition, however, is the main device to
M Qualitative efficiency is obtained if the bundle of different characteristics (as capacity, reliability, quality of 
transmission and the variety of services) correspond as much as possible to consumer preference. For a 
definition of qualitative efficiency. Kruse, J. (1985), p.130.
«  Compare: Kruse, J. (1965), pp.113-114.
70 Musgens, G. and J. Gruppelaar (ed.), p. 64.
71 Compare: Communications Week International (21/02/1991).
72 The rental charges for national circuits are seven times cheaper in the UK than in France. Financial Times, July
7,1991.
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push down leased lines charges. Contrary to the assumption that ISDN is a prerequisite for 
service competition, it, moreover, may hamper access of service providers to the network. 
The integrated network offers TOs the possibility for cross subsidization from reserved 
(voice-) to unreserved services,73 and to preempt potential service competitors by putting 
the intelligence already in the network (see chapter 23.).
A last but nevertheless important cost of the ISDN policy is related to the standardization 
which has come about as a side effect The standardization may very well lock 
manufacturing, system development, and user application into a pattern which may become 
technologically obsolete after some time. It therefore may hamper innovation.
To sum up, the advantages of an integrated network for service based competition may 
very well be matched by disadvantages due to the restricted scope for facility based 
competition. This deficiency might have been due to the a priori emphasis given to the 
rapid development of VANS. It is therefore likely that the ISDN concept leads to a level of 
network integration which is higher than optimal.
Closely linked to the ISDN concept is the aim to preserve the network and voice service 
monopoly. The network and voice-service monopoly was defended mainly on the basis of 
three arguments:
• universal service of basic services
• the financial viability of TOs
- the wastefulness of network duplication.
The universal service argument was referred to when justifying the exemption by Article 
90(2).74 However, it is not dear whether the universal service argument would justify a 
complete reservation of public switched networks and voice telephony. As has been seen for 
the USA, the liberalization of the long distance market did not erode universal service. It is 
highly unlikely that the universal service goal would be obstructed i t  for instance, private 
satellite systems were authorized to transmit voice service (see part IV). A second 
argument for the network and service monopoly therefore was to ensure the "financial 
viability” of TOs. Thereby the huge investments into the integrated ISDN network 
themselves became a justification for granting exclusive rights. However, even if the aim of 
the integrated ISDN network was undisputed, it does not appear necessary to preserve the 
network monopoly in order to ensure the necessary investments.
The concept of ISDN, by itself, does not require network monopoly. All it means is that the 
same communications link provides a range of different services. It could be provided by 
different carriers which fulfil certain harmonized standards and which are interconnected.
73 See also: MQller, J. (1969), p.477.
7* Compare: Guidelines (1991), p.17.
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Moreover, access charges can be imposed on service providers and network competitors in 
order to finance necessary investments. Since these higher cost of provision would be 
passed over to customers, those users who benefit from the upgraded network would pay 
for i t  The Commission’s concept instead implies that the network investments are paid for 
mainly by users of the telephony service. These are not identical with those who benefit 
from the greater variety of services provided by the integrated ISDN network. Arguably the 
Commission’s ISDN policy leads to a subsidization from residential customers to business. 
The latter can be expected to use VANS relatively more. The ISDN policy leads to effects 
which are contrary to the ones stemming from the traditional cross subsidization among 
services. The latter is supposed to benefit residential customers. However, this reversal of 
the traditional cross-subsidisation scheme cannot be expected to be efficient.
When putting forward the financial needs of TOs, it is important to stress that a major 
burden on the financial viability of TOs stems from budgetary constraints imposed on them 
by governments. The main part of TOs’ profits is not channelled towards investments, but 
has to balance losses made in the services of the post office, or to contribute to the federal 
budget. As is seen in subsequent chapters, national TOs are also used to finance industrial 
policy measures which increase their costs. For that reason it is highly unlikely that network 
competition would put the TO’s financial viability on the brink, if the latter were relieved 
from the external burden at the same time.
Moreover, the experience in the USA has shown that AT&T’s revenues did not drop when 
entry was allowed for. Overall growth of demand made up for the additional supply of MCI 
and US-Sprint. For these reasons it hardly can be claimed that a competitive environment 
would prevent TOs from investing into the ISDN upgrading.
Finally, it was put forward that the network monopoly would be a safeguard against 
wasteful network duplication. Again, so far no investigation has been made to clarify 
whether entry in the long distance market in the USA and the UK has been wasteful. 
Moreover, as for the previous argument, this would not preclude competition between the 
terrestrial public switched network of TOs and other networks already established 
(railways, cable networks), or between operators using different technology (satellites, 
microwaves, mobile and private networks). It would only offer a rationale not to license a 
second public carrier establishing a nationwide public cable network.
Quite to the contrary of the initial intention, the public network monopoly itself is likely to 
give artificial incentives for "wasteful" investments into private networks. Since the public 
network monopoly allows TOs to proceed with internal cross subsidization, more and more 
big users are encouraged to install their own networks which bypass the public ones. The 
increased use of leased lines and indoor services preempts the demand for upgraded public 
network provision. As long as the major motivation for these private networks stems from 
the tariff principles of TOs, they are inefficient
Even when the ONP directive requires cost-orientation of tariffs, there is no mechanism 
which ensures that these costs are reasonably incurred, or that the TO operates efficiently.
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As is discussed in chapter 14, this weakness can only be overcome if network competition is 
permitted.
73 J . The Concept of Service Based Competition
Hie Commission distinguishes reserved (telephony) services and unreserved services. Only 
the latter are open to private provision. Above it was discussed whether the network 
monopoly is necessary. However, even if it was, it has to be pointed out that this does not 
necessarily imply also the granting of exclusive rights regarding voice telephony.
The provision of basic services could be liberalized as much as VANS without threatening 
the financial viability of the network operator. In that case service providers only would 
have to pay corresponding access charges when using the public switched network. As long 
as there is only one national network operator, competition for basic services would be 
limited to simple resale and shared use of leased lines. As was explained in chapter 4.2.1., 
the main effect of this is cost orientation of prices and the elimination of cross subsidies. 
Cost orientation of tariffs, however, has been asked for by the Commission itself. The 
"basic” service monopoly is only necessary if cross subsidization shall be maintained, which 
contradicts these tariff policy aims. However, the principles of tariff policy as developed in 
the Green Paper are too vague to allow for clear interpretation75. Thus the unwillingness to 
challenge the exclusive rights of TOs as far as services are concerned is more likely to stem 
from political reasons. The politically sensitive discussion of income redistribution has been 
avoided by leaving Member States a free hand to provide voice telephony. However, 
alternatives to the inefficient internal cross subsidization • as direct subsidies for the access 
of poor households - were not discussed.
The separation of reserved and non-reserved services actually leaves about 90% of 
revenues from telecommunications services under exclusive control of public enterprises.76 
Thus as far as the market size is concerned, so far only a marginal liberalization of 
European telecommunications services has been achieved.77
The present "mixed regime" of reserved and non-reserved services appears unstable for 
several reasons. Despite the dear definition of the reserved voice tdephony service 
provided in directive 90/388/EEC it will remain difficult to draw a line between "basic” and 
"value added" services. 5 years earlier the FCC eventually gave up similar efforts made in 
its computer enquiries. Given that cross subsidization among reserved services is not 
entirety relinquished, there will be continuous incentives to enter with services which 
attract some demand from the reserved area. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly dear
75 The Green Paper emphasize* the importance of common tariff principles and proposes that they should follow 
overall cost trends. On the other hand it argues that "excessive cream skimming” shall also be avoided. TOs 
should be allowed to prohibit simple resale of leased lines, if this is necessary to protect their financial
viability. Compare: Com(87) 290, p.50/51 and pp.79-82. See also: MttHer, JQrgen (1968),
% Ungerer, H. (1988), p. 201 and Lera, E. (1988), p.9
n  See also: Stehmann, Oliver (1990), p. 28-30.
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that advances in technology and new innovative services will circumvent any legislative or 
regulatory measures which control bypass.1* This "cream skimming” is inefficient because it 
is not motivated by lower cost but by regulation. In this respect one may expect continuous 
legal struggle between private companies, the Commission and member states. The latter 
so far apply a much broader concept of "basic” service.79 In Germany everything is 
considered a reserved service which - from the customer’s perspective • could be used as a 
substitute for voice telephony.80 If the Commission applies its definition strictly, most 
services are considered non-reserved by the service directive which are banned by member 
states’ legislation. In Chapter 6.5. it was pointed out that one major deficiency of the US 
step-by-step approach has been that markets were liberalized without abolishing the cross­
subsidization among services. The incentives for inefficient entry were described to be 
significant. The policy approach of the EC entails the same weakness as the previous FCC 
approach.
The safeguarding of fair competition between the TOs and private service providers is 
likely to be a further source of instability. The TOs have an advantageous position due to 
the opportunity of providing reserved and competitive services. Cross subsidization from 
reserved services to competitive ones will be difficult to monitor in reality. However, proof 
of a predatory intention is difficult to find. TOs are likely to restrict access of competitors 
to the public switched network. Moreover, they may continue a special relationship to the 
government It is unlikely that large inroads by competitors are politically acceptable 
especially if job losses might be at stake. Thus the TO may count on political support if 
competition becomes fierce.81
7* Robinson, Peter (1991), p.99.
w See in detail: Gebhard, Hans-Peter (1990), p.16.
so The reserved area, for instance, comprises also picture phone which is certainly a service which embodies some 
added value. Compare chapter 8.
si As has been pointed out before, in this respect the present law in Germany is revealing. Beside the category of 
•reserved" and "competitive" services a third category of "mandatory" services is introduced. Mandatory 
services can be provided by private business. However, the TO has certain infrastructural tasks to fulfill. The 
Ministry may impose restrictions on private entities providing these services if the TO is supposed to be too 
much" handicapped.
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8. Germany: Serviced Based Competition
West Germany represents in the EC one of these countries which have already achieved 
the universal service goaL Until reunification it was regarded as an example of a well 
entrenched PTT- monopoly. As in other countries this monopoly was based on historic and 
cultural reasons and the pressure of interest groups. This basis for the PTT -monopoly will 
be described briefly. As will be seen, however, the process of reunification has to some 
extent spurred the liberalisation process.
After analysing the present regulatory regime in some detail, the pricing policy of the 
Ministry will be examined. Eventually estimations of price elasticities of demand for local, 
long distance and international services are presented.
8.1. The State Monopoly of the Post Office: Historical Reasons
The historical development of the German post office will not be developed here in detail. 
The following chapter only tries to highlight the main historical events which have shaped 
the telecommunications industry in its present form. A s will be seen, political and historical 
reasons have dominated the institutional organization of this sector in West Germany. Only 
during the last decade have arguments based on more economic reasoning entered the 
discussion.
The control of the telephone network by the post office was mainly due to two reasons. 
First the telephone was regarded as a technical improvement of the telegraph. Since 1832 
when the first telegraph line was established between Koblenz and Berlin, the telegraph 
was controlled by the state. This control was later almost automatically extended to the 
telephone. The extension had military reasons: The importance of means of 
communications for military operations led to the exclusion of private usage of the 
telegraph network until 1849. Thus the state monopoly for communications was well 
established long before the telephone was invented1. The second reason for the state 
monopoly has not yet lost its relevance. Bismark used the postal services as a means to 
foster integration of the German"R e ic h In 1867 the postal services were standardized for 
the *Norddeutscher BuncT. After the establishment of the "Deutsches Reich" in 1871 the 
"Reichsposf was formed and its jurisdiction extended to the newly acquired territories. An 
extension of the post office’s responsibility from the letter and parcel service to the 
telegraph was a means to strengthen the position of the central government towards the 
provinces. In 1880 the post office and the telegraph were united. Private enterprises 
(including the US Bell company) tried to enter the market. The "Telegmphengesetz" of 1892 
finally ruled that the post office obtained the exclusive right to provide the network for 
telegraph and telephone. This monopoly did not include the provision of terminal
1 For a more detailed analysis of this period see for instance: Wieland, B. (1988). Here: p.203.
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equipment2. The "Fernmeldeanlagengesetz" (FAG) of 1928 finally confirmed the state 
monopoly for the telephone network which was exercised by the post office.
After the end of World War II there was in principle an unique opportunity to restructure 
German public enterprises. The old institutional structures had been mostly destroyed. 
New laws had to be passed in order to reorganize the industry. In case of the post office, 
however, the former organizational structure was restored. The FAG of 1928 was thereby 
adopted without any major changes. This ensured that the institutional restructuring of the 
post office was soon accomplished. Beside reestablishing the public enterprise character, 
the quick procedure also led to the exemption of the Deutsche Bundespost (DBP) from the 
application of the German competition policy. When the debate over the anticartel law was 
started in 1952, the structure of the telecommunications sector had already been faced3. 
Thus, beside the discontinuity of the political system, there is a long tradition in Germany 
of state provision and control over telecommunications services. At least since 1928 the 
industry structure has not been altered decisively.
&2. The Institutional Foundation of the Traditional State Monopoly
&2.1. The Legal Basis
When discussing the legal basis for telecommunications in Germany, three levels of 
national law have to be distinguished.
1) The "Grundgesetz* ("Basic Law" or Constitution)
2) The "Femmeldeanlagengesetz" (FAG)
3) The "Gesetz ueber die Verwaltung der DBP (DBP Constitution Act - PostVerwG).
For certain changes to come about it is important to specify on what level a reform is 
required. The legal basis of the DBP determines what steps of liberalisation appear 
politically feasible.
According to the "Grundgesetz" (GG) the Federal government has the exclusive right to 
make laws for post and telecommunications*. Furthermore the DBP has to be run as a 
public enterprise; the administration is headed by the Bundesmmisterium fur Post und 
Telekommunikation (BMPT), the ministry for postal and telecommunications services5.
2 see: Wieland, B. (1988), p.204.
3 sec: Blankart, CS. and E. Käufer (1983), p.444.
4 Alt. 73, Ziff 7 GG combined wilh Art. 123 and 124 GG.
3 Art. 87 GG.
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The foundation of the public enterprise in the "Grundgesetz" is important for several 
reasons: First, the "Grundgesetz” does not prescribe a certain economic regime. Therefore 
it does not indicate whether in general market provision or public control should be 
prefered. Decisions made regarding the telecommunications sector not only have to satisfy 
certain criteria of economic efficiency, but also the aims of public welfare which are 
specified in the constitution6. The latter includes the duty for secrecy of data transmission 
(A rt 10 GG) and the "Demokrade- und SozuilsUiatsprinzip’ which obliges the state 
institutions to balance economic and social objectives. Therefore it has been argued that 
economic efficiency cannot have priority for state enterprises. Second, permanent 
employees of the DBP are civil servants. The Secretary of the Interior therefore has a say 
concerning wages of civil servants and their employment. The status of civil servants very 
much restricts any policy of internal restructuring.
The DBP is exempt from taxes. On the other hand it has to deliver 10% of its earnings to 
the general budget (in 1985 its contributions amounted to DM 5 billion7). These payments 
exceed the amount which the DBP would have to pay if it was subject to taxation8. The 
Minister of finance has to be consulted before any changes in the financial policy of the 
PTT are undertaken. The considerable contributions by the post office to finance the public 
deficit make the finance minister reluctant to accept any changes which erode the basis for 
postal revenues. Finally, privatisation of the DBP is almost impossible. A change of the 
Basic Law requires a two-third majority in the parliament, which made changes of the 
"Grundgesetz" very rare in the past
The parliament therefore plays a crucial role for telecommunications policy in Germany. It 
ensures that the electorate has a direct influence in particular on issues like price setting. 
Fundamental changes are unlikely to materialize, if politicians reckon them to be 
unpopular. Tariff changes are handled with great caution. In 1991 the "reunification tax" 
imposed on the DBP Telecom made tariff increases necessary and started a political 
debate. After prolonged discussion these tariff increases were cancelled when important 
regional elections were approaching.9 Normally a general increase in tariffs is compensated 
by special reductions for residential consumers.10 Every change in the tariff structure is 
immediately scrutinized for possible repercussions on the average consumer.
More specific issues of the organization of the telecommunications sector are layed down 
in the FAG and the Postverwaltungsgesetz (PostVerwG) of 1953. The FAG covers both the
* see in more detail: Scherer, J. (1985), p.266
1 Statistischca Jahibuch (1967), p.68.
* see: Wieland, B. (1988), p.206.
* see for instance: Sflddeutiche, 20/21.04.1991.
10 For instance in 1974 a 'moonlight* tariff was introduced to compensate an overall increase in tariffs. The former 
was a price reduction for the off-peak period. See: Neumann, K.H. and B. Wieland (1985), p.5.
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network and the provision of services. The Postverwaltungsgesetz regulates in detail the 
relationship of the post office and private enterprises. Moreover, it contains the principle 
of "Eigenwirtsehaftlichkeif, which demands that the PTT as a whole has to break even 
Therefore as long as the postal services are in deficit, there have to be side-payments from 
the telecommunications sector mainly towards the letter and parcel services.11 
Both laws can be changed by simple majority in the Parliament. Thus, for instance the 
licensing of other network operators is easier to accomplish than the privatisation of the 
DBP.
8.2.2. The Exemption of the DBP from Competition Policy
The 'Law against Restraint o f Competition'' ("Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankun^ 
(GWB)) went into operation in 195812. It is directed against all private behaviour which 
restricts free trade. Thereby contracts, collusive behaviour, the control of dominant firms, 
cartels and corporate mergers as well as discriminating behaviour are regulated. According 
to the GWB all kind of cartel agreements which aim at the distortion of competition are 
prohibited (§ 1 GWB). The formation of certain cartels, however, is exempted from this 
prohibition (§ 2-8 GWB). Furthermore, the Minister of Economic Affairs is entitled to 
permit a cartel if he or she reckons this to be in the national interest. Domination of a 
market is assumed if a certain market share is acquired by a company (§ 22 GWB). In this 
case the supervision of abuse of monopoly power is undertaken automatically by the 
mKartellbefu>rdem (Registrar of Restrictive Trade Practises). Certain actions or treaties which 
are regarded as an abuse can be declared null and void by the authority. Though the GWB 
appears strong in principle it is weak as far as implementation is concerned. Public 
regulated or owned companies are exempted from the control of th e"KarteUbehorde"u . For 
public enterprises there exists only a "supervision of abuse". Nevertheless the GWB has 
been applied to certain actions of the DBP concerning its public procurement policy.14 
Thus the provision of the network, services and terminals was not controlled by the GWB. 
The exemption according to § 99 (1) GWB had been justified by structural differences 
between the telecommunications sector and other industries. For instance complaints by
11 see: Article 15(1) PostVerwG, and: Scherer, J (1985), p .269.
12 Blankart, C.B. and E. Kaufer (1963), p.440.
13 The exemption of state monopolies is made in § 101 GWB.
14 DBP does not produce terminals or equipment itself. These products have to be acquired from private firms.
The size of DBP as well as its monopoly position offers the PTT considerable market power (monopsony). 
This position is by the nationally biased procurement policy of all (European) countries. Thus
suppliers being ignored by DBP hardly can sell their products in other markets. According to { 98 (I) GWB 
the law against restrictive trade practises can be applied to the procurement policy of DBPJn various cases 
the"KaneUbehOrde* intervened. So far a formal rejection of practises by DBP did not take place because the 
\attrr had always been persuaded to change the objected behaviour before. Especially its 'invitations for 
bidding' have been rhaiiMgeri repeatedly. The ’K arteU behorde' was afraid of small competitors being ousted 
by the procedure alone. In detail see MonopoBcommission (1961), p JO-35.
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customers about price increases did not lead to a supervision of the rate-setting practises oi 
the DBP. This, however, only applied as long as the DBP did not compete directly with 
private enterprises. Once the de jure monopoly position is altered, the GWB thereafter 
may apply to the supply side as well15.
813. Cross Subsidization in the German PTT
In the past, the DBP enjoyed a comprehensive monopoly for the provision of the public 
switched network and services. Moreover, it directly participated within the Ministry in the 
regulatory decision making process. Several private networks were licensed16 for closed 
user groups. These licences, however, did not lead to competition between network 
operators because they were limited to certain users who were members of a "dub".
The traditional organization of the German telecommunications sector created a 
comprehensive system of cross subsidization. While being critizised for its allocative 
inefficiency, it created strong pressure groups interested in preserving the status quo. The 
most important feature is the principle of uniform service. A brief overview about the 
entire cross-subsidizing scheme of the DBP reveals six different features:
1.) There is the familiar subsidy from the long distance service to the local network and 
customer’s access.
2.) Due to uniform service high density areas subsidize low density regions, tariffs for local 
calls and for access are comparatively too high in urban compared to rural areas.
3.) The telecommunications services subsidize the traditional postal services (delivery of 
letters and parcels) by DM 2.6 billion (1991)17.
4.) A part of the exceptional profits made by the DBP have to be remitted to the federal 
budget. This amounted for 1987 to roughly DM 5 billion18.
5.) The status of civil servants has guaranteed working conditions for employees which are 
better than those offered in the private market. This indudes social security benefits, 
salaries, and protection against the termination of the working contract. As far as this has 
increased costs and prices, the effect is a subsidy from telecommunications customers in 
general to employees of the DBP.
6.) Its size19 has always tempted politicians to use the DBP for short term macroeconomic 
policy goals. In the past the DBP was obliged to use its procurement policy as a tool for
15 This has been the interpretation of the Monopolkommisston. See: Monopolkommission (1981), p32.
1« like the SWIFT network for banking transactions and START for travel agencies.
17 see: FAZ, 14/06/1991. That this is the average level of cross-subsidization can be seen from WeizsBcker, C.C. 
von (1988), p.26.
i* see: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1987 (1988), p.68.
19 DBP has been the largest enterprise in West Germany making exceptional profits. In 1987 the total profit of 
DBP amounted to DM 7.7 billion (before the contribution made to the Federal budget). It became by far the 
largest national investor and its budget was well above die budget of the largest state (Nordrhein Westfalen).
regional policy20 and to increase purchases in periods of economic recession. In those 
periods the DBP was regularly used as a catalyst for employment programms. After 
reunification, the DBP Telecom was obliged to raise its subsidization of the Federal Budget 
by additional DM 2 billion. It thereby had to contribute to the general costs of rebuilding 
the old GDR.21 The DBP itself cannot influence the extra burden imposed on it by general 
political considerations.22
The present subsidy from long distance services to customer access and local service makes 
the mean customer worse off. The median customer, however, is better off. This is due to 
the high concentration of long distance phone calls on business customers and a few 
residential customers. Competition, however, will erode any cross-subsidization scheme. 
Thus if competitiors enter, the immediate effect on prices will be contrary to the one set up 
by the subsidization. Therefore the majority of (residential) customers is regarded as worse 
off if competition is allowed for. In the political debate only the direct price effects which 
appear in the short run are taken into consideration. The process is perceived as a zero- 
sum-game, which supposedly leads to a redistribution from residential customers to 
business.23
The averaging of tariffs and the goal of universal service is regarded as part of the German 
"social consensus".24 A "gemeinwirtschaftlich" organized enterprise, moreover, is obliged to 
directly serve the general welfare.25 A restructuring of the industry which fosters price 
discrimination therefore was widely rejected as an attack on the social balance.
1987 about 560,000 people were employed by DBP. See: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1987, p.67., 
MonopoDcommission (1961), p.26 and Busch, A. (1965), p.138.
»  See: Article 31 PostVerwG.
21 R*ing a ’general* contribution, this amount was not meant to finance the investments into the 
telecommunications infrastructure of the old GDR. See: Telecommunications Week International, April 1991.
a  FAZ, 19/04/1991.
23 Indirect effects which arise through the lowering of prices for VANS and which eventually feed through in lower
prices for other products are generally neglected in the political discussion.
24 The of the category "social consensus* thereby differs. Some include also the subsidy flowing from
telecommunications services to the letter and parcel service. This is justified by a rather paternalistic 
argument: If letters and phone calls are substitutive means of communication, the present subsidy scheme is 
beneficial it supports the writing of letters. Writing letters instead of using the phone, however, is
considered to be superior since it raises the general level of education.
25 see in more detail: Blankart, C.B. and E. Kaufer (1983), p.443.
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83. The Restructuring of German Telecommunications
83.1. The "Witte Commission”
Before the reform of post and telecommunications in 1989, the Ministry for the DBP had 
two distinct functions: It combined the top management with the regulatory commission. 
Thus it had the double role of a player and the umpire. This mixture of administrative and 
commercial functions under one roof did not fit any competitive framework. Furthermore 
political and economic interests became mixed under this arrangement The minister of the 
post office is member of the cabinet. Therefore he or she has to run the enterprise 
according to the principles of governmental policy. The Minister is obliged to cooperate 
with macroeconomic and social policy.
However, due to strong political pressure a programme was developed to restructure the 
telecommunications industry in West Germany.
In September 1987 the "Regierungskommission Femmektewesen" which has been called 
"Witte Konunissum" (after its chairman Prof. Witte) submitted a report. It proposed certain 
steps towards liberalisation for German telecommunications. The report’s main proposals 
became law in 1989 without much alteration. Privatisation of the PTT (or the telecom part) 
was not at stake. Lawyers especially refrained from recommending privatisation because it 
would be contrary to the constitution. Furthermore, competition in the network for basic 
services had not been put forward26. Two arguments were seen as crucial against the 
liberalisation of network services: First, it was argued that this could undermine the 
infrastructural task of the DBP. Second, the Commission was concerned with the financial 
viability of the PTT in order to go ahead with new investments into the ISDN network. 
Until the mid 1990s about DM 40 billion had to be invested into the West German ISDN 
network.27 Finally, it was argued that the cost arising from establishing a second public 
switched network exceed the potential benefits from network competition in Germany. The 
installation of a parallel network would need investments of about DM 90 billion.28 There­
fore the basic services (which account for about 90% of total revenues from telephone 
services) have been left untouched. The Witte Kommission only postulated that rates 
should gradually move towards costs. Instead it proposed to liberalize VANS completely. 
The PTT has to provide leased lines on "fair and competitive” conditions. Every three years 
the federal government will examine whether those requirements have been met29. There
*  6 members voted for and 6 against competition. The statutes of the Commission rule that in case of parity 
measures towards competition are not proposed. See here and below in more detail: Wieland, B. (1968), 
p.266-275.
27 Zeit, 17/08/90, p. 28.
2» MonopoOcommission (1981), p.98.
2* WeizsAcker points out that these governmental inquireries are unlikely to come ever to the conclusion that the 
PIT has failed to fulfill its duties. In that case the government would have to critizisc itself for not having 
exercised its control function property. See. Weizsflcker, C.C. von (1968), p31.
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are some regulated services which the PIT  is obliged to provide. For these services entry 
of private firms is accepted. Lastly, there are unregulated services which are left completely 
to the market. For these services no licensing is necessary. The PTT, however, is also 
allowed to enter.
As far as the problem of "cream-skimming" is concerned, the Commission did not advocate 
a solution. It only proposed that if a clearcut distinction of VANS and basic services is not 
feasible, the DBP should rent lines to private competitors on the basis of volume sensitive 
charges.
Secondly, the separation of the postal services and telecommunications services was put 
forward. Thus the traditional PTT structure was broken up. On July 1, 1989 the enterprise 
was split into three independent parts (postal services, telecoms, banking). Originally the 
'Postvenvaltungsmi” which ensured political control by parliament was meant to be 
abolished. However, regional states opposed any steps which challenged their influence. As 
a result, theflnfrastruktumat* was created, which guarantees that political control persists30. 
The Infrastrukturrat consists of members of both chambers of the parliament. It has 
advisory functions for all decisions of the BMPT which tackle interests of the "Lander", or 
infrastructural questions. Moreover, it has to decide about proposals from the Ministry 
concerning mandatory services, data protection etc. If the Ministry and the 
Infrastruckturrat cannot compromise, ultimately the government has to decide. The three 
businesses of the DBP are expected to become economically independent from each other. 
Therefore the Commission proposed the phasing out of subsidy flows to the postal services 
by the early 1990s. The remittance to the state shall end by 1996, when the DBP Telekom 
will be taxed as a private enterprise. A 15% VAT is imposed on competitive services as 
mobile telephony from January 1,1993. Reserved services face the VAT 1996.31.
8 J i. The Impact of Reunification
Parallel with the reunification of East and West Germany on October 3, 1990 the East 
German "Deutsche Post* and the DBP were unified. Given the poor state of the East 
German telecommunications network there was an urgent need for investment. The East 
German system only provided the very basic services as telephony, telex, and some limited 
data communications. The structure of the network exhibited enormous regional 
differences in the density of access. While in East Berlin nearly every second household was 
connected, in areas like Dresden and Rostock only every nineth household had access to 
the public switched network.32 The average waiting time for a telephone connection was 10
»  Moreover, despite the division into three sectors under one roof social issues for instance still have to be tackled
uniformly for all sectors. See: Die ZEIT, (3 March 1989), p-2£. A detailed analysis of the German postal 
reform can be found in: Pfeiffer, G. and B. Wieland (1990).
31FAZ, April 25,1991 and March 30,1992.
»  Neumann, K.H. (1990), p.6.
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to 20 years. East Germany had a telephone main station density of 10.6 per 100 inhabitants. 
This is one of the lowest in Europe. The corresponding figure in West Germany is 46%, 
and 66% in Sweden.33 The poor technical performance of the network did not allow the use 
of facsimile and more advanced data communications.
The DBP Telecom undertakes the modernization and extension of the East German 
network. Until 1997 an investment volume of about DM 60 billion is envisaged to set up a 
completely new network based on modern technology. Both switches and cables will be 
built up from scratch.34 The "Telecom 2000* project plans to achieve a service level in East 
Germany similar to the one in West Germany by 1997. To achieve this goal the number of 
households having access has to grow from 1.8 billion in 1990 to about 9 billion. The most 
urgent need, however, has been to increase the lines between West and East Germany. The 
absence of reliable means of communication has been regarded as a major obstacle to 
private investment in East Germany. A first step to increase internal capacity was to 
interconnect 23 special networks which previously were exclusively used by the secret 
service (Stasi).35
By mid 1991 the number of lines from East and West Germany had increased from 1,460 to 
26,000. The installation of 500,000 new telephone sets by the end of 1991 was planned.36 
According to current investment plans all regional capitals will have digital trunk and local 
exchanges by the end of 1993.37 An additional "turn-key" programme for business 
customers entrusted private enterprises to install entire local networks on a turnkey basis 
(including switches, transmission lines and customer access).38 Radio communication is 
used to provide for more rapid interconnection. This technology can be used to bridge a 
distance of up to 10 Km from the customer to the switch.39 Nevertheless, the DBP Telekom 
is critizised for being too bureaucratic and perfectionist. The "Telekom 2000" project puts 
emphasis on medium and long term development and high standards neglecting urgent 
needs in the short run.40 Moreover, the target of 500,000 new telephone sets for 1991 was 
not met.41
55 Neumann argues that the provision of access was lower than would have been justified by the level of economic 
development of the country. It was rather due to the political interest to control communications and the 
information flow between citizens. See: Neumann, K. H. (1990), p.9.
34 66% of switches are older than 30 years. About 80% of telephone sets were installed as joint connections which
had to be shared by several households. See: Funksdiau (Spczial), 6/91 and: Tenzer, Gerd (1991), p38.
35 FAZ, 20/06/1991.
*  FAZ, 02/07/1991.
37 For a more detailed description of the development plan: Logica (1991), Tarifica Annual, Eastern Europe, 
London, pp.7-10.
*  Funkschau (Spezial), 6/91.
”  Compare: FAZ, March 30,1992.
40 In detail: Wirtsdiaftwoche, June, 21,1991.
41 Compare: Handelsblatt, January 28,1992.
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A main problem for the DBP is to raise capital for these additional investments. In contrast 
to a private enterprise it cannot do so on the capital markets by issuing shares. This 
generated criticism of the approach chosen to extend the exclusive rights of the DBP 
Telekom to the east. The "Monopolkommission" reckons that the DBP Telekom will not be 
able to quickly provide a complete new network for the GDR-territory. Instead it proposed 
to have private operators installing and operating local networks. In this respect the period 
of "early competition" in the USA could have offered a prototype. As was argued in more 
detail above, competition among many local operators contributed significantly to the rapid 
spread of telecommunications networks throughout the USA.42 Furthermore the 
Monopolkommission recommended licensing private carriers (railways, electricity 
enterprises and cable networks) to cany third party traffic.'*® It is most probable that both 
measures would have spurred the development of a modern telecommunications network 
in the old DDR territory. While new investors could have supplied local networks, 
operators of already existing networks could have provided additional capacity in the long 
distance market Given the need to rebuild the new network, in case of the GDR a 
duplication of investment would not have been occured. Eventually the privatisation of the 
East German "Deutsche Post" would have been a further alternative. In contrast to the 
legal situation in West Germany, the status of the East German PTT as a public 
administration did not have a constitutional character. It could have been privatized by a 
simple legislative act.43
The privatisation debate also gained momentum in West Germany. Given the additional 
need for capital by the government for the reunification, privatisation of the DBP Telekom 
is favoured by the Economics Minister. The sale of a minority stake would be possible 
without constitutional reform and could raise up to DM 50 billion.
While these proposals were first resisted by the BMPT, the latter has recently changed its 
mind. The Minister now promotes the sale of less than 50% of the shares. However, the 
traditional links between the DBP and the BMPT ensured that the preservation of 
exclusive rights granted to DBP got priority over a rapid rebuilding of East German 
telecommunications. Nevertheless, the urgent need to improve quickly intragerman 
communications led to a more liberal interpretation of the present legal framework. For 
instance the interpretation of the exclusive right to install the telecom network has 
somewhat changed. Apparently, it has been limited to the terrestrial public switched 
network. Thus satellite, mobile and radio based networks no longer come under the 
network monopoly of the DBP Telecom.
In this respect the licensing of private satellite network operators is especially relevant. 
Operators using VSATs for transmission to East Germany may offer services for third 
parties including basic telephony. The resale of spare capacity is possible. While presently
42 See in detail chapter 6.
*3 Privatisation would have been relatively easy to carry out, since the PTT employees did not have the civil servant 
status as in West Germany. See: Neumann, KLH. (1990), p.15.
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they are presently granted only for six years, it is reckoned, however, that these licences will 
be permanent. Thereby the BMPT has taken a more liberal approach than that sketched in 
the Commission's Green Paper on satellites. Moreover, the telecommunications bottleneck 
has made it likely that a third mobile network operator will be licensed. While this company 
at the beginning shall only operate in the East, it is expected to expand to the West after 
three years.44
Finally, various companies are asked to provide proposals for the installation of local radio 
networks.45 So far no country uses radio-phones for anything except high-priced mobile 
services. Whether local radio phone networks could be used for East German cities as an 
alternative to the fixed terrestrial network is being studied.
For the end of 1991 it is expected that the Ministry will allow for the resale and sub-channel 
multiplexing of spare capacity of the terrestrial network. In this context it is interesting to 
note that international leased lines are already used for resale. On national leased circuits 
voice switching and voice transmission is prohibited. These rules do not apply to 
international circuits which can be used for bypass by routing traffic out of West Gemany 
and then back in.46
** Communication! Week International^/3/91.
«  Economist, June 1,1991.
*  For instance Comsys Deutschland GmbH witches voice traffic in the Netherlands. The Dutch law does not 
restrict switching of phone lines. Thereby it offers a 'red phone* service for calls between West and East 
Germany. Subscribers can choose among four different priority levels (for waiting time) and different 
connection charges. This service became profitable after a 30% price cut for the use of international leased 
lines on July 1,1989. See: Kaflta, Gerhard (1990), p.47.
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&4. The New Regulatory Regime
In what follows a detailed analysis of the new regulatory framework in Germany after the 
post reform of 1989 is undertaken. The analysis is separated for the telecommunications 
infrastructure and the provision of services. Current developments mainly driven by the 
process of reunification are discussed.
In 1989 the amendment of the FAG has brought about a fundamental change in the 
organization of the German telecommunications market. While previously the exclusive 
rights of the Federation were extensive, the amendment introduced competition as the basic 
principle of the German telecommunications law. Monopoly rights are now regarded as an 
exception and they have to be justified.
According to the FAG exclusive rights of the Federation still exist for the transmission 
paths of the network (network monopoly) and for the voice telephony service (service 
monopoly). Both are interpreted as exceptions to the principle of competition and they are 
justified on grounds of infrastructural tasks. The DBP Telekom has a public mandate to 
carry out these rights of the Federation.
However, since the monopoly rights are vested in the Federation, the BMPT may authorize 
private entities as well to undertake activities which are covered by the special rights of the 
Federation. In that case the BMPT grants a licence to an individual firm. This policy has 
been applied to fringe areas of the network, like satellites and mobile telephony.
As far as non-voice-telephony services are concerned, principally private entities are free to 
compete against the DBP Telekom. Due to the network monopoly it is recognized that the 
DBP Telekom may abuse its special rights in order to gain a competitive advantage. For 
this reason the BMPT has laid down the principles of equal rights for the provision of non­
reserved services. The DBP Telekom has to provide access to the network for external 
users on terms which are not less favourable than those under which the DBP Telekom 
operates itself. Thus leased lines have to be provided to everybody who requires them, the 
BMPT is responsible for the regulation of tariffs.
Finally, the FAG distinguishes between mandatory and non-mandatory services. While for 
the latter there exist no restrictions on their provision, the former are characterized by 
certain obligations which are put on the DBP Telekom. Under well defined conditions 
private entities which provide mandatory services, may encounter certain restrictions if 
necessary to balance the competitive disadvantage of the DBP Telekom.
8.4.1. Infrastructure
Generally a distinction has to be made between private and public networks. Private 
networks as defined above, connect only a limited number of customers. They may oe 
completely separate from the public switched network. Alternatively service providers can 
use their own terminals while renting transmission lines from the TO.
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Public networks may be terrestrial or space networks. Moreover, terrestrial networks may 
consist of the fixed (cable), the microwave and the mobile network. The microwave 
network is neglected in what follows, since it does not play a crucial role in Germany.
&4.1.1. The Fixed Terrestrial Public Network
Present regulation
Article 1(2) of the " Telecommunications Installations Act” (FAG) establishes that the 
"Bund" (Federation) of Germany has the exclusive right to set up and operate transmission 
paths and their termination points (network monopoly). According to article 1(5) FAG the 
Federal Minister of Posts and Telecommunications exercises these rights, whereas the 
Deutsche Bundespost Telekom has a public mandate to carry them out (Article 1(5) FAG 
and Article 1 DBP Constitution Act). It is up to the BMPT to concretely define the scope 
of these rights.
Thus under present regulation the DBP Telekom has a de facto monopoly for the fixed 
terrestrial public network. In its declaration 'basic points o f the federal network monopoly*7 
the BMPT stresses that the services provided by the DBP Telekom in the exercise of its 
network monopoly must comply with the principles established by the ONP directive 
(90/387/EC).48
The aim of the network monopoly of the Federation is to allow every citizen to be 
interconnected to the network. Moreover, the provision of a universal nationwide network 
is regarded as the basis for the functioning of competition in the service sector. Therefore 
the monopoly rights reserved for the Federation are linked to certain obligations which 
must be fulfilled by the DBP Telekom. These obligations refer on the one hand to certain 
infrastructural aims and on the other hand they are supposed to ensure equal access of 
private service providers to the public switched network. In more detail, if it is economically 
feasible the DBP Telekom is obliged to provide its monopoly transmission paths for 
everybody who requires it (normally within 4 months). The network termination points 
have to be such that they allow for the interconnection of all terminal equipment which has 
received a type approval. Finally, connection lines to the network switches have to be such 
that transmission into private networks is feasible.
It is important to note that the network monopoly has been restricted to transmission only. 
In chapter 2.1.1. it was pointed out that technological advance has made it possible to 
supply many switching functions with external terminals. For this reason these functions no 
longer are the exclusive rights of the DBP Telekom. Thus the law provides for a narrow 
definition of the network monopoly which offers service providers considerable scope to 
employ intelligent terminals.
47 BMPT (1990) and (1991).
*  See chapter 122.1.
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Insofar the "Bund” has an exclusive right the BMPT has the right to authorize other parties 
to install a network (Article 2(1) FAG). In that case the ministry will license a private entity 
to cany out these rights of the Federation.
&4.1.2. The Mobile Public Network
Present Regulation
In case of mobile telephony the BMPT has used its power according to Article 2(1) FAG to 
license a private enterprise for the installation of a GSM network49 on its own.
Beside the DBP Telekom (Dj-network) the Mannesmann Mobilfunk GmbH sets up a 
second digital cellular public network (D2*network). Mobile telephony therefore represents 
an exemption from the transmission network monopoly since Mannesmann is entitled to 
establish its own signalling installations and to use its own frequencies. Mannesmann has to 
use leased lines of the DBP Telekom which according to Article 1(4) FAG have to be 
provided by the latter.
In line with Article 2(1) FAG the BMPT furthermore has granted several licences for local 
mobile networks ("Buendelfimk?) to operate in certain districts (Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, 
Frankfurt/M). Licences are granted if technical conditions are fulfilled and if frequencies 
are available. They comprise the right of data and voice transmission for closed user 
groups.
Finally, the Ministry has launched a call for applications for a private mobile PCN network, 
called E j. The successful applicant is obliged to serve at least 75% of the population by 
1997. Neither the DBP Telekom nor Mannesmann are permitted to apply for a PCN 
licence until 1996.
Hie PCN requires more investments into the network compared to the GSM network. On 
the other hand, once established, the PCN becomes attractive to customers since terminals 
are less expensive.50
Analysis
The main market of mobile networks is the nationwide GSM system. In the past the DBP 
Telekom has operated two analog "B" and "C" mobile networks. Given the relatively high 
price they had only a small number of subscribers (300,000). Not being subject to 
competition the DBP did a poor job if compared to Britain (1.2 million mobile telephone 
users) and Sweden (500,000), where competing mobile operators were permitted much 
earlier.51 The low penetration of mobile telephony in Germany compared to other 
Europeen countries can be seen from figure 8.1.)
«* GSM -  Groupe Spedale Mobile digital. The GSM is a digital mobile telephone network which is standardized
throughout the Community.
»  Les Echos, March 20,1992; and: Handelsblatt, January 29,1992.
M Economist, June 1,1991.
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Figure 8.1.: mobile telephons per 1000 inhabitants, Mai 1990 52
The new GSM system can be used throughout the Community and due to lower prices in 
Germany seven million subscribers are expected.33
The private competitor of the DBP Telekom has to interconnect with the terrestrial public 
switched network. Disputes have already arisen over the tariffs proposed by the DBP 
Telekom for its leased lines. The announced prices for standard leased lines are more than 
four times higher than the international average34. They were rejected by the Ministry.
The approach chosen to liberalize the German mobile telephone market can be criticised 
for various reasons. First, the limitation of entry to one competitor makes collusive 
behaviour likely.55 Then it appears questionable that one licence was automatically granted
#  
to DBP Telekom which did not have to participate in the selection procedure. The other 
licence was not granted on the basis of an auction but by using an administrative selection 
process. In comparison with an auction the selection procedure is detrimental for allocative 
and distributive reasons. An auction might have offered a better way to select the most 
efficient competitor. Moreover, by an auction the rent which exists due to the scarcity of 
frequencies would not be privatized but instead could have been reaped by the state. This 
approach, for instance, was chosen in the USA where second licences were auctioned off to
»  Source: DBP Telekom and; FAZ, June 29,1991.
53 Die ZEIT, Nr. 27,28/06/1991, p. 27.
5* Telecommunications Week international, April 1991.
S3 The GSM standardization leads to a harmonized good which is provided by both competitors. This facilitates
coordination among them. Moreover, the distribution of frequencies protects them from further entiy. Here
and in the following see in detail: Kruse, Jom (1991).
• s i i i s s a i £ « « u
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independent companies.56. However, in order to put both competitors on an equal footing 
this would have meant auctioning off both licences. This proposition may be rejected on the 
ground that the DBP Telekom would have had an unfair advantage when participating in 
the auction. It could have used profits made in monopoly markets to cross-subsidize its 
bidding. Moreover, given the absence of a bankruptcy risk for the public firm, DBP 
Telekom would have been likely to win one licence. However, thereby DBP Telekom would 
have got the GSM licence on less generous terms than it got the licence now. For 
distributive reasons it would have been preferable to let the state reap the rent from 
frequency scarcity.
DBP Telekom has been offered further considerable advantages.57 First it knew about its 
licence much in advance, thereby being able to start the building up of it’s own mobile 
network earlier. Moreover, it could select its suppliers earlier.58 Then the DBP Telekom is 
able to cross-subsidize when installing the mobile network. While later cross subsidization 
may be discovered, the investment decisions in the network cannot be made reversible. 
Given the high uncertainty of future market development investment decisions taken at the 
moment can hardly be challenged as an unfair action. Not being threatened by a 
bankruptcy risk DBP Telekom may therefore be induced to overinvest. Finally, as has been 
seen for the debates among British Telecom and Mercury and the current debate among 
DBP Telekom and Mannesmann, the public network operator tries to restrict access to its 
public switched network or to overcharge for leased lines.
For all these reasons it might have been better to exclude the DBP Telekom from the GSM 
network. Thereby equal chances among private operators of the D mobile network could 
have been more easier achieved. Furthermore the old B and C networks operated by DBP 
Telekom could have put some competitive pressure on the mobile duopoly. Now being 
operated by one of the two competitors they are likely to be neglected in the future. Finally, 
the two independent mobile operators might have put more competitive pressure on the 
fixed terrestrial network.
Thus even in a market niche like mobile telephony present policy measures try to limit the 
competitive pressure which arise for the state owned firm. It is likely, therefore, that 
consumers will be prevented from reaping all potential benefits of the new communications 
technologies.
St The market value of the D2 licence is estimated to be between DM 2 billion and DM 4 billion. Compare: DIW
(1990), Europäischer Mobilfunk verbessert Femmeldedienste, in: Wochenbericht 4/90, Januar 25, p. 49; and: 
Economist, October S, 1991.
57 Again in more detail: Kruse, Jöm (1991).
38 DBP began investments in summer 1989. Not before winter 1989 Mannesmann knew about its selection as a 
second licence«. See: FAZ, June 29,1991.
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&4.13. Satellite Public Networks
Present Regulation
According to Article 2(2) FAG the BMPT is obliged to grant concessions for satellite 
communication installations for the transmission of data at low bit rates (lower than 15 
kbit/s), provided that this does not affect radio communication. Thus private companies 
have a legal claim to a licence (for low bit rates).59 The installations can be used for private 
or public services, excluding voice service. The licencee then has to lease the necessary 
satellite space capacity from the DBP Telekom. The latter is obliged to arrange for 
interconnection with the public network (Article 1 (4) FAG). For higher bit rates the 
Ministry may grant permission for satellite installations.
Analysis
The distinction between transmission and switching as applied for the terrestrial network, 
cannot be extended to satellite networks. Moreover, the infrastructural considerations of 
the terrestrial network cannot be applied to satellite networks. Therefore the Ministry 
decided to allow for niche competition ("point-to-multipoint"), making an exemption of the 
network monopoly. By March 199111 private satellite operators were already licensed.
The reason to limit satellite concessions to low bit rates is to prevent competition with the 
voice communication of the terrestrial network. In fact the BMPT has indicated in the 
*Amtliche Begrilndung zum Poststrukturgesetz" that licences for higher bit rates will not be 
denied if the substitution of voice telephony can be prevented. Thereby, presently Germany 
operates the most liberal regime for satellite services in the EC
A main problem is that - similarly to the operator which relies on leased lines of DBP 
Telekom - satellite licencees are not allowed to lease space capacity directly from Intelsat 
or Eutelsat. Instead they have to apply for capacity at DBP Telekom. While the latter is 
quick in assigning space capacity for its own purposes, competitors sometimes have to wait 
for months.60
No special licences will be granted for satellite installations for East Germany. However, 
for licences for traffic between East and West Germany there have been individual 
authorizations to transmit voice telephony as well. These authorizations are granted only if 
DBP Telekom is not in the position to provide an equivalent service in a comparable time 
frame (3 months). Moreover, the licencee has to prove that there is an urgent need for this 
service. While the basic licence has a duration of 10 years, the individual authorization to
3* There is no competitive selection process among licence applicants, since everyone who complies with the 
conditions of the lisensor will obtain a license. The licence does not include restrictions for the size or the 
configuration of the satellite network. Only circumventing DBP voice service monopoly is prohibited.
to Funkschau, 10/91, ’Em Boom verbindet Ost und West*.
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transmit voice telephony cannot last more than six years. However, as has been mentioned 
earlier, it is expected that eventually the authorization to carry voice telephony will be 
permanent
8A1A Private Networks 
Present Regulation
According to Article 2(1) FAG the BMPT may grant an authorization to set up and 
operate individual telecommunications installations for certain routes or districts. If a 
concession is granted, the BMPT has the right to establish the concession terms (Article 
2(2) FAG). A concession has to be granted to electricity suppliers for their service 
purposes (Article 2(2) FAG). No licence is necessary to set up and operate 
telecommunications installations which are used exclusively within the limits of the same 
premise, or between several premises belonging to the same owner provided that the 
distance between these premises does not exceed 25 km. This applies also for transport 
companies as long as these installations are used exclusively for their own service needs, 
and for installations for internal activities of "Lander" authorities (Article 3(1) FAG).
The BMPT may authorize operators of installations within the same premise which are 
connected to the telephone service of DBP Telekom to provide monopoly services for third 
parties. In that case DBP Telekom has the right to impose special obligations on these 
operators until the 31/12/19%. These obligations, however, have to be approved of by the 
BMPT.
Analysis
Private networks are another exemption to the network monopoly granted to DBP 
Telekom. However, the limitation of private networks for sites within a small radius 
prevents them from being used to bypass the public switched network. The "Witte 
Kommission" had recommended to allow the installation of private networks covering the 
whole territoiy. So far this has not been done by the Ministry due to the possible 
substitutive effects of basic services.61
&4.15. Use of Leased Circuits
Present Regulation
Article 1 (4) FAG provides that everyone has the right to provide telecommunications 
services for third parties over permanent or switched connections to be made available by 
DBP Telekom. Sub-channeling or reselling is permitted. This, however, does not include 
voice service. DBP Telekom is obliged to provide leased lines to everyone requiring them
«  BMPT (1988), Reform des Po*t- und Fenuneldewesens, Heidelberg, p.46.
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to offer non-reserved services. Leased lines have to be made available on the same terms as 
for DBP Telekom itself. According to Article 1(4) DBP Telekom has to allow for 
interconnection. Monopoly transmission paths therefore must be accessible to the user via 
service neutral, freely reachable interfaces. Any kind of discrimination among private 
suppliers and between private suppliers and DBP Telekom is prohibited. DBP Telekom is 
obliged to ensure that connection lines can be used for non-voice services, that the user can 
freely choose among service suppliers, and that private switches are connected to the 
switches of DBP Telekom network. Thus the principle of equal access for "data over voice” 
has to be respected.
If according to Article 2(1) FAG the BMPT authorizes someone to provide services which 
are covered by the exclusive right of the "Bund" (voice traffic) then the Minister or DBP 
Telekom according to Article 2(2) FAG may impose certain restrictions for the 
interconnection with the public network (like the prohibition of resale or an additional 
surcharge).
Tariffs for leased lines are regulated by the BMPT. They can depend on the duration of 
usage, the moment of provision, or on the distance of transmission. However, tariffs are not 
allowed to differ according to the purpose for which the lines are leased.
Thus the use of leased lines for third party traffic, shared use, and resale is permitted if no 
voice service is included.
Analysis
As has been mentioned already, the Ministry is responsible for leased lines tariffs. If the 
BMPT and DBP Telekom cannot compromise the Infrastrukturrat is consulted. If still no 
compromise can be found, finally the Cabinet decides. Leased lines' tariffs have to be 
related to costs, thus instead of usage sensitive prices flat rate pricing has to be applied. 
Tariffs recently proposed by DBP Telekom have been challenged by the operator of the D2 
network as well as by VANS providers. Compared to tariffs in the UK the German ones 
are four times as high.62
International Use of Leased Circuits
The rules specified by the FAG do not apply to international circuits. Thus they can be 
bypassed by routing traffic out of Germany and then back in. On international circuits 
compression technology is allowed and there are no restrictions for transmission of data 
and voice signals. Using international lines leased from DBP Telekom firms can first send 
data or voice traffic out of Germany and then bade in. Shared use, third party traffic and 
resale are not prohibited.63
B Communications Week International, 27/05/1991, p J
o See the example given in footnote 46.
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However, the rental charges on standard border leased lines in Germany are stil 
exorbitant A non German operator charges for a leased line to Japan about DM 1,800 
DBP Telekom asks for DM 14,000. For leased lines to the US the German operator’s price 
is three times as high as the price of its counterpart; for the UK it still costs twice as 
much.64
8.4.2. Services
8A2.1. Fixed Voice Services
Present Regulation
Article 1(4) FAG provides that the operation of telecommunications installations for the 
purpose of voice traffic for third parties is an exclusive right of the "Bund" (telephone 
service monopoly), which is exercised by the BMPT (1(5) FAG). As in case of the network 
monopoly DBP Telekom has a public mandate to carry out these rights. The basic rights 
based on this regulation have been passed over to DBP Telekom on the 27.11.1990. Future 
regulations will have to describe in more detail the scope and content of these rights.
Under Article 1(4) and 2(1) FAG the BMPT has the right to authorize other entities to set 
up and operate individual telecommunications installations. Thus the BMPT may allow 
private entities to provide services which are presently covered by the monopoly rights of 
the Federation. If such exceptions are made the BMPT will grant a licence. It is left to the 
discretion of the ministry to set the terms of these licences.
The scope of the telephone service monopoly to some extent depends on the definition of 
the services concerned. In that respect in the declaration of the BMPT"Eckpunkte" special 
reference is made to the telecommunications services directive of the Commission 
(COM/388/EC).65 It is said that the German distinction between telephone service and 
other telecom munications services will be drawn according to this directive.
Thus telephone service is defined as the direct transmission of speech in real time, which 
has to be switched between public switched network termination points. Hence the 
transmission of speech without switching is not covered by the monopoly (this is the case 
for permanent connections among certain customers). If a voice message is stored or if it is 
transmitted with considerable delay it does not belong to the telephone service monopoly. 
Finally ¡f speech is transmitted exclusively among network termination points which belong 
to the same customer then it does not belong to the service monopoly of the Federation. 
Services which consist of a combination of voice transmission and other characteristics are 
only considered to belong to the service monopoly if from the viewpoint of the customer
M All prices for January 1991. See: Economist, October 5,1991.
*8 See chapter 723.1.
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they might substitute the voice telephony service. This ability of substitution has to be 
investigated by the BMPT. In that context the specific characteristics of the individual 
service, its purpose and the price have to be considered. A service which involves much 
more transmission capacity than ordinary telephone services do is not considered to be 
telephone service. This applies for instance for videoconferencing in a broadband network. 
On the other hand the joint transmission of a telephone service and pictures is regarded as 
being covered by the telephone service monopoly.
DBP Telekom exercises the rights which stem from the telephone service monopoly of the 
Federation. At the same time it has to fulfill certain obligations which mainly have ta 
ensure that infrastructural aims are met. DBP Telekom is obliged to provide access for all 
users to the telephone service.66
8A2 2 . Mandatory Services
Present Regulation
By Artide 1(4) FAG generally erverybody has the right to provide telecommunications 
services for third parties if these services do not belong to the service monopoly of the 
Federation as described above.
However, the "competitive" services are principally divided in mandatory services and non­
mandatory services (Artide 22 PostVerfG). Mandatory services are services for which DBP 
Telekom has to fulfill certain obligations (Le. the provision throughout the country).67 
The Federal Government has the right to determine which mandatory services must be 
rendered by DBP Telekom in the public interest. For these services special regulatory rules 
may be set up as well for firms competing with DBP Telekom.68
<6 Furthermore certain quality standards are prescribed in the law. For instance access has to be provided within
15 working days. The provision of the telephone service has to fulfill certain quality standards. Services have 
to be offered unbundled so that consumers are free to choose among them. Finally DBP Telekom is obliged 
to provide a permanent fault service. Until the 31.12.1991 it has to develop a concept which outlines the 
conditons on which access to the telephone service will be offered to private suppliers of non-monopoly 
services. DBP Telekom is obliged to keep an updated data file of the telephone service subscribers and their 
telephone numbers.
*7 This could for instance apply for public coin boxes and telephone enquiry services which together amount to 
losses of DM 1 billion annually. However, mandatory services have not been defined yet. See: Funkschau, 
12/1991» p.28.
** Artide 1(4) FAG rules that private suppliers are entitled to offer mandatory services beside DBP Telekom. 
However, the BMPT is authorized to put certain obligations on these enterprises (Artide la(2) FAG). This 
can be done only if due to the special obligations put on DBP Telekom by Article 25(2) of DBP Constitution 
Act the competitive position of DBP Telekom is considerably impaired and secondly if compensation from 
monopoly services is not possible (Artide la(2) FAG and Artide 37(4) DBP Constitution Act). Only if both 
conditions are fulfilled the BMPT may impose obligations on the competitors of DBP Telekom which are 
suitable to remove the competitive disadvantages of DBP Telekom. The obligations may relate to the quality 
of services, to their coverage, and to their price. Firms having a market share below 3 % are exempted from 
these obligations (Artide la(2) FAG).
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Finally in the "Eckpunkte’ the BMPT has stressed the principles of non-discrimination 
which apply if private suppliers have to use the monopoly services provided by DBP 
Telekom as an input for their own services. The telephone service as a bearer service has to 
be available for competitors of DBP Telekom on the same terms as the latter uses them 
themselves. DBP Telekom is not authorized to impose any restrictions regarding access or 
any special tariffs if these monopoly services are used by private competitors.
8A I3. Non-mandatory services 
Present Regulation
Value added network services, telex, and packet & circuit switched data services can be 
provided by everybody for third parties over permanent or switched connections of DBP 
Telekom (Article 1(4) FAG). A notification of the BMPT is obligatory according to Article 
la(l). DBP Telekom is obliged to offer access to its network on a non-discriminatory basis. 
It has to offer network capacity to external VANS - suppliers on the same basis as it is 
using the network for its own value added network services. If in the future an individual 
service is declared to be mandatory certain obligations may be imposed on private suppliers 
(see above).
Analysis
Despite some pressure all data and telex services were liberalized. In case of the former it 
was reckoned that due to technological convergence no borderline could be drawn between 
telecommunications and data services.
Article 37(2) PostVerwG explicitly states that compensation between basic services shall be 
permissable. The same applies for "compensations” using revenues from monopoly services 
for the benefit of mandatory ones (Article 37(4) PostVerwG). This, however, will make the 
control of cross-subsidization difficult.
Mandatory services are a special feature of German regulation. As the result of a political 
compromise, the regulation of mandatory services most clearly reveals the unstable mixture 
of public and private service provision.69
According to a study made for the Commission of the EC70 Germany ranks second to the 
UK in Europe as far as the number of VANs-suppliers is concerned. The VANs offered by 
DBP Telekom71 have not proven to be very successful to date. The videotext system failed 
to reach the market penetration goals set by DBP Telekom. Moreover, the service is losing
*  See also: Schmidt, Susanne K. (1991), p.218.
Sdcon Networks (1969).
71 Mainly its videotact system (BTX), an electronic mail system (Telebox) and a telemetry service (Temex).
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(1) in the text this is called "notification” of the BMPT; only technical requirements must be met (like network security).
(2) only certain technical standards have to be fulfilled. There is no competitive selection process for granting a licence.
(3) licences might be limited in number, or conditions are imposed in order to protea the monopoly rights of the Federation.
(4) the licences for "Buendelfunk" are limited by the number of frequencies available. For the nationwide mobile network 
presently two licences are granted
(5) for low bit rates. (6) for high bit rates.
(7) for dosed user groups. (8) for private installations and low bit rates only an approval is necesasaiy.
(9) only non-voice traffic. (10) in case that voice traffic is included.
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(1) in the text this is called "notification" of the BMPT; only technical requirements must be met (like network security).
(2) these obligations have to be fixed by the BMPT in the future.
(3) the licences for "Buendelfunk" are limited by the number of frequencies available.
Presently there are two licences for a nationwide mobile telephone network.
(4) it has not been decided yet which ones are the mandatory services.
(5) for non-voice service only.
(6) for low bit rates.
(7) for high bit rates.
DM 100 million a year.72 Large entry comes from firms like IBM and Daimler-Benz which 
open their internal networks in order to provide services to third parties. Siemens created a 
subsidiary to enter the VANs market. There are also several small firms operating. 
However, especially the latter face serious problems competing with DBP Telekom because 
of asymmetric information. The network operator has good information about its 
competitor’s capabilities and costs.73
8 i. The Tariff Structure
Graph 8.1 depicts the price development of basic services in West Germany for the last two 
decades. A the beginning of the 1980s DBP brought international EC tariffs somewhat 
closer towards cost. As its "contribution to European integration” it was the only European 
TO to set equal prices for national and international (EC) long distance tariffs in 1982. 
This was done to take account of the fact that the costs of provision are almost the same in 
both markets. As can be seen, this adjustment led to a considerable decrease in real prices 
to EC countries. The next important tariff step was due in 1988.
One aim of the Post reform was to achieve a further cost orientation. The mTanf9Cr scheme 
in three steps reduced long distance call prices. While before long distance and local prices 
developed in almost parallel fashion, the real long distance price thereafter decreased 
sharply. This can be seen dearly in graph 8.1.). However, prices for international long 
distance calls were not changed simultaneously. Thus, while adjusting national prices, the 
Ministry fell back on its cost orientation principle in the international market.
Revenues steming from the "Tarif 90" were supposed to suffice for additional investment in 
the GDR infrastructure. However, it is not certain whether the extra burden related to the 
contributions to the federal budget will eventually lead to price increases. As can be seen 
from Graph 12.1 in chapter 12, in an international context German tariffs are 
comparatively high.
*
72 While it forecasted over 2 million users by 1990, in fact only 260,000 users are currently connected Compare:
Witte, E. and M. Dowling (1991), p. 442.
73 See in detail: Witte, E. and M. Dowling (1991), pp. 446-448.
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Graph 8.1.: real prices for national and international telephone services in West Germany 1977 
-1991 (1977 « 100).74
Graph 8.2. shows that in comparison to other communications services, the telephone 
service has been a bargain. Over time local and long distance prices have decreased relative 
to possible substitutes.
74 Here and in the following graphs are based on my own estimations calculated from data provided in the 
appendix.
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Graph 8.2.: Real prices o f communication services in West Germany 1977 - 1991 (1977 -  
100).
8.6. Conclusions
The main intention of the reform of the German PTT has been the separation of regulatory 
and operational functions, the liberalisation of non-voice services, and the split of DBP in 
three enterprises. The latter shall be run as private enterprises. From the previous 
discussion of the Commission’s strategy it becomes dear that the German post reform has 
mainly applied the policy objectives of the former. Germany probably has followed most 
closely the Green Paper proposals. The future development of German 
telecommunications therefore may be regarded as a good test of the overall approach of 
the EC.
The aim of the separation of the BMPT and DBP Tdekom has been to prevent the firm 
which exercises exclusive rights of the state from abusing its special position when 
operating in the non-reserved markets. The Ministry remains, with the role of the 
industry’s regulator. When DBP Telekom is put under competitive pressure there will be an 
incentive to lower the quality of the monopoly services or to raise their prices in order to 
cross-subsidize. The regulator must have the power to regulate quality standards, to 
investigate whether cross subsidization occurs and whether access charges for competing 
private firms correspond to underlying costs.
However, the present reform falls short of these aims. First, the Infrastrukturrat ensures 
that political control over DBP Telekom prevails. Furthermore the government continues 
to abuse DBP Telekom for general political objectives. The latter has been seen from
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current tariff discussions. The recent "reunification tax" has clearly shown that the reform 
has failed to live up to expectations. DBP Telekom has not gained more independence 
from the political system than it had before the reform. Two years later, in 1991, DBP 
Telekom had to remit DM 92 billion to the government. This included DM 4.7 billion as 
the obligatory surcharge of 10% of turnover, which has to be transferred annually to the 
federal budget. DM 2 billion were additionally imposed as a special reunification tax. 
Finally DM 25 billion had to be paid to cover losses of DBP Postbank and DBP Postdienst. 
Clearly this extra burden imposed on DBP Telekom contradicts the declared aim of 
running the state enterprise according to commercial principles. Moreover, a more radical 
realignment of tariffs towards costs was thereby prevented.
Moreover, the regulator still cannot be regarded as a neutral referee. Being the Ministry 
for telecommunications it represents the State as the only shareholder of the enterprise. 
The government has a strong interest in preserving DBP Telekom’s profits, to cross- 
subsidize postal services and the federal budget. Therefore it is likely to be reluctant to 
have "too much* competition. This point was illustrated with the licensing procedure for the 
two mobile GSM networks. It has been argued that for the society as a whole it would have 
been better to have granted both licences to private operators. This, however, would have 
exposed DBP Telekom cable network to more competitive pressure. By reserving one 
licence for DBP Telekom, the Ministry also protected its own interests. It appears that the 
reform was meant to create an efficient enterprise run as if under competitive pressure 
which nevertheless can be exploited for external goals. This is likely to lead to a conflict of 
interests once competition really takes off.
Given the dynamic momentum the liberalisation process gained in the US after entiy on 
the fringe had oocured, further institutional change can be expected also in Germany. It 
was already triggered off by the process of reunification. The 1989 reform created only an 
unstable regulatory framework for an industry in transition.
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9. Toiofnmmnnlfatinnii in Italy: Network Fragmentation and Regional Imbalances
9.1. Historical Development of the Present Market Structure
As in other EC member countries, initially in Italy it was intended to create a state 
monopoly in telecomunications, run by the Ministry for Posts and Telecommunications. 
However, during the 1920s, foreign capital was indispensable to build up an Italian 
telephone network. In order to attract foreign investment, enterprises were formed outside 
the Post Ministry. Ericsson, for instance, participated 1924 in the establishment of the 
concessionaire responsible for the telephone network in the south of Italy.1 In the 1930s the 
state increased its control over the sector. The limited number of independent companies 
which had received a licence to provide telephone services were bundled within the state 
owned Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI). The IRI is a stateholding independent 
from the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. Thereafter the Ministry only runs 
those services for which no concessionaries could be found.2 Both the structure of the 
telecommunications network and the regulatoiy framework were set up in the 1930s, 
without encountering important changes until today.
As a result, the structure of the network and the regulatory system in Italy are somewhat 
blurred. As can be seen from graph 9.1. there are presently two different institutions 
responsible for Italian telecommunications. One is the Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications keeping control over the 'Azienda di Stato per i servizi telefonie? 
(ASST) which runs most of the national long-distance and the network with EC member 
countries. The reason why ASST remained under control of the Ministry is mainly 
historical When the telephone industry was privatized in 1925, the long-distance sector (in 
contrast to the local network) did not find any private investors3. The Post Ministry is also 
in charge of national telex and telegraph services, which are provided by the Direzione 
Centrale Servizi Telegrafici (DCST). Finally the Direzione Centrale Servizi Radioelettrici 
(DCSR) operate radio telephone services (primarily maritime ones).
The second institution is the stateholding "Società Finanziaria Telefonica" (STET). In 1933 
STET was created by the IRI, which currently depends on the Ministry of Public 
Participation. Since 1964 STET controls the "Società Italiana per l\Esercizio Telefonico" 
(SIP), which runs the local networks. Before the turn of the century, SIP was incorporated 
as a privately owned company. Later it was nationalized.4 Now SIP is a so called *Società a 
Partecipazioni Statali" (PPSS), thus it is traded on the stock market but the government 
owns the majority of shares (60%). PPSS firms are endowed by the government with an
1CNEL (1966), p. 148.
2 Tarifica Anual (1991), p.171.
3 Silvano, F. (1988), p.73.
4 Mondini, Giorgio (1991), p.67.
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interest-free capital fund (Fondo di Dotazione). The interest earnings accumulated on that 
capital balance the costs imposed on the PPSS firms by political obligations (like keeping a 
certain employment level, or universal service requirements).5 Besides running the local 
network and providing the subscriber’s interface, in recent years SIP has also been granted 
a concession to provide data transmission facilities, mobile radio and telematic services.6 
The licence for the provision of these services has been granted to SEP by the Ministry for 
Posts and Telecommunications in 1984. It expires in 2004.
STET also owns Italcable which is responsible for the telephone traffic, the telex and the 
telegraph service to non European countries.7 Italcable was created in 1921 for the purpose 
of planning, laying and operating submarine telegraph cables. By this time 77% of the 
shares were hold by the private sector, mainly Italians living overseas and interested in an 
transoceanic communications network.8 It was absorbed in the IRI-STET holding in 1965. 
In August 1989 Italcable took on the responsibility for packed&circuit switched data 
services to European countries.9 Italcable has been investing in different foreign markets, 
having a stake in the Argentinian TO Entel, and subsidiaries in the USA.
Finally, STET owns 100 per cent of the shares of Italtel. The latter is the state 
manufacturer, which, however, competes with private firms, especially Telettm (owned by 
Fiat). Italtel’s share in the Italian telecom market is above 50 per cent10.
The concessionary firms have to pay a fee to the state which is usually a percentage of the 
revenue earned during the year. Moreover, the Ministry has the right to set tariffs at a rate 
it deemes suitable.
5 Gamardella, Alfonso (1990), p2.
4 Prod», R. (1989), p.10.
7 A more 4rt«iM  description of the structure of the Italian telecom sector can be found in: STET, (1988), p.89/50.
«Lenti, Felice (1990), p .ll.
9 Vergnano, Franco (1991), p.72.
10 Die Welt, 10.03.1988.
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Government
Figure 9.1: the structure of the Italian telecommunications industry
Among the three different network operators, SIP is by far the most important one, 
accounting for 79% of all revenues steming from telecommunications services. It is 
followed by ASST (13%), Italcable (3.7%), the PTT Ministry (3.8%) and Telespazio 
(0
Interestingly, the Italian network structure resembles the one in the USA in that the long­
distance carrier is separated from the local network. Moreover, like AT&T, STET 
combines both service provision and manufacturing. However, since all public networks are 
controlled by the Italian state, this separation has not led to network competition. On the 
other hand economies of scope could not be reaped either. Instead, in the past frequently 
problems arose for interurban calls. A call from Rome to Milano, for instance, first passq? 
through the local network of SIP, then through the network of ASST and finally it is again 
channeled in the local network of Milano (SIP). This repeatedly created problems of 
interconnection and capacity shortage since investment decisions were not adequately 
coordinated between ASST and SIP.
u  Gebhard, H J. (1987), p. 4.
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92. The Modernization of Italian Telecommunications
At the mid 1980s the reform of Italian telecommunications became a top issue of the 
political agenda in Italy. Three imminent problems were identified. First, it was recognized 
that the historically developed fragmentation of the network had been inefficient. As a 
result, the restructuring of the industry was envisaged, in order to make service provision 
more efficient. Secondly, there had been a relative decline of the Italian 
telecommunications network compared to other EC member countries. This decline, 
however, was only partly explained by the fragmented network. The operators did not have 
sufficient funds for investment. Finally, as for the economy as a whole, there existed a gap 
between the north and the south. In the south of Italy universal service had still not been 
achieved, which became a further handicap for development of this region.
However, restructuring of the network became the main aim on the political agenda for 
several years. STET, SEP, Italcable, Italtel, ASST and Telespazio (satellite rails devision) 
are to be joined into one company which combines operative services and equipment 
business.12 Two alternative models were proposed. "SuperSIP" implied that SIP would be 
granted the sole concession for telephone services. Italcable and ASST would be 
incorporated within SEP. Alternatively, *SuperStef was put forward to grant the holding 
company STET itself the concessions to offer services. ASST and Italcable then would 
become divisions responsible for their respective services.
Beside merging the different enterprises under one roof, the restructuring was supposed to 
include also the separation of business and regulatory power. Currently regulatory 
functions are divided between the Istituto Superiore delle Paste e delie Telecomunicazioni 
(ISPT) which handles terminal approvals, and the Consiglio Amministrativo responsible for 
granting the licences to the concessionary companies.
However, until now the operating companies also keep some regulatory power. The general 
director of ASST, for instance, is also the regulator of the industry, which precludes a 
critical revision of state policy towards the industry13. Moreover, ASST and SIP have to 
consent if private service providers use leased lines to provide competitive services. This 
offers both firms the opportunity to discriminate against potential competitors.
After discussing the proposed reforms for several years, eventually the "Senate" approved 
the transfer of ASST to IRI on July 18, 1991, and the parliament in January, 1992.14 The 
main obstacle, however, is a political objection to this transfer. On the one hand, the 
employees of ASST would lose their status as civil servants,15 thus the transfer is objected 
by the trade unions. On the other hand, the Italian system of patronage leads to inertia of
12 Compare: La Repubblica, 04.04.1988 and: Mucd, A. (1989).
13 Compare: Cubrera, G. (1989). p.8 and STET (1988), p37.
14II Sole • 24 Ore, July 19,1991 and January 17,1992.
B Rapporto Assuiform (1969), p_52.
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political institutions since changes always affect political parties. Traditionally the Partito 
Democmta Cristiano keeps control over ASST.16 The transfer of the long-distance carrier 
from the PTT to the STET is therefore also opposed by the biggest political party, afraid of 
losing control over the enterprise.
The second major aim of present Italian telecommunications policy is to catch up with the 
more advanced countries in the Community. When an analysis is carried out on an 
aggregated level, Italy is placed in a middle position within the EC.
For the country as a whole, the provision of telecommunications services has been in 
relative decline compared with other EC countries. At the late 1960s the density of 
telephone sets was higher in Italy than in France and roughly the same as in West 
Germany. 1987 Italy had a density of 32 per 100 inhabitants, while in West Germany and 
France the rate was at 43.17 Overall the pentration of VANS is small in Italy. In 1987 voice 
services had a share of 88.4%, data services 6% and VANS only of 0.5% of the Italian 
telecommunications service market.18 The number of videotex subscriber lines, for 
instance, in Italy amounts to only 6% of those in West Germany and 0.18% in France 
(1987). Less striking but similar is the lag behind for telex subscriber lines and mobile 
telephones.19 Finally, the quality of the Italian services is low. The waiting time for service 
access or for the repair of faults exceeds many times the ones of the more advanced 
countries.20 In 1990 only 53% of all calls made reached their destination (EC average: 
70%). Italy had the lowest speed of transmission of the 7 biggest EC member countries.21 
The relative decline of the Italian telecommunications sector is mainly due to a 
comparatevely slow increase of investment. Graphs 9.1. and 92 illustrate this development. 
Graph 9.1 shows that the gap in annual gross investment in telecommunications services 
compared to West Germany has widened in the decade to 1986. Even if account is taken of 
differences in national income, the Italian telecommunications sector has been relatively 
neglected. Investment as a share of national gdp in Italy was twice that of West Germany in 
1977. In 1986, however, the German rate was significantly above the Italian one. This is 
seen from figure 92.
14 A detailed analysis of party interest* in the proposed reforms can be found in: Carini, Alessandra (1990),
17 Siemens (1968), p.15.
18 Rapporto Assinform (1989), p i3.
19 Calculations based on data provided by: Siemens (1988), p. 32-35.
30 In 1962 the average waiting time for connection to the public switched network was 8-5 months. While being 
reduced, in 1968 still in average one had to wait half a year for getting access to the network. However, SIP 
has started to pay more attention to the quality of service. By decree a new code of practice was introduced in 
1990 which reduces waiting time to 35 days at maximum. SIP also promises to pay compensation if fault
repairs are not undertaken within two working days of receiving an request. See: Tarifica Annual (1991), p.179 
and SIP (1990).
21 SIP (1990), p.8 and: La Repubblica, AJTari&Finanze, Maizo 16,1990, p.17.
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Graph 9.1.: annual gross investment in telecom services in Italy and Germany 1977-1987 in 
SUS22
H-----------1---------- 1---------- 1---------- 1----------1---------- 1---------- 1"
Graph 92.,: investment in telecoms as a share o f pip in Italy and West Germany
Given the high deficit of the government’s general budget, when carrying out investment 
decisions SIP mainly depends on its own resources. These sources, however, have been
22 Sources for Figures 92. to 9.4.: International Telecommunications Union (UTT) (1988),
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relatively small. Graph 93 shows that again in comparison to the DBP Telekom, Italian 
operators realized relatively small net income streams.23 This may partly be explained by 
the tariff policy for telecommunications services in Italy (in more detail see chapter 9.6. As 
in all countries, telephone tariffs are a political issue in Italy. The Ministry for Post and 
Telecommunications is responsible for tariff setting. However, as has been seen in chapter
9.1. the PTT is separated from the SIP. Thus while the Ministry would be Mamed for tariff 
increases, it is not made directly responsible for a deterioration of the quality standard of 
services provided by SIP. During the period of high inflation rates in the 1970s, the 
Ministry failed to raise tariffs correspondingly, thereby depriving SIP of the necessary 
revenues to modernize its network. As a result STET repeatedly has asked to align 
telephone prices to inflation.24 Moreover, the fragmentation of network operators into 
different undertakings deprived SIP of the second source of financing, the traditional cross­
subsidies. SIP receives all the revenues from local calls access and some long-distance calls. 
However, the bulk of long-distance and international service revenues are reaped by ASST 
and Italcable. These revenues are split among the three companies on a fixed proportion 
according to the type of call. As can be seen from Figure 93. SIP made small profits when 
compared to DBP Telekom. Based on different calculations, Pellegrini got even more 
drastic results.25 ASST and Italcable instead have been making reasonable and rising 
profits. Especially during the last years profits made by Italcable were exceptional.26 A 
cross-subsidisation of SIP’s losses by profits made by ASST is prohibited. Thus during the 
period where other European TOs accelerated the development of their networks, the 
financial means for the Italian operator became more limited. Thereby the level of self 
financing of SIP steadily declined, until 1979 nearly 80% of investments had to be financed 
by external borrowing. At this time 30% of its costs were on interest rate payments. Thus, 
the traditional network structure itself became a severe impediment to the development of 
the Italian telecommunications network. While in the period 1975-1979 the average 
percentage increase in exchange lines was 18% in France, in Italy it ran at about 6% 
annually.27
23 Total income minus total expenditure (including taxes) for telecommunication services. See also: Stehmann, O.
(1990), p. 21-23.
24 La Repubblica, Febraio 22,1991.
25 He argues that until 1975 SEP made modest proficts. Since then it has been making substantial losses. See:
Pellegrini, Umberto, (1969), p. 206.
26 in detail: Lend, Felice (1990), p.13.
27 Pellegrini, Umberto (1969) p.204-205.
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Graph 93.: net income ofDBP Telekom and SIP in US$ 1977-1986.
SEP has found itself in a vicious circle. Low investment rates led to a deterioration of the 
quality of services. Low quality and the limited number of services provided by SIP 
deterred customers from using SIP’s network. Thereby the revenue available for further 
investments shrank. Customers make less use of telecommunications services in Italy than 
in other countries. Per customer the monthly revenue accrued by SIP amounts to Lire
293,000 as compared to Lire 500,000 in the UK and 450,000 in Germany28.
Finally, the situation of Italian telecommunications has been aggravated by strong regional 
disparities of economic development.29 General economic divergence between the north 
and the south have been mirrored in the telecom network. Northern Italy has already 
achieved a penetration of telecommunications services comparable to countries like the 
Netherlands, France and West Germany. This holds for the high rate of households 
connected to the network and to a smaller extent also for the usage of VANS. In contrast, 
in the south even basic telephone services are not universally provided. The density of 
terminals in the Mezzogiomo is comparable to that measured in Spain. As an example,
1985 in Lombardia the density rate was at 44%, while in the south of Italy only 22% main 
stations were installed per 100 inhabitants.3® Moreover, VANS remain rare in the less 
developed regions of Italy. Different levels of development, however, also lead to different
28 Benzoni, Paolo (1990), p.4. See also: Gnetti, Attilo M. (1990), p3.
8  See for instance: Martin, José M f, and Oliver Stehmann (1991), especially pp235-236.
30 In more detail: SIP (1988), and Media Duemila (1988), p.101.
priorities for telecom policy. The northern regions are mainly concerned with widening the 
scope of the provision of VANS, which favours liberalization. In the south universal service 
arguments are more relevant, which supposedly requires a financially strong network 
operator. The costs of investments made in the south are not covered by revenues. For 
instance, in 1983 SIP made a loss in all but one of its eight regions in the Mezzogiorno. The 
loss in those regions amounted to 46% of its total profit. As a result, in Italy one finds a 
very heavy regional cross subsidy also in the telecommunications network.31
The different objectives are reflected in the current investment programme of SIP. The 
'Piano Europa" initiative entails an acceleration of investments into the sector. It is aimed 
at adding 1 million new subscribers each year from 1988-1992. SIP assigns about 33% to 
35% of its investments to Southern Italy which produces only 27% of the company’s total 
income.32 43% of the four million new subscribers aimed for by 1993 shall be in the south.33 
Thereby the density rate of 27% shall rise to 42% until 199234. When delivering an 
intermediate report, for 1990 SIP could announce considerable progress by having reached 
a density rate of 37%.35 While the main bulk of investments are concerned with the 
provision of new network interconnection points, 20% of the financial means of the 
programme are intended to raise the quality of services and about 10% are directed 
towards the development of VANS36. In its "Rapporto Semestrale Sulla Qualità del 
Servizio"37, SIP offers a detailed analysis of the progress made in raising quality standards. 
Waiting time for repairing defaults, for information services and connections have been 
considerably reduced. The digitalization of the network switches shall be accelerated from 
20% in 1989 to 45% by 1992. In 1991 an ISDN pilot service is planned to start, which 
becomes available in the major eight cities of Italy.38
Moreover, the "piano Europa" shall stimulate the growth of mobile radio 
telecommunications and satisfy the rising demand for data services.39
31 Pye, R. and J. Lauder (1967), p. 100.
32 Benzoni, Paolo (1990), p 5.
“ Tarifica Anual (1991), p. 179.
^ S T E T ÍW M ), p ¿ 5 .
35 Tarifica Anual (1991), p.177.
*  Brabant, de, F. (1989), p.46 and STET (1968), p Jó, 64.
37 SEP (1990).
38 To attain these goals in 1969 SIP unveiled an even more ambitious investment plan which superseded by 50%
the amount* previously foreseen in its 'piano Europa*. Tarifica Anual (1991), p.175.
39 The transmission of data shall rise by 19%, mobile telephones by 43% and facsimile by 44% annually. Castagni,
Nkoletta (1988), p.83.
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This investment programme is financed mainly by additional revenues expected from tarif 
increases. From this SIP expects additional revenue of about $ 855 million annually. Ii 
reckons that with higher tariffs and increasing demand for telecom services about 75% ol 
the investment can be self-financed while the other 25% will have to be borrowed or raised 
through issuing new shares.40 In 1991 residential and business fixed monthly charges were 
increased, as well as local tariffs. While international calls saw a 20% cut, national long­
distance was left untouched.41 Moreover, STET has asked the government for more 
freedom to set its own tariffs in order to make up for the high investments. It proposes a 
price-cap approach similarly to the one applied in the UK.
9J.The Regulator Regime
As was pointed out in chapter 9.1., regulatory legislation in Italy has not been 
fundamentally altered since the 1930s. Thus, the legislative cornerstone of Italian 
telecommunications is the Postal Code of 1936. Despite all amendments, this Code is still 
based on the principle of monopoly provision. The current legislative framework issued in 
1973 was built upon a the earlier Postal Code. It regulates telecoms on the basis of a 
distinction between telephone, telegraph and radio services. VANs, the transmission of 
data and private circuits are totally ignored.
Some changes, however, have been introduced recently. The Decreto Ministeriale 06-04-9042 
outlines future development of Italian telecoms. The decree defines some technical 
requirements of access to the public switched network and fosters the implementation of 
ISDN. Liberalization has been restricted to some VANS, which, moreover, have been 
defined narrowly. However, some competition has already been introduced de facto.
9J.1. Infrastructure
93.1.1. Fixed Terrestrial Public Networks
The "Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 29-03-1973", No 156 is the relevant Italian 
legislation at this writing. This decree states that the provision of telecommunications 
services is the exclusive right of the state (Article 1). According to Article 2 the public 
authority competent in this field is the Ministry for Post and Telecommunications. 
According to Article 3 and 4 the administration can provide telecommunications services 
either by itself or by means of licences (conccssioni). If the concessionaire is a state 
controlled company
40F fc T e ch ,A p t t tU . im .
41II Sole - 24 Ore, January 17,1991 and Communications Week International, February 4,1991.
42 Ministero delle Poste e delle Telecomunicazioni (1990).
239
then according to Article 198 the licence can be granted without a call for tenders.
The public switched terrestrial network is run jointly by the three concessionary companies 
ASST, SIP and ItalcaUe. ASST is responsible for ail international traffic to European and 
Mediterranean countries. It, moreover, provides most of the national long-distance traffic. 
SIP provides local service and some trunk traffic not provided by ASST. Italcable finally 
provides the rest of the international traffic. All three companies have received licences 
within the limits of the Decreto del Presidents della Repubblica, 13-04-1984, No 523.
The licences oblige all carriers to fulfil the aims defined by the government for the Italian 
telecommunications sector. For instance, according to Article 7 of the licence granted to 
SIP, the company has to exploit the services conceded in respect of the principles stated in 
the Piano Regokttare Nazionale delle Telecomunicazioni of 1990. Article 20 states that SIP 
has to submit a long and a medium term plan to the Ministry which entails the programme 
to ensure the growth and the integrity of the public network. The PTT and the Treasury 
annually examine the budget of the concessionaire (Article 48). The licence also contains 
obligations concerning the build up of local networks and quality standards.43 
The licences of the three STET enterprises have a duration of 20 years, while individual 
licence terms are subject to periodic re-examinations. The next reexamination will be due 
in 1992.
93.1.2. Mobile Public Networks
The current legislation does not establish a regulatory difference between fixed and mobile 
voice services. Thus SIP also hold an exclusive right to establish mobile telecom networks. 
SIP operates an Integrated Mobile Telephone and Paging Service (RTMI). A cellular 
RTMS system was launched in 1985 and presently it has about 100,000 subscribers. For 
1992 more than 250,000 subscribers are envisaged.44 SIP’s GSM network is due to operate 
by the end of 1991. However, recently the Minister of the PTT dedared that SIP monopoly 
in mobile telephony will be ended soon.45 The Italian government has set up a commission 
to examine the case for a second mobile operator. So far there are two applicants for the 
second GSM licence (Racal Telecom/FIAT and Olivetti/Bell Atlantic).46 SIP, however, 
claims that its monopoly on telephone services includes mobile telephony until the year 
2004.
43 According to Article 27 SIP commits itself to build up a local telephone network in any site where there are at
least 25 physical or legal persons waiting for a connection.
44 Protetti, Cesare (1989).
45 Vergnano, Franco (1991),
*  La Repubblica, May 18,1990.
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93.13. Satellite Public Networks
Telespazio has an exclusive licence to operate the earth and the spacial segment.
Telespazio is responsible for Italian satellite communications facilities. It does not offer 
services directly but provides channel capacity to the international carriers, Italcable, the 
state television and radio operator (RAI) and ASST. Telespazio represents the Italian 
government within Intelsat and Eutelsat.
Data and voice services via one way and two way satellite earth stations are transmitted 
only by SIP. Public institutions may obtain non-exclusive licences for internal purposes.
93.1A Private Networks
A network installed only for internal use on a private property does not need an 
authorization, provided that there is no connection to the public network.
The Ministry has overall authority for granting licences to install private networks. These 
licences are granted by the DCST. Presently there are no legal provisions for the 
connection of private circuits to the public networks. Private networks operating 
domestically have to request permission from SIP.
Licences for private networks of closed user groups are granted if the public network does 
not offer complete coverage. The licencee is prohibited from offering services to third 
parties. Licences were granted to public utilities like ENEL (power), ACEA (water) or 
large private corporations like FIAT. Other state owned administrations (railways, public 
transportation operators) can operate private networks under the authorization of the PTT 
Ministry.
9J.1J. The Use of Leased Lines
The ASST is responsible for the leasing of point-to-point circuits. Resale to third parties is 
prohibited. Neither the licences granted to network operators nor the global legislative 
framework deals with non-discriminatory requirements on equal network access of private 
service providers. Future legislation is expected which permits interconnection of leased 
lines to public networks provided that simple resale of capacity is not practised.
93.1.6. Analysis
Presently, in Italy there is a comprehensive network monopoly hold by state owned 
enterprises. Despite the measures of liberalization in other EC countries regarding 
satellites and mobile systems, in Italy actual no steps towards competition on the fringe 
have been undertaken. So far there is only a declaration of the Ministry that one private 
mobile operator shall be licensed. Thus, Italy is one of the most protected markets in 
Europe. The process of restructuring will even increase the power of the state owned
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network operator. The Italian network thereby will mainly move in the direction of the 
traditional TO system which existed in other EC member countries before measures oi 
liberalization were undertaken. Thus even when SuperSTET is eventually realized, the 
Italian telecom structure will be backward compared with more advanced member 
countries.
9.3.2. Services
The Decreto Ministeriale 06-04-1990 distinguishes the following services
a) bearer services
b) teleservices
c) supplementary services
d) application and/or VANS
According to Article 3 of the decree, services under a) to c) are part of the state monopoly 
and hence they are supposed to be offered either directly by the state administration or 
under exclusive right granted to the three public network operators. Nevertheless, some of 
the complementary services are actually provided under a competitive regime.
93.2.1. Reserved Services
The 'Piano Regolatore delle TelecomunicaztonT' states that voice services, both fixed and 
mobile, belong to the teleservices (Article 2), which according to Article 3 are reserved. 
Packet&switdied data services are classified as bearer services and provided exclusively by 
SIP. Italy, France and Spain in 1988 jointly opposed a Commission’s directive to allow the 
leasing of lines by private data transmission providers after 1993.47
93.2.2. Competitive Services
VANS are generally open to competition. There is no licensing or declaration procedure in 
Italy. Thus, administrative restrictions may be considered to be small.
Teletex and telefax are classified as teleservices, however regulation treats them as VANS 
(Article 2 of the degree of 06-04-1990). No licence is needed to provide these services. 
Itakable offers a number of innovative telematic services and is mainly responsible for 
providing value-added services. In 1991, for instance, Cable & Wireless entered the Italian 
fax market by setting up"Securefax" in direct competition with SIP.
47 Economist, October, 28,1989, p. 87.
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(1) Télétex and telefax are treated as VANS, thus their provision is free.
(2) Presently for VANS not even a declaration is required. However, when being provided on leased lines the approval of the 
network operator is necessary.
93.23. Analysis
The process of service liberalization has remained rudimentary. Although VANS should be 
liberalized, their private provision is handicapped by the absence of dear regulation. They 
have to be offered over SEP public network. A key problem is that the tariffs charged by SEP 
for data transmission are 20% to 30% above the European average. A further obstade is 
the regulation for the use of leased lines. Regulatory control has not been withdrawn from 
the network providers, which still dedde about access. This offers them the power to 
prohibit or restrict access of service competitors, which partly explains the low diffusion of 
value-added services in Italy.
Moreover, compared to Britain or Germany and even Spain, Italy has a very restrictive 
policy towards entry by private service providers. While the Commission argues that beside 
voice all services shall be liberalized, according to the present regulation in Italy most 
services remain under monopoly. The Decreto Ministeriale defines VANS very narrowly 
which appears to be in contradiction with the EC directive. However, de facto some 
competition has already been established, since several private (also foreign) enterprises 
have started to offer value-added services.48 The Italian VANS market is expected to 
double by 1994.49
9A Tariff Policy
Graph 9.4. depicts the development of real prices for basic services in Italy since 1977. 
Until 1989 the price for national long-distance calls decreased more than for local ones. 
This may be taken as some cost orientation of prices. However, in 1990 long-distance prices 
were increased while nominal local ones were left untouched. While the price setting in the 
early 1980s appeared to bear some cost orientation, the recent price movement eliminates 
this effect. As will be argued in more detail in chapter 13., in a European context Italian 
national tariffs appear especially out of line with costs. Graph 12.5. shows that the Italian 
long-distance price was the highest but one in Europe by 1990. In contrast, the local call was 
comperatively cheap (graph 123.). After the price increase for national long-distance calls 
in 1990, in 1991 SIP announced an increase in local ones (leaving the former untouched). 
These prices are explained by the additional investments required by the "piano Europa"50. 
The (by European standards) high Italian telephone charges, however, weaken the 
argument that operators in high inflation countries are at a comparative disadvantage.^ * 
Despite an above average inflation rate during the last two decades, real Italian
48 Example* in: D Sole - 24 Ore, June 27,1991.
49 FinTcch, January 10,1991.
30II Sole-24 ore, Gennaio 17,1991 
^  This argument, for instance, can be found in: SIP (1989).
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real telephone prices have remained at the top in Europe. The price for international calls 
according to graph 9.4. followed closely the development of the local price. Given that costs 
for national long-distance and international calls do not differ much, thus over time price 
distortions grew especially in the international market. Graph 12.7. and 12.2. show that 
Italy is among the most expensive places in Europe to phone EC countries or the USA 
respectively. This result is not changed if the 20% rate cut for international calk in 1991 is 
taken into consideration.52 The absence of the traditional cross-subsidisation scheme in 
Italy therefore has not protected the international telephone markets from price 
distortions. Quite to the contrary one finds in Italy the highest price distortions among EC 
countries.
Graph 9.4.: Real prices for kxal, long-distance and EC calls in Italy 1977-1991 (1977 * 100J53
9.5. An Alternative Reform Proposal
The Italian telecommunications sector entails certain features which make it particular in 
the European enviroment The most obvious one is the fragmentation of the network which
52 D Sole-24 Ore, Gennaio 17,1991.
33 Based on data provived in the appendix.
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is split among different companies. Price and cost comparisons (see chapter 2.1.3.) have 
indicated that the Italian operators are comparatively inefficient. Network fragmentation 
prevented the familiar cross-subsidisation. High profits made in the long-distance and 
international markets were not transfered to the main operator. SIP subsequently lacked 
the financial means to spur investment into the quality of the network and customer access. 
The apparent failure of SIP to raise customer access in line with other member countries 
may support the claim made earlier that in the interim period of network development 
some cross-subsidisation is necessary.
Interestingly enough, the smaller flow of cross subsidies and the separation of the long­
distance and local network did not lead to more cost-based pricing. Quite to the contrary, 
the price development in Italy is more out of line with costs than in other EC countries. 
When the law to pass over ASST to the IRI group was designed in 1988, the intention was 
to adapt the Italian telecommunications network to the dominating TO model in Europe. 
However, by doing so, it is unlikely that the main shortcomings of Italian 
telecommunications can be overcome. The SuperSTET reform only tries belatedly to copy a 
telecommunications regime which is already being relinquished by other EC member 
states. It grants a de jure monopoly to the STET and leads to the highest feasible 
concentration of market power. There are no incentives to reduce costs, to react quickly to 
demand shifts and to enter the market of news technologies. While other member countries 
slowly move away from an outdated network structure, the SuperSTET reform introduces it 
in Italy.
It is interesting to note that the Italian network structure resembles the one in the USA in 
that the long-distance carrier ASST is separated from the local network. Moreover, like 
AT&T, STET combines both, service provision and manufacturing. What had to be done by 
a tedious and expensive breakup in the US has existed in Italy from the beginning. The 
long-distance network is run by a separate operator which gained experience on its own. 
However, since all public networks are controlled by the state, in Italy this separation has 
not led to network competition. On the other hand, economies of scope could not be 
reaped either. The existence of economies of scope between different networks, however, 
has been the major rationale for network integration in Europe. Thus, one may argue that 
the Italian telecommunications network combined the disadvantages of the US approach 
(network fragmentation) with the European ones (public monopoly). Network 
fragmentation prevented the familiar cross-subsidisation which fosters universal service. 
High profits made in the long-distance sector were not transferred to the main operator to 
MihsidiV customer access. SIP subsequently lacked the financial means to spur investment 
into the quality of the network and customer access. Network fragmentation and public 
provision ensured that the Italian telecommunications system operates at high cost even 
when compared with European TOs.
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While having been a considerable disadvantage in the past, the fragmented network 
structure offers a unique opportunity for reform. Without considerable transaction cost of 
restructuring, in Italy one could introduce competition between long-distance carriers. This, 
however, would require ASST becoming an independent firm which is not foreseen by the 
present SuperSTET reform. While ASST at the beginning would become the (regulated) 
dominant long-distance operator, other entrants could be licensed. By separating Italcable 
from STET and allowing ASST and Italcable to operate in both the national and the 
international long-distance market, competition would quickly set off. Further operators 
then could be licensed in the future. Beside private networks, railways and cable networks 
can be expected to enter the rapidly growing market The latter have already installed their 
own networks which reduces entry barriers caused by sunk cost (as, for instance, the need 
to acquire the right of way). Additional competition can be expected from liberalised 
mobile networks which can operate throughout the country and across the border. As the 
experience of AT&T has shown, growth in the long-distance market is strong enough to 
cater for additional suppliers. AT&T lost relative market share but in spite of the entry of 
additional operators it increased total output. Given the high price elasticity of demand in 
the long-distance market, price cuts will create a sharp increase in volume demanded. 
However, universal service could also be fostered by this approach. This could be ensured 
by leaving SIP’S local monopoly untouched at the beginning. A privatisation of ASST would 
produce considerable revenues for the state. While SIP was previously deprived of the 
cross-subsidisation revenues, the revenues coming from ASSTs sale could be used to foster 
the spread of the network. Thus, on both ends the modernisation of the Italian 
telecommunications network could be spurred by applying the US model of long-distance 
competition and local monopoly. Due to the already fragmented network, in Italy the 
conflict of goals between universal service and network competition does not exist. This is a 
major advantage in comparison with other EC member states.
While being a big step forward, the approach outlined above is unlikely to turn the whole 
industry upside down. Since SIP presently controls 80% of the network, at the beginning 
only a small segment of the Italian telecommunications market would be liberalised. 
Further measures of liberalisation could be taken thereafter. This, for instance, could lead 
to SEP entering the long-distance market as well. However, that would require that the local 
operator would lose its bottleneck position for the access to the local loop.
While liberalising only a relatively small part of the telecommunications network, efficiency 
gains can be expected to be large, since by doing so the main distortions could be 
eliminated.
Compared to the approach chosen in the UK, the Italian approach would have the 
considerable advantage of separating the competitive parts of the network from the ones 
which supposedly still have some natural monopoly characteristics. In the UK strong 
regulatory supervision has to be applied to ensure that the dominant firm BT does not 
abuse its monopoly position in the local network to cross-subsidise those markets where 
competition from Mercury arises (see in detail chapter 11). Moreover, the local networks
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are bottlenecks; Mercury depends on access to its competitor’s network to complete its 
customer calls. BT repeatedly has tried to impose high access charges on Mercury, thereby 
raising the competitor’s cost and its own revenues at the same time. The most serious 
regulatory problems which arose in the UK would not come up in Italy due to the 
separation of local and long-distance operators. Compared to the UK, therefore, the Italian 
long-distance market could become more competitive.
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10. Spain: Universal Service and the Provision of VANS
10.1. Historical Development
1877 the first telephone line was installed in Spain. Thereafter, for 47 years private 
enterprises and municipalities ran different local networks. In 1924 ITT got the licence to 
set up th e"Compañía Telefónica Nocional de España" (CI NE).1 Thus about 65 years before 
the privatisation of British Telecom, in Spain Telefónica was established as a private 
enterprise. It obtained a concession valid for 20 years to provide basic telephone services 
throughout the country. This status has remained unaltered, for practical purposes, until 
today.
However, in 1945 the shares of ITT were nationalized. When the company was reprivatized 
thereafter the state hold less than 50% of all shares. However, by widely spreading the 
shares, it secured its own dominant position among Telefónica’s shareholders. By then, the 
state also had to decide about a prolongation of Telefónica’s concession, which was 
approved in 1946. The "decreto de 31 de octubre de 1946* conferred monopoly status on 
CTNE, with all rights and the autonomy to develop and administer a telephone service2. 
Over time the range of exclusive rights granted to Telefónica increased steadily. Initially 
Telefónica provided only voice services. By a State Decree of December 21, 1970 
Telefónica obtained the concession to provide coasts and ports radiotelephone, public data 
and other services. By the Decree of October 26,1978 were added teleinformatic, facsimile, 
videotex, and teletex services. Thus, over time Telefónica was not only able to maintain its 
monopoly position but succeeded in extending it towards related markets and newly 
emerging services. Until today, despite its private status, Telefónica has operated within the 
same monopoly framework as did other European TOs.
Private ownership mixed with state intervention did not help develop the Spanish 
telecommunications network during the decades of autarchy. In the period 1945-1960 
Telefónica had installed roughly 1,2 million lines, less than it installed in just one year in 
1989.3 By the end of the Franco dictatorship the Spanish was among the least developed 
telecommunications networks in Europe. Since then Telefónica has attempted to radically 
improve the coverage and quality of the infrastructure. As a private company, Telefónica is 
to some extent able to coordinate its business strategy independently from the government. 
However, the budget is subject to governmental approval. The same applies for tariff 
increases.
For about 60 years the regulatory regime has not been altered significantly in Spain. 
However, during the 1980s the government’s policy towards the telecommunications sector 
has become more active. First it removed most of the regulatory powers from Telefónica.
1 Plaza, Crisanto (1969), p.390-392.
2 see: Fragoso, R.L. (1988), p.88.
3 Compare data provided by Plaza, C. (1989), p390 and Sharma, P. (1991), p JS.
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Until 1985 Telefónica was assigned the responsibility to plan and develop telephone 
services. By the decree 1209 of June 19, 1985, the responsibility passed over to the 
Dirección General de Telecomunicaciones (DGT), which depends directly on the Ministry 
for Transport, Tourism and Communications. This rearrangement gave the DGT the 
power to deal with general telecommunications regulation and legislation, licences and 
authorizations for private provision of telecommunications services. The same decree 
established the Junta Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (JNT) which is responsible for 
sketching the telecommunications policy, introducing new technologies, norms and 
regulations. Telecommunications services are separated from postal services, telegram and 
telex. The latter being provided by the Dirección General de Correos y Telégrafos (DGCT) 
which is a government department.
In a second step the government liberalized the service sector to some extent. 1987 the Ley 
de Ordenación de las Telecomunicaciones (LOT) consolidated the previous decree. 
However, it distinguished between three different^ categories of telecommunications 
services, taking measures to liberalize VANS. The LOT is the present regulatory 
framework for the Spanish telecommunications market.
Recently, the government has increasingly used its influence on Telefónica to employ the 
enterprise for the governments aim to develop the Spanish industry. Despite the private 
status of Telefónica, the government has kept defacto control over the company. The DGT 
appoints the Government Delegate to Telefónica who ensures compliance with the 
provisions of the licence. Moreover, the government presently owns 32 per cent of CTNE’s 
equity4, while the rest of the shares are widely dispersed. 56 per cent of the private 
shareholders own less than 200 shares5.
In December 1991 Telefónica received a new 30 years licence. Under the new agreement 
the Spanish TO loses its monopoly in mobile telecommunications in 1994.
10.2. Spanish Telecommunications Policy in the 1980s
During the 1980s the government recognised telecommunications as a crucial sector for the 
development of the Spanish economy. Consequently, Telefónica was incorporated into the 
governmental economic programme, which intends to push the country into the league of 
the highly industrialized countries. According to the "Plan Electrónico e Informático 
NacionaT (PF.TN), which was approved in January 18, 1984 the information and 
telecommunication sector is the key sector for national development. To improve the 
sector’s performance the Plan therefore proposed6:
1) to increase demand for electronic and informatic products
4 through the Central Rank of Spain and the public sector holding INI. See: Sharma, Paul (1991), p35.
5 see: Financial Timet, 14.01.196S.
6 see: Fregpao, R.L. (1968), p. 87.
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2) to increase national production of these products in order to reduce dependance on 
imports
3) to increase exports dramatically
4) to generate technological development within Spain.
These aims were based on the idea that the Spanish telecom industry faces four structural 
problems which make state intervention necessary.
1) The high dependence on imports of high technology products
For many high-tech products there are no national suppliers. Foreign firms therefore hold 
a market share of up to 100%. This is regarded as a major weakness of the Spanish industry 
for two reasons. First, these markets have the highest growth potentials. Thus they could 
contribute significantly to the industrialization of the country. Second, Spanish industry 
depends heavily on high-tech inputs. This is seen as a handicap since the need for specific 
technological characteristics significates that imported products often do not offer optimal 
solutions.7
2) The public good aspect of the telephone network
In the mid 1970s, Spain and France had approximately the same levels of telephone 
penetration. While France increased its telephone density from 11.8% in 1974 to 44.6% in 
1987, in Spain the access rate grew only to 24%.8 Moreover, the density rate differs 
considerably from region to region. In Madrid 36.8 main stations are installed per 100 
inhabitants while the corresponding figure is only 18-5 in Suroeste. In comparison, in 
Germany the highest value is obtained in West Berlin (62.3), while the lowest appear in 
Rheinland Pfalz (41.7), which still exceeds the value realized in Madrid (all for 1987).9 
Although Spain is the fourth biggest telecommunications market in the EC, it nevertheless 
has still one of the lowest telephone penetration rates.
The low density of the Spanish telecommunications network can be explained partly by 
geographical reasons. Spain’s population is concentrated on a few key cities and it has large 
areas which are sparsely populated. The low density of inhabitants in the peripherial 
regions increases the subscriber loop substantially. Achieving universal service is therefore 
more expensive in Spain than in other EC member countries. However, given the low 
density rate, externalities of access still can be expected for the Spanish public switched 
network.
Rural areas typically face a less advanced infrastructure, lower penetration, longer waiting 
lists and accelerating demand. Satisfied and unsatisfied demand for lines is more 
residentially oriented. Telephone traffic is more local and less international which has
7 see: Buesa, M (1989), pp .82-101.
® Sharma, Paul (1991), p35.
9 Data from SIP (1988).
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consequences for profitability. 10 The high costs of installation in rural areas, the uncertainty 
of demand and the length of user take-up periods may lead to a considerable net cash 
outflow in the initial years of investment. This is likely to make some public assistance 
necessary.11 Thus, while in more advanced member countries of the EC the achievement of 
universal service has moved attention towards the advantages of competition, in Spain the 
case of monopoly provision may be still justified by the low access rate.
3) The low rate of difltasion of telecommunications services
Spain is among those countries which have the lowest levels of diffusion of 
telecommunications services in the EC. For instance, in 1987 Spain had only 500 installed 
teletex subscriber lines, compared to 16000 in West Germany. The number of mobile 
telephone subscribers in Spain amounted to only 7.5%, and for videotex subscriber lines 
6.6%, of the respective number in West Germany. In all cases the latter only holds a middle 
position, thus the difference to the more advanced countries in the EC (UK, France), is 
even higher.12 The higher proportion of small enterprises having less need for advanced 
telecom services has kept demand at a low level. Since economies of scale are important for 
the provision of VANS, the low level of actual demand prevents the take-off of an advanced 
service industry in Spain.
On the other hand, the availability of advanced telecommunications services is regarded as 
essential to foster economic development and to attract foreign investment. They are seen 
as a means for reducing regional differences within Spain and regarding the core of the 
Community.13
4) Network integration on the European level
The policy of network integration promoted by the Commission itself put the Spanish 
telecom industry under additional competitive pressure. Standardization of technology and 
the approval procedure makes it easier for competitors to enter the Spanish market.14 Thus 
it is feared that the national champions of the Core countries of the EC will easily outdo 
Spanish suppliers, given that the former could realize economies of scale in their home 
markets.
Thus the government reckoned that due to the small domestic market and increasing 
external competition, Spanish firms would not be able to increase their market share. In 
order to reduce the high dependence on imports therefore governmental support was
10 Pyc, R. and G. Launder (1987), p. 100.
11 Compare: Hansen, S., CleeveJey D., Wadsworth S., Bailey H. and O. Bakeweil (1990), p. 208.
12 Calculations based on data provided by. Siemens (1988), p.34/35.
13 In more detail; Tirado, Carlos, Granger, José R., and Maria Nieto (1990),
14 El Pals, Septembre 16,1990, Negodos, p .ll.
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envisaged To support peripheral regions a 'Plan de Extensión del Servicio Telefónico en el 
Medio RuraT was set up to provide telephony service to all villages with a population of 
more than 50 inhabitants.15 In cooperation with the STAR programme of the Commission, 
"telecommunications centers” are installed in peripherial regions which offer advanced 
services to small enterprises. Thereby the demand for services like videotext or E-mail 
which according to Telefónica so far have not reached the "critical mass" shall be 
spurred.16
The need to spread and modernize the telephone network has led to an accelerated 
investment programme of Telefónica: For the period 1981-84 investment grew at an annual 
rate of 14 per cent which increased further in the second half of this decade17. Presently 
Telefónica has embarked on a new investment programme to expand the network. In 1989, 
it invested Ptas 582 billion on the network and installed 1.4 million new lines, 51% more 
than in the previous year. Under its present four year programme it intends to install 4 
million additional lines, increasing the share of connected households to 44% by 1994.18 
Overall infrastructural spending rose from Ptas 189 million in 1985 to Ptas 721 million in 
1990.19 Quality is improving too. 87% of all lines installed in 1989 were digital.20 By 1992 
the digitalization of trunk lines is planned to stand at 75%.21 Since 1987 extensive testing 
for ISDN has been carried out. For 1991 it was planned to upgrade exchanges in 
accordance with CCl i 'i  and CEPT recommendations.
Nevertheless, Telefónica has failed to cope with soaring demand for access to the network. 
At the beginning of 1990 the waiting list for a telephone line stood at over 400,000. The 
waiting time for customer access had increased to about 8 months.22 The demand for 
access in Spain depends considerably on the business cyde. While it dropped significantly 
during the economic crisis 1977-1982, it took off after 1985.23 The increase in demand for 
new lines rose from 13% in 1984 to 19.5% in 1988.24
15 This still will leave about 23,000 villages without connection to the network. Castilla, Adolfo, Gaitin, Ricardo
and Oscar Battistdn (1990), p.13.
16 El Pais, Junio 26,1991.
17 Financial Times, January 14,1985 and October 19,1967.
18 Sharma, P. (1991), p35.
19 Communications Week International, March 4,1991.
20 In more detail: El Pais, Octobre 7,1990, Negocios, p.15 and Economist, May 12,1990, p.74.
21 Logic« (1991), p.258.
22 Logica (1991), p.258 and: Funkschau, 17/1969.
23 In more detail: Plaza, C. (1969), p. 400,407.
24 Castilla, A., Gaitin R  and Oscar Battist6n (1990), p.21.
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Though impressive as such, Spain so far has not been able to reduce its discrepancy 
compared with the more advanced countries of the EC. Though the latter have already 
readied a point of saturation as far as access to the network is concerned, countries like 
West Germany and France have had even higher growth rates of total investment in 
telecommunications than Spain (for the second half of the 80s) 25. Thereby Telefónica is 
under double pressure. On the one hand, it has to satisfy universal service goals. On the 
other hand, it is forced to upgrade the network, which can be used for VANS only after 
digitalization of switches and the installation of fibre optic cables has been achieved.26 
Despite its private status Telefónica has been employed by the state for national 
development programmes as much as other state owned network operators in the EC. 
However, its private status may have given Telefónica two important advantages. One is 
concerned with financing. In order to raise funds to go ahead with its investment 
programme, Telefónica successfully floated shares on the international capital market. This 
source of revenues does not exist for state owned enterprises. Especially in less advanced 
countries, however, shortage of capital of the state is a major impediment for investment. 
This advantage may be matched by the disadvantage that a private firm may have less 
influence on the government’s decision making. As in other EC member countries, tariff 
setting is carried out by the Ministry. Therefore one may argue that the private status 
reduces the power which can be exerted to raise prices. According to this argument, 
compared to publicly owned companies, a private firm over time would be less able to raise 
revenues. This holds especially in inflation prone countries where telecom prices fail to 
follow the overall price trend. However, in the Spanish case apparently Telefónica 
succeeded in pushing prices up. As will be discussed below in more detail, in Spain telecom 
tariffs are well above the European average. After some political struggling, in 1990 
Telefónica prevailed with a tariff scheme which raises telecom prices on an inflation plus 2 
percent package. Given that in Britain BT presently operates under a RPI - 6.25% scheme, 
this rather appears a favourable deal for Telefónica. Moreover, as will be seen in chapter
6.6. Telefónica succeeded in convincing the Ministry to take a major step towards cost 
based pricing in 1991. Beside the UK, there has not been a similar drastic price change 
throughout the EC.
Thus one may conclude that overall the private status has offered Telefónica an additional 
source of income necessary to maintain a high level of investment. On the other hand it has 
not reduced the company’s influence on tariff setting.
The second advantage is related to the greater scope for decision making. As a private 
company, Telefónica to some extent is able to coordinate its business strategy 
independently from the government. In that respect its international engagement 
distinguishes Telefónica from other mostly domestic oriented European network operators. 
For instance, in 1990 Telefónica got a 43.7% stake in Compañía de Telefónos de Chile
^  Calculation based on data provided by Siemens, (1988), p36.
26 Plaza, C (1989), p. 407.
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(CTC), which owns 94% of Chile’s telephone lines.27 It has got further stakes in south and 
north American companies. Having a relativly small domestic market, Telefonica reckons 
that international investments are indispensable to remain competitive.
Suming up, in Spain a bias has been given to a supply-led strategy. As a result the present 
legislation does not challenge the monopoly position of Telef6nica. CTNE instead remains 
the exclusive network operator in Spain. Moreover, as will be seen in more detail, 
Telef6nica’s exclusive rights still comprise many services which according to the 
Commission should be liberalized. There is not a clear distinction between the provision of 
the network, the services and the supply of equipment. Telefonica and the *Institute 
National de Industrial (INI) have founded a joint enterprise (Amper) last year, which 
produces electronic goods (including products for the military sector) 2S.
This supply oriented approach may have become a constraint on development. Since it left 
the provision of almost all services to the control of Telefdnica, it has prevented the set up 
of further operators and service providers. Given Telef6nica’s inability to match soaring 
demand, the protection of Telefdnica’s exclusive rights has handicapped the development 
of VANS in Spain.
103. The New Regulatory Regime
The Ley de Ordenadon de las Telecomumcadones (LOT) lays down the basic legal 
principles for telecommunications in Spain. As will be seen, much has been regulated only 
in a general manner, to allow for future secondary legislation.
The LOT generally distinguishes three kind of services:
1) bearer services
2) end - to - end services
3) value added network services
Bearer services are defined as services which use switched telecommunications networks to 
link termination points for the transmission of data. They include services on non-switched 
networks which entail switched lines (Article 14(1)). From this definition it can be seen that 
"bearer services" are almost identical with the public network.
End-to-end services are services which supply complete communication capacity between 
users, including terminal equipment and which require switched elements. End to end 
services comprise voice telephony, mobile telephony, telegram, telex, teletex, telefax, 
videotex, videophone.29
27 Economist, May 12,1990, p.74.
28 El Pais, Decembrc 30,1988 and April 10,1989.
®  in detail: Caneton, Rubio (1990).
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Value added services finally are defined in the LOT as services that use as support the 
bearer and end to end services. They must offer some characteristics which distinguish 
them from the support service.
Principally two different licences are granted for the provision of non exclusive services. An 
administrative authorization is granted if the service provider uses the public switched 
network.
The more severe administrative concession is required if the provision requires the 
installation of separate networks. This applies for mobile and satellite services but also for 
services provided on leased lines. A concession will not be granted if the public network can 
provide the necessary infrastructure.
Regulation of telecommunications is carried out by the Administración del Estado, acting on 
proposals of the Ministry. Thereby a separation of regulatory functions and operational 
activities appears to be accomplished. However, despite the separation, impartiality may 
not be ensured. This depends mainly on the role of the Government agent in Telefónica. 
He or she has a power of veto which is exercised if the public interest is at stake. Thereby a 
confusion of the "public interest” and the interest of the State as the major shareholder is 
probable.
The new 30-year agreement signed between the TO and the government on December 26, 
1991 replaces the earlier one dating from 1946. Under the new regime Telefónica will 
maintain its monopoly on local, long-distance and international telefone traffic. A 
progressive reduction of this monopoly, however, is foreseen. Telefónica is obliged to invest 
annually 500 billion pesetas (about 3.5 billion ECUs) over the next 5 years.
According to the new contract, the government increases the number of its own Telefónica 
board members from three to five, while retaining one government’s member the right for 
veto for matters of "public interest".30
103.1. Infrastructure
103.1.1. Fixed Terrestrial Public Networks
Article 1(1) LOT states that any communication via cable or radio frequencies is the 
exclusive right of the state. The LOT treats network infrastructure as one of bearer 
services. According to Article 14(5) of the LOT, bearer services shall be offered under a 
monopoly regime. The Spanish telecommunications administration keeps the monopoly 
rights. According to the exclusive licence granted to Telefónica, the latter carries out these 
rights of the state. Article 13(2) LOT rules that Telefónica has to offer bearer services to 
operators providing VANS.
30 Fm Tech, November 14,1991.
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103.1.2. Mobile Public Networks
Presently Telefdnica has the exclusive right to operate mobile networks. It is discussed 
whether for the GSM system a second licence shall be granted to a private operator. Under 
the new licence agreement, Telefttnica loses its mobile monopoly in 1994.
Although the first mobile system in Spain was installed as early as 1982, mobile 
communications took off very slowly. By 1990 it had a penetration of just under 1 per cent 
of the population.31 Currently there are two separate cellular telephone networks in 
operation. When opening the GSM digital cellular network at the end of 1991, there will be 
three systems, all operated by Telef6nica.32 However, car phones are picking up quickly. 
From 1986 to 1990 more than 40,000 car phones were installed. This number is expected to 
raise up to 120,000 by the end of 1991. This was spurred by the liberalization of terminals in
1986 which subsequently reduced prices by more than a half.33 Prices for mobile telephony 
are still high in Spain. In mid 1991 a car phone plus installation fees costed about Ptas
175.000 ( -  $ 1,620), which compares with £ 50 («$ 84,75) in the UK.34 The monthly rental 
charge amounts to Ptas 6000 (*$ 55) compared to £ 25 (=$ 42) in GB.
103.13. Satellite Public Networks
Only one-way earth stations are open to competition.
Article 8 of the LOT provides that the use of communications satellites is reserved to the 
state. Telefttnica therefore controls both the space segment as a signatory to Intelsat and 
Eutelsat and also earth segment for two-way earth stations.
103.1 A  Private Networks
Licences may be granted to establish private networks of closed user groups. However, 
Article 23(1) provides that no separate networks may be used if there exist bearer or final 
services which can substitute the separate network. According to Article 23(2) a concession 
which has already been granted to set up such installations can be withdrawn if equivalent 
bearer or final services are provided.
31 Sharraa, P. (1991). p.40.
32 I v o t t s ,  Felk (1991), p.10.
33 El Pal*, Julio 7,1991.
34 At 1991 exchange rate. El Pal», Julio 7,1991 and: Wirtschaftswoche, Juni 21,1991.
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103.1.5. Use of Leased Circuits
Service providers using leased lines have to have an administrative concession (Article 22). 
Thus they are treated equally as independent networks. Simple resale of bearer or end to 
end services is not allowed.
A further restriction is put on foreign capital if services are provided for third parties. 
According to Article 15(2) service providers using their own installation must have the 
Spanish nationality. In case of an undertaking, foreign share holding shall not exceed 25 % 
of the capital35 This restriction does not apply for service providers using bearer services 
of the Spanish TO.
103.2. Services
103.2.1. Reserved Services
Article 13(1) of the LOT gives a general definition of reserved services, then providing a 
list of those services covered initially thereby. Among these are all voice telephony, mobile 
telephony, telegram, telex, teletex, telefax, videotex.
Given the regulation of the LOT, further services may be later declared as reserved.
103.2.2. Competitive Services
Article 20(2) LOT provides that value added services shall be offered under competition. 
VANS are defined as "telecommunications services which (...) use the support o f bearer or 
final telecommunications services, and add other facilities to them (...)*■ However, Article 
24(4) provides that competition may be excluded if
a) there is no private initiative to provide the service
b) the optimal size of the undertaking makes competition impossible
c) it is in the public or social interest to extend the service.
VANS providers using switched networks must obtain an administrative authorization 
according to Article 21 LOT. Those using leased lines instead need an administrative 
concession (Article 22).
If Telefttnica provides competitive services, Article 21(5) LOT provides for separate 
accounting for monopoly services and value added network services. Thereby the state 
regulator has broad discretionary power to restrict competition.
According to Telef6nica’s new licence, leased lines will be liberalised in 1996. Data 
transmission services are liberalised from January 1993.
® This regulation probably infringes Article 7,52-53,59-66 of the Treaty of Rome.
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(1) Here "essential requirements" are assumed to apply for the "administrative authorization", while "further requirements" apply 
for the "administrative concession".
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(1) Here "essential requirements” are assumed to apply for the "administrative authorization", while "further requirements" apply 
for the "administrative concession".
(2) provided by the DGCT.
(3) depending on whether separate installations have to be installed or not.
Analysis
The LOT has granted wide discretionary power to the state. While most services are kept 
under monopoly, competition for the remaing ones can be stopped whenever it seems 
suitable.
Despite private ownership Telefdnica therefore turns out to be among the most sheltered 
TOs in Europe. Although the LOT was adopted half a year after the publication of the 
Green Paper, it does not take account of the Commission's policy towards service 
liberalization. In contrast to, the Green Paper, LOT defines reserved services broadly and 
competitive services narrowly.
Many services still under monopoly regime in Spain are supposed to be liberalised by the 
service directive. Given that Artide 5(2) of the Treaty of Rome provides that Member 
States refrain from all measures which undermine the competition rules, it is likely that the 
LOT will be challenged by EC law in the future. Further pressure is likely to rise also in the 
market for mobile telephony and satellites.
The Commission of the EC has recently informed the Spanish government that some parts 
of the LOT may be in contradicton to Community law. This applies, for instance, to the 
limitation of foreign ownership in telecommunications enterprises to 25%. The 
Commission also rejects that services as telex and videotex are considered as reserved 
services.36
104. Tariff Policy
Until 1990 the government exerted strong pressure to keep prices for local calls down. 
Since the price for local calk is included in the RPI index it thereby tried to keep control 
over inflation. As a result, Spain was one of the countries where prices diverged most from 
costs. Being obliged to keep local prices down, Telefdnica increased tariffs for long distance 
services. Spain was the most expensive country in Europe to call the USA, Telefdnica 
charging twice as much as DBP Telekom and four times as much as BT.37 In March 1990 
the government decided to indude all services in the RPI, not just local ones. Telefdnica 
only has an overall price cap, thus being free to raise local prices within limits. This 
procedure resembles regulation for British Telecom. As a result, more cost oriented prices 
have been introduced. On April 15, 1991 charges for calls to the USA fell by 21.3% and 
intra EC calls by 2.6%. National calls were reduced as well. On the other hand, three 
minute local calls cost three times as much as before, while line installation fees were 
increased by 19%.38
*  El Pais, Marzo 9,1992.
57 FinTech, April 18,1991.
38 El Pals, April 30,1991, and: Communications Week International, April 29,1991 and: FinTech, March 22,1990.
258
Graph 10.1 depicts the development of real prices for basic services in Spain. It can be seen 
that overall the development can be described as cost oriented. Local prices fell less than 
prices for national long distance ones. The strongest price decrease was seen for 
international calls to EC countries. However, nominal prices for national services were 
increased considerably by 1989, while the one for calls to EC countries were not reduced. 
This has been justified by the increased investment programme of Telefttnica. The most 
outstanding price change occured in 1991 when tariffs for local calk increased by more than 
200%.
International calls are still comparatively expensive in Spain compared to other EC 
countries. This can be seen from Graph 12.7.) and 12.8.) in chapter 12.) On the other hand, 
even after the strong ¡Mice increase in 1991, a Spanish local call remains cheaper than a 
German one.39
Graph 10.1.: real prices for basic telephone services in Spain 1977-1991 (1977 * 100)
10.5. An Evaluation of the Spanish Telecommunications Regulation
Summing up, the Spanish telecom industry can be characterized by as much state 
intervention as other EC member countries. This holds though legally Telefdnica is a 
private firm. The intended separation of operational and regulatory functions has not yet 
been achieved in practise. The government continues to exert strong influence over the 
company. Besides being the major shareholder it sends a government delegate at the board
*The Spanish 3 minute call costed ECU 0.09, the German ECU 0.11 in 1991.
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of directors. In addition to the normal rights connected to this position, the delegate, 
moreover, has a veto power for many policy issues, particularly those related to finance and 
tariffs. Finally, the government can, at any time, renegotiate the concessionary agreements 
and add further legal obligations on Telefdnica. Its private status by and large has not 
sheltered Telefcnica from state intervention. This comprises investment programmes, but 
also tariff policy. In fact distortions in the Spanish price policy have been worse than for 
other EC countries, having state owned TOs.
Private ownership by itself does not give an incentive to the government to liberalise the 
sector. Compared to publidy owned TOs in other member countries Telef6nica has been 
more successful in sheltering its market against entry.
The telecom sector is under pressure from two sides: On the one hand, a special effort is 
needed in order to raise the number of households connected with the network (universal 
service). On the other hand, if Spain wants to dose the gap as far as the provision of VANs 
is concerned, it has to liberalise the sector. The highly innovative and risky nature of these 
services make them a "natural" candidate for private industry. Both aims, however, are 
difficult to combine: the technical problems of separating clearly basic and advanced 
services imply that a liberalised VANs market will erode revenues of Telefdnica as long as 
there is cross-subsidisation among basic services. The latter, however, might be regarded as 
necessary to foster the goal of universal service. However, the main problem remains the 
shortage of capital, necessary to proceed with investments. The interconnection of rural 
areas present particular problems for the TO; it generates a high cost of installation and a 
slow take-up of services. Thus over the initial years of investment the TO suffers from 
negative cash flows.
While in the past Telef6nica even lacked the capital to finance all necessary investments in 
rural areas, it presently is moreover expected to expand the provision of VANS and mobile 
telephony. This is likely to enhance the TO’s shortage of capital The development of these 
new services has common features with investment in rural areas. Given that demand is 
likely to increase only slowly, they require considerable investment at the beginning while 
revenue streams are difficult to predict
Telef6nica is therefore put under pressure from two sides. It is for this reason that the 
extension of monopoly rights to new services does not appear sensible, especially in a 
country still lacking universal service. The lack of capital will hinder the rapid development 
of Spanish telecommunications. While financial assistance from the state will not be 
available at a sufficient level, rising prices and cross-subsidisation appear inevitable. This, 
however, will handicap the whole society by increasing costs of communications. For this 
reason, private investment into the provision of VANS and the set up of local networks in 
rural areas, would spur telecommunications development. Thus, competition for local
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networks would probably stimulate the access to the network thereby increasing the 
demand also for Telef6nica’s services. New competitors which raise additional capital and 
increase overall investments therefore would help to alleviate the main obstacle to 
telecommunications development in Spain. By doing so, it would release Telefdnica’s 
financial means needed to reduce congestion and to increase the quality of the existing 
network.
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11. Privatisation and Competition: The UK-Approach
11J , The Road towards Privatisation
The policy adopted by the British government towards telecommunications has departed 
from approaches undertaken in continental Europe. Presently, the structure of the British 
telecom industry in many aspects resembles more the US market than the German or the 
French. Nevertheless the starting point in the UK has been very much the same as on the 
continent. Up to the 1970s the industry sector was controlled by the British post office 
which was reorganized in 1969. While before this reorganization the PTT was part of the 
public administration, it became a public enterprise thereafter. The employees lost their 
status as civil servants. In 1974 the Department of Industry took on the supervision of the 
PTT from the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, which was dissolved1.
In 1981 the British Telecommunications Act split the Post Office in two distinct enterprises. 
British Telecom (BT) was established as a public corporation which became responsible for 
telecommunications services.2 It was separated from the postal services which were left to 
the Post Office. The Act retained BTs exclusive privilege to provide services3. Regulatory 
power was transferred to the Department of Industry. The latter became responsible for:
1) The separation of the Post Office and the telecom sector.
2) The licensing of new network operators.
3) The licensing of private enterprises supplying VANS on leased lines.
While before, the monopoly for terminal-equipment was handled more strictly than for 
instance in West Germany, the 1981 Act introduced more competition for manufacturing.
In the 1980s the structure of British telecoms was changed fundamentally. Different options 
were discussed for further liberalisation. In order to introduce competition for telecom 
services the government had basically two alternatives. One was to allow the sharing and 
resale of leased lines by private firms. This would have led to service-based competition, 
comparable to later developments in the rest of the EC. The second proposal was entry by 
another carrier. The latter either would be allowed to specialize on certain routes or to 
build a second network. Parallel to the question of competition the government also 
scrutinized the possibility of privatising BT.
Two reports were asked for by the government in order to analyse these issues. The Beesley 
report (1981) considered the question of unrestricted resale of BTs capacity. The report 
concluded that all restrictions to offer services to third parties should be abolished, and that 
BT should be authorized to set prices for leased circuits. According to the report, given
1 See in more detail: Heuermann, A. and K.H. Neumann (1985), p.43-46.
2 Muller, JOrgen (1967), p.250.
3 Vickers, J. and G. Yarrow (1985), p35.
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regulatory safeguards, BT also should have been able to enter competition in the non-voice 
market. However, the Beesley report went further and favoured entry of other network 
operators4. The government mainly followed the proposals of the Beesley report. In 
February 1982, the Mercury Consortium received a 25 year licence to operate a private 
digital network for voice and data.5 Three companies set up a consortium. Cable & 
Wireless owned 40%, British Petroleum 40% and Barclays Bank 20% of the shares. In 1984 
Cable & Wireless acquired the shares of the two other companies and became the sole 
own«’ of Mercury. Generally this was regarded as a strengthening of Mercury, because 
Cable & Wireless afterwards had a stronger incentive to transfer "knowhow". Cable & 
Wireless itself is a telecom enterprise, which owns 79% of the Hongkong Telephone 
Company and produces fibreoptic cable for digital transmission in the USA6.
In July 1982 the government announced formally that it considered the transfer of 
ownership. Since a privatised BT still had to be regulated, a second report by Prof. 
Littlechild had to evaluate several proposals for regulation. Thereby it tackled problems of 
consumer protection against monopolistic exploitation^how to encourage innovation and to 
minimize the burden of regulation. Various forms of regulatory mechanism of BT were 
checked against five different criteria7. Generally the government did not trust the "rate-of- 
retum" regulation applied in the USA. This was rejected because it does not encourage 
efficiency and, moreover, it has an element of discretion in regulation. The latter enhances 
the danger of "capture" by the incumbent firm8. Finally, the Littlechild report 
recommended the "load tariff reduction scheme" (LTR), according to which prices of long­
distance services would be reduced gradually9. Eventually, a scheme similar to the one 
proposed by the Littlechild report was adopted by the government. According to the "RPI - 
x"10 rule, BT is permitted to increase prices for a bundle of services (including customer 
access, local call services and long-distance traffic) in line with the retail price index minus 
x%. The V  has to be negotiated with the regulatory authority. It has to reflect cost 
reductions due to technological advance. Thereby the company should be forced to pass 
over cost savings to consumers. Within the basket of different products BT kept price- 
setting flexibility and thereby the opportunity to defend itself against competitive pricing by 
competitors. Therefore, the RPI - x% scheme allowed BT to reform its tariff structure up 
to a certain point.
4 Sec: Heuermann, A. and K.H. Neumann (1985), p.102/103.
3 Müller, Jürgen (1987), p.253.
* See: Heuermann, A. and K.H. Neumann (1985), p. 127/128.
7 (1) Protection against Monopoly, (2) Efficiency and Innovation, (3) Burden of Regulation, (4) Promotion of
Competition, (5) Proceeds and Prospects.
* See: Beesley, Laidlaw, B.H. and P.Gist (1987), p.231.
* Vickers, J. and G. Yarrow (1985), p.40.
to RPI « Retail Price Index
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In 1984 the new Telecommunications Act led to the sale of slightly more than 50% of BT 
shares to the public. The official share price was undervalued and rose rapidly after trading 
began11.
11.2. The Asymmetric Duopoly Regime
11.2.1. The Telecommunications Act 1984
Section 2 of the Telecom Act 1984 ("the Act”) abolished BTs exclusive right to run the 
telecom system and its statutory involvement in regulation. Instead, BT was required to 
operate under a licensing scheme from the Secretary of State.12 The Act also required the 
licensing of one other operator (Mercury) and establishes the "Office of 
Telecommunications” (OFTEL). OFTEL is headed by a Director General o f Telecommu­
nications (DGT) who has to be appointed by the Secretary of State for five years. The 
Secretary of State and the DGT are under a general duty to maintain and promote 
effective competition in the provision of telecommunications services in the UK (Sections 
3(2) and 4(3) of the Telcom Act 1984). Licences are granted by the Secretary of State after 
consultation with the DGT. Thus the Act does not create any rights in law to obtain an 
operating licence. If necessary OFTEL, can change regulations of a licence ex post. Its main 
duty, however, is to supervise the network operators. It is obliged to ensure "fair 
competition" and protect consumers. The DGT has to secure that the company, which is 
obliged to provide universal service, is financially viable13. Section 3 of the Act contains 
universal service requirements obliging the Secretary of State and OFTEL to secure the 
provision of telecommunications services such as emergency services, public call services 
and services in rural areas. As far as the manufacturing is concerned the Office has to 
ensure that the international competitiveness of British equipment producers is 
improved.14
Thus in the present regulatory process four major parties are involved:
1) The Department of Trade & Industry, which appoints the DGT and is responsible 
for granting licences.
2) OFTEL, which has to enforce the obligations put on the network operators by their 
licences.
n In more detail: Vickers, J. and G. Yarrow (1985), p36.
12 Muller, JOrgen (1967), p.254.
13 Beeslcy, M.E., Laidlaw, B.H. and P. Gut (1967), p. 231.
w When BT tried to buy digital switching equipment from the Swedish company LM Ericson, OFTEL intervened 
in order to support British producers (GEC and Plessey) which were more expensive. This intervention was
justified by Vital interests" of the British industry. See: Heuermann, A. and K.H. Neumann (1985), p. 197/198 
and: Carsberg, B. (1967), p.238.
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3) The Monopolies & Mergers Commission (MMC), which has to consider changes of 
licences and has to respond to anti-competitive behaviour of network operators.
4) The Director General of Fair Trading: He has to monitor agreements in restraint 
of trade (collusion).
The latter potentially has the most pro-competitive weapon in the UK. The law on 
restrictive practises, however, can not be applied by OFTEL where the expertise on 
telecommunications resides, but has to be applied by the Office of Fair Trading15.
Continuing regulation of BT is justified by its dominant position. Since local network 
services are still monopolized by British Telecom, cross-subsidisation and predatory pricing 
are likely, if no control is exerted. Moreover, given the importance of telecommunications 
as an input for production, certain quality standards and continuity of supply has to be 
guaranteed. Further justifications are related to non-economic interests: The information 
industry is considered to be crucial for security (defense) reasons. Furthermore, certain 
goals related to social objectives (universal service, maintainance of public telephone 
cabins, etc) have to be satisfied.
11.2.2. The Licences of BT and Mercury
Mercury and British Telecom started competition from very different points. BT owned the 
only existing network. Furthermore, it was permitted to enter manufacturing. Mercury had 
only recently begun to build up its own long-distance lines. Therefore, during the first 
couple of years, it was mainly concerned with investments in infrastructure. The 
asymmetric market situation required asymmetric regulation. As a result, the two 
enterprises obtained very different licences. Obligations put on the two competing network 
operators differ in at least five aspects:
1) Universal service:
§1 of the licence contract commits BT to provide all services in the entire country. The 
obligation to provide services was stressed for rural areas in particular1^ . Though Mercury 
received the same status as a "public telecoms operator" in 19841^ , it does not have to 
provide universal service. However, until 1986 it was obliged to establish a network which 
linked at least 15 of the main cities in GB. While there is no obligation to do so, Mercury is 
entitled to offer all telecoms services nationally and internationally.
U Beesley, M.E., Laidlaw, B.H. and P. Gist (1967), p236.
w More rWnfl« about the licensing contracts can be found in: Heuermann, A. and K.H. Neumann (1985), p.212- 
220.
17 The for Mercury was granted by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry under sec.7 of the
Telecom Act 1964.
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2) Infrastructural obligations:
§4 and §11 of the BT contract oblige the latter to maintain all existing public phone boxes, 
to provide emergency call- and maritime services and to provide maintainance of the 
network. There is no similar obligation for Mercury.
3) Interconnect kin:
British Telecom is obliged to offer access to its network to all network operators which 
possess a licence (§13 + §14). Access charges have to been settled among the companies. 
In case of failure, the Director General of OFTEL has the power to decide the proper 
conditions for access.
4) Resale:
British Telecom is not allowed to offer access to other enterprises which only want to resell 
bask services (§46).
5) Price setting:
Mercury does not encounter restrictions on its price setting flexibility18. British Telecom in 
contrast has got upper bounds for its prices. Initially, a RPI - 3%*scheme was agreed upon. 
Furthermore, OFTEL investigates periodically tariffs of BT in order to prevent any abuse 
of market power.
11.23. Has Competition Prevailed? The Development after Privatisation
11.23.1. A Critique of the British Approach
Liberalisation of the market for terminals has been complete. Even the monopoly to install 
the first telephone set was dissolved in 1985. On the other hand BT was entitled to enter 
manufacturing as welL By doing so it became a fully integrated telecom-enterprise similar 
to AT&T before divestiture. Its 1987/88 market share for the basic telephone set was 
estimated to amount to ca 60%19.
In contrast, the development of the service sector has been ambiguous. The British 
approach has three characteristics:
i* Though internal cross-subsidisation is prohibited for Mercury as well.
i* See: Heuermann, A  and K.H. Neumann (1965), p.73/82.
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1) Privatisation
2) Market duopoly
3) Re-regulation
Privatisation and liberalisation have been undertaken simultaneously. However, there is no 
necessary link between them. Similarly, the new regulator may have two objectives. One is 
to be the watchdog of the privatised dominant firm, protecting consumers’ interests by 
fixing the price bundle. Independent of this control function, the regulator also may be 
responsible for introducing as much competition as possible. To the extent that the latter 
prevails, one may expect the need for control to be reduced.
A major problem arose when both companies failed to agree about the conditions for 
interconnection. The trade unions of BT torpedoed access of Mercury. The requirement 
for access with the BT system on nondiscriminatory grounds originally referred to the local 
network. For a supplier of solely high density routes, it would be very costly to connect all 
individual customers directly with its network. Therefore it was envisaged from the 
beginning that Mercury would lease lines from BT to complete phone calls transmitted 
through its long-distance network. The problem, however, is that the dominant carrier and 
its competitor have contrary interests concerning the charges for interconnection. By 
raising the access price, BT may not only increase its revenues stemming from Mercury but 
also it can raise directly the input-costs of its rival Moreover, the dominant firm had an 
interest in postponing access altogether, in order to prolong its monopoly position. The 
asymmetric bargaining position therefore created the need to regulate access charges by an 
independent commission. After long discussions, in 1984 an agreement was reached which 
allowed Mercury to connect its lines to terminals of BT customers through existing local 
switches20.
Still, the issue of access was not settled yet In 1985 Mercury succeeded in Court with its 
interpretation of "unrestricted access”21. It additionally claimed access to the long-distance 
network of BT. The earlier decision ruled that a phone call using Mercury long-distance 
lines had to get access on both sides of caller and receiver to the local network. Since 
Mercury did not have a complete intercity network, it could not interconnect all of its 
customers. Its interpretation of unrestricted access (which prevailed) implied that a call 
could be switched from the local (BT-) network into Mercury long-distance line. Afterwards 
Mercury could channel it into BTs long-distance and thereafter into its local network. This 
arrangement obviously offered Mercury the opportunity to provide a much greater range of 
service, while its own network still was only rudimentarily developed. The Court decision 
also relieved Mercury from strong pressure to build up its own network. Thus "unrestricted 
access" strengthened Mercury considerably. The important burden of capacity risk was 
entirely put on British Telecom.
20 See: Heuermann, A. and K-H. Neumann (1985), p.139-149.
21 Financial Times, 9 March 198S.
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A second success for Mercury was the government agreement not to license further 
network operators at least until 1990. Thereby Mercury had a six year lead in building up 
its own network. Unrestricted access and the exclusion of further entrants at least until
1990 have ensured very favourable conditions for Mercury. Both arrangements were not 
made in order to prevent wasteful duplication of the network but they were justified by the 
"infant industry argument": Protection for Mercury had to be ensured while it struggled for 
a foothold in the industry. It is, however, arguable whether systematic featherbedding of the 
new entrant was necessary. Obviously the government had an interest in keeping Mercury 
in the market in order to prove that its approach was appropriate.
The asymmetric market situation and the asymmetric regulatory scheme make an 
assessment of the transitional period difficult. The fact that Mercury still remains in the 
market does not prove that competition among public operators is a feasible concept for a 
small European country. It rather proves that regulatory protection was sufficient to keep 
Mercury alive.
On the other hand the experience with regulation has already shown that the British 
authorities face basically the same problems as the FCC before. The regulatory authority 
has the disadvantage of having less information than the dominant carrier. Since the only 
source about cost development is British Telecom itself, it is likely that the latter is able to 
dominate the bargaining about the V  in the RPI-x scheme. The value for V  has changed 
twice until 1991. While at the beginning RPI-3% was established, V  thereafter rose to 4.5 
% and the White Paper declared a value of 6.25%, which applies from August 1, 1991.22 
Thus, each time when the price cap was reconsidered, it was increased. Though it is 
impossible to tell the exact motivation of the DGT, it might be very well that ex post the 
previous price cap was considered too small. While not giving detailed explanation for his 
choice of "x", the regulator nevertheless indicated that rate-of-retum was the most 
important criterion*23 For the same reason BT is able to overcharge Mercury for access to 
the local network, because it is better informed about the incremental cost than is 
OFTEL24. The latter will therefore hardly succeed in establishing "fair terms'' for 
interconnection. It is not certain, whether the RPI - x% scheme will not eventually lead to 
rate-of-retum regulation, when profits made by BT influence the decision about "x". Then 
the price cap will be used to restrict the company’s profit to a given rate-of-retum of 
capital, which reduces the firm’s incentive to become efficient. The company may believe 
that the short term advantages of increased efficiency and lower costs may be more than 
offset by a tougher "x" and lower prices in the following period. Thus, RPI - x% only works 
if the regulator has a good idea of how efficient the regulated firm actually is.25 Another
22DTI(1991),p.6.
23 Beesley, M £. and S.C. Littlechiki (1989), p. 460.
24 See: The ECONOMIST (21 January 1989), p. 75 and: Kay, J. and J. Vickers (1988).
25 Economist June 1,1991.
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drawback of the RPI - x% mechanism is the implicit assumption that rates have been 
reasonable at a starting point. Then, in the aftermath, "x" has to follow costs which are 
reduced by technological development This assumption, however, cannot reasonably be 
maintained. Before privatisation BTs prices were as much distorted as those of other 
European TOs. Thus even if the regulator succeeded in fixing "x" according to cost savings, 
price distortions existing before, would not be eliminated. Moreover, given rapid 
technological development, it is very unlikely to be the case that the regulator will correctly 
foresee the implications of technological development on prices. Thus, the mechanism can 
be critisized for its arbitrariness.26 The problem of capture is likely to rise again, since the 
regulated company (BT) can be expected to have sti ong advantages in the bargaining 
process, due to a lead in information. Furthermore, due to its inflexibility, the RPI-x% rule 
cannot ensure that BT will indeed pass over all of the cost reductions which it achieves27. 
Further drawbacks may have arisen from the privatisation policy, carried out 
simultaneously to the introduction of competition. "Unfair" price setting could be applied 
by a publicly owned company. However, it is much more likely in case of a private company 
where less control can be exerted. Moreover, the scope to put obligations on the latter to 
publish its commercial data is limited. As a major deficiency the excessive secrecy of the 
present regulatory system has been critizised: OFTEL is anxious to avoid being challenged 
in court. Thus its reports on the pricing policy of network operators can hardly be used to 
properly examine the market. It has been argued that if OFTEL is not entitled to publish 
commercial data, which suggests that the asymmetric position in favour of BT is likely to 
rise in future28. A similar threat to competition can arise for terminal equipment Though 
BT faces the possibility of investigation by the Monopoly & Mergers Commission, it may 
be able to distort competition by using its dominant position in the network. Here too the 
US experience with AT&T is instructive. Therefore the priority given to the transfer of 
ownership has rather limited the scope for competition. Since the government used its 
privatisation program of public enterprises as a means of reducing the public deficit, it had 
an interest in a high market price before selling the shares. A transfer of ownership is more 
successful the higher are expected profits. If fierce competition is envisaged, demand for 
the shares offered will drop. So will the price. The planned privatization thus gave the 
Treasury an effective veto on plans to breakup BT in 1982-83.^  Therefore, the emphasis 
put on privatisation sacrifised some crucial elements of liberalisation. The most important 
are the failure to restructure the industry, the failure to license further network operators 
and the refusal of resale of leased lines.
*  Mailer, JQrgen (1987), p255.
27 See for instance: Beesley, M.E., Laidlaw, BJi. and P. Gist (1987), p.230.
M Beesley, M E , Laidlaw, BM. and P. Gist (1987), p.235.
29 Economist, October S, 1991.
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Arguably the goverment repeats the same mistakes by simultaneously announcing further 
steps of liberalisation and a further sale of BTs shares.30 The urgency of privatisation 
furthermore prevented the restructuring of British Telecom. In contrast to AT&T in the 
USA, British Telecom was not divested. Instead the dominant firm integrated vertically by 
being allowed to enter manufacturing. The intention behind this decision might have been 
to avoid the fragmentation of the US market. Despite competition, British Telecom still 
should have the opportunity to reap economies of scope. The government therefore wanted 
to have both efficiency in production (vertical integration) and efficiency due to 
competition. Thus one may conclude that BT rather resembles the old AT&T before 
divestiture than the new one, operating only in the long-distance market and in 
manufacturing. It is surprising that little notice was taken of the lasting regulatory 
difficulties which led to the break up of the vertically integrated AT&T. A restructuring 
similar to the divestiture of AT&T could have promoted competition threefold31:
1) The divided component parts could compete with each other (yardstick 
competition).
2) Experience and expertise could be spread, instead of being concentrated on one 
enterprise.
3) The danger of anti-competitive behaviour could have been reduced.
The problem of supervising cross-subsidisation from the monopolized local to the (more) 
competitive long-distance market could have been avoided by changing priorities: '..the  
pressing desire to transfer a company into private ownership has stood in the way o f ensuring a 
proper framework for competition in the industry."32 Thus, one may conclude that the aims of 
allocative efficiency did not require privatisation. To the contrary, privatisation may have 
postponed further steps of liberalisation and more intensive competition.
Finally, a further point of criticism is that the government did not go far enough to 
liberalize the industry from state intervention. By doing so, cost-based pricing and a 
business-like management of BT could have been expected to materialise. However, the 
government has ensured its influence on the telecommunications market. It controls the 
licensing of entrants. Thus the most important negotiations still take place between the 
Department of Industry and British Telecom. In comparison to the FCC, the power of 
OFTEL is rather limited.
30 The announcement of March 1991 to apply full cost interconnection charges to BT*« local network may be
explained by the government's interest to raise BTi profitability before the sale envisaged for the end of the 
year. Only after fierce protests this decision was taken back later in the year. Moreover, it is argued that 
necessary restructuring of BT is postponed in order not to threaten the second tranche of privatisation. See: 
Economist, June 1,1991, and Financial Times, July 16,1991. In December 1991 the government sold half of 
its BT stake, thus its holding has been reduced to 25.8%.
31 See as well: Vickers, J. and G. Yarrow (1985), p.48.
32 Vickers, J. and G. Yarrow (1985), p.49.
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1123Ì. Some Empirical Evidence
In 1990 the government undertook a general review of the previous seven years. By the end 
of 1990 BT still controlled 95% of the UK’s telecommunications market.33 After seven 
years of network competition Mercury’s market share could hardly be seen as a threat to 
BTs dominant position. The difference from the development in the US intraLATA 
market is striking. As was discussed in chapter 6, in almost the same period AT&T’s 
market share dropped considerably more (to 63%). It has been argued that contrary to the 
US, during the last years in Britain the competitive impulse has become less strong while 
price differences between both operators shrunk. Both operators avoided a price war, BT 
apparently accepting the 10 to 20 per cent price gap with Mercury.34 Thus so far BT has not 
been forced to a general lowering of prices by competition.35 Improvements in BTs 
services have been due more to pressure coming from the regulator then the other 
competitor. BTs profits rose steadily until 1989. When BT announced a further 14% 
increase in profits for 1990, it was widely argued that despite regulation the dominant firm 
was able to abuse its market position.36
At the beginning of 1991 Mercury was able to serve 75 per cent of the UK's population. 
Since the remaining 25% are those customers who are the farthest from the Mercury 
network, they would cost Mercury most in interconnection payments paid to BT. An 
alternative means would be to lease lines from BT, thereby reducing the distance of BTs 
network over which the calls would have to be carried.37 The leasing of lines from BT so far 
has been prohibited for Mercury. However, the governments plans to lift these restrictions. 
A persistant problem has been the settlement of access charges for Mercury to use BTs 
local networks. In 1985 OFTEL laid down the conditions for interconnection of Mercury 
and BT. Payments were calculated on the basis of incremental cost and increased every 
year by RPI - 3%.38 Generally, it was argued that BTs charges to Mercury were low.39 In 
October 1990, however, Mercury claimed that its payments to BT had risen above costs 
since 1986. BT instead argues that access charges are below cost, since it runs deficits on 
the local networks.
At the beginning of 1991, OFTEL changed its approach by proposing fully applied costs, 
thereby increasing Mercury’s cost by up to 20%. Before this price increase Mercury paid
33 Economist, November 17,1990; and: Financial Times, January 20,1992.
34 FinTcch, March 7,1991..
*  Financial Times March 11,1991.
36 Before tax BT made a profit of £ 3.1 billion in 1990. Handelsblatt, 25. Mai 1991, and Economist July 7, and June
1,1991.
37 FinTech, June 13,1991.
3® The level of payments varies according to daytime and the distance that BT has to cany the call.
39 See for instance: Economist, June 1,1991.
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about 30 percent of its total call revenues to BT for interconnection charges.40 According to 
OFTEL’s new concept competitors to BT would have had to pay an "access deficit charge" 
to BT. This charge has to be paid in addition to the interconnection fee. The latter is a slice 
of the variable cost of each call. The "access deficit charge" was meant as a share of the 
fixed cost of the local network. However, it is questionable since BTs losses may be partly 
due to inefficiency. Moreover, some account should be taken of BTs advantage in 
inheriting a complete network including customers in 1984 from the taxpayers.41 Finally, 
the "access deficit charge" would have discouraged entry by further competitors. Some 
months later OFTEL fell back on its previous decision, resolving that BT would have to 
bear full losses in maintaining the local network until its market share had fallen from 95% 
to 85%.42 The continuing debate on access charges, Mercury’s fringe position even after 7 
years of operation and BTs rising profits may lead to the conclusion that the asymmetric 
duopoly did not create much competition in British telecommunications. Further 
liberalisation therefore was considered to be inevitable.
The DGT thereafter proposed that BT put local and long-distance networks into different 
subsidiaries dealing with each other at arm’s length basis. This could be the starting point 
for a restructuring similar to the AT&T.
11.233. The Rebalancing of Tariffs
The intensity of competition between BT and Mercury cannot be assessed from market 
shares alone. Price development since 1984 has to be scrutinized as well. From 
liberalisation one would expect two different results, first a rebalancing of tariffs towards 
costs and second a lowering of tariffs due to competitive pressure. Graph 11.1.) dearly 
indicates that a rebalancing has occured for national tariffs. While the long-distance price 
dropped by 1991 to below 30% of the real price in 1977, the local price rose after 1986. 
However, it can be seen, that compared to 1977, by 1991 the real price of a local call had 
also declined. Compared to national long-distance, the price for intra EC countries has 
decreased less. International calls were not induded in the price cap. Furthermore, as 
discussed in some detail in chapter 12, the accounting rate systems prevent carriers from 
reducing international calls unilaterally.
Beside the indicated rebalancing, BT and Mercury offer now many discounts and various 
price bands which furthermore lead to be more efficient pricing (see chapter 3.3.)
«o Gflhooly, Denis (1991).
Economist, June 1,1991.
42 The Independent July 7,1991.
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Graph 11.1.: Real prices o f BT for 3 minute calls at peaktime 1977-1991 (1977 = 100J43
The second effect, however, is more difficult to measure. It is difficult to maintain whether 
overall tariff decreases have been due to competitive pressure or to cost reductions due to 
technological advance which would have emerged also under monopoly. However, in 
chapter 12.2.2. a comparison of tariffs in different EC countries is provided. As will be seen 
in the EC the UK only has a middle position. Some member countries enjoy cheaper 
telecommunications services, although their TOs operate under monopoly.
11.2.4. Competition and Universal Service
At the heart of the debate about liberalisation is the question of the effect on universal 
service. Generally, it was feared that competition could cut off poorer households by 
increasing residential and local charges.
In the Telecom Act and in BTs licence the government introduced certain safeguards. BT 
essentially is required to offer basic voice service throughout the UK at non-discriminatory 
prices, decreasing in real terms. So far these prices have been nationally uniform.44 
According to the survey of the Central Statistical Office45 1989 85% of households were 
connected to the telephone network. This was a higher percentage than the one which was
43 Sources: Calculations based on data provived in the appendix.
44 Milne, Claire (1990), pJ67.
45 Central Statistical Office (1990), p365/366.
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achieved before 1984. Despite higher residential and local charges privatisation and 
liberalisation thus did not lead to a lower density rate. This rather limited effect on network 
penetration could have been expected, given the price inelastic demand for access and local 
phone calls (see below). However, compared to continental Europe, in Britain the density 
rate did not keep pace with the rising penetration in other EC countries.46 Thus, one may 
conclude that while measures of liberalisation did not lead to a deterioration of the level of 
network penetration, it nevertheless stood in the way of further improvements. However, 
this relatively small impact of liberalisation on universal service may be partly due to the 
safeguards built in the Telecom Act of 1984. Moreover, when investigating households 
without telephone, it was found that most had low income (63% of them under £ 150 a 
week), while other criteria (regional differences, age) were less significant47 Thus, income 
appears to be the most important reason for households to abstain from the telephone 
network. This would make direct income subsidies an efficient means to foster universal 
service. OFTEL and BT therefore agreed to provide subsidies for the access of low income 
households. Moreover, BT agreed to provide a low-user tariff under which the rental will 
not exceed 60% of the standard residential charge.
Overall, however, the experience ofthe UK confirms previous conclusions that universal 
service goals are not likely to suffer by liberalisation. This holds if measures of 
liberalisation are introduced when nation wide coverage has been already achieved.
113. The White Paper "Competition and Choke"
In March 1991 the Department o f Trade and Industry published a White Paper on the future 
telecom policy in Britain.48
In the White Paper the government announced its decision to end the duopoly policy 
applied to network operators. Further public operators shall be licensed, while special 
reference was made to cable television companies. While BT and Mercury may not get a 
national franchise to supply broadcasting services, cable television companies shall be 
allowed to provide telecommunications services in their own right.49 However, new public 
operators will be allowed to provide both television and telecommunications services. Cable 
operators are expected to provide mainly local services along the networks they have 
already installed. In connection with Mercury and further long-distance operators thereby a 
complete alternative network could be installed to BTs network. This supposedly would 
diminish the importance of interconnection charges. The government sees the problem that 
if the cable operator serves only a part of its franchise area, it would be more expensive for
4* Milne, Claire (1990), pJ66.
47 Milne, Claire (1990), pJ68.
4® DTI (1991).
*  DTI (1991), piii.
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a public operator with an universal service obligation (BT) to serve the rest. In the future 
this problem would be solved either by levying extra charges, or by imposing an universal 
service obligation on the cable operator.
This decision was anticipated by the US Regional Holding Companies (RHCs) which until 
now have been prohibited from competing in the domestic long-distance market. The 
RHCs have systematically bought into British cable franchises since 1989. Due to this, one 
may expect competent local competitors in the UK. Presently the RHCs are also preparing 
to enter the British long-distance market,50 which needs fewer expensive switches and 
fewer physical lines than local networks. Moreover, in the long-distance market BTs profit 
margin is still high. Further entry can be expected from British Rail which can use its own 
2,500 km fibre-optic telecommunications network already installed along the railway 
trades51 and British Waterways which may join US Sprint. By the end of 1991 the latter 
announced that it had applied for a full UK licence induding international 
telecommunications. National Network, a private UK operator, receives the first licence to 
compete against BT and Mercury.52
While proposing to liberalize entry in local and long-distance networks, the White Paper 
suggests more freedom for BT to rebalance prices.53
However, two major restrictions on full competition shall remain at least in the short term. 
Until 1993 equal access is put off. Equal access means that customers would be able to 
route their calls to the long-distance carrier of their choice. Presently, to use Mercury’s 
network, subscribers have to buy necessary additional equipment for indirect access via the 
BT network. Equal access would offer Mercury access to BTs enormous customer base. 
However, by 1993 a first step towards equal access shall be realized. This will comprise the 
long-distance network. A code put in by the customer shall signal which network is chosen. 
Those customers who do not choose will automatically be put in BTs network.54 For 1995 a 
second step is envisaged. This will extend the "equal access" procedure also to the local 
network55.
The second restriction refers to the highly profitable international market. Entry of 
network operators will be licensed only for the national market. The government declared 
that in the short term international operating licences will not be granted. The reason for 
this decision may be found in chapter 12. Unilateral liberalisation offers foreign TOs the
30In Spring 1991 already eight RHCs had invested in British cable franchises. See: Commission (DG XIII) (1991).
*1 Economist July 7,1990.
32 Financial Times, March 31,1992.
33 FinTedt, March 7,1991.
34 FinTcch, February 7,1991, and March 7,1991.
33 Nachrichtentechnische Zeitschrift, Mai 5,1991.
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possibility to play one British operator off against the other. OFTEL therefore is willing to 
liberalize the international market only on a bilateral or multilateral basis.
11 A. The Regulatory Regime
Since the White Paper is only a policy document it is not legally binding. Thus, the Telecom 
Act 1984 is still valid as far as the regulatory regime is concerned.
According to the Act the Secretary of State has wide discretionary power as regards the 
licensing procedure. For the set up of telecom installations and also for the provision of all 
services a licence is necessary. Notwithstanding the general duty to promote competition, 
the Secretary of State is free to decide when granting individual licences.
The Telecom Act of 1984 thus did not create any new rights in law to obtain an operating 
licence. Given this discretionary power of the State, the degree of liberalisation achieved in 
the UK cannot be established from the legal text alone. While in Germany, for instance, 
private undertakings have a legal claim to provide certain services, in the UK similar rights 
do not exist. For this reason the White Paper becomes crucial since it reveals the 
government’s intentions regarding the licensing policy in the future.
11.4.1. Infrastructure
11.4.1.1. Fixed Terrestrial Public Networks
Beside the White Paper, the Department of Trade and Industry (DU) has published 
guidance notes to be read in conjunction with the former.56 According to these notes for 
applications which do not indude the use of radio, the first come, first served basis is 
applied. In contrast to BT, Mercury and Kingston57, specific service obligations will not be 
imposed on new operators. Those applicants offering two-way services to a substantial class 
of customers and those offering long-distance services to local operators will be considered 
to be public operators. Licences for public operators prohibit cross-subsidisation.
As was pointed out before, entry is expected for both the local and the long-distance 
networks. Emphasis is given to those entrants which already operate cable networks for 
other puposes. In the local markets TV operators are expected to apply for licences. In the 
long-distance market entry is expected from the Railways, Water Companies and 
undertakings reselling the spare capacity of their private networks.
On March 26, 1991 the resale of spare capacity from the Post Office’s private network was 
permitted. Thereby National Network (Natnet) entered the market as a small third national 
competitor. Natnet will sell idle capacity to other organisations for their internal
56 DTI (1991), Notes for the Guidance of Applicants for a Licence to Run a Telecommunications System, March
25.
57 BT is under a universal service obligation, Mercury has to meet minimum requirements for its network and
Kingston has a universal service obligation for its local network.
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communications. To do so Natnet has to rent lines from BT or Mercury to complete the 
connection.58
11A1.2. Mobile Public Networks
Presently fixed network operators are prevented from offering mobile services under their 
fixed link licences. According to the White Paper the government intends to maintain this 
restriction on fixed operators.59 Thereby it hopes that mobile systems will add competitive 
pressure on the cable network operators.
At the moment there are two British mobile telephone networks (Vodafone and Cellnet) 
which have helped the UK to get by far the largest penetration of any EC member state. In
1991 about 1.2 million mobile telephones were installled.60 This can be seen also from 
Figure 8.1. in chapter 8.4.1.2.
At the end of 1989 three companies were licensed-to install GSM systems. They are 
expected to operate by 1993. While on the one hand it is expected that this will lead to 
considerable competition among mobile operators, on the other hand it is feared that too 
many systems will lead to market fragmentation. In order to survive, it is estimated that at 
least three and a half million subscribers are needed. Too many mobile networks may not 
allow operators to reap economies of scale. They may end up with a market share which is 
too small to become competitive also with the fixed network.61
11.4.13. Satellite Public Networks
While there will be a class licence for private satellite networks, public networks via satellite 
links will not get an "across- the- board" authorisation.62 Instead, satellite licences will be 
granted on a case by case basis. Regarding satellite installations the government does not 
reveal its criteria for granting a licence. The reason for the government's reluctance to 
grant public satellite network licences is mainly that these networks allow the bypassing of 
the international accounting rate system. Individual licences for data or voice traffic, 
however, may be granted.
Initially, licences were limited to BT, Mercury and Kingston. Thereafter licences were 
granted also to a number of specialized satellite service operators.
M Economist, March 31,1991.
59 However, BT and Mercury already have invested in this area, either by subsidiaries or through substantial
shareholdings.
Wirtschaftswoche, 21 Juni, 1991.
*1 Economist, September 16,1989.
«  DTI (1991), p.13.
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1U .1A  Private Networks
The installlation of fixed private networks requires only a class licence. Private mobile 
networks, used only for internal purposes (taxi companies etc) are only limited by the 
scarcity of spectrum. Several licences also have already been granted for private satellite 
networks. A new class licence is envisaged, which does not limit entiy.
l l A l i .  The Use of Leased lines and Interconnection
As far as the licences of Mercury and BT are concerned, changes are proposed to oblige 
both network operators to interconnect new operators to their networks. The DGT is 
entitled to determine tariffs of leased lines, in order to ensure that costs are fairly 
apportioned between public network operators. BT and Mercury shall be paid fully 
allocated costs plus a return on capital employed, and a contribution to any deficit incurred 
in the provision of exchange lines. After December 31, 1992 the DGT is empowered to 
publish a directive requiring the provision of equal access facilities among all operators. BT 
and Mercury will be required to provide circuits to other public operators except where the 
DGT reckons that demand could be met by other means.
The White Paper reconsiders also the policy concerning the interconnection of systems. 
Thereby it recognises that BT should receive a contribution to its deficit on exchange 
lines.63
As far as international circuits are concerned, existing restrictions on voice telephony and 
telex shall be removed. Moreover, as regards those countries which'apply a similar 
regulatory freedom, simple resale shall also be permitted.64 In order to prevent 
international network operators from restricting competition by raising prices of leased 
lines, OFTEL will introduce price control In the case of BT a licence modification is 
undertaken to include international leased circuits in the domestic price cap for leased 
circuits of RPI - 0%.65
11.4.1.6. Analysis
The approach chosen in the White Paper implies a dear departure from the duopoly policy 
applied before. It appears that the UK is heading for full liberalisation of the public 
telecommunications networks. However, as was pointed out before, given the discretionary 
power of the state, only future licensing policy will tell whether the government lives up to 
these aims. The main restrictions which apparently remain due to the White Paper are
63 D n  (1991), p.7.
*  DTI (1991), p3.
*5 DTI (1991), p.IS.
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related to the international market. The aim is to avoid that a dominant overseas operator 
negotiates accounting rates to the disadvantage of the competing operators in the UK.66 
Presently the main exemption from full competition appears to be the satellite market.
The reasoning behind the restriction on the provision of international satellite services is 
not totally convincing. One may argue that the bypass of the accounting rate system is 
beneficial in order to raise pressure to reform the system. Moreover, BT and Mercury have 
the possibility to compete in the satellite market. It is therefore not the case that only 
foreign firms will be able to use satellite transmission for the UK international services, 
while high accounting rates keep domestic cable operators from setting competitive prices.
11.4.2. Services
Generally all services can be provided if the requirements of the "Branch Systems General 
Licence" (BSGL) are fulfilled. The BSGL system covers telegraph, telex, telextex, telefax, 
packet&circuit switched data services, amd VANS." Domestic leased lines have to be 
provided by BT, Mercury, and Kingston. Special licences instead are required only for 
services provided on cable networks and two-way satellite services. In mid 1991 about S50 
special licences had been issued.67
11.4.23. Analysis
As for telecommunications networks, the main problem for service provision in the UK is 
again the wide discretionary power of the government. It does not reveal any criteria 
against which applications for licences are judged. This will make it difficult for applicants 
to challenge a refusal through the Courts. Since BT dominates the service market and the 
government still owns 49% of shares, there may still exist incentives for the government to 
abuse the licensing procedure in favour of BT.
“  D ll (1991), p. 12. See also chapter 12.
67 Information provided by OFTEL.
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11.5. An Evaluation: Privatisation versus Liberalisation
Seven years after the reorganization of British telecommunications a very unbalanced 
duopoly has emerged When compared to the almost simultaneous process of liberalisation 
in the USA, in the UK the competitive pressure on the main operator has been rather 
limited. While AT&T’s market share dropped to about 63% in 1991 BT still hold 95% of 
the British telecommunications market. It has been argued that after some preliminary 
struggling for market share, the BT-Mercury duopoly has moved more towards a peaceful 
coexistance. Entry led to a rebalancing of BT*s tariff structure without, however, stimulating 
overall price cuts. As will be seen in chapter 12 different sources calculated similar basket 
prices for BT and continental TOs like France Telecom and the DBP Telekom. This 
limited competitive pressure on BT led to a steady rise in profits of the dominant operator. 
The profit made in 1990 was comparable to that of the German TO in the same year.
I therefore conclude that the small market size of the British telecommunications sector is 
a considerable handicap for national liberalisation strategies. It reduces the scope for entry 
and therby enhances the possibility of collusion.
Furthermore it was argued that privatization stood in the way of more competition. It 
prevented a previous restructuring of British Telecom and supposedly has encouraged the 
government to put off further liberalisation until the second tranche of BT*s shares is sold. 
Similar to the USA, access charges have been a continuous problem for the regulator. The 
recent struggle about full cost pricing revealed that OFTEL has not developed yet a clear 
cut approach to this problem.
Nevertheless the British duopoly may be defended as a "second best" solution towards 
network competition. This, however, only applies from a national perspective. As will be 
argued in chapter 14, a multilateral approach chosen simultaneously by several member 
states is more likely to stirr up competition. This, however, was never put forward by 
British policy makers, who chose a do-it-alone strategy. Moreover, with the exception of 
mobile telephony no emphasis was given to "system competition". The latter refers to 
competition between operators using different technology. Thus cable networks and British 
Rail were not allowed to enter before the recent White Paper. The same applies to two-way 
satellite systems. Instead a second cable entrant was licensed which mainly duplicates the 
already existing BT network. It is still unclear whether the competitive impact of a second 
cable operator will be strong enough to make up for the high fixed cost of establishing the 
network. As was pointed out in chapter 8 an independent Commission found for the even 
bigger West German market that the costs of network duplication would exceed the 
expected benefits from having a second operator.
The recent White Paper can be regarded as a step to mend the deficiencies of the duopoly 
approach. It declares the governments will to permit further entry and stresses the
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importance of system competition by refering to cable operators and the railway network. 
Having already established the necessary networks, these enterprises incur less sunk cost 
when entering telecommunications. It is reckoned that BTs new competitors will be able to 
bypass its local networks, thereby solving the persistent access charge controversy.
The success of the competitive British mobile market may be taken as a hint of the scope of 
competition steming from new transmission technologies.
Finally the service market in Britain turns out to be the most developed one in the 
Community. The variety of services provided and the lower prices charged in the UK 
clearly contradicts the argument that network monopoly is required to foster service 
competition.
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12. The Regulatory Regime of International Télécommunications
The previous chapters discussed the regulatory environment in the US and the EC from 
the point of view of domestic markets. No reference was made to the regulatory regime of 
transborder communications. While the latter is a "logial consequence" of the national 
regimes, the international market nevertheless is organized differently. Most important, 
there is a multitude of players operating in this market.
Diverging national policy approaches recently have destabilized the traditional system of 
transborder telecommunications, leading to increasing competitive pressure on TOs. 
Without being enforced by a regulatory reform, current developments in the 
intercontinental market lead to facility based competition.
As will be in part IV this could provide a precedent for competition in the intra-
European long-distance market.
12.1. The Intercontinental Market
Each country is sovereign in the determination of access conditions to the national 
network. This control over access is exercised by requiring an operating agreement from 
foreign carriers. When national TOs acquired a monopoly status in their domestic markets, 
foreign carriers were de jure prevented from terminating locally the traffic they had carried 
to the national frontier. Thereby domestic operators were granted sole rights to offer 
international services. International communications was not regarded as a market in its 
own right Instead it was reduced to a technical problem of interconnection of independent 
national networks. To solve the technical problems bilateral agreements were needed. 
Nevertheless multilateral cooperation was set up to develop common principles for 
interconnection. As a result, in the past telecommunications services between countries 
have been governed by the same exclusionary rule as services provided domestically. The 
international telecommunications market is organised by the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), a specialised agency of the United Nations. Founded in 
1865 the ITU is the oldest inter-governmental organisation. It was bom in the era of 
national monopoly in telecommunications. The national telecommunications 
administration operated the national network and represented the country in the ITU. 
Thus the ITU was responsible for the coordination of national telecommunications 
providers, regulating all kinds of services. Its paramount objective was to foster 
interconnectivity and interoperability of networks. Despite fundamental changes in 
technology and services and despite the arrival of new network operators the structure of 
the ITU has not been changed over the last four decades. Its main components are the 
Plenipotentiary Conference which is the supreme organ of the ITU and which periodically 
revises the International Telecommunications Convention (ITC), the Administrative
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Conferences which deal with regulatory matters, the Administrative Council responsible for 
general policy and the General Secretariat who has financial and administrative 
responsibilities.1 The ITU has no legal power to shape the international 
telecommunications market. It is mainly responsible to keep a regulatory regime working 
which is based on bilateral agreements.
Thus the structure of the international telecommunications market was determined by 
bilateral cooperation of national TOs sharing the costs of interconnecting their domestic 
networks. Since national markets were similarly organized this cooperative model required 
little regulation. The ITU sponsors a Consultative Committee on International Telegraph & 
Telephone (CC1TT) whose recommendations concerning technical matters and accounting 
procedures are widely accepted. They fit a multipolar network which is managed by firms 
that are dominant and sovereign within their own borders and which cooperate on the basis 
of shared interest. The emergence of satellite technology first seemed to threaten this non- 
rivalrous structure. However, the new technology also was turned into a system of global 
cooperation.
Nevertheless, recent measures of deregulation and liberalisation undertaken on the 
national level of different member states have had a strong impact on the the 
intercontinental telecommunications market. The "cooperative model" has been put under 
strain. The intercontinental market consists of two distinct networks: the suboceanic cable 
and the satellite network. In the following recent developments in the intercontinental 
cable network are first discussed. This comprises the price setting scheme of the TOs which 
form an international cartel Then I briefly review the policy which has been applied for the 
installation of Intelsat’s network. Finally, I discusse the extent to which the cooperative 
model has been changed into a competitive one during the last decade.
12.1.1. Intercontinental Submarine Cables
Intercontinental cables are installed on a bilateral or multilateral basis between the carriers 
on both sides. A foreign carrier has to make arrangements with the destination carrier to 
complete a telecom message. These arrangements are typically reciprocal. Each carrier sets 
his own price and the terms of availability of international services which originate in his 
country.2 In the case of transit of a third country, carriers have to negotiate mutually 
satisfactory agreements. Investment costs and revenues are shared according to the concept 
of half -circuit The carrier on either side contributes one half of the investment costs of the 
circuit. Accounting rates are calculated to compensate the destination carrier for one-half of 
the international transfer plus the domestic interconnection costs. They are supposed to be
1 In more detail: EUgar, R., and D. Witt (1990), p-289/290.
2 Trcrise, Philip, H. (1987), p334
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set at a level equal of the cost of a call Corresponding rules have been set up in the CCTTT 
recommendations. Though the CCTTT regulations are not binding in a legal sense they are 
widely accepted. Being based on the explicit principle that circuit switching and message 
transmission are the exclusive function of national TOs they generally prohibit subleasing 
and shared use of private leased lines.3 Recommendation D1 forbids the resale of capacity 
by a customer to a third party. The intention is to prevent large users with spare capacity on 
leased lines from undercutting the TO’s international tariffs. Since the CClI l 
recommendations are widely observed any entrant is confronted with business terms which 
hardly can be negotiated. In a deregulated environment they therefore create distortions of 
competition in favour of incumbents. Moreover, being licensed to provide international 
traffic in one country does not serve a private operator if he cannot get access to another 
national network. Due to long cooperation among TOs, this access is difficult to obtain. 
This effect can be clearly seen from market shares of US carriers. As was shown in table
6.1. the interLATA market share of AT&T dropped to 67% by 1988. In the 
intercontinental market by the same year AT&T's market share was still at 90%4. The 
CCTTT recommendations have allowed formation of a cartel which hardly can be broken 
up. A good example are the accounting rates which are calculated on the basis of CCTTT 
recommendations.5 These accounting rates have remained powerful despite the arrival of 
new carriers.
12.1.2. The Tariff Policy of the International Cartel
Having the exclusive right to set tariffs and collect payments in the domestic markets, the 
originating carrier is free to levy any charge for a particular international call. The price 
users are charged for an international service is called collection charge. The collection 
charge varies depending on where the call originates. For international links a mechanism 
is needed to compensate the terminating carrier and transit carriers for costs they incurred 
in handling a specific call An accounting rate is established between the originating and the 
destination carrier as the basis for international settlements. These accounting rates are 
generally denominated in Special Drawing Rights (SDR) or US dollar per paid minute of
3 Witt, D.,(1987), pJ59 and: EUger, R. and D. Witt (1990), p.294/295.
* Source: FCC, quoted from: Johnson, Lleland L. (1991), p. 226.
5 The basic principles of the recommendations are
a) The rate for a communication between two countries shall be the same independently of the route used (direct
or transit).
b) Each country shall be considered as a single unit of area.
c) International accounts shall be settled on a bilateral basis.
d) Rates should be reduced as low as possible on a reciprocal basis.
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traffic. The originating carrier agrees to reimburse the carrier of destination by a fixed 
proportion of the accounting rate. This proportion, called settlement rate, is generally one 
half of the accounting rate. Finally, settiements are made on a net basis. When the traffic in 
each direction is unequal, the carrier sending more traffic pays the other one the 
difference.6 The accounting rate therefore may be described as a uniform usage sensitive 
price for access to foreign networks.7
A p
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PÀCollection Rate (B)
Accounting
Rate 
Settlement 
Rate
Revenue
Revenue
(A) q (B) 
Country A
.(B)
Country B
Figure 12.1.: the international settlement mechanism
Figure 12.1.8 illustrates the international settlement system. Country B has a higher 
collection rate and less outgoing calls q(B) (measured in billed minutes of traffic). Thus it is 
reimbursed by country A. If S is the settlement rate and q(A) the quantity of outgoing calls 
from country A then the transfer paid to country B is T = [q(A) - q(B)] S which 
corresponds to the hatched area.
The mechanism described in figure 12.1. causes a profit maximising carrier in country B to 
set a price which exceeds the monopoly price. If the collection rate is raised, q(B) will 
decline. However, the negative quantity effect is partly offset by an increase in the transfer 
payments of carrier A. On the other hand, given the price of country B, carrier A has an 
incentive to raise its price in order to reduce the reimbursement paid. Thus both carriers 
have an incentive either to raise their price or to keep it at a high level. The settlement
* Ergas, H. and Paul Paterson (1991), p30.
7 Neumann, K. H. (1987), p 383.
* A similar explanation can be fov^d in: Ergas, H. and P. Paterson (1990).
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procedure has an inbuilt gravity towards a high collection price.9 In practise this effect has 
been even strengthened by the decline of costs for international calls. The settlement 
procedure leads to tariff inertia since unilateral reductions of the collection charge are 
punished. Combined with cost reductions, the tariff inertia thereby led to a rising gap 
between prices and costs.
However, the international settlement mechanism only worked smoothly as long as TOs 
applied similar tariff principles. As soon as prices diverge considerably, both carriers have 
conflicting interests. The low price carrier A has an interest in reducing the settlement rate 
while the contrary is true for the high price carrier (as long as the low price carrier has 
more outgoing calls). As soon as collecting rates diverge, high price carriers get an 
additional incentive to keep up their collecting and accounting rates. To the contrary 
carriers which are forced to reduce their collection rates also have an incentive to reduce 
accounting rates.
In the case of the intercontinental market TOs are free to set accounting rates and 
collection charges arbitrarily. Accounting rates are not published. Within Europe and the 
Mediterranean Basin the CCITT recommendations put forward further regulation. 
European TOs have agreed to use uniform rates for the use of international transmission 
and switching facilities.10 Furthermore exact ratios are prescribed for the price relations of 
automatic switched services and the monthly rental for leased lines.11 Thereby "harmful" 
competition to the switched network shall be precluded. Moreover, leased circuits are 
made available only for the customer’s own needs, while sharing and resale are prohibited. 
Similarly the interconnection of two or more private leased circuit networks is not 
permitted without prior agreement by the regulator (TO or Ministry).12
The accounting rate system has served carriers well in the past, providing workable 
arrangements between them and meeting a number of key requirements for the 
development of the international network.13 It was a consequence of the postwar 
institutional structure and adequate to serve the aim of universality and joint provision of 
transmission facilities. The simplicity of the accounting rate system reduced the transaction 
costs of service agreements, and introduced uniformity into international pricing
9 As von Wetzsddcer has pointed out, the tariff setting procedure led to international prices which exceed those
tariffs necessary for the joint profit maximum of the two operators involved in an international call. The 
settlement rate can be regarded as the marginal cost for the originating carrier. It exceeds, however, the cost 
which is incurred by the carrier of destination. Thus the operator of origin which is responsible for the 
collection charge maximises profits at a tariff level higher than the true costs of the destination carrier. Von 
Weizsftdcer argues that by a joint agreement to lower their prices both operators could raise their profits.
10 Neumann, K.H. (1987), pp385-389.
u  Leased circuits are normally priced on the basis of a flat monthly rental charge. Witt, D. (1987), p. 360/361.
12 Neumann, ILH. (1987), pp399-405.
13 Ergas, Hemy and Paul Paterson (1990).
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arrangements. The 50:50 split spread the risk of capacity expansion equally among 
carriers.14
From a general welfare viewpoint the accounting rate system is detrimental because it 
prevents competition and offers the wrong incentives to TOs. There is little discipline 
imposed on carriers to pass on cost reductions arising from technological advance. The 
accounting rates impose a floor on the overall price level under which collecting rates 
cannot drop, irrespective of costs. Since accounting rates do not vary by time of day they do 
not allow for efficient price setting. Off-peak tariffs especially exceed considerably 
underlying costs. By generating strong incentives to perpetuate existing price-cost 
distortions the accounting rate system increasingly handicaps the growth of the 
international network. In this respect the US-European intercontinental market is 
revealing.
Although calls from the US to foreign destinations are on average 25 per cent cheaper than 
incoming calls15 the accounting rate system has widely prevented competition. From 1980 
to 1984 the average price per minute for an international call originating in the US dropped 
from $2.01 to $1.29 due to pressure exerted by the FCC. After competition was introduced 
in 1984 it only fell modestly to $1.18 by 1988 and still remains four times above the average 
national long-distance price. The reason for this is twofold. First, the new competitors to 
AT&T prefer to become members of the international cartel agreements themselves. 
Secondly, the accounting rates became the largest element in costs of foreign calls, with 
75% of the amount collected from consumers being passed over to foreign companies. In 
an extreme case in 1988 99% of what AT&T collected on calls made to Brazil was handed 
over to the Brazilian telephone company.16 Since accounting rates do not drop parallel to 
the prices charged the consumers, they become the lower threshold under which no carrier 
will set their price. In fact as table 12.1. shows in the case of the peak-off calls with some 
countries AT&T encounters losses for each call made.
14 Ergas, H. and P. Paterson (1991), p34/35.
W See: Dixon, Hugo, Financial Times, April 4,1990; July 16,1990.
W Economist, July 6,1991, p.14.
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AT&T revenue in $ Payment to TO in $
Germany 3.76 4.62
France 3.76 4.69
Italy 3.76 5.39
Table 12.1.: AT&T revenues and payments to European TOs, direct call economy rate (5 
minutes), 1988.17
As a result national regulators of domestically liberalised markets have not sought to 
reduce national collection charges for international calls for instance by imposing formal 
price-cap regulation. As was pointed out, profits from incoming calls and accounting rates 
cannot be controlled nationally.18
Nevertheless, collection rates for EC-US calls diverge considerably, depending on where 
the call originates. This can be seen from graph 12.1. which compares the collection rates 
for the peak and off-peak periods between Italy, Germany, Spain and the USA.
17 Stanley, V.B. (1968), p. 240.
i* Cheong, K. and M. Mullins (1991), p.106.
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Graph 12.1.: Standard and cheap collection rates between Italy, Germany, Spain and the 
USA in US $(1991)19
In some cases the same call costs more than twice as much, depending on where the call 
originates. Given that the US tariffs are also kept well above the competitive price, this 
clearly illustrates the scope for tariff reductions in the intercontinental market
Pressure on the accounting rate system is rapidly increasing. A potential threat stems from 
technological progress. According to the EEC analysis and forecasting group GAP costs for 
long-distance transmission in Europe fell by 9% annually throughout the decade ending in 
1985. After the introduction of the ISDN network a further acceleration of this cost 
decrease is expected.20 In the early days of the system collecting rates were closely linked to 
accounting rates. However, the degree to which cost savings are passed on to collection 
rates differs much from country to country. Hence the collection rates at the two ends of 
each relation started to diverge. This effect was enhanced by differences in inflation rates 
and exchange rate fluctuations. Downward rigidity in collection rates carried over intC 
accounting rates which subsequently moved far out of line with costs. The ratio of 
accounting rate to collection rate thereby rose inevitably for carriers which sought to
19 sta; standard rate; cheap: cheap rate; it: Italy; Spain: Spain; gen Germany. The black column always presents the
collection rate charged in the EC country, the shaded column presents the collection rate of US-Sprint.
20 Figures given by an OECD study are even more dramatic. See: Ungerer, H. (1990), p.9.
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reduce their prices. Moreover, traffic flows were changed considerably with diverging price 
policies. As can be expected from the high price elasticity of demand for international calls 
due to diverging collection rates the quantity demanded on each side started to diverge21. 
Countries with lower collection charges thereby became likely to run permanent settlement 
deficits. This is especially apparent in the EC-US market.
As mentioned above, due to price regulation of the FCC and some competitive pressure 
AT&T had to reduce prices for international calls during the 1980s which increased volume 
considerably. In Europe TOs are under less pressure to readjust tariffs. As a consequence 
they have moved far out of line with costs.22 In the case of traffic to and from Germany this 
led to a significant financial deficit for US carriers. In 1989, 420 million calls were made 
from the US to Germany while there were only 250 million in the opposite direction.23 
Given the bilateral agreements the US carriers had to reimburse the DBP Telecom 167 
million dollars for delivering calls to their final destination.
As a result US carriers have lobbied the FCC to enforce a general price cut for 
international calls. Due to this pressure the DBP Telekom recently lowered the accounting 
rates for AT&T, MCI, and Sprint by 17%.24
However, the present international settlement procedure puts carriers in liberalised 
domestic markets at a second disadvantage. Monopoly TOs are able to play one off against 
the other when negotiating agreements concerning the accounting rate. Newly established 
carriers in the USA long to get access agreements with foreign TOs. In order to provide full 
service to their customers they must offer international dial access comparable to that 
provided by AT&T. For this reason the foreign TO is likely to be successful when offering 
access to these carriers under less favourable terms.25 This process of "whipsawing" diverts 
the welfare gains from competition among US carriers to other countries26. For this reason 
the FCC requires operating agreements which stipulate partially uniform accounting rates 
on parallel routes to the same country27. However, TOs are likely to find other tools than
21 This development is strengthened by the "call me back" effect. When the same phone call is differently priced
depending on the country of origin, especially large customers have an incentive to set up their calls in the low 
price country.
22 For an empirical investigation see: Ergas, H. and Paul Paterson (1991), p. 35-45. 4
23 Compare: Telekom taucht im Atlandk”, Frankfurter Rundschau, November 17,1990.
24 "Telekom taucht im Atlantik”, Frankfurter Rundschau, November 17,1990.
23 For instance it may force the US carrier to relinquish the half circuit concept and take 60% of total costs 
instead.
26 Compare in more detail: Johnson, L.L. (1991), p. 228-231.
27 In 1969 MCI proposed to extend its "call USA” service to Spain. Its agreement with Telef6nica involved a
surcharge of 035 SDR on the current accounting rate. Thereafter AT&T came to a similar agreement for its 
"USA Direct" service. In mid-1990 the FCC rejected both accords on grounds of whipcawing. Compare: 
Johnson, LX. (1991), p. 233.
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the accounting rate to extract concessions from US carriers. As a consequence, on the one 
hand regulators of liberalizing countries restrict competition among their carriers in the 
international market. On the other hand, however, they increase pressure on high tariff 
countries to renegotiate the accounting rate procedure.
The second challenge to the accounting rate system comes from national measures of 
liberalisation. In April 1991 the USA and UK unilaterally reduced their transatlantic 
settlement rates by 30% over the next two years.28 Since long-distance markets in both 
markets become increasingly competitive accounting rates wQl be driven towards costs. In 
1989 US Sprint and Cable & Wireless as the parent firm of Mercury installed the first 
private cable (PTAT-1). This erodes the near monopoly position previously held by AT&T 
and BT for the intercontinental market. Bilateral competition will lead to even greater 
price divergence in the European-US market, revealing the true costs of monopoly 
provision to consumers in the EC. Already before the new settlement agreement the UK 
was the cheapest site for calling the USA, as can be seen from graph 12.2.
•  r s  1 l .S  2 Í .S  3 I S
Graph 12.2: price o f a 1 minute call to USA in $US 199CP*
However, beside foreign regulators like the FCC and domestic consumers, European TOs 
will face additional pressure to abolish the present accounting rate system.
28 Economist, July 6,1991, p.14.
Derived from ft basket of prices, taking in peak, standard and off-peak rates. Source: Fin Tech, September 6, 
1990.
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Instead of using direct links end users and carriers may route traffic through third 
countries, thereby avoiding high price TOs. Thereby TOs themselves may be forced to 
compete for US traffic.
This is feasible for instance for calls from Germany to the USA. The collection rate for a 
call from Germany to the UK plus the price from the UK to the USA is lower than the 
collection rate for a direct call from Germany to the USA. An international firm therefore 
can route its call to the USA through its PBX in the UK30.
12.13. Satellites
When satellite communications became commercially viable in the early 1960s, they were 
perceived as being superior to cable networks for communications which involved the 
greatest distance (due to the insensitivity of satellites to distance or transmission path). The 
limited quality and quantity available at that time made a single supplier desirable. 
Moreover, all countries depended on the US satellite and launcher technology, which 
encouraged the establishment of a joint enterprise.31 This backround led to the foundation 
of the International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation (Intelsat) as a non-profit 
organisation32 by the USA and 13 other nations in 1964. Currently 118 nations have 
become members of Intelsat. After an interim period permanent agreements entered into 
force on February 12, 1973. The first agreement is among governments, called parties. It 
establishes Intelsat as an international organisation. The second operational agreement is 
signed by operating entities designated by member governments. Beside France, the 
Netherlands, and Spain all other EC countries designated their TOs.33 In the USA Comsat 
was founded as a private, profit making corporation which is organized without government 
ownership or financing. Comsat is the US representative to Intelsat All US domestic 
carriers who want access to the Intelsat system have to rent capacity from Comsat.
•
Costs of investments and revenues from operation are distributed among member 
countries according to their relative share of usage. Each signatoiy is assigned an 
investment quota which corresponds to the relative usage of Intelsat’s capacity. After 
deducting the operating costs, the revenues from utilization charges are distributed to the 
signatories in proportion to their quota.
30 For instance, in 1967 the peak rate for a five minute call from West Germany to the USA costed USS 10.09.
Routed via the UK the price dropped to USS 8.86. Source: Eurodata Foundation (1987), quoted from: 
Johnson, LX. (1991), p. 241
31 Snow, Marcellus S. (1987a), p.43.
32 While initially Intelsat was founded as a consortium this status was changed to that of an international
organisation in 1963. In more detail: Gershon, Richard A. (1990), p.249-259.
33 Snow, MS.  (1967a), p.44 and 51.
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The institutional structure of Intelsat consists of three features:
The Board of Governors: The executive body of Intelsat is the Board of Governors in which 
member countries are represented according to their national quota. The Board is 
encouraged to make unanimous decisions. Otherwise the votes are counted on the basis of 
the quota. Thus the power structure of Intelsat resembles more a commercial organisation, 
in which ownership share determines control, than a political entity of equal votes.
The Assembly of Parties and the Meeting of Signatories: Both bodies consist of 
representatives of all parties or signatories, each taking decisions on the basis of equal vote 
regardless the investment share. The main duties are to formulate "recommendations" and 
"views" on long-term objectives, amendments to the agreements, authorization of the use of 
specialized satellite facilities outside of Intelsat etc. Both bodies were created in order to 
give Intelsat a more "democratic" structure since all designated operating entities are 
represented on an equal basis. ^
The director general: While in the interim period Comsat was responsible for the managing 
of Intelsat, the permanent agreements of 1973 created the position of a director general 
who has to supervise the construction, establishment, operation and maintenance of the 
space segment.34
Intelsat thus has the status of an international organisation. Its internal structure, however, 
resembles one of a private firm which pursues commercial interests. As will be seen this 
contradictory structure has led to conflicting interests between political and commercial 
goals. Moreover, it made Intelsat especially vulnerable to entry. As an international 
organisation Intelsat has certain obligations which are founded in political aims. For 
instance it offers international distribution of voice, data and video signals to the member 
countries on a non-disaiminatory basis.35 Therefore a system of cross-subsidisation was set 
up which resembles the one described already for national networks. Revenues from high 
traffic routes (eg the North Atlantic region) subsidize low density ones. As a consequence 
signatories from industrialized countries subsidize less profitable traffic routes that 
interconnect geographically isolated and /or developing countries.36 Again similarly to the 
national debate, market entry in the intercontinental market is therefore disputed not only 
in terms of efficiency but also as regards the redistributional impact.
Also from an institutional point of view the Intelsat agreements may be seen as an 
extension of national arrangements to the international market. Intelsat owns only the 
space segment of the international satellite network (including tracking, telemetry and
34 Ail in more detail: Snow^1987a), pp.44-54.
3® Article V of the intergovernmental agreement prohibits price discrimination among users erf the same service.
*  Gershon, RA. (1990), p.249.
293
control), while the ground segments are owned and operated by the national 
telecommunications entities. On the European side therefore the Intelsat system gives full 
control over the satellite network to national operators. Being the only national signatory, 
they control the space capacity available and decide about the conditions for access by 
other users.
Since the beginning, Intelsat almost enjoyed a monopoly status in the delivery of 
international satellite communications. Currently it's share of the world's international 
telephone calls is at about 70% while it delivers almost all international television 
transmission.37 This exclusive position is stipulated in the permanent agreements of 1973 
which also contain provisions regarding the use of separate satellite systems by Intelsat 
members (Article XIV of the intergovernmental agreement). Before using separate 
satellite systems for domestic needs a member must consult the Board of Governors on 
technical compatibility. An economic criterion is also applied. The member country is 
obliged to avoid significant economic harm to the global system of Intelsat. After being 
consultated the Assembly of Parties will make recommendations. Although article XIV 
does not explicitly deal with the question of non-compliance, member states can be 
sanctioned in the case of a breach of rules. According to article XVI of the 
intergovernmental agreement the expulsion of a member country is possible. Further 
sanctions can be applied if a signatory fails to pay the capital contributions due to the 
quota. However, so far no member country has actually been expelled.38 The "economic 
harm" Article appears rather to apply moral suasion instead of legal sanctions. In particular 
those countries which foster private satellite systems do not interpret Article XTV(d) as 
prohibiting their installations.39 Moreover, it is directed only towards the challenge of 
private satellite systems. Due to the technological progress, however, Intelsat is mainly 
challenged by submarine fibre optic cables which are not covered by the Intelsat treaty.
Intelsat's tariff policy is regulated in the permanent agreements. In contrast to the bilateral 
character of international tariffs routed through terrestrial networks in the case of satellite 
technology, tariffs are settled by multilateral agreements. Generally, collection charges do 
not depend on whether a call is routed through the terrestrial or through the space 
network.
Article V of the intergovernmental agreement and Article 8 of the Operating Agreement 
constrain Intelsat to non-discriminatory and average-cost tariffs, resepectively. Average 
cost pricing, however, only applies in an aggregated sense, thus individual services can 
divert from this principle. The pricing regime is consistent with the rate-base pricing
37 The transatlantic satellites had a capacity of 6300 voice circuits in 1966; roughly six times the capacity of AT&T
cables. Compare: Trezise, Philip, H. (1987), p337.
»  Snow, MS. (1967a), pp 61-63.
»Snow, M S (1967b), p.136.
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principles used by regulated public utilities in the US. The prohibition of price 
discrimination leads to a subsidy of low density routes. As a consequence Intelsat has to 
prohibit rate arbitrage by users engaging in the resale of their circuits to third parties (cream 
skimming).
Suming up, in the past TOs succeeded in extending their network monopoly from cable to 
satellite technology. Both systems were part of what has been described as the "cooperative 
model". The next chapter will investigate the sources from which competition may arise in 
international telecommunication. It will be seen that there are increasing spillover effects 
from national measures of liberalisation.
12.1 A. Competition In the Intercontinental Market
Generally, facility based competition in international telecommunications may stem from 
four different sources:
1) private networks which satisfy demand of closed user groups and which may resell 
spare capacity.
2) public network operators establishing further cable links and reselling capacity to 
other countries.
3) competition among the satellite and the cable networks.
4) entry by additional satellite operators.
To a different extent all four sources of competition already work in the intercontinental 
market. Case 2) of traffic routing was already discussed above. In particular, the 
importance of private networks is rising fast.
The current international arrangements have so far determined the pattern of market 
entry. They undermine the competitiveness of established carriers especially in relation to 
private networks. Large users get artificial advantages to shift their traffic from public 
switched telecom networks (PSTN) to specialized networks, which allow them to avoid the 
accounting rate mechanism. This very much resembles the bypass of access charges to local 
networks in the USA (discussed in chapter 6). The same applies for operators installing 
separate satellite systems who do not have to take account of the accounting rate when 
settling their tariff structure. Instead entry by carriers establishing public switched networks 
is discouraged.
However, the main threat to Intelsat’s position as a dominant firm appeared from 3) and 
4). First, Intelsat member countries became more interested in establishing separate satellite 
systems. Secondly, on bilateral and multilateral basis national common carriers have started
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to deploy sub-oceanic fibre optic cables. In both cases technological progress and political 
interests fostered entry into the international communications market.
In the case of separate satellite systems two cases again have to be distinguished. First, 
some Intelsat member countries wanted to install regional systems owned by TOs. Thereby 
a certain share of satellite traffic was diverted from Intelsat. However, since the separate 
system is owned by Intelsat members themselves, competition was not at stake. Second and 
more recently, the USA have licensed private separate satellite systems which, however only 
operate in niche markets.
The first step was mainly chosen for political interests. In the 70’s the dependence on US 
satellites and rocketry diminished and Intelsat member countries wished to install their 
own domestic satellite systems. To avoid this Intelsat agreed to lease transponders for 
domestic use by its members in 1973. By doing so, however, it could not achieve more than 
a postponement of regional and domestic systems (like Eutelsat). Thus the first inroads 
into Intelsat’s domain came from other governmental institutions which were set up mainly 
in order to support the regional space industry.40 The intention was not to stir up price 
competition. On the other hand the favourable attitude of Intelsat's dominant member 
changed over time. While in the 60s the USA had a veto right concerning decisions of the 
Board, their quota diminished gradually to below 25%. This was accompanied by a 
declining share of US participation in Intelsat spacecraft and research subcontracting. As a 
result, the US interest in maintaining Intelsat’s predominance declined. Moreover, the 
national deregulatory movement quickly led to spillover effects to the international market. 
The liberalisation of the domestic satellite market in 1972 ("open sky policy") encouraged 
private satellite carriers also to file with the FCC for the international market. In 1981 the 
FCC authorized limited use of domestic satellites for transborder communications between 
the US and neighbouring countries. Intelsat was too expensive for these markets 41 The US 
government asserted that the "significant economic harm" clause did not commit Intelsat 
members to refrain from establishing separate international systems. It asserted that 
Article XIV only provided for consultations. In November 1984 the Reagan administration 
declared support for private international satellites. However, they were not meant to 
operate on the basis of a common carrier status which would have allowed them to route 
communications through public switched networks. By preventing them from doing so it 
was claimed that significant economic harm could be avoided. Only 20% of Intelsat traffic 
were put under pressure while the "core" of Intelsat earnings would remain unchallenged. 
By 1985 five applicants sought licensing to provide private satellite services in the North 
Atlantic region. Being excluded from the public switched network they proposed to carry 
traffic within the network owned or leased by the customer. PanAmSat was the only 
applicant who proposed traffic to Latin America. Thereby it claimed to fill a market niche
40 European aerospace firms complained that they did not receive their "fair share" of Intelsat contracts.
Compare: Gershon, RA. (1990), p.251.
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which was not served satisfactorily by Intelsat In 1987 PanAmSat launched its first satellite 
which currently offers services for sale and lease between the USA» Latin America, the 
Carribean and Spain.
By the end of 1991, the US government dedared its intention to abolish Intelsat's 
monopoly. Firms like Alpha Lyracom which so far were allowed to use their satellites only 
for the transmission of TV signals, are potential entrants in the telecommunications 
market42
On the technological side over time the scarcity and high cost of satellite channels were 
overcome. Moreover, technological progress facilitated the provision of a much greater 
diversity of services, a potential which cannot be catered solely by Intelsat. As a result again 
potential entrants claimed that they would not compete with Intelsat "core" services, but 
instead they would offer complementary ones. Furthermore the high rate of absolute traffic 
growth was regarded sufficient to compensate Intelsat for any relative losses in market 
share due to entry.43
More recently fibre optic submarine cables have become the major threat to Intelsat’s long 
term financial viability. Intelsat’s agreements do not put obligations on its signatories to 
ensure that non-satellite transmission modes do not cause "economic harm”. However, 
while European operators have no incentive to threaten Intelsat, US carriers may have an 
artificial one to do so. Being signatories of Intelsat, European PTTs may not wish to build 
submarine cable capacity in order to compete with their own satellite venture. On the other 
hand the US regulatory environment encourages carriers to do so. AT&T as a rate-base 
regulated company has an uneconomic incentive to build and use its own cables which it 
can include in its rate base. If AT&T instead leases Comsat’s satellite circuits it has to 
cover all expenses. As a result the FCC had to apply a proportional-fill-policy requiring 
AT&T to use an approximately equal number of satellite and cable circuits for overseas 
links. However, this proportinal-fill policy has been challenged and recently the FCC has 
relaxed the loading requirement for AT&T. By 1994 this requirement will be down to 30%.
Moreover, the Intelsat pricing policy gives artificial advantages to the installation of fibre 
optic cables for which carriers are free to apply their own tariff principles. This is 
encouraged by the cross-subsidizing policy applied by Intelsat. Finally, in the US the trend 
towards liberalisation of the domestic market has also stimulated competition for Intelsat. 
The emergence of new long-distance carriers has led to separate agreements which 
circumvent the network build up by TOs. On both sides of the Atlantic national competitors 
occur which are able to instal competing private cable networks. Besides the PTAT-1, BT 
cooperates with MCI building the TAT-X cable which will handle 150,000 calls
Wirtschaftswoche, Dezember 7,1991.
o  Snow, M.S. (1987a), p.99.
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simultaneously.44 After some resistance European TOs also start cooperating with 
competitors to AT&T in the USA. MCI for example concluded agreements with the 
Belgian TO to carry traffic to and from that country. As a result, 1990 Intelsat's revenues 
plunged 19% because of competition from fibre-optic cables.43
The rapid increase of satellites and fibre optic transatlantic cables will most likely create 
excess capacity in the 1990s.46 As a result a significant competitive challenge is expected for 
Intelsat. While in 1975 there were about 8,000 voice circuits in transatlantic cable, this 
number rose to 37,000 in 1985.47 It is reckoned that by the mid 1990s about 650,000 voice 
circuits are available between the USA and Europe while projected demand is estimated to 
rise only to 82,000 circuits.48 Thus even if Intelsat were protected against entry of private 
satellite systems the fibre optic cables would put it under competitive pressure. Intelsat has 
already reacted to the changing environment by redeploying its resources to the markets 
for which satellite communications are best suited: point-to-multipoint communications 
(broadcasting) and private corporate networks. Since 1984 Intelsat has introduced more 
than 100 new services. However, in order to prevent artificial entry it is necessary to free 
Intelsat from regulatory restrictions which prevent it from responding to competition. 
Presently the incumbent is put at an disadvantage due to the average-cost pricing rule. It is 
assumed that the incumbent could have formidable power if it gets permission to set prices 
flexibly. Thereby entry would be foreclosed until market growth would require further 
capacity. Once being freed from regulatory restrictions the "core” of Intelsat services could 
prove to be a sustainable natural monopoly which does not need regulatory protection. 
Since the intercontinental market is rapidly growing in both basic and value added services, 
Intelsat is likely to lose market share rather than absolute levels of traffic. Moreover, due to 
technical problems which arise for fibre-otic cables carriers are expected to keep satellite 
capacity always as a backup if their submarine cable is down.49
During the last decade the intercontinental communications market has changed 
fundamentally. Although the vast majority of Intelsat member countries still grant exclusive 
powers to their signatories, in the intercontinental market competition has come about. 
This is due to national policies of liberalisation in the US and the UK. While the 
homogeneous market structure is destroyed, interests of carriers start to diverge. A market
44 Financial Timet, November 6,1990.
49 Wall Street Journal, December 2,1991.
44 Compare: Genhon, RA. (1990), p.255.
47 Source: FCC. Quoted from: Dixon, Financial Times, April 3,1990.
48 Genhon, RA. (1990), p.255.
** FinTech, May 31,1990.
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is emerging which consists of a dominant firm Intelsat, private satellite systems, regional 
satellite institutions, and different fibre-optic consortia.
12.1.5. Evidence of Strategic Behavior
Experience in the intercontinental market is also interesting from the aspect of strategic 
behavior of incumbents. Both, carriers investing into suboceanic cable networks and Intelsat 
have been challenged for strategic investments.
Several authors have pointed out that excess capacity in both the Atlantic and the Pacific 
Ocean Basins has been a persistent problem. Between 1970 and 1985 nearly every year 
fewer than 50% of satellite circuits were actually used.-*® Similar overinvestment has 
materialized in the intercontinental cable networks. TAT-8 by itself has a capacity which 
alone was sufficient to cover all voice traffic between the USA and Western Europe in 
1990. Nevertheless, carriers filed for completion of TAT-9 for 1991 with a potential 
capacity double that of TAT-8.51 Based on cronically overoptimistic estimates of the growth 
of demand, capacity generally was well above utilization. The effect would have been even 
stronger if not for the FCC. In accordance with the Communications Act of 1934 the FCC 
has an obligation to prevent unreasonable high investments of US carriers. However, as 
experience showed with TAT-7 in 1983 and TAT-8 the Commission could not prevent the 
establishment of these links, although it initially had concluded that they were not needed.
While some excess capacity is desirable to protect against failure of existing facilities, it has 
been claimed that the existing scope of idle capacity in the system cannot be explained on 
technical grounds alone. On the side of the US carriers overinvestment could be explained 
by rate-of-retum regulation which gives an incentive to Comsat to inflate its rate base. 
Given that AT&T was forced by the FCC to use satellites for about one-half of its circuit 
requirements, Comsat did not have to fear that rising costs would induce its main customer 
to switch to alternative means of transmission. This, however, does not explain the interest 
of European TOs to pay for their share in capacity investment. Only in cooperation with 
foreign TOs, however, could Comsat and AT&T overinvest into satellite and cable capacity. 
Intelsat’s overall investment programme reflects the collective decisions of its more than 
100 members.
An alternative interpretation therefore is that overcapacity was regarded as a means to 
fence off potential entrants. Since the US in 1972 had liberalised the domestic satellite 
market, spillover effects into the intercontinental market were likely to occur. Excess 
capacity than could be used as a signal to both, the regulators and potential competitors.
30 Johnson, L.L. (1987), p.282. And; Trerisc, P. H. (1987), p.336.
«  Johnson, LX. (1989), p. 228.
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Hie latter had to reckon that the incumbent was able to increase output rapidly without 
incurring high investment costs. Despite the high profit margin which could be observed in 
the market, competitors then had to assume that these would shrink drastically in the case 
of entry.
A second motivation for "strategic” investments may have been to give a certain signal to 
the FCC. Excess capacity could be used to convince the regulator that actually the licensing 
of further networks would be a waste of resources.
From a strategic point of view, similar to US carriers, European TOs therefore may seek to 
forestall the installation of private networks by investing in excess capacity in Intelsat and 
suboceanic cables. This joint interest of incumbents may explain the rapid increase in 
transAtlantic fibre optic cables and Intelsat’s capacity which occured during the last years.
Pricing behaviour of Intelsat is also consistent with this interpretation. Anticipating the 
competitive pressure which came about from private fibre optic cables and the PanAmSat 
satellite system, Intelsat sought to reduce tariffs in selected uses. Rather rapidly Intelsat 
managed to market new services at relatively low prices and subsequently in 1988 its 
utilization of worldwide capacity grew to 69%.52 Thus its postentry behavior corresponded 
exactly to that expected from a strategically behaving incumbent. This led to disputes 
whether Intelsat would apply predatory pricing to discourage entry.53 Predatory behaviour 
might have become a feasible strategy for Intelsat, first, because it was able to compensate 
for losses by using profits made in still monopolised markets ("deep pocket strategy"). 
Second, due to the previous establishment of excess capacity, it was able to rapidly increase 
quantity at low additional cost.
122. The European International Telecommunications Market
122.1. The Regulatory Regime
Generally, the regulatory regime of the international European market is not different 
from the intercontinental one. So far on the European level apart from the ITU, no 
regulatory body has emerged which specifically regulates the bilateral agreements of 
national carriers. However, recently the Commission has started to play a more active role 
in the international telecommunications market. On 10 May, 1990 it threatened to 
challenge the TO cartel on grounds of the competition rules of the Treaty of Rome.54
52 Johnson, L-L. (1989), p. 226.
53 Johnson, LX. (1989), p. 223.
^The Commission announced its intention to examine whether the arrangements governing international 
telephone charges are compatible with the competition rules of the Treaty of Rome. See in detail: Cheong, K. 
and M. Mullins (1991), p.114, and FtnTech, May 2,1991.
300
For the continental cable network in Europe, CCITT recommendations prescribe exact 
ratios between the prices of automatic switched services and the monthly rental for leased 
lines. As far as they are applied nationally, the opportunity to use leased lines for 
competing services is thereby restricted. Thus the CCITT recommendations have the 
purpose to protect the monopoly revenues of the incumbent firms.55 Private leased circuit 
networks are generally only permitted for single subscribers which may not resell capacity 
or provide third party traffic.56 Accounting rates among service providers have been fixed 
by the CCITT, based on cost studies carried out by this institution. In order to prevent 
bypass the recommendations ask for the prohibition of tariff arbitrage. 
Telecommunications routing could be used to gain rost advantages. However, by this 
regulation the incentive to do so is diminished. In order to avoid financial disadvantages for 
a destination operator, the operator of origin using a transit route not agreed upon before, 
has to reimburse the operator of destination as if the authorized routes had been used.57
Although Intelsat capacity is used for the intercontinental market as well as for intra­
continental ("regional") markets, in Europe Eutelsat was set up as an additional satellite 
institution. It has presently 28 member countries. The regulatory regime for the space 
segment in Europe was designed according to the intercontinental market. In contrast to 
the intercontinental market where Intelsat until recently enjoyed a monopoly position for 
satellite communication, in Europe different satellite networks already exist. Beside 
Intelsat and Eutelsat various European states have set up their own national satellite 
systems. France launched the TELECOM and TDF satellites, Germany the DFS and TV- 
SAT satellites and Italy and Spain will follow suit with their own systems. In 1988 the first 
private (TV only) European satellite was set up (ASTRA). Furthermore, a growing number 
of non-European satellites has emerged which also can be used for services with European 
coverage.58 However, since national TOs keep control over Intelsat, Eutelsat and national 
satellites, the different systems so far have not started to compete. In 1990 there were 11 
satellite carriers with 24 operational telecommunications satellites serving Western 
Europe.59 However, Eutelsat is the dominant player in Europe. It operates telecom 
satellites for telephony, data and video services within the FSS frequency band. All EC 
countries are members of Eutelsat and presently their investment share is 88Vo.60 The 
signatories have the exclusive right to purchase and resell space segment capacity. Any 
organisations which want to rent capacity from Eutelsat in order to set up their own service
»  Wilt, D. (1987), p360.
J rif^iitt for instance are provided for SWIFT, a network for transactions between banks.
57 Witt, D. (1987), p360/361.
»  Com(90) 490,20/11/90, p.78.
»  EC (1990), Annex ffl.
«o Com(90) 20/11/90, p.14-15.
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are obliged to purchase the segment from the national signatory.61 Again the European 
70s have formed a cartel which restricts competition in two ways. First, as signatories they 
individually have control over the distribution of the national quota of Eutelsat space 
capacity. This is provided for in Article 16a of the Operating Agreement in conjunction 
with Article nb of the Convention. Thereby they can preclude or discriminate against 
private satellite service providers. Second, by pooling together their sales of space segment 
capacity they also restrict competition between themselves. As with Intelsat there are 
■economic harm" procedures which bind national governments not to establish other 
satellite systems which cause an economic harm to Eutelsat.62 However, the treaty's ruling 
does not determine what actions can be taken against a member country which does not 
comply with these obligations.
Moreover, the procedure under Article XVI has never led to the conclusion that significant 
economic harm has been caused by a competing provider. As has been pointed out before 
separate satellite networks have already been installed by Member Countries. As in the 
case of Intelsat the "significant economic harm" clause cannot prevent a Party from 
authorizing such a competitor. Since these national satellite systems are installed by the 
same organisations which control Intelsat and Eutelsat, they are not used for price 
competition with the latter. The impact of these national satellite systems on Eutelsat may 
be compared to the installation of a private network for closed user groups. They cut out a 
certain slice of Eutelsat’s market. The size of the slice is exogenously given. Then Eutelsat 
has no incentive to change its pricing behaviour to regain part of the lost market share. 
Thus competitive pressure is not exerted by these systems. If established unilaterally, a 
private satellite operator would face problems achieving the necessary uplink authorization 
from other countries. This also keeps TOs from using their national satellite systems from 
competing with Eutelsat
Moreover, the present regulatory regime leads to a conflict of interests in that the national 
telecom organisation has regulatory and operational responsabilities. Since normally the 
TOs are the national signatory to Eutelsat, potential private users of space capacity have to 
apply to their competitor in order to get access. As a result they are likely to be 
discriminated against if their services compete with those provided by the national TO. 
Moreover, the present regime keeps Eutelsat from developing independent commercial 
strategies when selling space capacity. A further drawback of the present system is that the 
potential benefits of the satellite system cannot be reaped if TOs operate both the 
terrestrial and the space network. This can be explained by the TOs subordinating the 
usage and the pricing of their satellite capacity to the specific targets of their own business
61 The European Broadcasting Union (EBU) is the only exception. Communications Week International, April.
62 Article XVI a) of the EUTELSAT convention provides that "any Party or Signatory which intends (...) to
establish, acquire or utilize space segment equipment separate from the EUTELSAT Space Segment (...) shall 
(...) furnish all relevant information to the Assembly of Parties through the Board of signatories which shall 
establish whether there is likely to be any significant economic harm to EUTELSAT.”
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strategy. Since their main business is still the operation of the terrestrial network the 
satellite system is used rather as a backup for the former. Thereby the satellite capacity is 
not fully used.
12.2.2. International Tariffs in Europe
The following empirical investigation of the tariff structure in EC member countries will 
first look at the price development for basic telephone services. I concentrate on those 
member countries which were discussed in some detail before.
The tariff structure of the public switched telephone network (PSTN) is fairly uniform 
throughout Europe. There are three different services: local, long-distance and 
international. However, sometimes there exist also intermediate cases like special prices 
for border zones. Moreover, tariff zones vary considerably among EC countries. Many calls 
considered to be local by BT are long-distance in other countries. Charges depend on day 
time, duration and distance. In the UK competition between BT and Mercury has led to a 
large variety of discounts for big users. Finally, some countries levy a value-added tax 
(VAT) on telecommunications services, while others do not.
For these differences the following price comparisons can only be a rough approximation of 
the true cost of telecommunications in individual member countries. However, they may 
provide an overview on general developments in telecommunications pricing.
a) Local calls
In the case of local telephony one finds that until 1990 relative prices were developing in 
the same way in all four member countries. Italy (1982) and GB (1987) saw drastic price 
increases. However, the price increase in GB was less dramatic than predicted after the 
partial liberalisation of 1984. Instead in 1990 in Spain, Telef6nica increased the price for 
local phone calls by 200%. For the other three countries, the 1991 real local price was lower 
in 1977.
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Graph 123.: relative prices for local service in 4 member countries 1977-1991 for a 3 minute 
call (1977 = 100)63
Graph 12.4. instead depicts absolute local prices in all EC member countries in 1990. It 
shows that in the UK local calls are the most expensive. They are comparatively cheap in 
the other three member countries discussed here (this does not include the recent price 
increase in Spain). A local call costs about four times more in the UK, compared with 
Germany. In general, European TOs either have kept nominal local calls constant, or 
lowered them in the period 1985-1990*
Generally, there is a trend in Europe towards enlarged local-tariff-zones. This results from 
technical network developments which renders it economical to switch the traffic further 
away from customer premises.
*3 Sources for relative price development: See appendix. In the case of GB the price for BT has been chosen. 
G * Germany I -  Italy GB * Great Britain S -  Spain 
44 Source: Fin Tech, September 6,1990.
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Graph 12.4.: absolute Prices one minute local call in USS, 1990s5
b) long-distance calls
In the long-distance market GB saw the sharpest decline in relative prices since 1977. As 
can be seen from graph 12.5, after 1984 the price decrease accelerated. By 1991 a three- 
m in lit e-call costed about 35% of the price of 1977. Price developments in Spain and 
Germany indicate that since the late 1980s an effort has been made to move long-distance 
prices more towards costs. The opposite holds for Italy where long-distance calls decreased 
significantly until 1989. Thereafter the long-distance prices were increased while local calls 
became cheaper.
65 See: Sessions, Margrit (1991), p. 29.
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Graph 12-5.r relative prices for a 3 minute long-distance call above 100 Km (peak rate) in 4 
member countries 1977-1991 (1977 -  100)
However, when comparing absolute long-distance prices, both carriers in the UK have only 
a middle position. Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark and Spain had cheaper rates in 
1990.
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Graph 12.6.: absolute prices o f a one minute long-distance call ( > 100 Km ) in US$, 1990s6
c) intra EC calls
In the case of calls to EC member countries, Germany saw the greatest decline in relative 
prices, due to price changes in the early 1980s. GB was passed over by Spain, which, 
however according to graph 12.8. still had the highest absolute price for calling the EC 
among all twelve member countries.
As in the case of national long-distance calls, prices for EC calls are cheaper in Denmark, 
Luxembourg and Netherlands when compared to Mercury. Italy did not see much price 
decrease in relative prices and in 1990 beside Ireland it was the most expensive place for 
national and international long-distance calls (see also graph 12.2. for prices to the USA).
66 Source: FinTech, September 6,1990.
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Graph 12.7.: relative prices o f coils to EC member countries, peak time 1977-1991 (1977 = 
100).
While especially BT and Mercury charge many different rates for international calls, other 
TOs like France Telecom apply only a single rate. The use of a single charging zone, 
however, is against the principle of cost orientation. Costs vary whether a call is made to a 
neighbouring country (France - Germany) or to a more distant one ( France - Greece).
On average, across-the-border peak-time calls are 2.5 to 3 times as expensive as equivalent 
national long-distance calls. Moreover, prices for a call in one direction differ up to a factor 
of 2 from a price for the same call in the opposite direction.
+
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Graph 12.8.: absolute prices for 1 minute call to EC countries in USS, 1990 derived from a 
basket? 1
d) Access prices
Graph 12.9. depicts the connection charges in EC countries. These are relatively high in the 
UK, Denmark and Greece, while the DBP Telekom has the lowest access charges in 
Europe.
47 Source: Fin Tech, September t>, 1990.
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Graph 12.9.: absolute connection charges in EC countries, in USS, 19906*
Overall comparison
The price comparison has shown that in the UK competition has led to a rebalancing of 
tariffs similar to that in the USA. In an European context, the UK is among the countries 
with the highest connection and local charges. Considerable price decreases were 
encountered in those markets where competition has come about (national long-distance 
and intercontinental calls). Supposedly the cost variety of discounts and tariff bands leads 
to a price structure which is more related to the costs of providing an individual service. On 
the other hand, among the TOs operating as monopolists, currently five do not offer off- 
peak reduction for European wide calls.69
However, when compared with EC countries which have introduced cost orientation in 
tariffs, the UK is not especially cheap. The Netherlands, Denmark and Luxembourg are 
cheaper in access, local service, long-distance and intra EC calls. In the case of calls to the 
US they are next to the UK operators. OECD and Oftel studies have compared residential 
and business price baskets for the UK, Germany, France and Italy (1991). According to 
those studies France was the cheapest place for residential and business, while the UK and 
Germany were close.70 Lógica calculated the basket for business telephone costs for 1990 
for EC and Scandinavian countries. The basket consisted of 30% local, 10% long-distance,
** Source: FinTech, September 6,1990.
69 Ungerer, H. (1990), p. 11.
70 FinTech, February 21,1991.
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30% EC and 30% USA call prices. While getting similar results for the previously 
mentioned countries, the Logica index showed that business telephone costs in Denmark 
and Netherlands amount only to two third of the UK (BT). Several other countries also 
remained cheaper than BT71
These data suggest that in the UK the duopoly mainly led to a rebalancing of tariffs. 
Compared with telecommunications tariffs in other advanced EC member countries, the 
UK has not become a cheaper place.
For universal service reasons one would expect countries with a relatively low connections 
rate to have relatively low prices for access and local services, while being expensive for 
long-distance services. The opposite may hold for countries having already achieved 
country wide coverage. These countries could be expected to be more concerned with cost 
based pricing. Overall, these presumptions are confirmed by the data, with some 
noteworthy exceptions. Countries like Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal have been 
the most expensive ones for international calls. However, only Portugal turned out to be 
among the cheapest for access and local calls. Italy and Greece instead are expensive also 
when access is concerned and take a middle position for local calls. In the case of Greece 
this might be explained with higher cost of installing cables among the different islands. 
That Italy is especially expensive in telecommunications services was further shown by the 
abovementioned international price comparisons of OFTEL. According to OFTEL, Italian 
customers are charged up to 30 per cent more than those in the UK72. Given the low 
quality of service, the Italian telecommunications operators therefore appear especially 
inefficient. This partly can be explained by the disjoint telecommunications system which 
prevented the TO from reaping economies of scope (compare chapter 9).
When investigating the pricing policies of countries with an advanced telecommunications 
network, one finds that some TOs already apply a cost orientation. Moreover these 
countries appear to be the cheapest places for telecommunications service in Europe 
(Luxembourg, Netherlands and Denmark). Germany instead has not gone far in realigning 
prices with costs. Although it has reached already universal service it is by far the cheapest 
country in Europe as far as customer access is concerned. In 1990 access cost in Germany 
less than one fifth of the price charged by BT. Access and relatively low local charges are 
cross subsidized by national and international long-distance charges which are the highest 
among the advanced EC member countries. As far as TOs have started to rebalance their 
tariffs, this process was concentrated on national services. Thereby over time the main 
burden of cross-subsidisation has been shifted towards international services. This was seen 
most clearly in Italy, where international tariffs followed local ones, while long-distance 
tariffs decreased over time. Intra EC tariffs are still 2.5 times higher than the highest
71 Logics (1991), Tarifica Annual, Tariff Comparisons and: Financial Times, July 4,1991.
72 FinTech, February 21,1991.
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jwtional long-distance tariffs73. Moreover, it could be seen that among member countries 
national prices diverge more than international ones. This may be explained by the existing 
of accounting rates which put a lower floor to international prices.
73 Compare: Se—ioni, M. (1991), p. 10.
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13. Estimation of Demand Elasticities
13.1. Introduction
As was pointed out in part H, assumptions concerning price elasticities of demand for 
telecommunications services are important when studying pricing principles. In the 
following estimates are presented to examine whether the assumptions made can be 
empirically supported. There already exists a literature of similar studies which were made 
for a variety of countries.1 Most investigations, however, are concentrated on the USA.2 No 
comprehensive study has been found for EC member countries.3 For the four countries 
discussed here in detail I have therefore carried out these estimations myself.
In the following the results of estimates of the price elasticity of demand are reported for 
different basic services in Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK In order to compare the 
findings, the estimations carried out below all rely on the same models. In this chapter I 
first present the models, explain the underying assumptions and describe the data set. 
Thereafter results are presented for the four EC member countries.
Most studies use demand functions for telephone services which contain as independent 
variables only the telephone price and real income.4 Thereby possible cross price effects 
are neglected. In the first model presented here other means of communication are 
included as possible substitutes (like telex or telegram). A similar investigation has been 
carried out by Rea and Lage.5 However, in order to compare results and to estimate 
subsamples, for international services I also estimated a second model without substitute 
services.
13.2. Demand Equations
The demand functions for telephone services are postulated to be:
(1) log Local * a0 + a/log(PTL/p) + <*2 l°g(PEL/p) + a j  log(PTx/p) + a4 
log(PTg/P) + (15 log(Disinc/p) + €j
1 See for instance for Australia: Beweley, Ronald and Delnzil G. Ficbig (1988), pp 393 - 409. For the USA: Griffin,
James M. (1982), pp.59-66. Ben-Akiva, M., McFadden, D. and K.E. Train (1987), pp.109-123. Lage, G.M. and 
J.D. Rea (1978), pp. 363-381. For Switzerland: Gassmann, J.M., Gfeller, A. and W. Wasserfallen (1986), pp. 
187-197. For West Germany. Neumann, K.-H., Schweizer, U., von Weizsäcker C. C. (1982), pp. 185-204, 
especially p. 194.
2 A good presentation and critique can be found in: Taylor, Lester D. (1980).
3 This may be explained by the fact that the necessary data are not systematically collected by TOs or related
libraries. For my own studies they had to be assembled step by step from different sources (see appendix).
4 See for instance: Gassmann, J.M., Gfeller, A. and W. Wasserfallen (1986), p. 188 and Bewley, R. and D.G. Fiebig
(1988), p. 395.
3 For international communication services of the USA. Rea, J.D. and G.M. Lage (1978), p. 364.
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(2) log Long * p0 + 0/log(PTLL/p) + 02 log(PEL/p) + log(PTx/p) + $4  
log(PTg/P) + £5 log(Disinc/p) + e2
(3) log France ■ r0 + r/log(PTFrance/p) + r2 log(PEL/p) + r3 log(PTx/p) + 
log(PTg/P) + r$ log(Disinc/p) + log (Trade/p) + €j
where:
Local * number of local phone calls (annually).
Long: * number of long-distance phone calls (annually).
France * number of outgoing phone calls to, for instance, France (annually).
PTL = price index for a 3 minute local call.
PTLL = price index for a 3 minute long-distance call ( > 100km) at day time.
PTFrance = price index for a 3 minute international call to, for instance, France at day 
time.
PEL = price index for an express letter.
PTx = price index for a telex (2 minutes).
PTg * price index for a telegram (20 words).
Disinc = household disposable income.
Trade * value of exports and imports between the two countries involved in the 
communication, 
p * general price index, 
e 1 =* random disturbances.
The a ’s, 0 \  and r ’s are assumed to be constant coefficients. Given the logarithmic 
specification they are also the elasticities of demand. It is assumed that the own-price 
effects are negative. The opposite is expected for the substitute services (express letters, 
telex, and telegram). Disposable income is supposed to represent the income constraint on 
households. In case of the international demand function the "trade” variable is used to 
represent the business sector which is supposed to have a high share in international calls.6 
For both variables it is expected that the elasticity of demand is positive.
133. Data
For all services annual data were collected for the period 1970 - 1989. Complete data for 
the years before 1970 could not be obtained. The dependent variable is measured as the 
total volume of phone calls made in one year.7 Prices have been deflated by an index of
6 For the national demand function different variables were introduced to represent "business demand". However,
all available data was too much aggregated. Variables like "gnp" then had the same impact as the "disinc" 
variable. The latter was finally chosen to allow comparisons of national and international demand equations.
7 For the same reason they are generally used in the literature as praxis. See for instance: Rea, J.D. and G.M. Lage
(1978), p. 366-367.
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general prices. The price for an individual service is determined for each year. In case of 
price changes during a year a weighted average was calculated. The appendix contains all 
data used for the estimations, including sources.
In order to investigate whether results have changed over time, I have also estimated the 
equations for subsamples. Results of these subsamples, however, can be taken only as a 
indicative, due to the small number of degrees of freedom. Compared to the model of the 
domestic market, as can be seen from equation (3), in the international market an 
additional variable has been added (trade). As a result, in case of subsamples too many 
degrees of freedom were lost. Subsamples therefore have only been calculated for the 
second model which excludes substitute services (see tables 133) to 13.6) for West 
Germany). Over the entire sample both models have been estimated in order to see 
whether results depend on the specific model chosen. Before calculating subsamples, first 
by introducing a dummy variable I tested whether a significant change in the own-price 
elasticity of demand occured. If this was the case, the estimations for subsamples were 
carried out.
There are several limitations imposed by the availability of data. The aggregate measures 
for household income and total trade are too broad in scope to measure the constraints of 
the demand function. Given the high concentration of long-distance phone calls on a few 
households and firms, some weighting is necessary. However, I had to rely on these 
imperfect proxys since more disaggregated data are not available.8
A second limitation stems from the identification problem. Generally, equations are 
identified since all nominal prices are determined by the Ministry. Thus all the independent 
variables are exogenous and no problem of simultaneity exists. However, it has to be 
assumed that capacity always had been sufficient, so that there has not been a constraint on 
demand. Thus it was assumed that the annual quantities of phone calls were indeed the 
quantities demanded at the particular price and year. Unfortunately it could not be 
determined whether supply has always been adequate.9
Finally, the problem of spurious relationship may occur in these demand equations. The 
problem of misspeciflcation arises if two variables move in the same direction but do not 
have a causal relationship. This may appear if the data are strongly time trended, which 
leads to non-stationarity of time series.10 A spurious relationship can be eliminated by 
including a further variable which determines the other two.11 I introduced the "trend"
I This »1«* applies for phone calls made during off-peak periods. No breakdown could be obtained from the DBP 
Telekom in order to weigh the price index.
* For the identification problem see: Pindyk, R.S. and D.L. Rubinfeld (1987), pp. 186-190. And: Lage, G.M. and 
JX>. Rea (1978), p. 367.
10 See for instance: Hunt, L.C. and E.L. Lynk (1990), 232.
u In several this was carried out. For instance, in the case of the Italian-German telephone market a variable 
representing "tourism" was introduced. Thereby I tried to investigate whether the annual flow of German 
tourists would « plain some part of the dependent and the "disinc" variable. Sec also chapter 9.
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variable, which was tested for Where it was significant the variable is included
in the model Overall the "trend” ;
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13.4. Empirical Results for West Germany
The empirical results are presented in tables 13.1 to 13.6 for West Germany. After the 
results for the three other member countries have been reported, in chapter 14 I will 
discuss the conclusions which can be drawn for the European telecommunications sector in 
general
The tables contain the estimates of demand elasticities. In brackets the values of the t- 
statistic are reported. The table includes also the Durbin Watson value (DW), the R^, and 
the "F-statistic for significance". The models have been calculated and tested with the PC- 
give program. Various test statistics can be found in the appendix.
a) domestic services
Table 13.1 and 13.2 comprise the empirical results for the local and national long-distance 
services in West Germany. Comparing equations (1) and (2) one finds that the own-price 
elasticity of demand for the local service is almost zero (-0.008), the t - value indicates that 
the null hypothesis that PTL is equal to zero cannot be rejected. Instead the own-price 
elasticity for the long-distance service has been estimated to be -0.18. The value is 
significant. In both cases the elasticity is negative as was expected. Moreover, the result 
supports the assumption made that long-distance services are more price elastic than local 
ones. The demand for both services is very elastic in regards to disposable household 
income. The results for the substitute services were not satisfying. While not always 
significant, in two cases they have the "wrong" sign. It was expected that the cross price 
elasticity would be positive.
For the subsamples it can be said that apparently the own-price elasticity of demand has 
risen over time in the long-distance market.12 However, as the DW test indicates, there is 
negative serial correlation for equation (2b). For national services, therefore, the results of 
the subsample are not relyable.
b) International Services
Results for international services are depicted in table 13.3 to 13.6. Table 133 to 13.5 
present estimations for services to EC member countries. These are compared afterwards 
with the German-US market.
The estimates of the own-price elasticity of demand for services to the three EC member 
countries report values between -033 and -0.51. All values are significant. On average they 
are more than twice the value estimated for the price elasticity for national long-distance.
Given the low t-valuc for the local service in equation (la) and (lb), for this service a similar conclusion cannot 
be made.
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The "trade" variable is significant only in the case of France, with the predicted positive 
sign. The income elasticity again is high, positive and always significant. The cross-price 
elasticities of substitute services appear to be low and positive (with the exception of telex). 
Equation (3a) to (5a) represent the alternative model which excludes the substitute 
services. As can be seen, the own-price elasticity increases to the range -0.5 to *0.67.
The subsamples show clearly for all three markets that the own-price elasticity of demand 
rose significantly for the second period. The value estimated for the entire period thereby 
lies in between the ones obtained for the two subsamples. Test results did not indicate 
autocorrelation, misspecification, heteroscedasticity or missing variables.
Finally, if compared to the telephone demand for calls outgoing from West Germany to the 
US, these results are confirmed. In the second period the own-price elasticity increases. 
However, one finds that for both models and also for the subsamples the price elasticity for 
calls to the USA exceeds that estimated for EC countries.
318



Ta
bl
e 
13
.A
: 
De
ma
nd
 
fo
r 
in
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
ph
on
e 
ca
ll
s 
fro
m 
W
es
t 
G
er
ma
ny
 
to 
G
re
at
 
B
ri
ta
in

Ta
bl
e 
13
.6
: 
De
ma
nd
 
fo
r 
in
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
ph
on
e 
ca
ll
s 
fro
m 
W
es
t 
Ge
rm
an
y 
to 
th
e 
US
A
13.5. Estimation of Demand Elasticities For Italy
As in the case of Germany, data were collected for the period 1970-1989. Principally the 
models have not changed to the ones used before. However, due to the availability of data 
minor changes had to be introduced. Unfortunately for the telex service national data were 
available only for the period 1976-1989. The latter period, however, does not offer 
sufficient observations to estimate subsamples. Therefore, for the model comprising the 
period 1971-1989 the telex service had to be neglected. However, estimates for the period 
starting 1976 are included to see whether results change. The "disinc" variable has been 
lagged since test results indicated that the lag is significant. Moreover, without the lag the 
value of the RCSS test was high, indicating autocorrelation. The test results generally 
improved with the lag. They can be found in the appendix.
Lwal Service
For the entire period and also for the subperiods all variables are significant. The substitute 
service PEL has the expected sign, while the price for telegrams is negative. The coefficient 
for household incume is above 1 and positive. It does not change much for the two 
subperiods. The own-price elasticity of demand finally is relatively low over the entire 
period (-0.139). This corresponds to the result obtained for West Germany. In contrast to 
the results obtained for the former, however, equation (7a) and (7b) indicate that the price 
elasticity for local telephone calls has risen over time.
For the latter two equations the small number of observations and the test results reduce 
their reliability.
Equation (7c) then mainly confirms the previous results. The substitute services have small 
coefficients. Telex and express letters are not significant. The income variable has not 
changed.
Long-distance Service
Again the equation for the entire period excludes "telex". Coefficients do not change 
considerably if (8) is compared with (8a). I tried to break down equation (8) into two 
subsamples as before. However, a low Durbin Watson value and also a very low value for 
the Reset test indicated misspecification due to missing variable(s). I therefore do not 
report the results for the subsamples.
In both equations PEL is significant and has the predicted positive sign. The other 
substitute services are not significant. The income variable is significant and positive. 
Finally, the coefficient of the own-price elasticity of demand is significant and negative. It 
exceeds the estimated elasticity for local service. Moreover, one finds that for the more 
recent period (8a) the price elasticity of demand is increased.
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International Services
As can be seen in the appendix data have been collected for phone calls from Italy to 
Germany and to all the EC. The former were reported as incoming calls from Italy per year 
by DBP Telekom. Unfortunately the estimates and the test results were not conclusive. A 
very low Durbin Watson value and the Reset test indicated missing variables. Several 
variables were introduced, without improving test results decisively.13 Thus, no findings can 
be reported for international services here.
u For instance, a variable for "tourism” was introduced, supposing that the number of outgoing calls from Italy to 
EC countries may be influenced by the number of tourists travelling to Italy every year. The variable was 
significant but did not improve test results sufficiently.
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13.6. Estimation of Demand Elasticities For Spain
Demand equations for Spanish telephone services correspond to those discussed for 
Germany. Unfortunately for Spain no data about the quantity of local calk was available. 
Prices for substitute services could not be obtained for the early 1970s. Thus for the 
equation for national long-distance calls I had to choose a shorter interval (1974*1987). 
Subpenods were formed again for the second model, neglecting substitute services. 
Regional data have been published by the Banco di Bilbao. These comprise disaggregated 
data on the quantity of national long-distance calls and disposable income of households, 
available for the penod 1976-1986. For the "disine" variable only every second year was 
reported, so that half of the values had to be estimated. The share of disposable income of 
each region to the national value of disposable income has been relatively stable. The 
approximation of the missing variable for a certain region then was carried out according 
the following procedure:
disinc'im disincri9 7 7 disincri979
= 0.5 —--------  + 0.5 ————-
disinc*!?» dismc°1977 d isinc"^
disincfim = the estimated value of disposable income of region r in 1978 
disinCiro = national disposable income in 1978.
Then I carried out estimations for three poor spanish regions: Guadalajara, Soria,Teruel 
and for three rich regions: Madrid, Alicante, Barcelona.
The selection was based on per capita income. The short period and the estimation of the 
disinc variable reduce the reliability of the results for the regions. In some cases the result 
of the reset test indicates missing variables. However, further variables could not be 
included given the small number of degrees of freedom. Moreover, especially for the less 
developed regions, results to some extent might have been influenced by insufficient 
capacity. Thus actual demand might have been higher than the number of calls observed. 
However, as will be seen, the main result of the regional estimates is that in poor regions 
the price elasticity of demand is considerable higher. Since over time the real price of long­
distance rails has fallen, capacity shortage leads then to an underestimation of price 
elasticity. Thus as far as congestion has occured in poorer regions, one might expect even 
more drastic differences in the price elasticity of demand.
For international phone calls originating in Spain no disaggregated data could be obtained. 
However, from the DBP Telekom I received data of incoming calls from Spain to West 
Germany, measured in million chargeable minutes 1970-1988. Thus estimation could be 
carried out for the Spanish-German telephone market. Unfortunately from Telef6nica I 
only obtained prices for a 3 minute call to Germany for the period 1978-1988. Therefore 
for the international market there are not enough degrees of freedom to create 
subsamples. For the same reason not all substitute services could be included. In the
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equation presented here I have left out "telex". The estimation results for the coefficients ol 
other variables did not depend much on which substitute service was left out. This can be 
seen also when comparing results for (10) and (10a). The "disinc" variable was lagged which 
improved test results.
As before I present in the following the main results of these estimations. Test results are 
reported in the appendix.
1) National services
a) national long-distance
Both, model 1 including substitute services and also model 2 show that the absolute value of 
the direct price elasticity of demand for Spanish long-distance calls is above 1. In both cases 
the price elasticity is significant The value of the own-priee elasticity is not altered much 
when substitute services were taken out. To see this, compare (9) and (9a). Not all 
substitute services are significant. Disposable income is significant only in the second 
model, neglecting substitute services.
When compared to the results of Germany, Italy and the UK one finds that the values 
obtained for the direct price elasticity of national long-distance services are very high. They 
are well above one and exceed the values obtained for other countries by more than 100%. 
In all cases the estimate has been significant.
Equations (9b) and (9c) again show the results for the subperiods. As for Germany and 
Italy one finds that the price elasticity has increased in the second period.
b) Regional equations
The most striking result of the regional estimates is that they indicate that the own-price 
elasticity of demand varies considerable among regions. In the case of the three rich 
regions the estimated coefficients correspond to the results which were obtained for West 
Germany overall However, in the case of the poor regions a much higher price elasticity of 
demand was obtained. On average the absolute value for the poor regions exceeds the ones 
obtained for the rich ones by more than 100%. These results may be compared to the ones 
obtained for the national level Also in the latter case, the relatively poorer country (Spain) 
has a much higher own-price elasticity of demand than richer Germany. Italy remains in 
between.
All values obtained for substitute services have not been significant.
2) International services
As has already been pointed out, the availability of data does not permit the estimation of 
subsamples for the international service. For the decade 1978-1988 for both models I found 
that the own-price elasticity of demand, disposable income and trade are significant. They 
all have the predicted sign. The own-price elasticity of demand of -0.8 corresponds to values
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obtained for other EC member countries. However, it is lower than the one for national 
long-distance services. This result is especially striking because from chapter 12.2.2. it could 
be seen that national prices are relatively cheap, while international ones are expensive in 
Spain.
Trade has had a relativelly small impact on telephone demand, while the income elasticity 
has been relatively high. This confirms results obtained for other EC countries. The 
substitute services are significant, telegram having the supposed substitute effect. Express 
letters instead have a negative sign, indicating a complementary character.
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13.7. Estimation of Demand Elasticities For the UK
Data
While for Italy and Spain the data were constrained by missing information about prices, in 
the case of the UK the constraint has been quantities. British Telecom does not reveal any 
information about the quantity of calls transmitted after competition was introduced in 
1984. As a consequence no subsamples could be formed due to the small sample size. For 
the same reason no comparison could be made of the pre-competitive period and the time 
thereafter. However, from the DBP Telekom I received the quantities of incoming calls 
from Britain until 1988. While these data only refer to one international market, at least 
some comparisons could be made.
In the anual Statistical Abstracts furthermore one finds quantities of all international phone 
calls made in Britain each year (until 1984). However, given the wide range of price bands 
applied by BT, these data were too much aggregated.14, so that I did not use them for my 
estimations. For national services the "trend" variable was significant and therefore it was 
included in the model.
Overall the estimates for the British telephone services are less reliable than those obtained 
for the other countries. This is mainly due to a strong price increase in 1974 (the price per 
unit rose by 300%).
Given that no data were available for the period after 1984,1 could not compare the results 
obtained with others for a period starting after 1974. The only exception being the UK- 
Germany market.
Local and Long-distance Calls
Overall the results for national services are not satisfactory. They are presented in table
13.13. The own-price elasticity for the local service is very low but does not have the 
predicted sign. Household disposable income has an elasticity below 1 and is significant.
In the case of the long-distance market the own-price elqsticity is not significant. The 
"disinc" variable turns out to be the only significant one beside the "trend", both having the 
predicted positive sign.
International Services
In table 13.14 equation (14) refers to the UK-EC market and equations (14a) to (14c) refer 
to the British-German market.
As was said before the strong price increase in 1974 very much determines results if it is 
included. This was the case for national services and also applies for the UK-EC and UK- 
Germany market in equations (14) and (14a). The own-price elasticity of demand is very 
low and it is not significant.
14 Without having rough estímate» of the share of continental and intercontinental calls, no weighing was possible.
324
For the British-German market results are much improved if only the post 1973 period is 
looked a t This is done in (14b) and (14c). The "disinc" and "trade" variables are significant 
and have the predicted sign. The value for the own-price elasticity is negative and 
significant It is higher for the more recent period This confirms results previously 
obtained for Germany and Spain. Comparing (14c) and (4c) - the demand equation for the 
German-UK market - I find that the own-price elasticity does not vary much for both 
markets. However, for the latter the "disinc" variable is much more elastic.
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14. A Concluding Assessment
The previous disscussion has shown that continental EC countries unanimous^ opt for a 
service - based approach towards competition.
This approach has been sketched by the Commission. However, considerable differences 
persist, given that member countries like Spain and Italy have appeared reluctant to follow 
suit. The basic strategy relies on the separation of reserved and unreserved services. 
According to the Commission's approach the former only comprise the basic telephone 
service. They remain under the exclusive domain of the national TOs. For all other services 
the national network operator has to permit access on non discriminatory terms. However, 
while this approach still reserves 85 per cent of telecommunications service revenues for 
the former (state) monopolists, several member countries still object it as being too liberal. 
Facility - based competition was rejected on the national level as involving excessive 
investment costs. The costs of a second network were reckoned to be higher than the 
benefits of competition. This view, however, was not shared by the UK. On the EC - wide 
level the Commission maintained that the necessary investments into the ISDN network 
would justify restrictive measures to protect the TO’s monopoly as a source of revenues. 
Thus, it is argued that network competition would threaten the establishing of the ISDN 
network which is deemed necessary for the VANS market. Indeed the recent price 
increases were justified by the ISDN investment programmes. Thereby to a large extent 
residential consumers pay for a network upgrade mainly used by business. This put the 
traditional scheme of redistribution upside down. However, the present scheme is no better 
justified than had been the former.1 I have argued that the economic rationale for total 
network integration via ISDN is weak. The ISDN concept corresponds to the traditional 
view of a centrally planned network and exclusive provision. It is used as a defense against 
private entry which allegedly creates network fragmentation. The rationale for ISDN is 
based implicitly on the assumption of static cost functions. The aim is to avoid duplication 
of network investments. However, the large cost reductions due to technological progress 
make a static approach hardly applicable to the telecommunications network (see chapter 
2.1.1.7.). Contrary to a monopolistic structure, competition can be expected to shift the cost 
curves downwards. The cost effects due to this downward shift may very well offset 
economies of scope which are associated with network integration. Thus, ISDN cannot be 
defended on the basis of economies of scope and preempts the possibility of competition 
between different types of network.
National TOs have been surprisingly fast in carrying out the upgrading ot the network. It 
has been argued that one possible reason for the speed with which ISDN investments are 
carried out may be found in strategic behavior. The ISDN network will imply higher fixed 
and sunk costs and lower marginal costs compared to the coaxial cable network. This raises 
entry barriers in the industry. Potential entrants have to fulfil higher technical standards in
i Since the Commission did not force TOs to switch to cost based pricing, the services which face a high price 
elasticity of demand pay for the fixed investment costs. This contradicts the Ramsey pricing rule.
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order to get interconnection with the existing network. Moreover, the fibre optic cables 
have a capacity which is about 10 times higher than the one of the old coaxial cables. This 
may allow incumbents to deter entry. It also can be interpreted as a signal to regulators that 
further investment by private competitors into transmission capacity is not needed. 
Evidence for this kind of strategic behavior has been found in the intercontinental market 
where measures of liberalisation have occured earlier. Over two decades Intelsat held 
excess capacity in the space segment of the satellite network. The FCC intervened 
repeatedly to prevent further investments into the satellite capacity. More recenty 
incumbents have greatly increased the capacity of submarine intercontinental cables. For 
the mid 1990s considerable excess capacity is expected in this market.
One interesting conclusion of the counfcry-by-country analysis is that economic reasoning 
has hardly played a major role for the development of the present market structure. Instead 
historical and political reasons dominated. Recently, all three continental member 
countries have had a rationale to introduce network competition. In all cases these reasons 
are related to national pecularities. This leads to the conclusion that there does not exist a 
unique strategy which is optimal for all member countries. However, in all cases 
governments refrained from investigating seriously the alternative of liberalizing the 
infrastructure. In case of Spain, Telefonica is not able to keep pace with raising demand. 
Shortage of capital is a major constraint on network development. In these circumstances it 
could be beneficial to allow private firms establishing local networks in rural areas which 
are not sufficiently catered for by the TO. The "independents” in the USA could be taken as 
a possible example. They developed parallel to AT&T and thus existed long before 1984. 
The period of "early competition" in the USA showed that competition does not hamper 
network development. Instead it allowed the USA to obtain national coverage much 
quicker than the PTT system in Europe did. Until today the USA have a higher access rate 
of households than EC member countries. This can be seen from figure 14.1.
In the case of Germany, reunification created a somewhat similar situation. The 
rudimentary state of development of the East-German telecommunications network 
required a huge investment programme. The underdeveloped telephone network is 
considered one of the main obstacles to economic development of what used to be East 
Germany. The potential benefits which can be expected from licensing private firms setting 
up local or long-distance networks in this territoiy were pointed out. The merger of the 
West German and East German PTTs and the extending of DBP’s monopoly rights 
supposedly has slowed the process of network development in the east.
Italy, finally, demonstrates most clearly that economic reasoning has not been the backbone 
for the set-up of the network structure. As was pointed out in part II, the major rationale 
for monopoly provision is the existence of economies of scale and scope of an integrated 
network. For historic reasons, however, in Italy the local, long-distance and international 
networks have been kept separated. Cross-subsidisation between the different entities has 
been prohibited. In any case the state kept control over all different networks. The Italian 
industry structure therefore to some extent resembles that of the United States after the
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breakup of AT&T. Similar to the BOCs, SEP controls the local and parts of the long­
distance network while the ASST is responsible for the main bulk of long-distance traffic. 
However, network fragmentation and state control ensured that while efficiency gains due 
to economies of scope were relinquished, no efficiency gains were reaped according to 
competition. Thus Italian consumers supposedly got the worst of both worlds in 
telecommunications. All empiricial evidence found supported this conclusion. In the past 
the Italian TOs provided low quality at a high price without having sufficient financial 
means to foster universal service. As a result demand for telecommunications services is 
considerably lower in Italy compared with other European countries. Parallel to other EC 
member countries, Italy also chose to reform the telecommunications industry in the 1980s. 
More dearly than in all other cases the reform of the Italian telecommunications industry 
offered the alternative of going the US or the (continental) European way. Introducing 
competition in the long-distance sector would have been feasible without undergoing a 
tedious and costly process of divestiture as was necessary in the case of AT&T. While 
network competition was not studied at all, the proposed reform belately tries to introduce 
the traditional TO model in Italy. However, given the political inertia, it is likely that by the 
time SuperSTET is created, several European countries may have already introduced 
network competition. Thus it may be outdated from the beginning.
Despite various promises to mend their ways when carrying out reforms on a national level, 
governments continue to abuse "their" TOs for general policy objectives. Recent examples 
of this behavior could be found for all three continental member countries.2 Moreover, 
when measures of liberalisation were introduced at all, this was done in a way to protect the 
TO from "too much" competition. An example at hand is, for instance, mobile telephony.
The "EC-approach" was compared with the "Atlantic" approach of facility-based 
competition. It was found that the US and UK have chosen very different strategies 
towards this end. In both cases a "mixed regime" came about in which a dominant firm 
remains regulated by an independent authority. Experience in the US computer enquiries 
have hinted towards the nonsustainability of most regulation. The growing complexity of 
networks and services makes it difficult to develop consistent rules. It was found that the 
separation of the "competitive" parts and the "natural monopoly" core has not created a 
new stable industry structure. Already seven years after divestiture it becomes obvious that 
the local network is also losing its "natural monopoly" characteristics. Adding that state 
regulators do not want to relinquish the old cross-subsidisation scheme, the danger of 
inefficient entry arose. Mainly private networks are increasingly used to bypass the public 
switched network.
2 Asa further example one may refer to France. France Telecom is not treated differently to DBP Telekom. Being 
France’s sixth biggest company it nevertheless is its largest taxpayer, thanks to a special levy. It shall be used, 
moreover, to subsidize the French computer and electronic firms like Bull and Thompson. See: Economist, 
October 5,1991.
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In the UK instead this separation was not carried out. However, by leaving BT as an 
vertically integrated firm, the problems of interconnection charges arose. The dominant 
operator has a strong incentive to discriminate against its competitor as far as 
interconnection into the local network is concerned. Simultaneously introducing 
liberalisation and privatisation handicapped competition. It prevented the restructuring of 
BT and led to a asymmetric duopoly regime.
I have argued that Mercury’s competitive impact on BT has been rather low. When a 
comparison of basket prices was made, different sources found that BT is not cheaper than 
the monopolistic DBP Telekom or France Télécom. Thus, competition mainly led to a 
rebalancing of tariffs but not necessarily to cost reductions and generally lower prices. BTs 
profits, moreover, were similar to those realized by the monopolistic DBP Telekom in 1990. 
Among TOs in continental Europe the latter’s profits are exceptional. This was interpreted 
as a further sign of competitive pressure on the dominant firm in the UK. As a result, the 
recent White Paper has pressed for further steps of liberalisation.
Although in both cases the mixed regime has created serious regulatory problems, the 
overall impact of liberalisation is positive. In both countries it led to a rebalancing of tariffs 
without threatening the universal service goal Cross subsidies were more directed to needy 
households, thereby becoming more efficient themselves. In both countries also the service 
market has developed much more than in EC member countries which supposedly follow 
the 'service-based* strategy towards competition. Both the variety and the prices of VANS 
provided in the UK are more favourable to consumers than on the continent. This clearly 
contradicts the view that network competition hampers the development of the VANS 
sector. The benefits from the electronics revolution spurred by competition may very well 
offset those related to economies of scale and scope.
In the empirical part I estimated the price elasticities of demand for basic telephone 
services and compared the price setting policy in the four EC member countries. The 
estimated regressions confirmed the assumption made that demand for the long-distance 
service is more elastic than the one for the local service. Moreover, it was found that for all 
international services the own-price elasticity exceeds the one for national ones. In the 
intra-EC market, price elasticities vary considerably depending on the origin of the call. 
Among the international services the highest estimates were obtained for the service to the 
USA. This result is interesting because it indicates that price decreases following from 
liberalisation will have the strongest quantity effects in the intercontinental market. 
Relatively speaking, it can be expected that measures of liberalisation will create higher 
(positive) welfare effects for international services than for national ones. This result leads 
to the conclusion that a "second-best-strategy" towards facility based competition in Europe 
should start with liberalizing the international telecommunications sector (a point which is 
discussed in more detail in part IV).
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The demand estimates also showed dearly that telephone demand is very responsive to 
changes in household income. For international services, moreover, a positive correlation 
between trade and telephone demand was found. However, telephone demand appears less 
elastic as regards to "trade” than regarding household income.
A further interesting result of the empirical investigations is related to the apparent 
increase of the own-price elasticity over time. A development which did not emerge as a 
structural break but as a continuous development over time. This could be found for the 
national long-distance and the international services. The increase in the price elasticity of 
demand could not be expected, given the overall decline in real telephone prices for all 
countries over time. I the case of a linear demand curve, a lower price signifies a downward 
move on the demand curve, thus ceteris paribus the price elastidty of demand should be 
lower. This effect then must have been more than compensated by an outward shift of the 
demand curve. The increase in the price elasticity of demand appeared parallel to a more 
mature network, a higher access rate, and increasing national income. This may lead to the 
condusion that cost based pricing leads to higher welfare gains in a relative advanced 
economy having already established a fully fledged telecom network. Competition then 
becomes more attractive when a nationwide network has already been installed.
The results for alternative means of communication services were less clearcut. Some 
authors have claimed that telegram and telex are substitutes for the telephone service in 
the international market while they are not for national ones. Overall, this could not be 
confirmed by my estimates. In the regressions I have carried out, the coefficients for 
substitute services were often not significant and they did not always have the predicted 
sign. Among other reasons this may explained by two factors. First, the substitute 
relationship between these services and the telephone service may be weak. Secondly, these 
services may not have either a purely substitute or complementary character. For instance 
a telegram may be sent to confirm a certain information given already on the phone 
(complementary). In another situation it may be chosen instead of the phone call because it 
is less expensive (substitute effect). In this case there are two overlapping effects which 
partly cancel out.
The price comparisons have shown that TOs have introduced some cost orientation during 
the last decade. However, compared to the dramatic rebalancing of tariffs which occured in 
the USA and the UK, in continental Europe this "cost orientation” has not gone far. It may 
rather be a reluctant response to increasing pressure from the Commission and business 
pressure groups. Moreover, the rebalancing of tariffs was limited towards national services. 
Even in the UK and the USA international services were not included in the tariff 
rebalancing. The present "cooperative* system in the international market prevents any 
drastic unilateral price adjustments. Thus, over time the burden of cross-subsidisation has 
been shifted from the national long-distance to the international services.
Cost orientation of tariffs does not depend on whether a (public) monopolistic or a 
competitive regime prevails. As was seen from the discussion of optimal 
telecommunications tariffs, a public monopolist may be encouraged to apply cost based
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pricing by state regulators. In general the tariff policy of Scandinavian operators has 
followed more narrowly optimal pricing rules. However, in the EC all experience has shown 
that the political process prevents a rebalancing of tariffs in countries with a monopolistic 
regime. When comparing the tariff structure of member countries this clearly could be 
seen.
It was pointed out in part II that the rationale for cross-subsidisation becomes weaker the 
more developed a network is. From this one may expect lower cross-subsidisation in 
member countries which already have established a fully fledged telecommunications 
network. For West Germany, however, it was found that compared to other EC members, 
customer access and local services are especially cheap. On the other hand long-distance 
tariffs are comparatively high. Countries like Spain or Italy instead have been found to 
cross subsidise to a smaller extent. Thus, on an aggregate level one does not find in the EC 
a process of phasing out of cross-subsidisation parallel to network development. Thus, not 
only on the national but also on an EC level the present tariff principles are contrary to the 
rules of optimal pricing.
Finally, it was argued that the benefits of competition may be more clear-cut if the 
universal service goal has already been achieved. Figure 14.1 shows that this is not the case 
for a number of EC member states.
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Figure 14.1: percentage o f households connected to the telephone network3
3 Based on data provided in Siemens (1989).
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The highest access rates have been achieved by the Scandinavian countries and the USA. 
Compared to these countries the UK for instance still lags behind to some extent. 
Countries like Spain, Portugal and Greece have not yet achieved universal service.
It was pointed out that the impact of network competition on the universal service goal is 
not clearcut This stems from the fact that the latter is related to two different categories of 
consumers. First, if geographical coverage has not been achieved yet, universal service can 
be spurred by providing access to rural communities. This often requires the set up of new 
local networks in remote areas.
As was shown in the case of Spain the failure to interconnect rural areas is often related to 
a shortage of capital for the national TO. It was argued that by allowing entry on a local 
level, interconnection of rural areas could be achieved quicker. Here network competition 
would spur universal service.
The second category is related to income. Poor households do not interconnect at the 
present access- and monthly flat rate. In their case only an income subsidy can ensure 
access. If this subsidy is paid for by raising tariffs for (long-distance) services, competition 
has to be excluded to avoid cream skimming. Only in the latter case universal service and 
liberalisation conflict.
One may conclude that given the different level of network development, member 
countries have diverging interests related to network competition. Countries like Spain, 
Portugal and Greece may give a higher priority to universal service, keeping some range for 
subsidizing poor household’s access to the network. However, as was pointed out in chapter 
3.3.3. the universal serice goal can be fostered without giving up competition. On the other 
hand those countries having already established a countrywide network are more interested 
in liberalizing the long-distance market. This promises welfare gains due to the rebalancing 
of tariffs and due to gains in productivity.
Given the experience in the USA and GB and furthermore the diverging interests among 
member states, it is likely that an EC approach for network competition will also end up 
with a "mixed regime". Therefore in the following a step-by-step approach towards facility- 
based competition is put forward which takes account of both the economic principles 
derived in part II and the lessons from institutional reform taken from part m.
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A Strategy towards 
Facility-based Competition in Europe
PART IV

15. Liberalising the Intra-EC Long-Distance Market
Part II pointed out the potential benefits which may be reaped from facility-based 
competition in Europe. An entry threat may facilitate a "process of discovery" which 
reduces costs of network provision and spurs the development of new communications 
means. The industry structure fosters innovative entry which promises significant cost 
reductions.1 Additional benefits can be expected from terminating efficiency losses which 
are caused by state failure. Competitive pressure leads to a rebalancing of tariffs towards 
optimal pricing rules as developed in chapter 33. Thus, it can be expected that competition 
supports all three goals of efficiency: allocative, technological and qualitative efficiency. 
Network competition also supports the Commission’s policy to enforce a more efficient 
procurement policy of TOs. Being obliged to reduce their network costs, the operators 
cannot afford to continue with "buy national" principles. Finally, it was pointed out that the 
high elasticity of demand for telecommunications services ensures that price reductions due 
to competition generate a strong increase in demand. Additional demand may suffice to 
cater for the new network operators. Compared to Europe, in the US the number of phone 
calls made per telephone is up to three times higher.2
On the other hand it was pointed out that for a long transitional period a regulatory body 
has to supervise the incumbent TO’s behaviour, since the latter has market power and 
controls bottleneck facilities (local network). Having a first-mover advantage, incumbents 
are likely to engage in strategic behaviour in order to deter entrants. Experience in those 
countries which have ventured on liberalising telecommunications networks has shown that 
incumbents prevail in keeping a dominant position for a very long transitional period. In 
the US interstate market, 8 years after liberalisation AT&T still controls over 60%. Entry 
in the Japanese telecom market was permitted in 1985. In spite of a regulatory system 
which is biased in favour of new entrants, in 1992 NTT still hold a market share of above 
95% in the domestic and KDD 90 % in the international market.3 In the UK, BT controlled 
more than 90% of phone calls in 1992. Thus, the need for regulatoiy supervision is unlikely 
to disappear quickly.
Moreover, the competitive impact of liberalisation diverges significantly from market to 
market. In spite of newly developing technology, for the time being the local networks will 
still enjoy natural monopoly characteristics. Chapter 5 therefore concluded that a strategy 
towards network liberalisation should aim at exploiting all existing possibilities to increase 
the intensity of competitive pressure. In order to spur innovative entry and to reduce sunk 
investment costs, emphasis should be given to system competition. Thus, entrants using new 
communications systems (mobile, radio or satellite networks), may be preferred to others
1 For example, in the first three years after divestiture AT&T reduced employment by 17% despite increasing
output. Compare: Wenders, J.T. (1992), p.14.
2 Financial Tunes, July 11,1991.
3 Regulatory Research (1991), p. 11; 13.
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which install an additional fixed cable network. When investigating national policy 
approaches in part HI, I pointed out that all member countries have fallen short of this 
principle. Countries like Germany, Italy and Spain have reduced the competitive impact on 
the TO which may arise from mobile GSM networks by automatically granting one licence 
to the latter. Furthermore the TO gains an advantage by receiving its licence before the 
competitors do. Cross subsidies from their monopoly revenues to support their investments 
into the mobile network are almost impossible to control This offers them a lead in the 
investment race. The strategy in mobile networks so far has been dominated by the aim to 
prevent "too much” competition instead of aiming at "as much competition as possible”. By 
doing so the already limited scope to challenge the incumbent is further reduced and more 
regulatory interference will be the consequence.
Also the unilateral step chosen by the UK has fallen short of the previous expectations. 
Mercury's market share is still negligible, BTs profits have been burgoing and overall prices 
are not lower than those of public enterprises on the continent. High entry barriers for 
cable technology and the small market so far have prevented a strong competitive impact 
from Mercury’s entry.
In what follows I sketch an alternative road towards network competition which may avoid 
some of the previously mentioned shortcomings.
Principally six steps towards network competition may be distinguished.*4
1) Competition for the customer's hub
Reserved services can be provided by one TO to customers located in other member states 
who decide to move their telecommunications hub into the former’s member state. An 
incentive exists if TOs offer qualitatively different services or charge different prices. 
Horizontal agreements among TOs concerning the provision of reserved services presently 
restrict "hub competition". Hub competition could be fostered by the Commission applying 
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome since member states are not allowed to prevent such 
competition.5 Hub competition may become relevant for international enterprises.
2) Telecommunications Routing
The routing of telephone calls allows the exploitation of price differences among TOs. A 
French firm with a London branch may prefer to route its phone call to the US via GBt 
thereby taking advantage of the lower transatlantic tariffs of Mercury or BT in comparison 
to France Télécom. In the intercontinental market International Discount 
Telecommunications (IDT) has entered, using an automatic caU-me-back system.6
4 Compare: Stehmann, Oliver (1992).
3 The Service Directive allows only for the granting of exclusive rights by each member state on its own territory. 
See: Com(91a) pp. 18-19.
6 The European client calls a node in Hackensack, New Jersey. After one ring the client hangs up. Within three 
seconds she is called back. Thereafter the client is abje to make her long-distance call using any US long­
European subscribers of IDT can make their international phone calls through cheaper US 
carriers. On a call from Rome to Rio de Janeiro IDTs customers pay US $ 1.64 a minute 
while being charged 4,917 Lire (S 4.10) by Italcable (1991 prices).7 While being challenged 
by European TOs as illegal, IDT competition has already forced the latter to cut collection 
rates significantly. Telefónica proposed to the Spanish government to cut its tariffs by 25% 
as a response to IDTs entry. Italcable and France Télécom also have announced 
considerable reductions.8
In Germany AT&T and MCI got the permission to use Calling Cards (initially only for US 
soldiers). These cards can be used for similar call-me-back services. As a response to 
increased transatlatic competition the DBP Telekom announced a 30% price cut in 1992.9
3) Simple Resale
By leasing lines from the TOs, resellers and aggregators can sell capacity to third parties 
and undercut the TOs tariffs. Competitors could enter this market easily, since they do not 
bear costs of building and operating entire networks. They effectively operate as retailers. 
Recent recommendations of the Consultative Committee for International Telegraph and 
Telephone (CCITT) would permit companies to resell spare capacity and share 
telecomm uncations resources.10 In Germany, for instance, Worldcom GmbH offers leased 
lines to business customers for data transmission and phone calls. The latter are about 25% 
cheaper than DBP Telekom's tariffs. In chapter 4.2.1. it was pointed out that the 
detrimental effect of simple resale is to reduce the scope for optimal pricing packages. In 
the international market, however, the main distortions arise from accounting-rates. The 
introduction of full two-way resale then could be used to stimulate accounting and 
collection rate reductions.
4) Private Networks
Competition from private networks may have different levels. Big enterprises may install 
their own network for internal use if their stand-alone costs are lower that the costs they 
face when using the public-switched network. Private networks, however, are also chosen 
for quality reasons. They can be designed to meet the special needs of the enterprise. There 
are two levels of competitive pressure which arise from private networks. The first one 
stems from the big user’s potential to withdraw from the public-switched network. This
distance carrier. To use the IDT service, clients have to pay a fixed monthly sum of USS ISO • 250. IDT offers 
tariffs which are up to 75% cheaper than those charged by Telefónica for the transatlantic route. IDT has 
already won diems as the World Bank and big enterprises. Compare: Economist, February 15, 1992; El Pais, 
Febrero 19,1992.
7 Compare: Economist, February 15,1992, FAZ, November 18,1991.
* El País, Febrero, 19,1992.
9 Compare: Wirtschaftswoche, Februar 15,1992.
See: Communications International, April 1991.
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forces TOs to introduce special price packages. Secondly, TOs themselves compete in the 
provision of private networks.11 They can offer their expertise in network construction and 
management which non-communication enterprises barely have. European TOs expect thal 
at the end of this decade up to 10% of their turnover may stem from the provision oi 
international private networks.12 The competitive pressure of private networks increases ii 
they are interconnected into the public-switched network. Then idle capacity can be resold 
to third parties.
5.) Long-Distance Network Competition
Basically two types of long-distance network competition may be distinguished. The first 
one implies competition between different communication systems. MCI applied 
innovative entry when using microwave systems to enter the US long-distance market in the 
1960s. In what follows, I discuss the advantages of satellite entry. System competition 
avoids the cost of network duplication. It also leads to product market integration. Cable 
systems and satellites are used for both broadcasting and telecommunications.13 By doing 
so, the number of players in both markets is increased and the scope of use for an installed 
system reduces the risk of entry.
The second case refers to competition between different competitors using the same 
network system (BT and Mercury). Also in this case several options exist besides installing 
a new network from scratch. Railways have already installed their own communication 
network and may be entided to interconnect into the public-switched network. The same 
applies for the post office, which runs a closed network. The railway network is installed 
along the tracks and is used for internal transmission of data and voice communication. 
Due to the use of fibre-optics, railway networks have expanded their capacity beyond their 
internal needs. British Rail, for instance, runs a network with a higher capacity than 
Mercury’s public network.14 The European Railways are connected via Hermes^ and 
propose a consortium with private communication enterprises to expand a European-wide 
telecommunications network. Companies running electricity, water, gas, transport 
underground, and cable TV networks already have obtained a right of way and can use 
their infrastructure to lay telecommunications cables. Unlike railways and the post office,
11 AT&T and Sprint, for instance, edged out European rivals bidding for the construction and managing of a
global data network of Unilever. The latter owns 500 companies and has subsidiaries worldwide. Compare: 
Communications Week International, May 13,1991.
12 On a European level France Télécom has concluded an agreement with Maxwell Communications for the
supply of satellite business services in Britain and the rest of Europe. This could bring FT and BT into direct 
competition.
13 The ASTRA satellite uses a telecommunications frequency for broadcasting, while the DBS satellites plan a
range of data services.
14 Compare: Funkschau, January 21,1990.
13 Hermes: Handling through European Railways Message Electronic System.
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however, their present networks do not comprise switches which account for the main bulk 
of network costs. Thus, the latter face considerably higher entry costs.
6.) Local Competition
Only at a final stage may competition between local networks be envisaged. As was pointed 
out, cable TV networks, PCN and a combination of paging and Telepoint services may be 
envisaged as potential competitors. However, at the present stage technology is still not 
sufficiently developed to provide a significant competitive impact. Competition on the local 
level is rapidly increasing in the US. The major example is New York City where the New 
York Telephone Company is bypassed by other operators which connect corporate 
customers directly. In the US some manufacturers have already obtained licences to install 
cordless Local Area Networks. (LAN).16 In Europe, no radio spectrum is presently available 
for this technology.17 Potential entrants in the local network could be cable networks linked 
to PCN systems.18 The main advantage of local competition probably stems from 
withdrawing the bottleneck position of the TOs. Long-distance competitors and VANS 
suppliers then have an alternative local network, which reduces the TO’s ability to use 
access charges as a means of discrimination against competitors. Alternative local networks 
reduce the need for regulatory supervision. One may also envisage the breaking up of 
European TOs which would allow the introduction of yardstick competition at the local 
level This also would ease the task for future regulation.19
It is obvious that some competition has already evolved from steps 1) to 4). National 
approaches to liberalisation in the USA and GB have created spill-over effects on the 
international market. This was demonstrated in chapter 12. Pressure is exerted on 
European TOs to renegotiate accounting-rates and reduce collection rates. However, 
national legislation and international agreements still prevent steps 1) to 4) being fully 
implemented. TOs prevailed in completely preventing steps 5) and 6) on an international 
and national level in continental Europe.
It was pointed out that the service-based approach to competition in the EC, reserves about 
80% of telecommunications revenues to national TOs. Moreover, it does not exert pressure 
on the network operator to reduce costs and to introduce optimal or at least cost-based
16 in 1990, for instance, NCR Corp started selling a cordless LAN in the USA operating at 900 Megahertz, while
Motorola Inc introduced a LAN at 18 Gigahertz. Also, Apple Computer plans the installation of a cordless 
LAN. See: Communications Week International, May 13,1991.
17 Freeing the spectrum may affect other systems which use the same frequencies for maritime or military
communications. To the extent that the need for the latter vanishes, bandwith may become available in the 
future.
is In countries like Belgium and the Netherlands, cable systems for the use of broadcasting services have a 
penetration rate of around 80*90%. Compare: Gamham, N. and G. Mulgan (1990), p.2.
19 in Britain, the DGT has proposed to separate local and long-distance business. In Finland, they operate 
presently about 50 local telephone companies, run as co-operatives. See: Economist, October 5,1991.
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pricing schemes. The capacity installed is not used to its full potential According to recent 
studies, telecommunication systems in France, Germany and the UK are used from 35% to 
60% less than in the USA. There is no incentive to use capacity efficiently.20 The significant 
productivity differences among national TOs suggest that facility-based competition could 
put poorly performing operators under considerable pressure to improve their 
performance. Moreover, the higher productivity of smaller operators indicates that 
economies of scale and scope play a minor role compared to the choice of production 
technology and the degree of X-inefficiency. The last two factors, however, are variable and 
mainly depend on the degree of competition which prevails in the market.
The small size of national markets may render the licensing of separate public fixed 
terrestrial network operators unecomomic from a national perspective. The limited impact 
of Mercury on the British telecommunications market is an example.
However, there may be a different path towards facility-based competition in the 
Community which takes account of the political, economic and technological aspects of the 
present structure of the telecommunications market.21
While public provision of a network is well entrenched in national law, the intra- 
Community long-distance market is not similarly protected. On the other hand, a step-by- 
step approach, starting with network liberalisation of the intra-Community long-distance 
traffic may be considered as a second best strategy for promoting facility-based competition 
in Europe. After having established an integrated ISDN network, the EC would follow the 
path pioneered by the USA while being able to avoid the major problems which arose after 
the divestiture of AT&T. The approach follows step 5 as characterised above and in 
particular emphasises the beneficial effects which may arise from system competition.
Competition for the Intra-Community Long-distance Market
At present each national operator has the exclusive right to charge all calls going out of its 
country according to national tariff principles. The operator of the destination country is 
reimbursed for the costs of transmitting the call in its national network. Rules for these 
agreements are specified in the CCTTT recommendations.
International telecommunications services thereby have been governed by the same 
exclusionary rule as national services. The so-called cooperative model has created an 
international cartel of TOs which applies open price fixing.
These bilateral agreements between national telecommunications administrations actually 
split the intra-Community market into submarkets. In each submarket the national 
administration which sets up an individual call operates as a monopolist. This regime 
prevents international specialisation on the basis of individual companies' comparative 
advantage. It has led to prices which greatly exceed costs. On the other hand, this market
»  Ungerer, H. (1990), p.18.
21 Here and in the following compare: Stehmann, O. (1991b), pp.131-135.
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fragmentation has led to the installation of 12 incumbent TOs in the EC (plus Mercury). 
Chapter 5 emphasised the competitive potential which stems from traditional market 
separation in the EC. At the Community level this market fragmentation has prevented a 
dominant firm from emerging. While in the normal framework the existence of sunk costs 
is regarded as detrimental due to an entry deterring effect, in the international EC market 
they turn out to be beneficial since they prevent exit. After having liberalised the intra- 
Community market, monopolisation through predatory pricing is not likely to occur. The 
intra-Community market may therefore be best described as a natural oligopoly. In that 
case the main objective of a policy promoting facility-based competition in Europe should 
aim at overcoming the present market fragmentation which exists due to regulation and 
cable technology.
The liberalisation of the intra-Community long-distance market then could follow the 
following procedure:
At the first stage each TO should be entided to transfer calls in both directions. Thus 
in each submarket the monopoly would be transformed into a duopoly. Private 
companies should be permitted to lease lines for resale.
The second stage would lead to the licensing of private operators who employ a 
technology which has a market integration effect. This may be a separate satellite 
system and mobile operators.22
The third stage allows TOs of third countries to enter the bidding, so for instance 
France Télécom could enter the German-Italian market. This may happen by leasing 
lines or by the installation of a separate network. Thereby a large number of 
financially viable competitors would emerge.
In the fourth stage private competitors would be licensed to establish their own net­
works. This could involve companies such as the European railways which have 
already installed their own network, or others as cable networks (etc).
Below the main advantages of this concept are described. It will be argued that there are 
parallels with the US model of liberalisation, in which the interstate market is open to entry 
while intra-state markets are exempted from competition.
22 In detail see below.
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Potential Efficiency Gains
Figure 15.1 depicts the 1977-1989 growth of the number of phone calls in West Germany. 
As can be readily seen, international calls have grown twice as fast as national long-distance 
calls. Moreover, 89.9% of all international calls which originated in West Germany were 
directed to EC member countries in 198723. Since the growth of international phone calls is 
linked to the growth of trade, the increase in trade envisaged with the advent of the single 
market in 1993 is likely to spur their growth even further. Thus, the growth rate of 
international calls is likely to be similar to that envisaged for VANS. It will further 
accelerate if prices reduce to cost levels. This is essential for new competitors whose 
additional investments do not lead to a wasteful duplication of existing network facilities. 
As was seen for AT&T after 1984 and the Japanese domestic TO, NTT, the growth in 
demand caters for the additional supply of new entrants. For both incumbents total 
telephone service revenues rose after entry had taken place.24 Thus, while incumbents lose 
relative market share, one may not expect their absolute output to decrease. Already they 
cannot cope with the rising demand for international phone calls.
Figure 15.1: Growth in the number o f phone calls made in FR Germany; 1977-1989 (1977 * 
100).
It was argued in some detail in part II and III that over time the burden of cross- 
subsidisation shifted from national long-distance to international long-distance services.
23 See: Bundesministerium fiir Pott und Fernmeldewesen, (1988), p.57.
24 This point was already made for AT&T. For NTT see: Glynn, S. (1992).
341
But even though there is no major cost difference between the provision of international 
and national long-distance services, prices for the latter have dropped far more. Added to 
the fact that according to figure 14.1 international calls are growing much faster than 
national long-distance calls, the burden of cross-subsidies has decisively shifted towards the 
former over time.
According to the estimates of part III, due to the present tariff structure price elasticities of 
demand are held to be highest in the international long-distance market25. Thus the present 
price policy directly contradicts the criteria of Ramsey pricing. Liberalisation of the 
international long-distance market will therefore offer the greatest efficiency gains. If 
interstate long-distance prices in the US can be taken ¿s a yardstick, intra-European prices 
may fall by more than 50%. Apart from the expansionary forces mentioned above, the high 
price elasticity of demand will additionally spur demand for intra-Community calls if prices 
come down to costs.
The main economic argument against facility-based competition has been the existence of 
synergy effects (economies of scope). The concept^of partial liberalisation, however, 
combines efficiency in production with efficiency deriving from competition. Since national 
TOs remain integrated, unlike the position in the USA, competition at this level will not 
lead to a sacrifice of economies of scope in Europe.
The experience of Japan also supports the view that the international telecommunications 
market is more competitive. By 1990 the two domestic entrants had captured 4.2% of the 
market, after 5 years of competition. In the international Japan-US market 2 firms entered 
in 1989. However, already two years later their joint share added up to one third of the 
market.
Aside from the distortions of the tariff structure, the development of entry in the USA has 
shown that technology supports competition in the "very-long-distance" market. The new 
transmission technologies which have been the driving force behind competition among 
common carriers in the USA can substitute for cable only for very long-distances. 
Economies of scale offered by the new technologies would not materialise in the narrow 
national markets of the EC. For the inter-state market, satellites could provide an 
alternative means of transmission to the trunk lines installed by TOs. This leads to the 
second level of facility-based competition.
The Case for a Separate Satellite System26
Employing stage 1) and 2) of network competition hence may already have some 
competitive impacts without requiring significant investments into the infrastructure. A 
move towards fully fledged competition in the international long-distance market, however, 
would imply a move to step 3) and 4). It would be necessary to increase the intensity of
25 See in detail chapter 13 and 14.
2* In the following compare: Stehmann, O. (1992a).
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network competition. Apart from reducing costs of production, facility-based competition 
also supports the goals presently promoted by the Commission and most of the member 
countries.
Technological progress has had a twofold impact on the relationship of satellite and 
terrestrial telecommunications networks. On the one hand improvements of satellite earth 
stations have fundamentally changed the scope for the use of satellite technology in 
Europe. There has been a continuous reduction in size and cost of earth stations. While 
traditionally the big earth stations of the satellite network were interconnected into the 
terrestrial network, the development of 'Very Small Aperture Terminals" (VSAT) has made 
possible the establishment of a separate satellite network. VSATs can be operated on the 
customer’s premise and they may be used for point-to-multipoint as well as for point-to- 
point communication. As a result, a separate satellite network may principally carry out all 
functions of a terrestrial network.27 On the other hand technological progress in fibre 
optics make the latter more cost effective for point-to-point communication if compared to 
satellites. As a result satellite systems are widely regarded as suitable only for niche 
markets and they have been mainly used as a backup for the fixed terrestrial network. 
However, this viewpoint is far too concerned with technical issues, neglecting economic 
considerations. As will be argued in what follows, specific technological characteristics 
render a satellite network an optimal means to foster facility-based competition in Europe. 
Lower sunk costs, higher flexibility and the ability to integrate different product markets 
may allow a satellite entrant to compete successfully with terrestrial networks. This may 
offer a solution to European network fragmentation and foster the aim of universal service.
While the international traffic flowing through terrestrial networks is regulated by bilateral 
agreements, in the case of the space segment of satellites, a multilateral concept has been 
developed. Having presently 28 member countries, the international organisation Eutelsat 
is the dominant player in Europe. It operates telecom satellites for telephony, data and 
video services within the FSS frequency band. As signatories to Eutelsat national TOs have 
the exclusive right to purchase and resell space segment capacity. Hence, like the terrestrial 
network, the space network has been transformed into a cartel with the same members. As 
a result, competition is restricted two ways. First, as signatories, European TOs can 
preclude or discriminate against private satellite providers. Second, in pooling together 
their sales of space segment capacity they also restrict competition among themselves.
"Economic harm" procedures are meant to bind national governments not to authorize 
other satellite systems which cause "significant economic harm” to Eutelsat. Nevertheless, 
member countries have not refrained in the past from installing national systems. France 
launched the Telecom and TDF satellites, Germany the DFS and TV-Sat satellites and
Italy and Spain will follow suit with their own systems.28 However, since these national
i
27 Compare chapter 2.1.4.
28 Furthermore a growing number of non-European satellite systems are emerging which also can be used for
services with European coverage. See: Com(90a), p.78.
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satellites are installed by Eutelsat signatories, they are not meant as substitute but rather as 
complementary systems. In fact they do not put Eutelsat under competitive pressure.
Thus, one may conclude that national TOs have succeeded in extending their terrestrial 
network monopoly to the space network. By so doing, they managed to extend their control 
to new transmission technologies which could have been a potential threat to their network 
monopoly. Beside exploiting consumers by setting prices as profit maximising monopolists, 
the cartel moreover prevents the benefits of a satellite telecom network from being fully 
reaped. The present regulatory regime keeps Eutelsat from developing independent 
commercial strategies when selling space capacity. Private service providers are 
discriminated against. Finally TOs subordinate the usage and pricing of their satellite 
capacity to the specific targets of their own business strategy. The price setting is distorted 
since the use of satellite facilities is charged for on the same distance related basis as 
applied for terrestrial links. The technological advantage of satellites as regards wide-area 
coverage and insensitivity to distance is not passed on to users. Thus, since their main 
business is still the operating of the terrestrial network the satellite system is used rather as 
a backup for the former.
As a consequence, in Europe, demand for satellite equipment lags behind the US, which 
arguably puts the European satellite manufacturing industry at a competitive 
disadvantage.29 Equipment prices for ground stations and satellites as well as tariffs for 
services exceed considerably those charged in the US. Fragmented markets prevent 
producers from reaping the benefits of economies of scale which according to an estimate 
made for the Commission could reduce the costs of a commercial satellite in Europe by 
40%.30
Moreover, the market fragmentalisation described above handicaps specialized satellite 
services providers, while the existing monopolists are not able to provide sufficient 
transponder capacity to allow for a rapid expansion of these services.
Satellite technology now offers the opportunity to start some competition among network 
providers while still taking into account concerns regarding investment duplication and 
universal service. This could be achieved by separating the satellite network from the 
terrestrial network. Up to the early 1980s a satellite network was regarded useful only if an 
operator had to transmit services over more than a minimum distance. In general for the 
small European distances, satellite transmission was more expensive than terrestrial cable 
transmission. Since the satellite network could only be used when linked to the terrestrial, it 
was not regarded as a substitute technology. In the meantime, however, due to 
technological progress this concept of a "break-even distance" of satellite systems has been 
given up. Instead the intrinsic advantages of satellites over terrestrial networks have been 
put forward. In this context it is interesting to note that especially a fully developed satellite
29 22,000 two-way dishes are presently installled around the world, thereof 95% can be found in the USA and
pflnaf*a Compare: Financial Times, July 17,1990.
30 Com(90a) p2.
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network complies with the aim of universal service: one advantage is the widespread 
geographical coverage and a second the possibility to deploy the satellite network 
immediately over a wide area. The latter makes satellites an ideal alternative to the 
installation of a cable network in peripheral regions.
The appearance of VSATs has made it possible to run a satellite network completely 
separated from the terrestrial one. Such a network is capable of carrying out all the 
functions of the latter. Traditionally the large earth stations used with Intelsat and Eutelsat 
were owned and operated by the national TOs. The messages received were transmitted 
into the terrestrial network which thereafter distributed them to the user. With the arrival 
of VSAT earth stations this link to the terrestrial network can be circumvented. VSATs can 
be installed directly on the customer’s premises.
After characterizing three different steps towards the liberalization of the European 
satellite network the advantages of allowing "satellite entry" will be discussed in more detail.
*1
Broadly speaking, three different steps of liberalisation of the satellite network may be 
distinguished:
1) Competition for the Eutelsat capacity:
Presently the national TOs control the allotment of Eutelsat capacity. Being signatories 
they share the investment cost according to their national quota. On the other hand they 
control the distribution of transponder capacity which is available for domestic carriers. 
Thus TOs operate as referee and player at the same time. Thereby they may exclude or 
restrict private competitors for satellite services. Hence, while the network itself remains 
under the control of TOs, a first step could be to withdraw the right to distribute space 
capacity from national TOs. Instead a bidding procedure could be introduced in which TOs 
and private service providers compete on an equal footing. While in step 1) the present 
cartel of national operators is not challenged, Eutelsat has to allow for equitable, non* 
discriminatory access on a cost-based basis. This would mainly lead to an efficient use of 
existing space capacity. In the case of the intercontinental market, this approach was 
chosen for CableAWireless which received direct access to Intelsat, thereby bypassing 
British Telecom as the designated UK signatory.
2) Competition among a satellite network and the terrestrial network
While step 1) ensures efficient use of established satellite capacity, there is no incentive to 
reduce network costs since no rival network provider is permitted.
If the Eutelsat system is kept independent from TOs and if its management is moreover 
free to use it commercially, competition between the terrestrial network and the space 
network would be fostered. This would lead to considerable pressure to readjust tariffs 
towards cost Moreover, incentives would be given to both the TOs and Eutelsat to reduce 
the costs of the terrestrial and the satellite networks respectively. However, since both
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networks are already established, step 2) does not render necessary large investments into 
new installations. Competition can be achieved mainly by an institutional change.
3) Competition among various satellite systems
A complete liberalization of the satellite network would obviously include the licensing of 
further private satellite systems. By doing so, the competitive pressure could be increased. 
Satellite systems which have been installed to serve national purposes only could be allowed 
to enter foreign markets. However, the scope for further satellite operators may be limited 
by the scarcity of frequency bands. In the US the "open sky" policy successfully introduced 
step 3) as early as 1972. Therefore it might seem feasible also in the European context.
In most member countries the installation, ownership and operation of receive-only 
terminals for entertainment broadcasting reception is already largely liberalized. These 
terminals do not pose a threat to operators since they have no transmission capability. They 
were included in the Directive 88/301/EEC which liberalized the terminal equipment 
market by the latest of 30 June 1990. The new VSAT earth stations being capable of 
sending and receiving, however, have not been liberalized so far.
As was pointed out in chapter 723.2., to do so is the main aim of the Green Book on 
satellite telecommunications published recently by the Commission.
As far as the space segment is concerned, the Commission’s approach fits into step 1) of 
liberalization as outlined above. In its "Guidelines on the application o f EEC competition 
mles in the telecommunications sector* the Commission has pointed out that agreements 
between TOs to pool together their sales of space capacity may be regarded as a restriction 
to competition under Article 85. No exemption under Article 85 (3) of the Treaty of Rome 
can be expected since the TOs restrict third party’s ability to compete and they strengthen 
their individual and collective dominant position.31 Competition for capacity is envisaged in 
order to liberalize the VANs market. As far as service providers can choose between the 
satellite and the terrestrial network this already implies that both networks become 
somewhat substitutive. However, since voice service as the main bulk of services is 
exempted, network competition as described under step 2) is not fostered by the Green 
Book.
The main problem with this approach is that the investment in the space segment is carried 
out by the signatories whose investment share depends on their own use of the Eutelsat 
segment. This may lead to underinvestment if their use declines while private operators’ 
share of the space capacity increases. Moreover, as long as national TOs keep control over 
investment decisions of Eutelsat, they have an incentive to prevent the rise of a full-fledged 
system competitive to their terrestrial ones. It therefore seems inevitable that Eutelsat’s 
independence from the TOs is not limited to the distribution of capacity. It must comprise 
the entire range of commercial decision making, thus including investment decisions. Since
31 Com(91a).
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investment decisions into satellite technology involve considerable risk, it, moreover, does 
not appear reasonable to let TOs carry these risks alone while their private competitors 
only pay for the capacity they actually rent.
Competition between Satellite and Terrestrial Networks
It has been pointed out before that natural monopoly arguments have been put forward for 
the terrestrial as well as for the satellite networks. The exemption of the basic telephone 
service from the service directive by the Commission is based on the same argument. 
However, only in the case of an unsustainable natural monopoly the financial validity of an 
incumbent can be put at risk by entry.
The natural monopoly argument traditionally has been applied if the incumbent and the 
potential entrant use the same technology. As was argued above, there is little empirical 
evidence of natural monopoly elements for telecommunications networks. If the incumbent 
and the entrant can choose among different technological solutions, it becomes even less 
likely to prevail Moreover, the satellite network has already been installed. Competition 
between Eutelsat and the terrestrial network of TOs does not lead to additional "wasteful” 
investments. Thus satellite entry into the telecommunications market as sketched by step 2) 
can hardly be resisted on grounds of natural monopoly.
However, in the case where the satellite network is kept separate from national terrestrial 
operators, competition for voice services would lead to pressure towards reducing network 
costs. Without facing additional costs of network installation a mere split of already existing 
networks would lead to facility-based competition. Thanks to the fragmentation of the 
European telecommunications market a satellite entrant, moreover, if compared to an 
entrant using cable technology, may have a stronger competitive impact on national TOs. 
Apart from the direct competitive effect of having an additional supplier there will be an 
additional indirect one. The latter stems from the specific characteristics of satellite 
technology. For the case of facility-based competition, due to a second terrestrial network 
operator, the present market fragmentation cannot be overcome. Mercury may have a 
competitive impact on the British national and international long-distance market. 
However, due to regulation and technology it does not put pressure on France Télécom or 
the Deutsche Bundespost. Moreover, given the high share of sunk costs of terrestrial 
networks, competitors cannot expect to oust the others from the market by applying an 
aggressive pricing strategy. Thereby the probability is enhanced that the duopoly eventually 
evolves into a "peaceful coexistence1'. The satellite entrant instead is not committed to a 
certain geographical market. The short-term reconfigurability of the satellite allows the 
entrant to allocate capacity dynamically. Thereby it is possible to choose between several 
capacity assignment strategies adjusting to changing demand of traffic or price
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discrepancies in different markets.32 Thus, the satellite entrant is able to switch capacity to 
those markets which promise the highest profits. A sole entrant using satellite technology 
could simultaneously enter several European telecommunications markets.33 As a result 
terrestrial network operators will start competing against each other. By lowering ones own 
price a TO may expect to drive out some of the satellite's capacity which then is directed to 
other markets. These may differ either geographically or in relation to products.34 Apart 
from shifting its capacity from the French to the German long-distance market as a 
response to a price cut by France Télécom, the satellite entrant may also choose to 
withdraw capacity from the telecommunications business alltogether. Instead more capacity 
may be devoted to transmit TV broadcasting. Hence, it is the higher flexibility of capacity 
of the entrant which invites more competitive behavior from the incumbents. Thus a 
satellite entrant will not only compete directly against the incumbents but the latter will 
more and more compete against themselves. Ceteris paribus the incentive to compete in 
prices is increased. Thus due to the large geographical coverage and the satellite’s ability to 
switch capacity, previously fragmented markets become integrated and the competitive 
impulse will gain further momentum. The separate satellite system then would have a 
considerable market integration effect and it would function as a competition device. This 
could help to break up the cartel of TOs since the latter will face diverging interests. More 
competitive ones will be threatened less by the satellite entrant than those which operate 
at high costs. Especially if the third step is eventually undertaken, some TOs may also find 
the opportunity to use their national satellite systems for the (international) long-distance 
traffic of other member countries attractive. This would imply a twofold advantage. First, 
not all national TOs may be willing to resist the opening of the international telecom 
market since they may expect to gain individually. The alliance of the international cartel 
could be broken up. Second, after competition has been introduced collusive behaviour of 
the incumbents is less likely to come about. In the short run, the private satellite system 
may help to abolish the abovementioned accounting-rate system. Being a sizeable cost 
factor it equalizes the cost levels of entrants and the dominant firm. Thereby the scope for 
price cutting and subsequently the scope for entry by cable operators is severely reduced. In 
those countries which have already liberalised the domestic telecommunications market, 
the accounting-rate system has sheltered their international markets from competition. 
Since the private satellite system provides end-to-end services over independent facilities it 
cannot be handicapped by the accounting-rate procedure. An entrant being able to bypass
32 The short term reconfigurability takes the sire and location of the earth stations as given. For the case of long­
term reconfigurabiluy, the structure of the network can be readjusted by relocating earth stations or 
reconfiguring the satellite. See: Jose Casas and Hans Fromm, (1989) p.77.
33 Mobile technology may eventually have similar effect*. All member states have agreed to introduce the digital
GSM network. This could allow for roaming. A Danish mobile telephone could be used in Germany without 
registration. See: Economist, October S, 1991.
34 Moreover, the satellite may redeploy its capacity according to different daily or seasonal peaks thereby taking
advantage of emerging capacity constraints of the terrestrial links.
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this mechanism therefore will impose automatic pressure to abolish the accounting-rate 
system itself. By taking this step, the telecommunications market would only follow an 
approach earlier chosen for TV transmission. In Germany, for instance, the DBP Telekom 
also held the monopoly for TV distribution. After having modernised the cable network, 
private satellite entry was licensed, which now out-performs the cable since it is able to 
serve the whole European market Television transmission via satellite led to normative 
changes of the regulation of television channel cable distribution. By now several 
unregulated television diffusion satellites have been launched in Europe. By the mid 1990s 
it is expected that Europe will have satellite capacity for at least 250 TV channels.35 Given 
that in the TV market satellites already compete with cable networks, it is especially 
unreasonable to block the liberalisation of the satellite market for telecommunications. The 
integration of the TV and the telecommunications market also reduces the scope for 
strategic behavior on the side of the incumbent TO. Once the satellite is installed, an 
entrant may easily switch to other markets as in the case of an aggressive pricing policy. 
Once the TO raises its prices again, re-entry into the telecommunications market can 
quickly be carried out36
As has been pointed out, the main reason to exempt the network and basic services from 
competition has been the need for financially strong TOs being able to carry out 
investments into the ISDN network. This aim would not be endangered by setting up 
separate satellite systems. The emergence of optic-fibre cables has allowed them to 
increase dramatically the capacity of cable networks, while services can be offered at very 
low marginal cost.37 Thus, the satellite entrant is not likely to attract too much voice traffic 
from TOs. Despite 20 years of "open sky” policy in the USA, total satellite communications 
revenues account for no more than 2-3% of total telecommunications’ revenues.38 Taking 
the US experience as a yardstick, one can hardly argue that satellite entrants may be able to 
obstruct the performance of national TOs. However, entry on the fringe may impose some 
discipline and it may be a better safeguard to ensure cost-based pricing and cost-sensitive 
investments rather than these which pure regulation could provide.
Finally, the issue of universal service and the effects of competition for rural areas has to 
be reconsidered. In this context it is interesting to note that especially Eastern European 
countries are considering the use of private satellite systems to improve their 
underdeveloped communication networks. In Germany private firms have been already 
licensed to provide VANS and voice service, via satellites, to the territory of the former
35 Gamham, N. and G. Mulgan (1990), p.10.
*  One may even argue that once the satellite has been established a policy of hit-and-run entry in different 
markets may become feasible.
37 This development is discussed in: José Casas and H. Fromm (1989), pp.75-77.
3* Com(9Qa), p. 18, SO.
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GDR.39 This exception of the network and basic service monopoly granted to the Deutsche 
Bundespost Telekom is regarded as necessary because the set up of the terrestrial network 
involves many years of development. Due to the large geographical coverage40 the satellite 
network is especially apt to provide services to remote areas. Compared to the optical fibre 
system the satellite systems costs are more capacity dependent Both the share of capacity 
of the space segment and the size and complexity of the earth stations are closely related to 
the capacity of the link being provided. This makes satellites more and more appropriate to 
serve many thin routes rather than just a few high capacity routes.41 Thus, satellite 
networks may offer a low traffic area coverage. In Canada satellite technology already has 
been successfully used for remote areas. The number of long-distance calls in some Indian 
villages in northern Canada increased by as much as 800 % after satellite earth stations 
replaced radio installations. Similar results were obtained in Alaska.42 In Peru, a satellite- 
based communications system has been installed to provide a reliable and cost-effective 
service to the remote region of Eastern Peru. Thin-route" satellite communication is used 
as a means for rural development.43 As a result, satellite systems may be considered to be 
the adequate technology to close the gap between the developed and less-favoured regions 
in Europe. Their deployment may counterbalance the trend of advanced services only being 
provided around high density areas. Satellite technology is therefore seen to be crucial for 
the integration and the rapid reconstruction of Eastern European countries. However, their 
state owned TOs do not have the financial means to develop rapidly the terrestrial network 
and to increase at the same time their investment share in Eutelsat. Hence those countries 
which have not achieved universal service, have an interest in licensing private satellite 
systems. This offers the twofold advantage of quickly improving the national network 
without drawing on the scarce financial resources of the state. Therefore it might happen 
that central and Eastern European countries will allow private systems while the EC stays 
behind. However, the arguments put forward also apply for the less advanced countries in 
the Community. The development of a separate satellite system fosters the universal 
service goal rather than obstructing it.
Thus one may conclude that the two traditional arguments against facility-based 
competition in Europe - universal service and natural monopoly - do not apply for separate 
satellite operators. Quite to the contrary, those countries striving to develop their 
infrastructure promote the use of private satellite networks.
39 On March 1, 1991 Preussen Elektra, a regional electricity supplier started its satellite operations including voice
service to the GDR territory. The licence allows voice as well as data traffic and interconnection with the 
public-switched network. See: FinTech - Telecom Markets, 13.12.1990.
40 a  satellite’s coverage area can be as much as a third of the earth’s surface. See: Reed, Tony(1989), p.66 .
♦t Casas, J. and H. Fromm (1989), p.75/76.
«  Hudson, H.E. and E.B. Parker (1990), p. 197.
<3 The project demonstrates that even with relatively low-powered satellites smaller Earth stations can function 
quite well. In more detail: Mayo, J.K.; GJL Heoid and SJ. Klees (1992), p.67-70.
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Towards a Common Market in Communications
The wide discrepancies in telephone tariffs for interstate calls contradict the principle of 
harmonisation and integration which is associated with the single market. For instance, a 
telephone call from Athens to Bonn costs more than twice as much as from Bonn to Athens 
(minimum rates always)44. While barriers to trade are being dismantled, barriers to 
communication remain unchanged. As the US long-distance market has demonstrated, 
competition will lead to unified tariffs on a much lower scale which not only stimulates 
demand for telecommunications services but also lowers input costs for many other goods 
and therby directly contributes to the aim of promoting intra-Comunity trade. It also 
supports the Commission’s telecommunications policy. The aim to unify tariffs for intra-EC 
calls has been stated in the EC Guidelines for the harmonisation of tariff principles under 
the Council directive for ONP in June, 1990. Network competition also fosters the market 
for VANS which has been a cornerstone of the Commission’s telecommunications policy. 
Lower network costs spill over into lower prices for bearer services which support the 
development and use of advanced services. Separate network operators allow VANS 
providers to choose their operator; thus, the scope for uncompetitive behavior is reduced. 
Network competition reduces the need to ensure that TOs provide certain interfaces. TOs 
themselves will have the incentive to provide these interfaces in order to avoid losing 
customers to a competitor. Service providers themselves could also build their own network 
incorporating the means of access that they require.45 Furthermore, several VAN services 
can be offered immediately by satellite systems while they are unlikely to be available on 
the narrow-band ISDN for many years. However, national regulators may also find the 
liberalisation of the intra-EC long-distance market acceptable.
Coming back to the four-stage approach mentioned on page at the beginning of chapter 14, 
the previous reasoning has made it dear that already at stage 2 satellite entry would allow 
for some competitive pressure. However, an even stronger impact may be expected when 
TOs directly start competing. By limiting this initially to the intra-Community market, 
support of national regulators may be won. As has been pointed out already, the TO 
monopoly is entrenched in domestic markets. National administrators are more likely to 
support liberalisation measures if their national markets remain untouched. Though 
competition in the intra-Community market may divert some revenues from the TOs, the 
loss will be tolerable given the small market size compared to the national long-distance 
market46. Moreover, the more competitive TOs are likely to gain. So unanimous resistance
44 Compare chapter 12^2 and: BEUC (1988), p33.
49 Compare: Saiuftmch, J. (1991), p.481.
46 To give a rough estimation: The share of international phone «»11« of all long-distance calls (national and 
international) was only 4.45% in 1987 for West Germany. Calculation based on data provided by. 
Bundesministenum fttr Post und Ferameldewesen, (1967), p.57.
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to partial liberalisation should not be expected. In any case, national TOs could be 
appeased by continuing to entrust the national long-distance market to internal tariff 
principles. Thus the "fair trade-off1 between cost orientation and the aim of universal 
service called for by the Commission could be achieved. In this way the problem of national 
sovereignty regarding national tariff schemes could be circumvented The national 
operators would be guaranteed sufficient revenues to allow them to go ahead with 
infrastructural investments. The integrity of a Community-wide network would not be 
challenged.
The liberalisation of a small part of the market for basic services could be interpreted as a 
■peacemeal approachThe development of the intra-Community telephone market could 
be studied by national authorities. After a transitional period member states themselves 
could investigate again whether an extension of competition from the interstate to the 
national market would be worthwhile. In the meantime the national telecommunications 
operator would have gained experience from operating in a competitive market. National 
policy makers are already looking for ways to improve the market performance of their 
national TOs. Although their monopolies are being maintained, these enterprises are being 
restructured. Managements are now expected to run their firms as if they were operating 
under competition. Their participation in a competitive intra-Community market could 
therefore be regarded as a means of supporting these strategies. Experience with 
competition would be offered without forcing regulators to take the all-or-nothing decision 
to liberalise the whole domestic market.
Thus partial liberalisation in the form described above is much more likely to find support 
among national administrations than a full attack on well protected TOs. This could 
enhance the possibility that member states will opt for a common strategy aiming towards 
facility-based competition instead of taking unilateral steps.
A Comparison to the Development in the UK and the US
Certain complications have hampered competition in the US and UK, but are less likely to 
turn up in the intra-Community market. First there is the problem of a dominant firm 
which has to be regulated lest it abuses its market power. The existence of 12 firmly 
entrenched incumbents and high barriers to exit (sunk cost) have transformed the intra- 
Community market into a "natural oligopoly*. A process of concentration is not likely to 
occur. Neither is it likely that one incumbent will start predatory pricing. Offering a service 
below cost only makes sense if in the long-run the market can be monopolized. In that case 
higher prices could make up for the losses incurred before. However, given that each TO 
has the same source of national revenues to sustain a price war and given high exit barriers 
predatory pricing is not a feasible profit-maximising strategy for individual TOs. Therefore 
the participation of national TOs in the competitive framework is beneficial since it is a 
safeguard against monopolisation.
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Thus unlike the position in the US and UK where regulators have to supervise price-setting 
procedures of their dominant firms, in the envisaged European market price regulation 
should not be necessary. Also the regulatory control of access charges may become less 
stringent Whereas in the UK Oftel had to prevent an abuse of power by British Telecom 
when bargaining over access charges with Mercury, in the intra-Community market 
national TOs are on an equal footing. Moreover, the separate satellite system offers an 
alternative network to service providers.
In the US bypass has become a serious problem since common carriers who have to pay for 
interconnection into the local network build separate facilities in order to avoid these 
access charges. Consequently, the RHCs are deprived of revenues necessary to keep up 
their local networks. In the European market there are two safeguards against bypass. The 
first is the power of the TOs which in cooperation with national authorities can easily 
prevent the installation of bypass facilities on their territory. The second safeguard is that 
so far on the European level, there does not exist a regulatory authority. Problems like 
bypass arose in the US mainly due to the overlapping jurisdictions of regulatory authorities 
which have different strategies towards the telecommunications industry (FCC, state 
regulators and antitrust legal interventions). For the Community the jurisdiction of a 
supranational regulatory agency will be easier to define. Therefore bypass can be ruled out 
from the beginning. Moreover, the transaction costs of regulation can be reduced 
considerably.
Institutional and Regulatory Changes
The approach sketched above requires major institutional changes. They refer to Eutelsat 
and the need for a supranational regulatory body.
If facility-based competition based on different technology is aimed at, Eutelsat has to be 
protected against the power exerted by national TOs. In order to let Eutelsat emerge as a 
full-fledged commercial enterprise two strategies may appear feasible. First, one may argue 
that there are certain economies of scope between running a terrestrial and a satellite 
network. In order to reap these synergetic effects one might suppose it to be beneficial to 
let TOs participate in the separate satellite network. Hence national TOs would keep their 
stake in Eutelsat. Similar considerations, for instance, were put forward by the Commission 
to allow TOs to enter the non-reserved service market. In the case of the Eutelsat network 
private service providers have to be offered the same rights and obligations as are presently 
applied to TOs. Thus they equally receive a certain quota which determines their use of 
capacity and their investment commitment. As a result they would obtain voting power 
according to their quota, hence being able to influence the commercial policy of Eutelsat. 
This, however, in practise would leave probably a dominant position to national TOs. Given 
their status as incumbents, combined they are likely to keep the major share in Eutelsat. 
There is likely to evolve a common interest among TOs not to let the satellite network 
become a serious threat to their terrestrial networks even if they participate to some extent
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in the Eutelsat profits. Given this common interest, as a group the TOs finally are likely to 
dominate Eutelsat even if private service providers are admitted to join. Then the full 
development of the satellite system could be put on the brink.
The second approach is more radical in that it separates the Eutelsat network completely 
from the TOs. As a result Eutelsat would emerge as a completely independent enterprise 
which carries out investment and capacity distribution on its own behalf. In this case all 
special rights of signatories have to be withdrawn while Eutelsat is transformed into a 
private enterprise. The revenues stemming from the sale of Eutelsat shares could be used 
to compensate TOs for the investments already carried out. The latter would be prohibited 
from acquiring Eutelsat shares. Eutelsat then could either sell its capacity to other service 
providers (including the TOs) or instead it could provide services itself.
Only the second approach appears feasible for facility-based competition based on 
technologically different networks. Only by separating TOs from the space operator they 
could be kept from subordinating the space network under the priority given to their own 
terrestrial one. ~
Potential economies of scope from operating a terrestrial and a satellite network, however, 
should not to be given up. Since some TOs have already established their own national 
satellite systems they could compete with Eutelsat in the provision of satellite services. This 
would mean, however, to jump directly to step 3) which raises the need for an independent 
European regulatory agency which distributes scarce frequency bands.
However, a supranational regulatory authority also becomes necessary in order to 
supervise the terrestrial international market and to regulate entry. A "European 
Telecommunications Commission" (ETC) should be established, vested with powers similar 
to those of the FCC. In particular it should be empowered to
- ensure the compatibility of newly installed lines with the integrated ISDN system;
- license new network operators;
- investigate and decide on access charges levied on intra-Community operators;
- specify rules for and supervise the leasing of lines;
- prevent collusive behaviour of TOs;
- distribute scarce frequency bands for satellite and mobile operators.
The lack of an appropriate regulatory body to enforce Community-wide legislation remains 
a big obstacle to liberalisation. Already it is needed to spur the implementation of existing 
directives. The need for international regulation is rising fast. For example, interconnection 
charges between competing service providers have to be arbitrated among countries like 
GB and France. Once competition emerges, there will be the need for continual regulatory 
oversight.
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On the one hand there should be a liberalising of the telecommunications networks, while 
on the other one should set up a universal service fund. This fund should operate according 
to the principle o f subsidiarity. First, one may observe the level of access already provided by 
the market on its own. The fund may then target those customers who are likely to cut-off. 
By doing so, distortions in the service market would be minimised and the efficiency of the 
universal service policy itself could be increased.
On a smaller scale the Commission could already spur competition in the international 
market without waiting for member states to move first. As a defensive measure firms like 
IDT should be protected from TOs efforts to declare private routing as illegal. The 
Commission could use Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome against horizontal agreements 
among TOs when trying to prevent routing. The liberalisation of telecommunications 
routing supports the Commission’s goal of harmonising intra-Community telephone tariffs. 
As a further step in order to introduce network competition, the Commission may propose 
a directive which asks member states to license private network operators. As was pointed 
out in chapter 7, the Commission can take a decision on the basic service monopoly. By the 
time the Commission decided to leave the provision of the network under exclusive rights, 
alternative means of transmission just started to emerge. Those means have become more 
developed and a revision of the former decision may be at stake. In the service directive, 
the provision of the network was not deemed to be a reserved activity. Thus until now, 
there is no specific regulation concerned with network competition, leaving the latter 
subject to Article 90 of the Treaty of Rome.
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Summary
The supply of telecommunications networks is characterised by economies of scale and 
scope, high sunk costs and rapid technological progress. On the demand side, customer’s 
needs are quickly changing due to demand diversification. While the former elements 
support monopoly provision, the latter two factors render a decentralised market solution 
more efficient. It was argued that the evaluation of this fundamental trade-off between 
static and dynamic efficiency gains is crucial for the priority given either to public 
monopoly or network competition in Europe. However, scrutinising the record of 
European TOs, I found that the extent of "state failure" in telecommunications is rather 
high. For political reasons, the TO’s pricing policy directly contradicts optimal pricing rules. 
Since my empirical estimates indicated that the price-elasticity of demand is increasing 
over time, the efficiency losses caused by internal cross-subsididsation are rising. Nework 
competition would abolish this pricing scheme.
For two other reasons it was argued that over time the trade-off is biased in favour of 
competition. Technological progress has led to a variety of different networks which can be 
run separately. As long as there was only a cable network available and communication was 
confined to plain voice telephony, the planning of the network infrastructure was 
dominated by static considerations. The emergence of various substitute means of 
transmission and the diversification of customer’s needs have fundamentally changed the 
telecommunications environment. A new operator does not have to duplicate the 
incumbent's network. The entrant is likely to choose an architecture which places him in 
the best unit-cost position vis-à-vis the established operator. Hence, technical and 
qualitative efficiency goals become more important than mere allocative efficiency. The 
former, however, are better served in a competitive environment. Secondly, technological 
development leads to the integration of previously separated markets. In the case of 
satellite technology, the cable-based geographic fragmentation of different national 
markets is overcome. As a result, the already installed national incumbents may start 
competing against each other. The integration of TV and telecommunications signals in the 
broadband network leads moreover to product market integration. Cable firms may enter 
the provision of telecomunications services. Both effects render the natural monopoly 
concept out of date. In the case of the intra-EC market it is more reasonable to speak of a 
natural oligopoly; competition may become sufficiently strong in this market.
Finally, while having a competitive impact, an independent satellite operator also supports 
the universal service goal by being able to offer complete coverage of the territory. Thus, 
technological progress has alleviated the conflict of interests of different customer groups.
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On the other hand, the shortcomings of a "mixed regime" were pointed out. Regulation 
distorts the technical choices made by the incumbent. The possibility exists that incumbents 
use technology as a strategic weapon against potential competitors. In this respect the 
ISDN network is not just an upgrade of the coaxial cable network but it has also strong 
implications for the future scope of network competition. Moreover, a public policy 
approach introducing ISDN leads to a redistribution of benefits from telecommunications 
networks which may make residential users worse-off.
Announcing network competition for a future period may generate an investment race 
amongst incumbents which is detrimental The rat-race model showed that while the TO’s 
jargon refers to "getting fit for competition”, the race is likely to lead to over-investment 
which binds too many scarce resources. It leads to an evaporation of monopolist profits 
which, however, are not redistributed to consumers. While entry may be barred, society as a 
whole is worse-off even when compared to monopoly provision.
The last section contains a concrete proposal for the introduction of network competition 
in the EC. It was argued that special attention should be given to increasing the intensity of 
competition by fostering particularly innovative entry. Competition between already 
established TOs in the intra-EC long-distance market would not generate a loss in 
economies of scope. However, it would eliminate the worst price distortions which 
presently exist in the ECs telecommunications market. The Commission's service-based 
approach towards competition would be fostered by offering VANs providers the choice of 
different carriers. The TO’s scope for anticompetitive behaviour in the service markets 
would decrease.
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Chapter 43.12.
The Monopolist Outcome
*imi = [pix111) - (c-i) ] x111 - 1.5/b i2 - F
Maximising (4.2) with respect to x171 leads to
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Using xm and maximising (4.2) with respect to i
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Given the value for i one obtains the monopolist’s output
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Both values of (43) then can be inserted into (4.2) to derive (4.4)
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The Cournot Outcome
Inserting (4.8) into (4.5) gives the condensed profit function of the incumbent:
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Maximisation with respect to i leads to (4.9).
Inserting (4.9) into (4.8) provides for the quantities which both firms produce in period 2. 
Then one can write for the incumbent’s profit:
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Inserting (4.9) leads to
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Natural Monopoly
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Using (4.3) one can determine the consumer surplus in case of monopoly provision and 
investment:
The consumer surplus in case of entry and investment:
Using (4.4) and (4.10) one can calculate (4.11), which leads to (4.12).
Entry Deterrence
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Maximisation leads to:
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Using these quantities one can determine the entrant’s profit. This has to be equal or 
smaller than zero:
The condition ired < 0 is fulfilled for (4.13).
The incumbent will invest as much, i f  »jmid > Wj®.
In order to determine irjmid one has to determine the monopolist’s output at the 
investment level i^ .
x* Sc i+
2 2b
Inserting (4.13) leads to
x®
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2
which leads to
This has to exceed the value for as established for (4.10). This is the case for fixed cost 
in between the limits of (4.14).
Regulation versus Competition
W j * * -  +  Bm i  < ( 4 . 1 6 )
Using the value for the monopolist's output given that he has invested as calculated 
above one finds for Bi*"*1
B mid _ jjlB _ b Sc2 - 3 Sc jTjb + 9/4 F
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Using (4.4) and the values calculated above for jti11“, Bmi, jtj™41 one eventually finds the 
condition (4.17) for (4.16).
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The incumbent’s profit in the case of Cournot is
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The entrant's reaction function is 
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Using Xe as established above, the incumbent's reaction function with respect to i is
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The entrant’s output instead decreases with rising i
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Limiting Entry
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The Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
Case 1
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This can be determined using (4.56), (4.62) and:
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which is the incumbent’s profit in case of entry and the investment ^ = (4/19) bSc.
Inserting wiam and iridc one obtains for F(id)
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Similar to case 1) one can determine f ^ )  = F(id).
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Using we and w f as determined above one can determine both firms’ output depending on 
the investment i
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Inserting Xj and xc into w f one finds
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The expected investment from rat-race competition is
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Using F(i) as established above for F(id) and the values obtained for ic and i* one can 
determine (4.88).
For the incumbent’s expected profit one can write
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E(W) = 2  E (irj) + E(jre ) + Bc + Bm
E(W) * 2 (0.16 bSc2) + 0.035 bSc2 + 0.33 bSc2 + 0.195 bSc2 = 0.88 b Sc2
For the expected total social welfare
(4.58)
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Chapter 13
Diagnostic tests
In the following I report the results of the diagnostic tests which I undertook for the 
empirical estimations of demand elasticities.
Unfortunately I could not carry out all tests provided by PC-Give since the sample of 
twenty years was too low to generate sufficient degrees of freedom.
Tests
For the residual correlogram the "Residual Coiretogram Sum of Squares” (9) is reported. 
If ’s' is the length of the correlogram then in case of 0 > 2s this would be an indication of 
mis-specification.
The OLS test for residual autoregression reports the lag coefficients and the standard 
error. If the coefficient of the lag plus or minus twice the standard error include zero than 
the hypothesis that 6 = 0 is not rejected (thus the hypothesis is not rejected that the lag 
does not explain the dependent variable).
Furthermore an F-test is carried out for residual autoregression. If the prob value of the F-
statistic is above 0.05 then the hypothesis that the lags do not explain the dependent
variable is not rejected.
The Hq hypothesis of the test for autocorrelated errors is that there is no autocorrelation 
(errors are white noise). Again, if the prob value of the F-statistic is above 0.05, then the 
Hq cannot be rejected.
#
The LM-test for autocorrelated squared residuals (Arch: Auto Regressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity) tests the hypothesis that 6 = 0, in the model:
E (ut2 /  u t - 1# . . .  u t _r ) = c Q + 2 ¿ j u t - 12
Thus for 6 = 0  there is no heteroscedasticity.
I have carried out the Arch-test as well, though one normally does not expect 
heteroscedasticity to be a problem in time series models.
The Jarque and Bera test statistic for normality is Ch2 distributed with 2 degrees of 
freedom and tests the Hq of normality. For a -  0.05 and 2 degrees of freedom the critical 
value is Ch c = 5.99. If the actual value is below Ch c, then the Hq cannot be rejected.
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The Reset-test for omitted values adds auxiliary variables and tests for their significance. 
The Ho is that 5 = 0, thus that the added variables are not significant. If the prob-value of 
the F-test is above 0.05 then the Hq cannot be rejected.
Diagnostic tests for Germany 
Equation (1): local service
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 9.377 < 2s = 12 
Residual Autoregression F(3,8) = 0.22 (0.8786)
Autocorrelated Errors F(2,12) = 1.29 (0.3096)
The test results do not indicate autocorrelation.
b) heteroscedasticity
Arch-test: F(2,10) = 1.18(03481)
The Ho that 6 = 0  cannot be rejected.
c) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 1.223 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
d) misspecification
Reset-test: F(l, 13) = 0.028(0.8703)
The Reset test does not indicate missing variables.
For the subsamples I could not carry out all tests.
Equation (la)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 2.625 < 2s = 8
The Durbin Watson and the RCSS do not indicate autocorrelation.
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b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 0.233 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset F(l,6) * 22.847(0.0031)
The prob value of the Reset test is below 0.005. This indicates that equation (la) is 
misspecified.
Equation (lb)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 5,260 < 2s = 8
The Durbin Watson and the RCSS do not indicate autocorrelation.
b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 0.520 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset F( 1,6) -  3.451(0.1126)
The prob value of the Reset test does not indicate misspecification of equation (lb). 
Equation (2) long distance service
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 8.669 < 2s * 12 
Residual Autoregression F(3,8) = 0.05 (0.9833)
Autocorrelated Errors F(2,12) = 0.19(0.8277)
The test results do not indicate autocorrelation.
b) heteroscedastkity
Arch-test: F(2,10) = 1.17(0.3562)
The Ho that 5 = 0  cannot be rejected.
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c) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 0.731 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
d) missspedflcation
Reset-test: F( 1,13) = 0.958(03456)
The Reset test does not indicate missing variables.
For the subsamples 1 could not carry out all tests.
Equation (2a)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 5.275 < 2s = 8
The Durbin Watson and the RCSS do not indicate autocorrelation.
b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 0.056 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset F( 1,6) = 0.231 (0.6512)
The prob value of the Reset test does not indicate misspecification.
Equation (2b)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 8.725 < 2s = 8
Despite the high Durbin Watson value, the RCSS do not indicate autocorrelation.
b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 0.264
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The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspedfkatlon
Reset F (U ) -  0.004(0.9551)
The prob value of the Reset test does not indicate misspecification of equation (2b). 
Equation (3): calls from Germany to France
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 3.820 < 2s * 12 
Residual Autoregression F(3,7) = 0.14 (0.9339)
Autocorrelated Errors F(2,11) = 0.38(0.6940)
The test results do not indicate autocorrelation.
b) heteroscedasticity
Arch-test: F(2,9) = 0.47(0.6370)
The Ho that 5 = 0 cannot be rejected.
c) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 0.803 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
d) missspecificatiou
Reset-test: F(l,12) = 11.607(0.0052)
The Reset test indicates misspecification. When the three substitute service variables were 
excluded the result of the Reset test improved considerably (see equation (3a).
Equation (3a)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 9.269 < 2s -  12 
Residual Autoregression F(3,10) * 0.80 (0.5239)
Autocorrelated Errors F(2,14) = 1.72 (0.2153)
The test results do not indicate autocorrelation.
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b) heterascedasticity
Arch-test: F(2,12) = 0.04(0.9596)
The Ho that 6 = 0 cannot be rejected.
c) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 1.261 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
d) missspeciflcation
Reset-test: F(l,15) = 1.975(0.1803)
The Reset test does not indicate missing variables.
For the subsamples I could not carry out all tests.
Equation (3b)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 3.853 < 2s = 8
The Durbin Watson and the RCSS do not indicate autocorrelation.
b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 0.542 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset F( 1,7) = 0.005 (0.9460)
The prob value of the Reset test does not indicate misspecification. 
Equation (3c)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 2.095 < 2s = 8
The Durbin Watson and the RCSS do not indicate autocorrelation.
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b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 0.469 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset F( 1,7) = 4.553(0.0703)
The prob value of the Reset test does not indicate misspecification of equation (3c).
Equation (4): calls from West Germany to Great Britain
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 12368 < 2s = 12 
Residual Autoregression F(3,7) * 0.14(0.9321)
Autocorrelated Errors F(2,11) = 0.45(0.6472)
The test results are not unabiguous. The DW and the RCSS may hint to positive 
autocorrelation. The other two tests do not.
b) heteroscedasticity
Arch-test: F(2,9) = 0.7 (0.5213)
The Ho that 6*0 cannot be rejected.
c) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 0.499 ,
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
d) missspecfflcation
Reset-test: F( 1,10) = 10.714(0.0067)
The Reset test indicates misspecification.
Equation (4a):
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 9.261 < 2s * 12 
Residual Autoregression F(3,10) * 0.40(0.7548)
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Autocorrelated Errors F(2,14) = 0.36(0.7042)
The test results do not indicate autocorrelation.
b) heteroscedastkity
Arch-test: F(2,12) * 0.05(0.8423)
The Ho that 6 = 0 cannot be rejected.
c) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 0.963 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
d) missspecificatiofi
Reset-test: F(l,15) = 7.003(0.0183)
Again the Reset test indicates misspecification.
For the subsamples I could not carry out all tests.
Equation (4b)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 4.018 < 2s = 8
The Durbin Watson and the RCSS do not indicate autocorrelation.
b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 1.023 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset F(l,7) -  0.526 (0.4918)
For the subsample the Reset test does not indicate misspecification.
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a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 3.481 < 2s = 8
The Durbin Watson and the RCSS do not indicate autocorrelation.
b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) * 1.745 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset F(l,7) « 0.210 (0c6607)
The prob value of the Reset test does not indicate misspecification of equation (4c). 
Equation (5): calls from West Germany to Italy
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 7.454 < 2s = 8 
Residual Autoregression F(3,7) = 131(0.3460)
Autocorrelated Errors F(2,12) = 3.86 (0.0537)
The test results and the Durbin Watson value do not indicate autocorrelation.
b) heteroscedasticity
Arch-test: F(2,9) = 033(0.7295)
The Ho that 5 = 0 cannot be rejected.
c) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 4.928 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
d) missspecification
Reset-test: F( 1,12) = 0.118(0.7372)
Equation (4c)
The Reset test does not indicate missing variables.
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Equation (5a):
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 6.414 < 2s * 12 
Residual Autoregression F(3,10) = 0.42(0.7419)
Autocorrelated Errors F(2,12) * 0.98(0.3995)
The test results do not indicate autocorrelation.
b) heteroscedastidty
Arch-test: F(2,12) = 0.15(0.8644)
The Ho that 6 = 0 cannot be rejected.
c) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 0.590 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
d) missspecification
Reset-test: F(l,15) = 1.679 (0.2147)
The Reset test does not indicate missing variables.
For the subsamples I could not carry out all tests.
Equation (5b)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 14.383 > 2s = 8
While the Durbin Watson value does not, the RCSS indicates autocorrelation.
b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 0.745 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
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Equation (5c)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 6.359 < 2s * 8
The Durbin Watson and the RCSS do not indicate autocorrelation.
b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) * 0.268 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset F( 1,7) = 0.173(0.6899)
The prob value of the Reset test does not indicate misspecification of equation (5c).
Equation (6): calls form West Germany to the USA
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 6.80 < 2s = 12 
Residual Autoregression F(3,7) * 0.65 (0.6094)
Autocorrelated Errors F(2,ll) = 1.82 (0.2083)
The test results do not indicate autocorrelation.
b) heteroscedasticity
Arch-test: F(2,9) = 1.62(0.2511)
The Ho that 6 = 0 cannot be rejected.
c) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 0.283r
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset F(l,7) -  0.244 (0.6366)
The prob value of the Reset test does not indicate misspecification.
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The Reset test does not indicate missing variables.
Equation (6a)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 6.468 < 2s -  12 
Residual Autoregression F(3,10) = 0.84(0.5009)
Autocorrelated Errors F(2,14) = 2.23 (0.1445)
The test results do not indicate autocorrelation.
b) heteroscedasticity
Arch-test: F(2,12) = 1.20(0.3338)
The Ho that 6 = 0  cannot be rejected.
c) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 4.055 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
d) missspecificatioa
Reset-test: F( 1,15) = 7.489(0.0153)
The Reset test indicates missing variables.
For the subsamples I could not carry out all tests.
Equation (6b)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 2.834 < 2s = 8
d) missspecification
Reset-test: F(l,12) = 1.342(0.2692)
The Durbin Watson and the RCSS do not indicate autocorrelation.
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b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 0387 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspeciflcation
Reset F(l,7) « 0.730(0.4211)
The prob value of the Reset test does not indicate misspeciflcation. 
Equation (6c)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 2.093 < 2s ■ 8
The Durbin Watson and the RCSS do not indicate autocorrelation.
b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 0.415 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspeciflcation
Reset F(l,7) = 7.179(0.0316)
The prob value of the Reset test indicates missing variables.
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Italy
The "disinc" variable has been lagged since tests results indicated that the lag is significant. 
Moreover, without the lag the "Residual Correlogram Sum o f Squares" value was very high. 
Test results generally improved with the lag for disinc.
Equation (7)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 4.484 < 2s = 12 
Residual Autoregression: F(3,8) = 0.14(0.9329)
Autocorrelated Errors: F(2,12) = 0.29 (0.7544)
There is no indication of autocorrelation (neither from the Durbin Watson value).
b) beteroscedasticity
Arch-test: F(2,10) = 0.12(0.8868)
The Ho that 6=0 cannot be rejected.
c) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 0.784 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset-test: F( 1,13) = 0.984(0.3394)
The added variables are not significant.
Table 13.7
Equation (7a)
For the subperiods the number of observations is to small to carry out most of the tests,
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 4.969 < 2s = 8
Neither the Durbin Watson nor the RSSS indicate autocorrelation.
381
b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) * 0.602 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecifkation
Reset test: F (U ) = 8.053(0.0363)
The Prob-value is below 0.05. Thus the Ho that added variables are significant cannot be 
rejected
Equation (7b)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 3.568 < 2s = 8 
Neither the Durbin Watson nor the RSSS indicate autocorrelation.
b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) * 7.416 
The Ho of normality is rejected.
c) misspecifkation
Reset test: F(l,6) = 0.123(0.7374)
*
The Ho that added variables are significant is rejected.
Equation (7c)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 6.352 < 2s = 8
While the Durbin Watson is in the range where it is not determinated, the RSSS does not 
indicate autocorrelation.
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b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 2.962 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset test: F(l,7) « 0.253(0.6303)
The Ho that added variables are significant is rejected.
Table 13.8 
Equation (8)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 7.541 < 2s = 12 
Residual Autoregression: F(3,8) ■ 0.11 (0.9521)
Autocorrelated Errors: F(2,12) = 0.57 (0.5785)
The test results indicate that the low Durbin Watson value is not caused by autocorrelation.
b) heteroscedasticity
Arch-test: F(2,10) = 0.11(0.8957)
The Ho that 6=0 cannot be rejected.
b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 0.779 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset-test: F(l,13) = 8.158(0.0135)
The low Durbin Watson as well as the low Prob-value of the Reset test indicate that 
variables are missing.
383
equation (8a)
For the smaller period 1976-1989 again most of the tests could not be carried out.
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 8.278 < 2s = 12 
Neither the Durbin Watson nor the RSSS indicate autocorrelation.
b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) * 3.226 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecificatkm
Reset test: F( 1,7) * 0.000(0.9996)
The high prob value especially when compared to the results for (27) indicates that the 
telex variable had to be included in the model All further variables which were added were 
not significant.
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Spain
Table 13.9 
Equation (9)
The "disinc" variable has been lagged since the lag had a higher t-value. I could not find 
indication of misspecification or autocorrelation. However, due to the small sample size the 
test for autocorrelated errors and the Arch-test could not be carried out.
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 2.424 < 2s = 8
There is no indication of autocorrelation (neither from the Durbin Watson value).
b) normality
test for normality:Ch2(2) = 0.623 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset-test: F(1.7) = 0.001(0.9789)
There is no indication of missing variables.
equation (9a)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 9.123 < 2s = 12 
Residual autoregression: F (3,8) = 0.54 (0.6680)
Test for autocorrelated errors: F(2,12) = 0.55 (0.5978)
Though the Durbin Watson value is low the tests do not indicate problems with 
autocorrelation.
b) heteroscedastidty
Arch-test: F(2,10) = 0.31(0.7421)
There is no indication of heteroscedastidty.
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The result does not indicate that variables are missing.
For the subsamples I could not carry out the diagnostic tests. They therefore can only be 
taken as a rough estimation of the variables’ coefficients.
Table 13.10
Equation (10)
For equation (15) and (16) I could not carry out further tests for autocorrelation, 
misspecification and heteroscedasticity.
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 10.364 > 2s = 10
The RASS is slightly above the critical value. Thus it might indicate that there 
isautocorrelation.
b) normality
test for normality:Ch2(2) * 0.770 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset-test: F( 1.4) = 0.473(0.5296)
4
There is no indication of missing variables.
Equation (10a)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 10.976 > 2s * 8
The RASS is above the critical value. Thus it might indicate that there is autocorrelation.
b) normality
test for normality:Ch2(2) * 0.610 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset F-test: F(l,13) = 0.366 (0.5555)
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There is no indication of missing variables.
Table 13.11 
Equation (11)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 10.290 > 2s = 8
The RASS is above the critical value. Thus it might indicate that there is autocorrelation.
b) normality
test for normality:Ch2(2) = 0.427 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset-test: F( 1,4) = 31.65(0.0049)
The Reset test indicates the missing of variables
Equation (11a)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 5.175 < 2s = 8 
The RASS does not indicate autocorrelation.
b) normality
test for normality:Ch2(2) = 0.416 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset-test: F(l,4) = 26.801 (0.0066)
c) misspecification
Reset-test: F( 1,6) * 0.727(0.4267)
The Reset test indicates missing variables.
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Equation (lib )
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 8.077 > 2s -  8
The RASS is just at the limit of the critical value. The Durbin Watson value also is in the 
undetermined interval
b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 1.157 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecificatlon
Reset-test: F(l,4) * 20390 (0.0107)
The Reset test indicates missing variables.
Table 13.12
Equation (12)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 8.870 > 2s = 8
The RASS is just above the critical value. The Durbin Watson, however, does not indicate 
autocorrelation.
b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) * 0.537 *
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspedfication
Reset-test: F( 1,4) = 6.483(0.0636)
Though the prob value is low, it is above the critical value.
Equation (12a)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 11.402 > 2s = 8
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The RASS is above the critical value. Thus it might indicate that there is autocorrelation. 
However, the Durbin Watson value does not.
b) normality
test for normality:Ch2(2) * 0.810 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset-test: F(1,4) = 12.27(0.0267)
The Reset test indicates missing variables.
Equation (12b)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 15.098 > 2s = 10
The RASS is above the critical value. Thus it might indicate that there is autocorrelation. 
However, the Durbin Watson value does not.
b) normality
test for normality:Ch2(2) = 0.430 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset-test: F( 1,6) = 9.744(0.0355)
The Reset test indicates missing variables.
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Great Britain
Table 13.13 
Equation (13)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 7.533 < 2s = 12 
Autocorrelated Errors: F( 1,10) = 0.01(0.9157)
There is no indication of autocorrelation (neither from the Durbin Watson value).
b) heteroscedasticity
Arch-test: F(2,7) » 0.19(0.8292)
The Ho that 6 -  0 cannot be rejected.
c) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) « 0.862 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset-test: F( 1,10) = 2349(0.1563)
The added variables are not significant.
#
Equation (13a)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 4.931 < 2s = 8 
The RCSS does not indicate autocorrelation, 
b normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 0.772 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
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The Prob-value is below 0.05. Thus the Ho that added variables are significant cannot be 
rejected.
d) misspecification
Reset test: F(1,8) = 8.768(0.0181)
Table 13.14 
Equation (14)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 5.051 < 2s = 8 
Neither the Durbin Watson nor the RSSS indicate autocorrelation.
b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 1.757 
The Ho of normality is rejected.
c) misspecifkation
Reset test: F(1,6) = 0.048(0.8346)
The Ho that added variables are significant is rejected.
Equation (14a)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 12.70 > 2s = 12 
Autocorrelated Errors: F(l,10) = 0.06 (0.8086)
The Durbin Watson value and the test for autocorrelated errors do not indicate 
autocorrelation. However, the RCSS is above the critical value.
b) heteroscedastkity
Arch-test: F(2,7) = 0.15(0.8602)
The Ho that 6=0 cannot be rejected.
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c) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 1.276 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
d) misspecification
Reset test: F( 1,10) = 3.156(0.1060)
The Ho that added variables are significant is rejected.
Equation (13b)
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 5.453 < 2s = 12 
Autocorrelated Errors: F( 1,9) = 0.72(0.4168)
Neither the test results nor the Durbin Watson value indicate autocorrelation.
b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 1.810 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspecification
Reset-test: F(l,9) = 0.471 (0.5097)
The Ho that added variables are significant is rejected.
Equation (13c)
For the smaller period 1977-1988 again most of the tests could not be carried out.
a) autocorrelation
Residual Correlogram Sum of Squares: 5.056 < 2s * 10 
Neither the Durbin Watson nor the RSSS indicate autocorrelation.
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b) normality
test for normality: Ch2(2) = 0.425 
The Ho of normality is not rejected.
c) misspeciflcation
Reset test: F(l,7) = 4.853(0.0698)
The Ho that added variables are significant is rejected.
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